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USE OF NAVAL FORCE IN CRISES:
A THEORY OF STRATIFIED CRISIS INTERACTION
Joseph Frederick Bouchard, Ph.D.
Stanford University, 1988
Previous studies of international crises have implicit-
ly viewed all of the political and military interactions
between the two sides as a single interaction sequence.
This fails to capture the complexity of crisis interaction
and crisis stability. The theory of stratified interaction
developed in this dissertation states that crisis
interaction occurs at three levels: political, strategic,
and tactical. Interactions at each level evolve separately
and can independently influence whether or not a crisis
escalates to war.
The objective is to develop a differentiated theory of
crisis interaction cast in the form of contingent generaliza-
tions that offer discriminating explanations for the
occurrence of crisis stability problems. The method of
structured, focused comparison is used to conduct empirical
research on two sets of historical cases. The first set
consists of four case studies of United States naval
operations in crises: the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and
iv

the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The second set consists of four
case studies of peacetime attacks on United States Navy
ships: the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967 Israeli
attack on the USS Liberty , the 1968 North Korean seizure of
the USS Pueblo , and the 1987 Iraqi attack on the USS Stark .
Structured comparison of these cases reveals that the
stratified interaction model provides an accurate descrip-
tion of international crises. Tactical-level interactions
normally are not under the direct direct control of national
leaders, and under certain conditions can become decoupled
from the political-military objectives and strategy of
national leaders. Five patterns of tactical-level interac-
tions are identified: parallel stratified interactions,
momentary decoupling, decoupling followed by disengagement,
decoupling followed by tac*"ical-level escalation, and
decoupling causing escalation at the strategic or political
levels. The factors that can cause decoupling of tactical-
level interactions and the factors that determine whether or
not decoupled interactions escalate uncontrollably to war
are identified. Additionally, three political-military
tensions that can arise in crises are identified: tension
between the needs of diplomatic bargaining and the needs of
military operations, tension between the need for top-level
control of military operations and the need for tactical-
level flexibility and initiative, and tension between crisis
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Studies of international crises have repeatedly
concluded that the success of crisis management efforts is
critically dependent upon top-level political authorities
maintaining close control of the actions of their military
forces. This essential crisis management requirement has
been identified as a potentially serious problem area.
Several concerns have been raised: Preplanned
military operations and contingency plans may not be
appropriate for the unique circumstances of a particular
crisis, and may not support the political-diplomatic
strategy adopted by national leaders to resolve a crisis.
Delegated command of military operations could allow
unintended military incidents to occur, which the adversary
could misperceive as a deliberate escalation of the crisis
or signal of hostile intent. Military alerts ordered to
deter the adversary and increase the readiness of the armed
forces could set in motion a chain of events exceeding the
control of national leaders. Such problems are sources of
concern because they could cause national leaders to lose
1

control of events in a crisis, starting an escalatory spiral
leading to war.
On the other hand, some scholars believe that while
inadvertent military actions can contribute to crisis
management problems and the occurrence of inadvertent war,
attention should be focused on the political and psycho-
logical pressures on top-level decisionmakers. Thomas C.
Schelling, in a passage particularly relevant to this study,
has expressed such a view:
This is why there is a genuine risk of major war
not from "accidents" in the military machine but
through a diplomatic process of commitment that is
itself unpredictable. The unpredictability is not due
solely to what a destroyer commander might do at
midnight when he comes across a Soviet (or American)
freighter at sea, but to the psychological process by
which particular things become identified with courage
or appeasement or how particular things-get included
in or left out of a diplomatic package.
Thus* there is disagreement among students of crisis and war
over the effects of inadvertent military incidents on crisis
*
For examples of such concerns, see Alexander L.
George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of
Coercive Diplomacy (N*w York: Little, Brown and Co., 1971),
p. 14; John Steinbruner, "An Assessment of Nuclear Crises,"
in Franklin Griffiths and John C. Polanyi, eds., The Dangers
of Nuclear War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980),
p. 40; Phil Williams, Crisis Management (Hew York: John
Wiley, 1976), p. 202; Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and
War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981),
p. 287; Alexander L. Gsorge, "Crisis Management: The
Interaction of Political and Military Considerations,"
Survival 26 (September/October 1984), pp. 227-228; Scott D.
Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," International
Security 9 (Spring 1985): 99-239.
2Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 93.

3stability. Inadvertent military incidents are viewed as
dangerous in and of themselves because they can directly
trigger escalation, or, alternatively, are viewed as
dangerous because of the manner in which they can influence
the perceptions held by national leaders. This issue is of
practical relevance in crisis decisionmaking, as well as
being of theoretical interest in the study of international
crises.
The focus of this study is on the problems that can
arise when using military force as a political instrument in
crises. In an international crisis, military forces
commonly perform two missions: political signalling in
support of crisis bargaining, and preparing for localized
fighting and war should crisis management efforts fail.
Inadvertent escalation—any increase in the level or scope
of violence in a crisis that was not directly ordered by
national leaders or anticipated by them as being the likely
result of their orders—is a significant danger ia these
circumstances. A distinction can be drawn between the
general political requirements of crisis management, such as
limiting political objectives and military means, and the
operational requirements of crisis management, such as
maintaining control of military operations. The focus of
this study is on the operational requirements of crisis
This distinction pointed out to the author by
Alexander L. George.

management. The use of United States naval forces in four
crises that occurred since the end of World War II will be
examined to develop contingent generalizations on crisis
military interaction.
In the introduction to his study of international
crises* Richard N. Lebow discusses the distinction long made
between the underlying causes of war, the long-term sources
of hostility and tension, and the immediate causes of war,
the particular events, such as a crisis, sparking a war.
Lebow argues that, while students of international relations
since Thucydides have focused on underlying causes,
immediate causes are at least as important as underlying
causes, in that immediate causes can determine whether or
5
not war erupts from the underlying hostility and tension.
This study starts from the premise that Lebow is correct,
that immediate causes are important for understanding how
and why wars occur.
The causes of war can be viewed as falling on a time-
span spectrum, with long-term underlying causes working
their effects over years, decades or even centuries toward
the left end, and immediate causes occurring over days or
weeks toward the right end. The underlying causes toward
4Scott Sagan refers to this as the operational
dimension of crisis management. See Sagan, "Managing





5the left end of the spectrum Include the structure of the
international system, history, culture, economic development
and resources, ideology, geography, and military technol-
ogy. System structure has a strong influence on how "war-
prone** international politics are at a given time.
Historical, cultural, economic, and ideological variables
help to shape the political framework within which rivalries
arise between particular nations and contribute to the
intensity of the hostility and tensions between them.
Geographic factors, and the state of military technology
shape the strategic relationships between nations and
contribute to the level of tensions between them.
This study will be addressing causes of war at the far
right end of that spectrum- -events occurring over hours, or
even just minutes at the speed of modern warfare. There is
no intent to slight the importance of underlying causes or
longer-term immediate causes, which arrange the political
and strategic circumstances for war to occur. Rather, the
intent is to supplement those causes with greater under-
standing of how military interactions in a crisis could
inadvertently trigger war.
One of the fundamental problems in international
relations is to identify the necessary and sufficient
conditions for war to occur. This study makes two
assumptions on the necessary and sufficient conditions for
war. The first is that an international environment marked

6by confrontation over national interests, hostility, and
tension—all arising from the underlying causes of war—are
a necessary condition for war to arise from a crisis. The
implication of this assumption is that inadvertent military
incidents will not spark escalation leading to war in the
absence of confrontation, hostility and tensions. This
study thus focuses on inadvertent escalation arising under
conditions of acute international crises, when the necessary
condition for war are prssent.
The second assumption is that the underlying causes of
war are not sufficient conditions for war. War can be
avoided even under conditions of confrontation, hostility,
and tension so long as national leaders on each side are
willing to continue bargaining with the other side, are
willing to sacrifice certain interests in order to protect
or advance others, and perceive that the other side intends
to continue bargaining rather than resort to war. This
suggests that a number of factors can provide conditions
sufficient for war once the necessary conditions are
present. Examples include a belief that vital national
interests cannot be protected through bargaining, an
unwillingness to concede some interests to protect others
(perhaps because the price would be too high or domestic
political repercussions too severe) , a misperception that
the other side will not bargain seriously or intends to
resort to war at an opportune moment, and loss of control

7over military operations. These factors can give rise to
either deliberate decisions to go to war or to inadvertent
war. The immediate causes of war can thus provide
sufficient conditions for war if the necessary conditions
are present. The focus of this study is on a specific
subset of the immediate causes of war: those arising from
interaction of the military forces of the two sides and
resulting in inadvertent escalation to war.
The remainder of this introduction will present a
brief critique of the literature on crises and crisis
management, an overview of the theory being proposed, the
research design, the historical cases and case selection
criteria, and a summary of the organization of the study.
Critique of Crisis Theories
The existing literature on crises and crisis manage-
ment has three serious weaknesses. First, the various
political and military interactions that occur between the
two sides in a crisis are assessed in the context of an
implicit single interaction sequence model of crises.
Second, the frequently observed phenomenon of United States
leaders exercising close control over military operations in
crises, combined with a lack of familiarity with military
command and control procedures, has produced an erroneous
view of the manner in which military forces are controlled
in crises. Third, and derived from the two previous

8weaknesses, the concept of crisis stability is poorly
developed and there is a poor understanding of the
escalation processes that could cause a crisis to escalate
to war. These three weaknesses in the crisis management
literature are discussed in Chapter II. They are summarized
here to provide an overview of the study.
The first weakness is that previous studies of inter-
national crises have implicitly viewed the various political
and military interactions that occur between the two sides
as a single interaction sequence. The flow of events in a
crisis is viewed as a single sequence of actions and
reactions. A consequence of this perspective is the
implicit assumption that all the actions taken by a nation
during a crisis either are ordered by national leaders in
pursuit of their policy objectives, or should not have
occurred and therefore represent a loss of control over
•vents. Under the single interaction sequence model of
crisis interaction, a policy objective desirable for
avoiding war—control of crisis military operations by top-
level political authorities—is treated as the norm against
which actual crisis management efforts are compared. The
occurrence of military interactions not directly controlled
by national leaders is then viewed as a potentially
dangerous breakdown of crisis management.
The single interaction sequence model does not
accurately descrioe international crises. What actually

9occurs is multiple interaction sequences that only partially
influence each other. Multiple interaction sequences
,
evolving simultaneously but semi-independently, arise when
national leaders do not make all operational decisions
themselves, but must delegate significant decisionmaking
authority to subordinates. This is the basis for the
stratified interaction model of international crises,
described in detail in Chapter III.
The second weakness in the crisis management
literature is that it is based on an erroneous view of the
Banner in which military forces are controlled in crises.
This apparently resulted from the frequently observed
phenomenon of United States leaders exercising close control
over military operations in crises, combined with a lack of
familiarity with military command and control procedures.
The crisis management literature typically describes the
control of crisis military operations as being highly
centralized, with top-level civilian authorities exercising
direct control—in contrast to routine peacetime operations,
which are described as highly decentralized and having
little involvement of civilian political authorities. This
description fails to grasp the true complexity of military
command and control, leading to inaccurate assessments of
the crisis management problems arising from the employment




Even in crises, military commanders are delegated
significant authority to make operational decisions on the
employment of their forces— including decisions on the use
of force. Under certain circumstances military commanders
can use conventional weapons without seeking permission from
higher authorities. The scope of their authority is spelled
out in a variety of documents, which collectively will be
referred to as mechanisms of indirect control. There are
even provisions for commanders to act contrary to their
written instructions when circumstances dictate.
Although some scholars have recognized that these
features exist in the United States military command and
control system, the actual complexity of that system has not
been reflected in the literature on crisis management. The
literature is founded on a simple distinction between policy-
making and policy implementation, and turns to concepts such
as bureaucratic politics and organizational process to
explain why actions are taken that were not ordered by
national leaders. This fails to recognize that military
commanders at all levels in the chain of command have
important policy-making roles and are not simply bureaucrats
executing policy decisions. Thus, an understanding of the
mechanisas through which authority to make operational
decisions is delegated to military commanders is essential
for accurately assessing the crisis management problems that
arise when military forces are employed in crises.
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The third weakness in the crisis management literature
is that the concept of crisis stability is poorly developed
and there is a poor understanding of the escalation
processes that could cause a crisis to escalate to war.
Crisis stability is viewed as being primarily a function of
weapons technology, particularly the degree to which it
gives an advantage to the offense. Lacking is an
appreciation of the operational factors that affect crisis
stability once a decision is made to employ military forces
in a crisis. The escalation processes that could cause a
crisis to escalate to war are also poorly developed.
Although there is growing concern over inadvertent or
accidental war, these concepts are not well defined and the
scenarios in which they could occur lack plausibility.
Crisis military operations can indeed trigger or contribute
to an escalatory process leading to war, but the manner in
which they do so are subtle and complex—and best understood
in the context of stratified interactions.
To summarize, the weaknesses in the crisis management
literature are an implicit and misleading single interaction
sequence model of the political and military interactions
that occur in a crisis, an erroneous view of the manner in
which military forces are controlled in crises, and poor
development of the concept of crisis stability and the
escalation processes that could cause a crisis to
inadvertently escalate to war.
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Overview of Concepts and Theory
Three central concepts form the foundation for this
study: stratified interaction, stratified crisis stability,
and the tensions that arise from the interaction of
political and military objectives in a crisis. The theory
and its corollaries are developed and explained in detail in
Chapter III. They are summarized here to provide an
overview of the concepts presented in the research design.
The scope of this study is limited to international
crises in which two fundamental conditions are present: The
first is that both sides in a crisis seek to protect or
advance vital national interests and, conversely, have
vital interests at stake that they are unwilling to
sacrifice for the purpose of avoiding war. Both sides thus
take military actions intended to support crisis bargaining
and to counter military moves by the other side. The second
assumption is that neither side desires war as the outcome
of the crisis. National leaders on each side limit their
objectives and restrain their military moves to avoid being
misperceived by the other side as intending to launch a
war. Both sides thus seek to avoid inadvertent escalation
of the crisis while deterring escalation by the other side.
When both of these conditions are met, the primary danger is
of war arising from inadvertent escalation. These
conditions and the nature of international crises are
discussed in detail in Chapter II.
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The theory of stratified interaction states that,
given conditions of delegated control, tight horizontal
coupling between the military forces of the two sides, and
•cute crisis, interactions between the two sides will be
stratified in three levels: political, strategic and
tactical. The first corollary to the theory is that
tactical-level interactions can become decoupled from the
political-military objectives of national leaders. The term
decoupled is used to mean that vertical command and control
links to operational military forces at the scene of a
crisis are severed or otherwise fail to ensure that tactical-
level decisionmaking supports the crisis management strategy
of national leaders. Decoupling occurs to the extent that
operational decisions on the employment of military forces
made at the strategic and tactical levels differ from the
operational decisions political level decisionmakers would
have made to coordinate those military actions with their
political-diplomatic strategy for resolving the crisis.
This is an inductive theory arrived at through empirical
historical research into crisis interactions.
Crisis stability exists to the extent that neither
side has an incentive to strike the first military blow.
The crisis security dilemma is that, in a crisis, many of
the actions a state takes to increase its security and
improve its bargaining position decrease the security of the
adversary. The theory of stratified interaction directly
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Affects this dilemma. The stratified crisis security
dilemma is that, in a crisis, the securicy dilemma is
stratified, arising from the interaction processes occurring
separately at each of the three levels, and affecting the
likelihood of violence separately at each level. This in
turn leads to the concept of stratified escalation dynamics:
in an acute crisis, in which tactical-level interaction
between the two sides has become decoupled from direct
control by national leaders, the security dilemma, operating
separately at the tactical level, can trigger an escalatory
spiral, which under certain circumstances can cause the
crisis to escalate uncontrollably to war. Identifying those
circumstances is a primary objective of this study.
An important issue is whether these phenomena
—
stratified interaction, decoupling of tactical-level
interactions, and stratified crisis stability—are strictly
symmetrical or can also be asymmetrical. That is, must the
conditions necessary for these phenomena to occur be present
on both sides in a crisis, or can can the phenomena arise
when the conditions are present on only one side. This
issue will be addressed in the empirical research on the
theory, but the focus of the study will be on the United
States and the role of U.S. forces in crises. The
preliminary assessment is that stratified interaction tends
to be symmetrical (both sides in a crisis normally
experience the conditions for stratification) , but that
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decoupling and stratified crisis stability can be either
symmetrical or asymmetrical. This has important
implications for crisis management: war could arise through
• process in which one side has lost effective control of
its forces and is experiencing inadvertent escalation, while
the other side retains control over its forces and is
deliberately escalating the level of violence. This is
probably a more likely and dangerous scenario than one in
which symmetrical decoupling occurs and both sides
experience inadvertent escalation.
Another aspect of crisis stability is the danger of
misperception under conditions of stratified interaction.
The concept of the misperception dilemma describes the
inadvertent results that can occur when military forces are
used for signalling in a crisis. When signalling
adversaries, the dilemma is between inadvertent signals of
hostility and inadvertent signals of acquiescence. When
signalling an ally or friend, the misperception dilemma is
between inadvertent signals of encouragement and inadvertent
signals of retrenchment. Given stratified interactions,
then perceptions of the adversary can also be stratified,
with different perceptions being held at different levels of
interaction. Misperceptions can arise at one level without
other levels necessarily being aware of them, providing a




The interaction of political and military considera-
tions when military force is employed as a political
instrument in crises will be a central focus of the study.
The interactions generate what will be described as
political-military tensions—actual and potential conflicts
between political and military considerations which force
decisionmakers, either knowingly or tacitly, to make trade-
offs among individually important but mutually incompatible
objectives. These political-military tensions, which can
give rise to difficult policy dilemmas in a crisis, are
inherent in the use of force as a political instrument under
conditions of stratified interaction.
There are three political-military tensions. The
first is tension between political considerations and the
needs of diplomatic bargaining, on the one hand, and
military considerations and the needs of military
operations, on the other. The second is tension between the
need for top-level control of military options in a crisis,
and the need for tactical flexibility and instantaneous
decisionmaking at the scene of the crisis. The third is
tension between performance of crisis political missions and
readiness to perform wartime combat missions. These three
tensions between political and military considerations
affect the degree to which stratified interactions become
decoupled in a crisis, thus having a significant impact on




There is an inherent element of randomness and
unpredictability in the occurrence of war that structural or
system-level theories cannot eliminate or define out of
existence. Addressing the immediate causes of war gets at
that element of randomness and unpredictability, allowing
identification of various sets of specific circumstances in
which the probability of war is increased—which is both
theoretically significant and policy relevant. This study
will examine a particular subset of the immediate causes of
war, those arising from the use of force as a political
instrument in crises.
The type of theory this study seeks to develop is what
Alexander L. George describes as a "differentiated" theory,
an explanatory theory cast in the form of contingent
generalizations and offering discriminating explanations for
the occurrence of a phenomenon. Contingent generalizations
ere regularities that occur only under certain specific
conditions. Collectively they offer a differentiated
typology of situations in which the phenomenon of interest
manifests itself. The objective of a differentiated theory
is to identify the variety of different causal patterns that
can occur for the phenomenon, and the conditions under which
each distinctive causal pattern occurs. The value of a
differentiated theory is that it has greater policy
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relevance than theories cast in the form of probabilistic
generalizations, providing policy-makers a meens of
diagnosing the significance of specific situations.
The nature of the phenomena being addressed dictate a
focus on decisionmaking and the details of how crisis
military operations are controlled. This, in turn, requires
a research design in which a small number of cases are
examined in detail using the method of structured focused
comparison, rather than a research design using a large
number of cases and statistical methods to identify
significant variables. The purpose of structured comparison
of a small number of cases is to reveal the different causal
patterns that can occur for the phenomena, and the




The dependent variable is whether on not inadvertent
escalation occurs in an international crisis. For the
purposes of this study, inadvertent escalation will be
defined as any increase in the level or scope of violence in
a crisis that was not directly ordered by national leaders
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in
American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 509-512; Alexander L.
George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of
Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon, ed.,
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy




or anticipated by them as being the likely result of their
orders. The specific phenomena to be explained in this
study are the interaction of military forces in crises and
the impact of such interactions on crisis stability.
Empirical research on the use of United States naval
forces in crises trill used to develop a set of contingent
generalizations explaining three aspects of the theory: (a)
the conditions under which crisis interactions become
stratified and decoupled, (b) the conditions under which
tensions between political and diplomatic objectives arise
and affect crisis decisionmaking in particular ways, and (c)
the conditions that prevent stratified escalation dynamics
from occurring. The analysis will define discrete patterns
of tactical-level crisis interaction, each associated with a
particular causal pattern. Because the patterns of tactical-
level interaction are arrived at empirically, the patterns
identified in this study probably will not cover the
universe of interaction patterns—additional patterns could
well be identified through further empirical research.
The research design is divided into three phases. The
first phase will be an examination of the mechanisms of
delegated command, the nature of tactical-level military
interactions, and the use of United States naval forces as a
political instrument. These topics address some of the
greatest weaknesses in the crisis management literature.
The purpose of this phase of the research is to clarify
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existing concepts and, when necessary, to present new
concepts of crisis military operations before commencing the
case studies. This first phase of the research design will
encompass Chapters IV, V, and VI.
The second phase of the research design will consist
of a structured focused comparison of four cases in which
United States naval forces were employed in crises: the 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the
1967 Middle East War, and the 1973 Middle East War. The
purpose of this phase will be to develop contingent
generalizations on the theory of stratified interaction.
This second phase of the research will be presented in
Chapter VII.
To develop the contingent generalizations, eight
questions addressing specific aspects of the theory will be
answered through structured focused comparison. The first
three questions address the conditions necessary for
stratified interaction to occur: delegated control, tight
coupling, and acute crisis.
Question 1 . To what degree were interactions between
the forces of the two sides at the scene of the crisis the
result of actions taken in accordance with mechanisms of
delegated control, rather than direct control by national
leaders? If direct control was attempted, to what degree
were national leaders able to exercise constant, real-time,
positive control of operational decisions? If direct
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control was nominally in effect but not in fact being
exercised on a real-time basis, to what degree did on-scene
commanders rely on guidance in mechanisms of delegated
control relative to the direct guidance they received?
Question 2 . Were the forces of the two sides at the
scene of the crisis tightly coupled? Were on-scene
(tactical level) commanders vertically integrated with
sensors providing sufficient information on the adversary's
on-scene forces to allow them to develop a picture of the
adversary's moves and intentions independent of information
provided to national leaders? Were tactical moves by each
side quickly detected by the other side, prompting on-scene
commanders to make (or request authorization to make)
counter moves in order to preserve or improve their tactical
situation?
Question 3 . Were the forces of the two sides being
used by their national leaders as a political instrument to
convey deterrent or compellent military threats toward the
other side in support of crisis bargaining? Were the forces
of the two sides engaged in a test of capabilities under
restrictive ground rules as a result of & challenge to a
commitment being met by an effort to defeat that challenge
without escalation? To what degree did interactions between
the on-scene forces of the two sides influence the




The fourth question addresses the first corollary to
the theory of stratified interaction, that interactions can
become decoupled in a crisis. There are seven potential
causes of decoupling: communications and information flow
problems, impairment of political-level decisionmaking, a
fast-paced tactical environment, ambiguous or ambivalent
orders, tactically inappropriate orders, inappropriate
guidance in mechanisms of indirect control, and deliberate
unauthorized actions by military coojiieinders. More than one
of these factors can occur simultaneously, further
increasing the likelihood of unexpected escalation. The
causes of decoupling are explained in Chapter III.
To establish that stratified interactions became
decoupled in a crisis requires two findings: The first is
that one or more of the seven seven potential causes of
decoupling was present, creating opportunities for
decoupling to occur. The second, and usually more difficult
to establish, finding is that operational decisions made by
tactical-level decisionmakers differed from the decisions
that political-level decisionmakers probably would have made
in order to coordinate those actions with their political-
diplomatic strategy for resolving the crisis.
Question 4 . Did interactions at the tactical and
political levels become decoupled during the crisis? Did
any of the potential causes of decoupling arise during the
crisis? If conditions for decoupling existed, did national
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leaders perceive the operational decisions made by the on-
scene commander as interfering with or not supporting their
political-diplomatic strategy for resolving the crisis? If
momentary decoupling occurred in the crisis, was direct
command immediately reimposed or did it initiate a decoupled
interaction sequence?
The fifth question addresses the second corollary to
the theory of stratified interaction, that the security
dilemma is stratified in crises. The implication of this is
that decisionmakers at the political and tactical levels can
hold different perceptions of the offense-defense balance,
vulnerability to preemption, and the need to strike first.
Question 5 . Did national leaders and on-scene
commanders hold different perceptions of the vulnerability
of on-scene forces to preemption and the need to strike
first in the event of an armed clash? Did actions taken
with on-scene forces by national leaders for political
signaling purposes generate tactical situations in which the
on-scene commander perceived a vulnerability to preemption
and a need to strike first should an armed clash erupt? Did
actions taken for political purposes prompt the adversary's
forces to take compensatory actions to reduce their
vulnerability or to improve their ability to strike first?
The sixth question addresses the third corollary to
the theory of stratified interaction, that escalation
dynamics can be stratified in a crisis. A limitation
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imposed on this study by the circumstances of post-World War
ZZ history is that no crises during the period escalated to
a
• war in which the United States was a participant. The
absence of cases resulting in war precludes using the
outcomes of the crises, in the sense of whether or not war
occurred and the manner in which crises escalate to war, as
dependent variables. Thus, the research design cannot
address what would otherwise be the most interesting
question, the circumstances under which decoupled,
stratified interactions generate stratified escalation
dynamics leading uncontrollably to war. Although this
question cannot be addressed directly, research will be done
to identify conditions which may have inhibited stratified
escalation dynamics from occurring.
Question 6 . When stratified interactions become
decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation dynamics from
occurring at the tactical level? When tactical-level
interactions do begin escalating, what factors inhibit
escalation dynamics from being transmitted upward to the
a
I exclude the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incident as a crisis
that escalated to war because the incident did not lead to
immediate and sustained U.S. intervention in the war.
Although the U.S. commenced bombing North Vietnam after the
incident, the bombings were in retaliation for subsequent
attacks on U.S. forces in the South. Significant escalation
of the U.S. role in the war, in the form of ground combat
troops, did not occur until seven months after the Tonkin
Gulf Incident. The decisions to escalate the U.S. role were
aade after months of deliberation, not under conditions of
crisis as defined in this study.
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strategic and political levels of interaction? Under what
circumstances could these escalation-inhibiting factors
break down, allowing a crisis to escalate uncontrollably to
war?
The seventh question addresses the crisis management
problems that arise when military forces are used as a
political instrument in crises: the misperception dilemma
and inadvertent military incidents.
Question 7 . Did actions taken with military forces
send inadvertent signals of hostility or acquiescence to
adversaries, or inadvertent signals of encouragement or
retrenchment to allies and friends? Were national leaders
aware of the possibility of their military actions being
sisperceived and did this affect their decisionmaking? Did
inadvertent military incidents occur and how did they affect
efforts to manage the crisis? Under what circumstances did
the inadvertent incidents occur and what factors contributed
to their occurrence? Were national leaders aware of the
possibility of inadvertent incidents and did this affect
their decisionmaking?
The eighth question addresses the three tensions
between political and military considerations that arise
when military forces are used as a political instrument in
crises: tension between political considerations and the
needs of diplomatic bargaining, on the one hand, and mili-
tary considerations and the needs of military operations, on
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te other; tension between the need for top-level control of
ilitary options in a crisis, and the need for tactical
.exibility and instantaneous decisionmaking at the scene of
le crisis; and tension between performance of crisis
>litical missions and readiness to perform wartime combat
Lssions. Although the first source of tension (political
•reus military considerations) tends to pit military men
jainst their civilian superiors, these tensions are not
imply issues of civil-military relations. The second
mrce of tension (level of operational control) can
merate disputes between military commanders at the
>litical, strategic, and tactical levels. The third source
I tension (crisis missions versus readiness for wartime
Lssions) involves significant conflicts between crisis
Ilitary objectives and wartime military objectives, as well
i conflicts between crisis political objectives and wartime
Ilitary objectives. But all three tensions arise from the
squirements of crisis management, the essence of which is
Lacing political constraints on military operations.
Question 8 . Did tensions arise between political
snsiderations and the needs of diplomatic bargaining, on
he one hand, and military considerations and the needs of
ilitary operations, on the other? Did tensions arise
etween the need for direct, positive, top-level control of
ilitary operations, and the need for tactical flexibility
nd instantaneous decisionmaking at the scene of the
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crisis? Did tensions arise between performance of crisis
missions and maintaining or increasing readiness to perform
wartime missions? If any of these three tensions arose, how
did they affect political-level and tactical-level
decisionmaking? Are such tensions related to decoupling of
stratified interactions and the occurrence of stratified
escalation dynamics?
The third phase of the research design will consist of
a structured, focused comparison of four cases in which a
U.S. Navy ship was attacked during peacetime or crisis
operations: the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967 Israeli
attack on the USS Liberty , the 1968 North Korean seizure of
the USS Pueblo , and the 1987 Iraqi attack on the USS Stark .
Peacetime attacks on Navy ships are a particular concern due
to their escalatory potential (which is discussed in the
following section) . The purpose of this phase will be to
further develop and refine contingent generalizations on the
theory of stratified interaction. The focus will be on how
the naval and military chain of command reacted to the
attack and whether or not crisis management problems arose
from that reaction. The third phase will be presented in
Chapter VIII.
To further develop the contingent generalizations,
four of the previous eight questions will again be answered
in a structured, focused comparison. The four questions
address decoupling of stratified interactions, stratified
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iscalation dynamics, miaperceptions , and political-military
tensions.
Question 1 . Did interactions at the tactical and
political levels become decoupled during or after the attack
>n the Navy ship? Did conditions for decoupling arise
luring the crisis? If conditions for decoupling existed,
lid national leaders perceive the operational decisions made
>y the on-scene commander as interfering with or not
lupporting their political-diplomatic strategy for dealing
rith the attack? If momentary decoupling occurred in the
:risis, was direct command immediately reimposed or did it
initiate a decoupled interaction sequence?
Question 2 . When stratified interactions become
lecoupled, what factors inhibit escalation dynamics from
>ccurring at the tactical level? When tactical-level
.nteractions do begin escalating in violence, what factors
.nhibit escalation dynamics from being transmitted upward to
:he strategic and political levels of interaction? Under
rhat circumstances could these escalation-inhibiting factors
[ail, allowing a crisis to escalate uncontrollably to war?
Question 3 . Did actions taken with military forces
lend inadvertent signals of hostility or acquiescence to
adversaries, or inadvertent signals of encouragement or
retrenchment to allies and friends? Were national leaders
iware of the possibility of their military actions being
lisperceived and did this affect their decisionmaking? Did
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inadvertent military incidents occur and how did they affect
efforts to manage the crisis? Under what circumstances did
the inadvertent incidents occur and what factors contributed
to their occurrence? Were national leaders aware of the
possibility of inadvertent incidents and did this affect
their decisionmaking?
Question 4 . Did tensions arise between political
considerations and the needs of diplomatic bargaining, on
the one hand, and military considerations and the needs of
military operations, on the other? Did tensions arise
between the need for direct, positive, top-level control of
military operations, and the need for tactical flexibility
and instantaneous decisionmaking at the scene of the
crisis? Did tensions arise between performance of crisis
missions and maintaining or increasing readiness to perform
wartime missions? If any of these three tensions arose, how
did they affect political-level and tactical-level decision-
making? Are such tensions related to decoupling of
stratified interactions and the occurrence of stratified
escalation dynamics?
Focus on Naval Forces
As was noted in the research design, the cases to be
examined all concern the use of United States naval forces
as a political instrument in crises and peacetime attacks on
U.S. Navy ships. There are four reasons for this. First,
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of the branches of the U.S. armed forces, the Navy is the
service called upon most often to respond to crises. The
Navy is on the cutting edge of crisis management. Second,
American leaders and many analysts perceive naval forces as
having important advantages over otner types of forces for
crisis response. Third, in spite of the frequency of use
and perceived advantages of naval forces, some U.S. Navy
officers and civilian analysts feel that the role of naval
forces as a political instrument is not well understood.
Fourth, some analysts believe that naval forces have a
greater escalatory potential than do other forces.
Naval forces have long had an important role in the
foreign policies of maritime nations. The United States
Navy in particular has often been called on to serve as an
instrument of national policy. Data on the employment of
the U.S. armed forces as a political instrument collected by
Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan show that U.S. Navy
units were employed in 177 of 215 incidents (83%) between
1945 and 1975, while a follow-on study by Philip D. Zelikow
found that U.S. Navy units were employed in 31 of 44
incidents (70%) between 1975 and 1982. The U.S. Navy
supports peacetime foreign policy objectives through a
variety of missions, ranging from routine port visits and
9Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force
Without War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978),
pp. 38-44; Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War, 1975-82, M
Journal of Strategic Studies 7 (March 1984): 29-54.
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"showing the flag," to presence in strength at the scene of
• conflict and retaliatory attacks against hostile nations.
Wartime combat missions are the fundamental raison d'etre of
navies, but peacetime political missions are their most
common employment
.
The U.S. Navy is the branch of the armed forces most
commonly employed as a political instrument due to naval
forces being perceived as having several inherent advantages
for that role. The greatest advantage of naval forces stems
from the medium in which they operate: naval vessels are
free to roam the high seas (the oceans outside of
territorial waters) without restrictions, asserting freedom
of the seas—a principle well-established in international
law. The ability of naval forces to establish a visible
U.S. presence in international waters near the scene of a
crisis without intruding into disputed territory or
immediate need of politically sensitive shore bases is an
advantage not shared by land-based forces. The oceans
provide naval forces with wide geographic reach, only the
few nations without sea coasts and beyond the reach of
carier aircraft are not readily influenced by sea power.
Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (New
York: Praeger, 1967), p. 67; Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign
Policy (New York: Crane Russak, 1977), pp. 33-35; Hedley
Bull, "Sea Power and Political Influence," in Jonathan
Alford, ed., Sea Power and Influence: Old Issues and New
Challenges (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1980), p. 8.
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The mobility and flexibility of naval forces are
assets highly valued by national leaders. Naval forces are
readily moved to a tension area, maneuvered to signal inten-
tions and resolve, and withdrawn when U.S. objectives are
achieved. Endurance, the ability to remain on station in a
tension area for a prolonged period of time, is another
important attribute of naval forces. The endurance of naval
forces allows national leaders to send Navy ships to a
tension area and then wait and see what develops. Although
naval forces in a presence role serve primarily as a visible
symbol of U.S. power and influence, their combat strength is
a central element in their role. The ability of naval
forces to project power ashore on short notice with naval
gunfire, carrier airpower, cruise missiles, and Marine
troops provides national leaders with a wide range of mili-
tary options for conveying carefully crafted threats in
support of diplomatic bargaining. Equally important, these
combat capabilities also provide options for seeking a mili-
tary solution tc the crisis should it become necessary.
James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy , 1919-1979 . Second
Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 67; Edward
H. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 1. For an illus-
tration of the range of options that naval forces provide
the President in a crisis, see Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr.'s
description of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis in "The
Creation of the Cold War Navy, 1953-1962," in Kenneth J.
Hag an, ed. , In Peace and War: Interpretations of American
Naval History, 1775-1984
. Second Edition (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 316-317.
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Zn contrast, land-based air and ground forces face
numerous political, legal, and logistical constraints on
their ability to be inserted into a tense area. They often
require prepared bases (at least runways) , and may not be
welcome on foreign soil. Nationalism is a powerful emotion
in many countries, particularly former colonies, and even
nations desiring U.S. support may be hesitant to incur the
domestic political strife that a foreign military presence
can ignite. Land-based forces have a long and heavy
logistical tail that makes them a cumbersome political
instrument—they cannot be rapidly deployed other than in
small units with low endurance, and once inserted can be
difficult to withdraw. Deployment of land-based forces by
air, or even use of long-range bombers for a show of force,
can be precluded by reluctant allies and other nations
refusing passage through their air space or refusing landing
rights to refuel.
Employment of land-based forces normally entails
inherently greater risks than employment of naval forces due
to the much stronger political signals sent by forces ashore
and their vulnerability to a wider range of threats.
Because land-based forces imply a greater degree of
permanence than do naval forces, land-based forces can
signal a stronger and less flexible of commitment. Even if
a strong signal of commitment was intended, the fact that
land-based forces are difficult to move can inadvertently
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create an actual degree of commitment greater than had been
12intended.
Observers of naval diplomacy have concluded that
changes in the structure and conduct of international
politics since the end of World War II have been the primary
factors causing maritime powers, particularly the United
States, to place greater emphasis on the use of naval forces
as a political instrument relative to land-based air and
ground forces. Starting from the perspective of Robert E.
Osgood and Robert W. Tucker that the destructiveness of
nuclear war and the danger of conflicts escalating to
nuclear war impose constraints on and "regulate" the use of
force, James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver contend that
the superpowers have had to search for usable and
controllable forms of military power—instruments of force
which are both potent and responsive to the need for limits
12Martin, pp. 143, 146; Cable, p. 67; Luttwak, p. 1.
The superiority of naval forces over land-based troops and
aircraft was clearly demonstrated during the 1958 Lebanon
Crisis, when Marines were landed with carrier air cover
exactly when the President specified with only twelve hours
notice. Severe logistical problems delayed the deployment
of Air Force and Army units to the theater. See Kennedy,
pp. 320*322.
13Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order
and Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1967), pp. 2-40. U.S. naval officers, in somewhat less
analytic terms, had been asserting the existence of a
"regulated" strategic environment for some time. See
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, "The U.S. Navy's Role in General
War and Conflict Short of General War," Naval War College
Review 11 (April 1959): 7-11.

35
on their use. They conclude that naval power has been the
type of force best suited for use under these constraints,
14largely due to the advantages described above. Similarly/
James Cable has observed that "some of the constraints on
the use of American military power to exert international
influence are also such as almost to encourage reliance on
15limited naval force for this purpose.** Other observers
have suggested that domestic political constraints in the
United states have also caused naval forces to be favored
over the other armed forces. Thus, there is reason to
believe that in the future naval forces will continue to be
James A. Kathan and James K. Oliver, The Future of
United States Naval Power (Slco^incjton; University of
Indiana Press, 1979), pp. 17-18, 35. Also see Burke, pp. 9-
11; and Rear Admiral John D. Chase, **The Function of the
Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 95 (October 1969):
30-32. Chase's description of Pax Ballistica is essentially
the same as the regulated strategic environment described by
Osgood and Tucker, but preceded it by a decade.
15Cable, p. 28.
Commander Dennis R. Neutze, a Navy lawyer, has
suggested that the 1973 War Powers Act, which requires the
President to consult with Congress when U.S. forces are
introduced into hostilities or a situation of imminent
involvement in hostilities, makes naval forces preferable to
land-based forces. Because naval forces can be deployed
near the scene of a conflict without actually being
introduced into hostilities, they do not activate the
consultation requirement or the sixty-day limit in the War
Powers Act until hostilities are actually initiated. See
Commander Dennis R. Neutze, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A
Juridical Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support
of United States Foreign Policy, " JAG Journal 32 (Summer
1982): 133-134. Although his argument has merit, Presidents
have tended in practice to ignore the War Powers Act when
compliance with it would have interfered with their policy
objectives—much to the displeasure of Congress.
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the branch of the armed forces favored by United States
leaders for crisis response.
The role of naval forces as a political instrument in
peacetime received a great deal of attention in the U.S.
Navy in the early 1970s. Despite the efforts made to
develop concepts and principles of "naval presence," as
peacetime naval employment was known, there remains
dissatisfaction with our understanding of such political
missions. Admiral Stansfield Turner stated in 1977, "I
think that we who exercise naval presence do not know enough
about how to fit the action to the situation: how to be sure
that the force we bring to bear, when told to help in some
situation, is in fact the one most appropriate to the circum-
17
stances." Civilian analysts have echoed his concern. In
a discussion of the relative importance of peacetime naval
Missions, Geoffrey Till emphasized that assessment of such
issues "requires a full and proper understanding what naval
diplomacy is, exactly how it works and what its requirements
are." But he goes on to warn that "formulations of the
strategy of naval diplomacy have as yet some way to go
18before these things are achieved." When naval officers
17Stansfield Turner, "Designing a Modern Navy: A
Workshop Discussion," in "Power at Sea: II. Super-Powers and
Navies," Adelphi Papers No. 123 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 28.
18Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear




and analysts alike express concern that the use of United
States naval forces as a political instrument is not well
understood, there are grounds for questioning how well
United States leaders understand the implications of
employing naval forces for crisis response.
Several observers have expressed concern over the
•scalatory dangers associated with the employment of naval
forces. Of particular concern to some observers is the
ascalatory pressure that can arise when a U.S. Navy ship is
attacked. Former White House aide Chester Cooper,
commenting on the strong Senate reaction to the 1964 Tonkin
Gulf Incident, described the emotions aroused by attacks on
United States ships:
There is something very magical about an attack on an
American ship on the high seas. An attack on a
military base or an Army convoy doesn't stir up that
kind of emotion. An attack on an American ship on the
high seas is bound to set off skyrockets and the 'Star
Spangled Banner' and 'Kail to the chief and
everything else.
George H. Quest er and Sean M. Lynn-Jones have expanded upon
Cooper's remarks. Noting that "It is dreadfully dangerous
to sink a major power's warship today, " Quester warns that
"the warships of the world have become highly prized invest-
ments, such that their loss would be likely to enrage the
publics and governments that matter back home—enrage them
enough to trigger off escalations that neither side might
19
"The 'Phantom Battle' that Led to War," U.S. News
and World Report. July 23, 1984, p. 66.
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have wanted, thus setting up the deterrence and bluff
20
mechanisms that are at the heart of ' chicken*.*' Along the
same lines, Lynn-Jones observed that "Under conditions of
international tension and superpower rivalry, public opinion
in a liberal democracy is likely to demand retaliation after
a provocation by a major rival. Naval incidents seem to
elicit particularly emotional responses in the United
States.** He goes on to add that "Is is, of course,
relatively unlikely that a naval incident could provoke a
nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet
Union. ...An incident could, however, increase tensions and
needlessly disrupt negotiations or other political
discourse, much as the U-2 incident of 1960 forced the
21
cancellation of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit.**
Another view is that there is a greater risk of
nuclear war erupting at sea than ashore. This argument has
been made forcefully by Desmond Ball:
The possibility of nuclear war at sea must be
regarded as at least as likely as the occurrence of
nuclear war in other theaters. Indeed, there is
probably a greater likelihood of accidental or unauth-
orized launch of sea-based nuclear weapons, and the
constraints on the authorized release of nuclear
weapons are possibly more relaxed than those that
pertain to land-based systems. Further, there are
20George H. Quester, "Naval Armaments: The Past as
Prologue,** in George H. Quester, ed., Navies and Arms
Control (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 6-7.
21 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, **A Quiet Success for Arms
Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea," International
Security 9 (Spring 1985) : 164.
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several important factors that make it likely that any
major conflict at sea would escalate-to a strategic
nuclear exchange relatively quickly.
Incidents at sea between American and Soviet forces have
ieen identified as a potential catalyst for the nuclear
tscalation dangers described by Ball. As John Borawski
lotes: "The 1967 Israeli sinking C»ic] of the USS Liberty ,
md the subsequent US uncertainty as to whether a Soviet
ihip had attacked the Liberty , is often cited as an example
»f the type of nuclear Sarajevo that could inadvertently
23
ead to war." Thus, there are at least prima facie
•easons for concern that the use of naval forces as a
>olitical instrument in crises has an escalatory potential
22Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International
Security 10 (Fall 1985): 28-29. The factors Ball identifies
ire the occurrence of accidents at sea, the attractiveness
it ships as nuclear targets, the nuclear weapons launch
lutonomy of naval commanders, dual-capable weapons systems
md platforms, offensive Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
itrategy (including attacks on Soviet strategic ballistic
nissile submarines) , incentives for Soviet preemption
irising from the vulnerability of Navy ASW and command and
control systems, the Navy doctrine of offensive operations
In forward areas, Navy tactical nuclear weapons doctrine,
Soviet doctrine for war at sea, and lack of Navy contingency
planning for limiting escalation in a war at sea. Also see
iarry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and
fATO's Northern Flank," International Security 7 (Fall
L982) : 28-54; Eric J. Grove, "The Maritime Strategy and
Crisis Stability," Naval Forces 8 (6/1987): 34-44.
23John Borawski, "Risk Reduction at Sea: Naval
Confidence-Building Measures," Naval Forces 3 (1/1987):
18. It must be noted that Liberty was not sunk in the
attack. As will be discussed in Chapter VII, no U.S. Navy
commander in the chain of command thought that the Soviets
had conducted the attack, and the commanders in the
Mediterranean knew for a fact that the Soviets could not
have conducted the attack.
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that has not been adequately addressed in studies of naval
diplomacy and crisis management.
The characteristics of naval forces that give them
their advantages as a political instrument also generate
three serious potential problems for crisis management.
First, the political signals sent by naval forces are
particularly prone to being misperceived, inadvertently
sending the wrong signals to allies and adversaries.
Second, the nature of the maritime environment, in which
forces of the two sides in a crisis routinely operate at
point blank range, exacerbates problems of maintaining
control of events. Third, the nature of the naval warfare
environment, which places a premium striking first in
tactical engagements, exacerbates problems of crisis
stability and escalation control. These problems of using
naval forces as a political instrument are examined in
greater detail in Chapter VI.
To summarize, U.S. Navy crisis operations and
peacetime attacks on U.S. Navy ships will be used as the
historical cases for this study because the Navy is the
service called upon most often to respond to crises,
American leaders and many analysts perceive naval forces as
having important advantages over other types of forces for
crisis response, some U.S. Navy officers and civilian
analysts feel that the role of naval forces as a political
instrument is not well understood, and some analysts believe
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that naval forces have • greater eacalatory potential than
do other forces.
Cases and Case Selection
Two sets of historical cases will be used as sources
of empirical data, one set of cases for each phase of the
research design. These cases will be used as sources of
empirical data for deriving the contingent generalizations.
Although essentially the same questions will be asked in
each case, full-scale case studies will not be conducted.
Empirical data for the second phase of the study will
come from four cases in which United States naval forces
were employed in crises: the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Middle East War, and the
1973 Middle East War. The criteria for case selection in
the first phase of the research were (a) significant U.S.
naval operations were conducted which influenced the outcome
of the crisis, (b) naval operations were conducted in the
immediate proximity of adversary naval forces or land-based
forces that could threaten naval forces, and (c) there was a
possibility of fighting erupting between the United States
and the other side in the crisis.
Given the large number of crises in which the U.S.
navy has played an important role, case selection was
particularly difficult for this phase of the study. Among
the more prominent cases considered and rejected were the
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1954 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, the 1970
Jordanian Crisis, and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Although
th« 1954 Querooy-Matsu Crisis and the evacuation of the
Tachen Islands were perhaps as serious as the 1958 case,
there was less tactical-level interaction because China
ceased its harassment of the islands while the U.S. Navy was
on the scene (thus making a naval confrontation an unlikely
source of escalation) . The Navy role in the 1956 Suez
Crisis was limited to evacuation of civilians, there was
little tactical-level interaction, and little concern that
the crisis would escalate to war. There was little tactical-
level interaction in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, little concern
that the crisis would escalate to war with the Soviet Union,
and, after the Marines were landed, little concern that the
U.S. would be involved in a civil war. There was minor
tactical-level interaction in the 1970 Jordanian Crisis, but
the Navy role was small and there was little concern that
the crisis would escalate to war. Although there was
tactical-level interaction and concern among Navy officers
over the Soviet naval threat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War,
the Navy role was limited and there was little concern that
the crisis would escalate to war.
Empirical data for the third phase of the study will
come from four cases in which U.S. Navy ships were attacked
in peacetime: the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incident, the 1967
Israeli attack on the USS Liberty , the 1968 North Korean
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seizure of the USS Pueblo , and the 1987 Iraqi attack on the
USS Stark * The criteria for case selection were (a) the
attack was on a U.S. naval vessel, and (b) the attack
occurred during a crisis or under circumstances that could
have provoked a U.S. military response. The second
criterion, excludes limited war situations, such as the
Korean War and the Vietnam War. The four cases that were
selected are of interest because they come closest to
illustrating the circumstances in which stratified
interactions could become decoupled and stratified
escalation dynamics occur.
Although this study will focus on the use of naval
forces as a political instrument, the limitations of this
approach are recognized. Non-naval activities, particularly
diplomatic efforts, may be as important to the success of
naval diplomacy as the actions of the ships at the scene of
tensions. As Ken Booth has reminded, "naval diplomacy is a
natter of diplomats on land as well as ships at sea and of
the role the former can play to ensure that naval messages
24
are not misperceived. " Furthermore, it can be difficult
to separate the particular contribution of naval force from
the overall diplomatic and military effort made to resolve a
dispute. Commander James F. McNulty has observed that "it
24Ken Booth, "Foreign Policies at Risk: Some Problems
of Managing Naval Power, H Naval War College Review 29
(Summer 1976) : 15.
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is usually difficult to assess the effect of Naval Presence
alone on decisions which of necessity are made as the
outcome of reaction to a broad range of American signals
—




nations.** Thus, caution must be exercised when attempting
to assess the role of naval forces in achieving a given
political outcome.
Organization of the Study
This study will begin, in Chapter II with a review and
critique of the literature on crises and crisis management.
Chapter III defines the theory of stratified interaction and
its corollaries. Chapter IV examines the mechanisms of
indirect control, providing background on the command and
control procedures that influence the stratification of
crisis interactions. Chapter V discusses tactical-level
military interaction, illustrating the range of interactions
that can occur in crises. Chapter VI explores the use of
naval force as a political instrument in crises, applying
the theory of stratified interaction under the particular
operational circumstances surrounding the use of naval
forces. Examining crisis naval operations will also reveal
the political-military tensions that arise when crisis
25Commander James F. McNulty, "Naval Presence — The




management objectives and military objectives are pursued
simultaneously.
The next two chapters present the case studies.
Chapter VII presents the second phase of the empirical
research, the four case studies on crisis naval operations.
Chapter VIII presents the third phase of the empirical
research, the four case studies on peacetime attacks on navy
ships. Chapter IX presents the findings of the case studies
and presents the contingent generalizations on stratified
interaction. Internal and external factors that appear to
prevent stratified interactions from decoupling will also be
discussed. Chapter X presents conclusions on the theory and
suggests the policy implications of the findings.

CHAPTER II
USE OF FORCE IN CRISES:
A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE
Current concepts and theories on crises and crisis
management have three serious weaknesses. First, the
various political and military interactions that occur
between the two sides in a crisis are assessed in the
context of an implicit single interaction sequence model of
crises. Second, the frequently observed phenomenon of
United States leaders exercising close control over military
operations in crises, combined with a lack of familiarity
with military command and control procedures, has produced
an erroneous view of the manner in which military forces are
controlled in crises. Third, and derived from the two
previous weaknesses, the concept of crisis stability is
inadequately developed and there is a poor understanding of
the escalation processes that could cause a crisis to
escalate to war.
This chapter will review and critique the literature
on crises and crisis management, developing in detail three
major weaknesses in current concepts and theories. The




crises, presenting the perspective on crises that will be
used in this study. The second section will critique the
concept of crisis interaction and explain the weaknesses in
the single interaction sequence model that implicitly
underlies existing crisis theories. The third section will
review basic concepts of crisis management, focusing on the
measures required for national leaders to maintain control
of events in crises. The fourth section will review and
critique the concept of crisis stability, explaining the
weaknesses in current conceptions of crisis stability and
presenting a definition that more accurately reflects the
nature of crisis interaction. The final section will review
a serious problem in crisis management—misperception of
intentions and resolve—and present concepts that more
accurately describe the problems decisionmakers face in
trying to avoid misperceptions when using force in crises.
International Crises
Through journalistic and political license the term
"crisis'* has been stretched to describe a wide range of
phenomena. Essentially any problem for which national
leaders do not have a ready solution can, at the whim of
pundits or politicians, be labeled a crisis. The broad
definition of crisis used in the vernacular lacks sufficient
precision for this study because it covers far too wide a
range of political situations.
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The focus of this study is on a particular category of
international crisis: the "acute" international crisis.
This type of crisis has been defined by Oran R. Young as "a
process of interaction occurring at higher levels of
perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and
characterized by: a sharp break from the ordinary flow of
politics; a rise in the perceived prospects that violence
will break out; and significant implications for the
stability of some system or subsystem (or pattern of
2
relationships) in international politics." Phil Williams
defines such a crisis as "a confrontation of two or more
states, usually occupying a short time period, in which the
probability of an outbreak of war between the participants
is perceived to increase significantly." Along these same
lines, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing define a crisis as
"a sequence of interactions between the governments of two
or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual
war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high
4probability of war." Finally, the definition of crisis
Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute International
Crisis," World Politics 14 (October 1961): 182-205.
2Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton, NJ:
Princetion University Press, 1968), p. 15.
Phil Williams, Crisis Management (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 25.
Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among




used in International Crisis Behavior Project headed by
Michael Brecher is that:
a crisis is a situation with three necessary and
sufficient conditions, deriving from a change in its
external or internal environment. All three are
perceptions held by the highest level decision-makers:




high probability of involvement in military
hostilities , and the awareness of
3. finite time for response to the external value
threat .
Thus, the essential features of acute international crises
•re a confrontation, short of war, between two sovereign
states, and a perception by national leaders of a
significantly increased danger of war breaking out, or at
least greatly increased uncertainty that war can be avoided.
Shortness of duration is has been used by some
observers to distinguish an acute crisis from other crises.
This is normally done because national leaders tend to feel
severe time constraints and an urgent need to take immediate
action in crises, and because crises that drag out for weeks
or months lose their intense sense of danger as implicit
norms of behavior are tacitly established through actual
practice. However, prolonged crises are at least as likely
to occur as are acute crises, can have as great a potential
to escalate to war, and can be just as threatening to the
5Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel. 1967
and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980),
p. 1 (emphasis is his)
.
6Young, p. 15; Williams, p. 25.
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national interests of the parties involved. Prolonged
crises are certainly worthy of investigation, and have been
somewhat neglected in the crisis literature due to the focus
7
on short-duration crises. Additionally, an acute crisis
can arise during a prolonged crisis if either side takes an
action seriously violating the tacit norms of behavior being
observed. Although the phenomena of interest in this study
are most prominent in short-duration acute crises, they also
occur during the periods of acute crisis that can arise
during a prolonged crisis. Thus, while prolonged crises are
not excluded from this study, when they are addressed
attention will be focused on the periods of acute crisis
within them.
A feature of some crises, which can contribute to
crises being of short duration, is that national leaders
perceive themselves as acting under time constraints—action
Bust be taken immediately to avert unacceptable losses to
o
vital national interests. The perception of time con-
straints held by leaders of one nation is usually induced or
7Eliot A. Cohen, "Why We Should Stop Studying the
Cuban Missile Crisis," The National Interest No. 2 (Winter
1985/6): 6.
gOle R. Holsti, Crisis Escalation War (Montreal:
McGi 11-Queen's University Press, 1972); p. 9; Charles F.
Hermann, "Some Issues in the Study of International Crisis, w
in Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights
from Behavioral Research (New York: The Free Press, 1972),
p. 13; Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature
of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981), p. 12; Brecher, p. 1.
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exacerbated by the actions of the other aide in the crisis,
particularly if the crisis was provoked by an attempt at a
fait accompli , or if an ultimatum was presented. The effect
of a perception of time constraints is to raise the level of
stress experienced by national leaders, possibly reducing
the effectivenesss of their analysis and decisionmaking.
Perception of time constraints is a variable rather than a
parameter in crises, and can vary widely in intensity. In a
prolonged crisis all the features of crisis are present
except the perception of time constraints. Perception of
time constraints tends to be strong in the type of crisis of
interest to this study, but is not a necessary condition for
an international crisis to exist.
Another feature of international crises is that nation-
al leaders perceive important national interests to be at
9
stake in the conflict. Such perceptions are particularly
intense in acute crises. Examples of national interests
commonly perceived as important enough to warrant a crisis
include the security of the nation and its allies, spheres
of influence or positions of regional political prominence,
international principles such as freedom of the seas or
rights of neutrals, and sources of strategic minerals or
foodstuffs. The nation's reputation as a world power and
its bargaining reputation have sometimes been included as
9Holsti, p. 9; Hermann, p. 13; Williams, p. 25; Lebow,
Between Peace and War , p. 10.
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interests which when threatened can provoke a crisis, but
such interests normally become involved when a threat to one
of the more concrete interests listed above arises, thus
compounding the importance of the interest at stake. It is
the threat to important national interests that generates
the sense of urgency and perceived danger of war in
10
crises.
A crisis is fundamentally a bargaining relationship
between the two sides. Bargaining relationships are
marked by interdependence: the ability of each side to
achieve its objectives depends on the decisions and actions
of both sides. Thus each side, in planning its own course
of action, must take into account the objectives and
12
anticipated course of action of the other side. In crisis
This definition of acute crisis omits surprise as a
characteristic, which is included by Holsti, p. 10, and
Hermann, p. 13. However, a crisis need not surprise nation-
al leaders by its occurrence, and could build up gradually
from a prolonged dispute, so long as it arises in such a way
as to give national leaders the perception that it threatens
serious damage to important national interests. See Snyder
and Diesing, p. 17.
Thomas C.Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 187-203;
Clenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," in Charles F. Hermann,
ed. , International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research
(New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 217-256.
12A decision by one side to seek a military solution
to a crisis, as in a fait accompli , does not necessarily
eliminate bargaining as a feature of the crisis. The
outcome still depends of the decision by the other side
whether to resist or to sacrifice its interests in order to
avoid war. Furthermore, bargaining may continue to achieve
a final resolution of the dispute.

53
bargaining the two sides have common or complementary
interests, as well as conflicting interests, otherwise one
or both sides would opt for war rather than engage in crisis
bargaining. The advantage of viewing international crises
as a bargaining relationship is that it highlights their
fundamental political nature, which can be obscured by the
military actions taken during crises. To emphasize
bargaining is not to deny that crises are an intense form of
strategic competition over interests perceived as being
vital by national leaders on the two sides. Rather, the
focus on bargaining provides a useful means for
conceptualizing how strategic competition is conducted in
crises.
Bargaining of some sort is, of course, present across
the entire spectrum of international intercourse, from
routine peacetime negotiations to full-scale war. But
international crises stand apart from both peacetime
diplomatic disputes and wartime military conflict due to
their unique political-military nature. In crisis bargain-
ing, varying combinations and sequences of persuasion,
coercion and/or accommodation are applied in an effort at
resolving the conflict on favorable terms. Although the
threat of resort to force, even if only as a latent coercive
Coral Bell refers to this as an "adverse
partnership, which is marked by "solid common interests as
well as sharp conflicting interests." The Conventions of
Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 50.
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threat, is rarely ever totally excluded in peacetime
diplomacy, and political accommodation is rarely ever
totally excluded in wartime hostilities, in crises both the
political and military dimensions are prominent. In an
acute crisis the confrontation has intensified to the point
that coercion*--direct , implied, or even latent, including
standing deterrent threats as well as specific threats
related to the crisis—begins to dominate the relationship
and the grounds for accommodation begin to shrink toward
little more than a mutual desire to avoid war. The
prominence of coercion has led some observers to classify
crises as an intermediate status of relations between peace
and war, combining elements of both peacetime accommodation
14
and wartime coercion.
Crises consist of a series of bargaining interactions
between the two sides. Bargaining interactions include
formal negotiations, official diplomatic communications,
informal communications via intermediaries or the media, and
actions taken to convey political signals. Focusing on
interaction highlights the interdependence between the two
sides. Decisions made by each side reflect decisions made
by the other side as well as their own objectives, and the
ability of either side to achieve its objectives is
dependent upon decisions made by the other side.
14Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," pp. 218, 240;
Snyder and Diesing, p. 10.
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Although a particular type of international crisis
—
the acute crisis—has been identified as the focus of this
study, that category still covers a broad range of crisis
phenomena. Not all types of crises are relevant to this
study. It will thus be useful to review the typologies of
crises that have been proposed in the crisis literature.
Coral Bell distinguishes between adversary crises, those
between nations regarding themselves as adversaries, and
intramural crises, those among allies or members of a
regional organization. Williams, and Snyder and Diesing,
draw a similar distinction, excluding intra-alliance crises
15from their analyses. This is a useful because intra-
alliance crises, though they may be acute politically and
involve explicit coercion, rarely entail risk of war. Thus,
the scope of this study will be limited to adversary crises.
More extensive typologies of crises have also been
proposed. Young proposed six types of crises, based on how
they are initiated: an attempt at a fait accompli , applying
coercive pressure as an indirect response to undesirable
actions, a military response to nonviolent provocation,
military probe provoking a military response, a military
invasion provoking military resistance, and mutual
intervention in political upheaval in a third country.





These categories are not particularly useful for analysis of
crises, and serve mainly to illustrate the range of actions
that can provoke a crisis.
A more useful approach is to distinguish among differ-
ent motives for provoking a crisis. Snyder and Diesing
distinguish among three types of crises: the "coercive
bargaining type,** a confrontation arising from a challenge
met by resistance, the "war scare" or "security dilemma**
type, arising from fear of imminent attack, and the "prelude
or pretext to an intended attack'* type, provoked to justify
a preplanned military move. A hypothetical category, "acci-
dental crises," is excluded by Snyder and Diesing for lack
17
of empirical evidence that such a crisis has occurred.
Lebow has proposed a similar scheme of four types of crises:
the "justification of hostility" crisis, used as a causus
belli for war, the "spinoff" crisis, a deliberate hostile
act toward a third country taken to further the prosecution
of a war in progress, the "brinkmanship" crisis, a challenge
to a known interest or commitment of another country in
expectation that the other country will be compelled to back
down rather than fight, and the "accidental" crisis, caused
18by an undesired and unsanctioned provocation.
17Snyder and Diesing, pp. 11-17.
18Lebow, Between Peace and War
, pp. 23-97. Lebow
states the 1905 Dogger Bank Incident was an accidental
crisis. See his "Accidents and Crises: The Dogger Bank
Affair," Naval War College Review 31 (Summer 1978): 66-75
-
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Contrasting these two schemes, Snyder and Diesing's
coercive bargaining crisis is the same as Lebow's
brinkmanship crisis, and Snyder and Diesing's pretext to
attack crisis is the same as Lebow's justification of
hostility crisis. Snyder and Diesing's arguments for
treating a war scare as a separate category of crisis are
not persuasive. War scare crises are better viewed as a
form of coercive bargaining crisis in which the security
dilemma has a major impact on crisis stability. Lebow's
spinoff crisis also will not be addressed as separate
category because it does not address the motives for the
crisis so much as the circumstances in which it arose. All
spinoff crises fall into either the coercive bargaining or
pretext to attack categories.
Accidental crises, which were excluded by Snyder and
Diesing but included by Lebow, have not been adequately
addressed in the crisis literature. The role of military
accidents in provoking or exacerbating crises has received
attention, but as yet there are not adequate concepts for
dealing with the effects of accidents. This study will not
treat accidental crises as a separate category. Rather,
inadvertent military incidents will be viewed as provoking
or exacerbating one of the other two major categories of
crises—coercive bargaining (brinkmanship) or pretext to
attack (justification for war)—depending on how the two
sides respond to the incident.
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We are thus left Kith two major categories of crises:
coercive bargaining (brinkmanship) and pretext to attack
(justification for war). Of these two categories, the
coercive bargaining or brinkmanship crisis is the type of
interest in this study. While a pretext to attack or
justification of hostility crisis is certainly an acute
crisis, and could well entail intensive bargaining, the
19
outcome is preordained to be war.
Because the role of force as a political instrument in
crises can vary significantly depending on the nature of the
crisis, this study will distinguish between two categories
of crises: direct and indirect. A direct crisis is one in
which the United States is in direct confrontation with
19Analytical problems can arise when trying to
distinguish between "pretext to attack" and "coercive
bargaining" crises. That the outcome of a crisis was war is
insufficient to establish that crisis as having been a
pretext, it must also be shown that the nation which
precipitated the crisis desired war to be the outcome
regardless of the response by the other side. Complicating
this analysis it the possibility of dual motives in a
coercive bargaining crisis: if the target nation immediately
capitulates to all demands, the initiator suspends his war
plans, but if the target nation resists, the initiator
launches war using the crisis as a pretext. The motives of
the nation precipitating the crisis can also change during
the crisis. A crisis provoked as a pretext for war could
have a non-war outcome if the target nation were to offer
much larger concessions than the initiator had expected to
gain through coercion. Coriveisely, a crisis provoked for
coercion could result in war if the target nation is un-
willing to accept the initiator's demands and the initiator
then decides to use the crisis as grounds for war. Thus,
while its is useful to distinguish among crises on the basis
of motives, the possibility of dual motives and changes in
motives must be recognized.
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another nation. The seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968
generated a direct crisis between the United States and
North Korea. The term direct superpower crisis will be used
to describe a direct crisis in which the Soviet Union is the
adversary. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis was a direct
superpower crisis. An indirect crisis is one in which the
United States is involved because it is supporting a friend
or ally who is a direct participant. The 1958 Taiwan
Straits crisis was an indirect crisis between the United
States, supporting allies on Taiwan, and China. The term
indirect superpower crisis will be used to describe an
indirect crisis in which the United States and the Soviet
Union are brought into confrontation by a conflict between
their respective allies or clients. The 1967 and 1973
Kiddle East Wars generated indirect superpower crises. The
term indirect is used to convey the sense that the outcome
of the crisis, whether or not a Soviet-American war results,
can be influenced by the decisions of the third parties as
20
well as the decisions made by the two superpowers.
20See Williams, pp. 130-34. What is referred to in
this study as an "indirect superpower crisis" is described
as a "limited local war" by Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov. The
difference is primarily one of perspective: this study
focuses on the crisis between the superpowers brought on by
the limited local war, whereas Bar-Simon-Tov' s study focuses
on the local war itself. Bar-Simon-Tov provides a superb
analysis of bargaining relationships in this type of crisis
in The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 17-20.
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In summary, this study will address acute internation-
al crises, which are characterized by a confrontation, short
of war, between two sovereign states, and a perception by
national leaders of a significantly increased danger of war
breaking out. A crisis is a bargaining relationship between
the two sides, and, as such, consists of a series of
interactions between them. Additional features of acute
international crises are that national leaders perceive
important national interests to be at stake in the conflict
and tend to perceive themselves as acting under severe time
constraints. This study will be limited to adversary
crises, excluding intra-alliance crises. Of the two major
categories of crises—coercive bargaining (brinksmanship)
and pretext to attack (justification for war)—the coercive
bargaining crisis is the type that is of interest in this
study. Finally, this study will distinguish between two
categories of crises: direct, in which the United States is
in direct confrontation with another nation, and indirect,
in which the United States is involved through support of a
friend or ally that is a direct participant.
Interaction in Crises
Previous studies of international crises have
implicitly viewed the various political and military
interactions that occur between the two sides as a single
interaction sequence. This can be seen in the definitions
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of crisis given above: Young describes a crisis as "a
process of interaction," while Snyder and Diesing describe a
21
crisis as "a sequence of interactions.** Because both of
these analytical schemes focus primarily on top-level
decisionmaking, with little attention to decisionmaking by
military commanders at the scene of a crisis, the flow of
•vents in a crisis is implicitly viewed as a single sequence
of actions and reactions. This perspective on crisis
interaction will be referred to as the single interaction
sequence model.
The single interaction sequence model does not
accurately describe the complexity of crisis interaction.
What actually occurs in a crisis is multiple interaction
sequences that only partially influence each other. In a
crisis, national political leaders on the two sides are
interacting through diplomatic communications and political
signalling, national military leaders are interacting
through the actions taken with their forces, and military
forces in the field are interacting as they respond to
orders from higher authorities and the actions of adversary
forces. Such multiple interaction sequences, evolving
simultaneously and semi -independently, arise when national
leaders do not make all operational decisions themselves,
but must delegate significant decisionmaking authority to
21
Young, p. 15; Snyder and Diesing, p. 6.
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subordinates. The single interaction sequence model views
these multiple interaction sequences as a single flow of
events.
The weakness of the single interaction sequence model
is that in subtle ways it leads towards a unitary actor
perspective of national behavior. In its pure form, the
unitary actor model assumes that all actions taken by a
nation are at least authorized, il not specifically ordered,
by national leaders. The unitary actor model is typically
used in strategic analyses of the national interests,
objectives, and strategies that lead to crises. Countries
are treated as entities having interests, objectives, and
strategies. The role of organizations and individuals in
the formulation and execution of policy are essentially
ignored. Accidents and the possibility of national leaders
losing control of the momemtum of military actions receive
scant attention. The single interaction sequence model is
compatible with the implicit, even indavertent, assumption
that national leaders have authorized or are in direct
control of the actions taken by their forces in a crisis.
The weaknesses in the unitary actor model are well
recognized, which has lead to widespread use of the bureau-
cratic politics and organizational process models for
analysis of international crises. The bureaucratic politics
model recognizes that the policy perspectives held by parti-
cipants in decisionmaking are shaped by the organizations
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they represent, and that the policy recommendations made by
participants will be influenced by the parochial interests
of their organizations. In the organzational process model
governmental action is viewed as organizational output: the
decisions of government leaders trigger organizational
routines, which primarily determine the nature of the
actions taken. Organizational activity consists largely of
enactment of preestablished routines— the standard operating
procedures and programs which constitute an organization's
22
repertoire.
Although the bureaucratic politics and organizational
process models provide a more accurate description of
decisionmaking than does the unitary actor model, they are
not without their faults. The bureaucratic politics model
tends to treat all policy recommendations made to the
President and his closest advisors as having been motivated
primarily by parochial bureaucratic self-interests. There
is thus an inherent bias toward interpreting evidence of
policy disagreements or actions not ordered by the President
23
•s evidence of bureaucratic politics. The model does not
22Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining
the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1971), pp. 78-96, 162-181.
23Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important?
(Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy No. 7 (Summer
1972): 159-79; Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and
American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences 4
(December 1973): 467-90; Donald Hafner, "Bureaucratic
Politics and 'Those Frigging Missiles': JFK, Cuba and U.S.
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recognize two other possibilities: first, that conflicting
policy recommendations may be based on considerations of
national interest and the feasibility of various courses of
action, rather than bureaucratic self-interest, and, second,
that cabinet-level officals may well base recommendtions on
personal policy preferences or political considerations,
24
rather than on the interests of their bureaucracies.
The bureaucratic politics model fails to recognize
that national policies can be shaped by factors other than
the interplay of bureaucratic politics. This is apparent in
the "cult of the offensive" theory of the origins of World
War I. According to this theory, a principle cause for the
outbreak of war was that the armed forces of the European
powers had a bias for offensive military doctrines. Their
bias for the offensive is portrayed as being the result of
parochial organizational interests—autonomy from civilian
control, larger budgets, and prestige—as opposed to
25
rational analysis of national strategic interests.
Missiles in Turkey, " Orbis 21 (Summer 1977): 307-33; Barton
J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the
Jupiters in Turkey?" Political Science Quarterly 95 (Spring
1980): 103.
24Alexander L. George, Presidential Decsisionmaking in
Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 114-
16.
25Steven Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the
Origins of the First World War," International Security 9
(Summer 1984): 58-107; Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military
Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,"
International Security 9 (Summer 1984): 108-146.
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The "cult of the offensive* theory has come under
criticism for failing to recognize that factors other than
the parochial interests of the militaries also drove the
preference for offensive doctrines. In particular, some of
the European powers needed offensive strategies to fulfill
alliance commitments and others had definite policies of
expansion and aggrandizement. Thus, in this example, the
bureaucratic politics model resulted in explanatory factors
other than parochial organizational interests being ignored
and over-emphasis of the role of such interests in shaping
national strategies. Additionally, Jack S. Levy criticizes
the theory for its emphasis on bureaucratic routines as the
causal link between crises and war. Levy argues that while
bureaucratic factors may well lead to an offensive bias,
that bias does not inevitably cause crises to escalate to
war—additional, non-bur eacratic, conditions must be present
26for war to erupt.
The organizational process model has similar
problems. It implicitly accepts the simple public
administration distinction between policymaking and policy
implementation. Once the President has decided on a course
26Jack S. Levy, "Organizational Routines and the
Causes of War,** International Studies Quarterly 30 (June
1986): 193-222; and Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies,
Offense, and Instability," International Security 11 (Fall
1986): 151-75. Also see the exchange between Snyder and




of action, government organizations serve only to carry out
his orders—essentially devoid of their own policymaking
authority* Organizational routines serve only to explain
how presidential orders are corrupted in the process of
implementation. This, in turn, leads to the implicit
assumption that all actions taken by a nation during a
crisis either are ordered by national leaders in pursuit of
their policy objectives, or should not have occurred and
therefore represent a loss of control over events.
This raises the second weakness in the crisis
management literature, which is that it is based on an
erroneous view of the manner in which military forces are
controlled in crises. This apparently resulted from the
frequently observed phenomenon of United States leaders
exercising close control over military operations in crises,
combined with a lack of familiarity with military command
and control procedures. The crisis management literature
typically describes the control of crisis military
operations as being highly centralized, with top-level
civilian authorities exercising direct control—in contrast
to routine peacetime operations, which are described as
highly decentralized and having little involvement of
civilian political authorities. This description fails to
grasp the complexity of military command and control.
Even in crises, military commanders are delegated
significant authority to make operational decisions on the

*7
employment of their forces—including specified decisions on
the use of force. Under certain circumstances, spelled out
when the delegation of authority was made, military
commanders can use conventional weapons without seeking
permission from higher authorities. The scope of their
authority is spelled out in a variety of documents, which
collectively will be referred to as mechanisms of delegated
command. There are even provisions for commanders to act
contrary to their written instructions when circumstances
27dictate.
Although some scholars have recognized that these
features exist in the United States military command and
control system, the actual complexity of that system has not
28fully grasped in the literature on crisis management. In
the conduct of military operations, commanders at all levels
in the chain of command have significant decisionmaking
authority and can do much more than simply execute
presidential policy decisions. An understanding of the
mechanisms through which authority to make operational
decisions is delegated to military commanders is essential
27See Chapter VII for a detailed description of
military command and control.
28Two notable exceptions to this lack of awareness are
John Steinbruner, "An Assessment of Nuclear Crises," in
Franklin Griffiths and John C. Polanyi, eds., The Dangers of
Nuclear War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980),
pp. 34-49; Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Manage-
ment," International Security 9 (Spring 1985): 99-139.
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for accurately assessing the crisis management problems that
arise when military forces are employed in crises.
Returning to the organizational process model, its two
serious flaws can now be seen. First, it fails to recognize
that many government organizations, the armed forces in
particular, are delegated siginificant authority to make
29detailed decisions on how to carry out policies. The
normal state of affairs— in crises as well as in peacetime
and war—is for there to be innumerable military actions
taking place that the President is not directly
controlling. Second, the organizational process model fails
to account for the fact that decisionmakers in many
goverment organizations, particularly military commanders,
often face circumstances that had not been anticipated by
national leaders when deciding upon a course of action.
Lower-level decisionmakers can be confronted with a require-
ment to make what is essentially a policy decision without
specific guidance on how to make it or sufficient time to
seek further guidance from higher authority. Thus, the
organizational process model must be modified to account
29Allison, pp. 85-6, recognizes that "Government
action requires decentralization of responsibility and
power," but mentions this only as being the reason why
national leaders intervene in the internal processes of
organizations dealing with military and foreign policy. His
model recognizes only one legitimate policymaker, the
President, and treats all other governmental actors as




for the substantial legitimate decisionmaking authority
routinely delegated to military commanders.
Replacement of the single interaction sequence model
of crises in favor of a model recognizing the existence of
multiple interaction sequences corrects many of these
weaknesses in crisis theory. Each interaction sequence
consists of a. series of actions and reactions between
specific groups of decisionmakers on each side. Although
any number of interaction sequences could be postulated,
limited only by the number of decisionmakers capable of
affecting the crisis, this results in a model of excessive
complexity. Instead, a relatively simple model of three
interaction sequences will be used. Each of the three
interaction sequences will be associated with a specific
level in the chain of command, leading to a depiction of
crisis interaction as being stratified into three levels.
This will be referred to as the stratified interaction
model. The stratified interaction model is described in
detail in Chapter III. 30
Although this study is limited to interactions among
military forces, the stratified interaction model can be
applied to any organization that is sufficiently large and
comples that top-level decisionmakers are incapable of
exercising continuous direct control of its myriad
interactions with the environment. Thus, in the U.S.
Government, the stratified interaction model would apply to
the Department of State and other large departments as well
as to the Department of Defense. The model would also
apply, for example, to large corporations and universities.
The organization theory foundations of the stratified
interaction model are discussed in Chapter IV.
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The fundamental condition necessary for crisis
interaction to be stratified is for the military
establishment to be sufficiently large and complex that
national leaders are incapable of exercising constant,
direct, positive control of the actions of all operational
units which might have an impact on the crisis. This
condition is clearly met in the military establishments of
31the United States and the Soviet Union. It can also be
met in the military establishments of much smaller nations
if national leaders do not have the capability or desire to
exercise direct control of their forces.
When constant, direct, positive control of operational
forces is not being exercised, different sets of decision-
makers are delegated authority to make specified operational
decisions. Their decisionmaking authority is bounded by the
existing conditions of delegated command, which could range
from being tightly controlled to being essentially
autonomous. Even forces under the direct control of the
Paul Bracken contends that this condition arises in
the control of nuclear weapons: H In neither country [the
United States and the Soviet Union] do leaders have the
tight central control over nuclear arsenals offered in pub-
lic relations statements. Instead, they rely on the vast
organizations which are needed to manage the complex integra-
tion process. This has profound implications for maintain-
ing political control over nuclear forces as they go on
alert and operate in war." The Command and Control of
Nuclear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983),
p. 8. He also demonstrates that similar conditions pervade




President retain a certain amount of decisionmaking
authority, which can be substantial in some circumstances.
The fact that different sets of decisionmakers are
responsible for making different operational decisions does
not in itself lead to stratified interaction. Hypothetical-
ly, if all of those decisionmakers possessed identical
beliefs, objectives, and perceptions, the operational
decisions they make would be the same ones that national
32leaders would make if exercising positive control.
Organization theory explains why this hypothetical
situation will not necessarily be the case. Different
organizations and sub-organizations possess distinct belief
systems, referred to as an "organzational essences'* or
"bureaucratic ideologies" in organization theory, which
shape the perceptions of their members. In military
organizations, organizational belief systems become
formalized in the strategic and tactical doctrines
formulated for employment of their forces. Such doctrines
typically vary widely among military organizations.
Decisionmaking in organizations is bounded by cognitive
limits on rationality, which generate a range of mechanisms
for simplifying environmental complexity, coping with
ambiguity, and dealing with value complexity. A principle
32This is the assumption that is made in the "unitary
actor" model of national behavior. For example, see Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1981), pp. 20-23.
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•ffect of the cognitive limits on decisionmaking is to give
prominence to the beliefs and perceptions held by individual
decisionmakers. Thus, there are ample theoretical grounds
for expecting that military commanders will make operational
decisions different from those that national leaders would
have made if they had been in a position to make them.
Paul Bracken's concept of "tightly coupled forces" is
an important contribution toward a more accurate understand-
ing of how the U.S. command and control system affects
crisis interaction. Bracken contends that U.S. and Soviet
nuclear forces are tightly coupled due to two features of
their respective command and control systems: vertical
integration of early warning sensors with operational
On organizational ideology see Philip Selznick, TVA
and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1953), pp. 47-50; Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 237-46; Morton H.
Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washing-
ton, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 26-8. On
military doctrine as a belief system see Richard K. Betts,
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 115-26.
On cognitive limits on decisionmaking see Herbert A.
Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, " in Herbert
A. Simon, ed.. Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 241-60; James G. March and
Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1958), Chapter 6; Herbert A. Simon, "Theories of
Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science,"
American Economic Review 49 (June 1959): 253-83; Richard M.
Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 116-125;
John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New
Dimensions of Political Analysi s (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1974), pp. 88-139. On methods of coping
wirh cognitive limits, see George, Presidential Decision-
making , pp. 25-53.
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nuclear forces on each side, necessary to reduce their
vulnerability to surprise attack, and a de facto coupling of
U.S. and Soviet forces through each side's warning and
34intelligence networks. Mutual coupling can drive an
interaction process between Soviet and American nuclear
forces:
This mutual coupling occurs because a
threatening Soviet military action or alert can be
detected almost immediately by American warning and
intelligence systems and conveyed to force
commanders. The detected action may not have a clear
meaning, but because of its possible consequences
protective measures must be taken against it. The
action-reaction process does not necessarily stop
after two moves, however. It can proceed to many
moves and can, and often does, extend from sea-based
forces to air- and land-based forces because of the
effect of tight coupling.
This action-reaction process can produce what Bracken call?
"a mutually reinforcing alert, ** in which U.S. and Soviet
actions prompt increasingly higher alert levels on both
sides. A mutually reinforcing alert, in turn, would
exacerbate political tensions because of the near
impossibility of distinguishing precautionary military moves
36from hostile political moves.
Bracken's concept of tight coupling is an important
contribution to understanding crisis interaction, but it








between American and soviet forces. Two modifications to
Bracken's concept are needed to derive the stratified
interaction model. First, national leaders are not
necessarily an integral element in all aspects of the
vertical integration of sensors with forces: some major
warning and intelligence systems are directly linked to the
commanders of operational military forces, who have been
been delegated authority to take certain actions on the
basis of warning provided by those systems without further
orders from national leaders. Bracken makes this clear in
his description of the command and control system, but
includes national leaders in the action-reaction loop when
describing the process of mutually reinforcing alerts. To a
degree, that process can proceed without national leaders
specifically having to order alerting actions as military
commanders act in compliance with their standing orders.
The second modification to Bracken's model is that
U.S. conventional forces are vertically integrated with
warning and intelligence systems, and tightly coupled with
Soviet conventional forces, in a manner similar to nuclear
forces. The reasons for this are the same: the ability of
U.S. conventional forces to successfully execute their
wartime missions can be crucially dependent on strategic
warning of an impending Soviet attack. This is most clear
in NATO, where the alliance defense strategy is based on
having sufficient warning to complete essential defensive
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preparations. It is also true for the U.S. Navy, whose
Maritime Strategy is founded on early and rapid surging of
naval forces to key forward operating areas. An action by
either side to increase the readiness of major conventional
force commands is readily detected by the command on the
other side responsible for dealing with that threat, which
then takes actions to compensate for the changed strategic
situation. This is the normal state of affairs in
peacetime. As a crisis situation emerges the tightness of
coupling between the conventional forces of the two sides
actually increases as surveillance efforts are stepped up
and focused on those adversary forces most likely to play an
immediate role in the crisis.
In some military environments, particularly in naval
warfare, U.S. and Soviet forces are tightly coupled down to
the tactical level. At any given moment U.S. and Soviet
tactical forces are operating in close proximity in several
parts of the world: their naval forces routinely intermingle
on the high seas, their ground forces are within sight of
each other along the border between East and West Germany,
and their surveillance aircraft are monitoring and being
monitored by each other's air defense systems. Because a
surprise attack by either side could be tactically decisive
in an individual engagement, operational forces on both
sides keep their adversary under close and constant
surveillance. An action by either side's tactical forces to
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increase their readiness or improve their tactical situation
is readily detected by the other side's tactical forces in
the vicinity, which then take actions to compensate for the
changed tactical situation. Again, this is the normal state
of affairs in peacetime, and the intensity of surveillance
increases as the level of tensions rise in a crisis—further
tightening the coupling between the forces of the two sides.
Thus, the actual situation is that the tight coupling
of U.S. and Soviet forces is stratified into tight coupling
at two levels: the major command level, including strategic
nuclear forces and other major commands, and the tactical
level, encompassing operational units in close proximity in
the field or at sea. Significant information on the status
of the other side's forces flows directly to military
commanders at these levels from organic sensors under their
control and dual reporting from intelligence sources outside
their commands. Military commanders are only partially
dependent on the chain of command to tell them what the
Adversary is doing, and are delegated authority to take
certain specified measures to adapt the readiness of their
forces to changes in the adversary's forces. Military
commanders are obligated to immediately report such actions
to their superiors, thus allowing their orders to be
37
countermanded, if necessary. The key point is that within





specified limits, control of U.S. operational forces is
delegated widely to commanders with their own sources of
intelligence on Soviet forces.
In summary, interaction between the two sides in
crises has been viewed in terms of an implicit single
interaction sequence model that does not accurately describe
the complexity of crisis interaction. The weakness of the
single interaction sequence model is that in subtle ways it
leads toward an implicit assumption that national leaders
are in control of the actions taken by their nation in a
crisis. The bureaucratic politics and organizational
process models do not entirely correct this weakness and
have serious problems of their own. The key to correcting
these weaknesses is a more accurate understanding of the
complexity of the military command and control system, in
which military commanders are delegated significant
decisionmaking authority.
A model containing three interaction sequences—each
sequence associated with a specific level in the chain of
command—will be used. Crisis interaction is stratified
when the military establishment of a country is sufficiently
large and complex that national leaders are incapable of
exercising direct control over all operational units that
could have an impact on a crisis. Paul Bracken's concept of
"tightly coupled forces"—modified by the observation that
tight coupling is stratified, occurring separately at the
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strategic and tactical levels—then explains how interaction
sequences can arise.
Crisis Management
A nation confronted by a crisis can choose from among
three general strategies for dealing with it: capitulation,
war, or crisis management. As defined by Williams, "crisis
management is concerned on the one hand with the procedures
for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not
get out of hand and lead to war, and on the other hand with
ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis
in which the vital interests of the state are secured and
38protected." These two elements are also central to the
definition of crisis management used by Snyder and Diesing:
first, exercise of detailed control by the top leadership in
order to to avoid war, and, second, efforts by national
leaders "to advance or protect their state's interests, to
win or at least to maximize gains or minimize losses, and if
possible to settle the issue in conflict so that it does not
39produce further crises." This is the definition of crisis
management that will be used in this study.
The essence of the crisis management problem is to
find the optimum balance between efforts to advance or
3
*Williaras, p. 30.
39Snyder and Diesing, p. 207.
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protect national interests, and efforts to avoid war.
Williams describes crisis management as an attempt to
balance attainment of national goals in the bilateral
competition against efforts to avoid the shared danger of
40
war. Similarly, Snyder describes crisis management as
balancing coercion against disaster avoidance, and balancing
41
accommodation against loss avoidance. This conceptualiza-
tion of crisis management as balancing between pursuit of
national interests and avoidance of war will be a foundation
for the concept of political-military tensions to be
developed in Chapter III.
The ability of national leaders to maintain control
over events is a central problem in crises. Decisionmakers
commonly perceive that a crisis can develop a self-
sustaining force or impetus of its own, degrading their
42
ability to control events. According to Thomas C.
Schelling, "It is the essence of a crisis that the
participants are not fully in control of events; they take
steps and make decisions that raise or lower the danger, but
43in a realm or risk and uncertainty.** Thus, maintaining
40Williams, p. 29.
Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining,** p. 240. Also
see Snyder and Diesing, p. 270.
42
Young, pp. 19-20; Williams, p. 26.
43Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 97.
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control over events also means maintaining control of risks,
particularly the risk of war breaking out inadvertently.
On the other hand, Schelling's description of
brinkmanship as "manipulating the shared risk of war," and
his concept of "the threat that leaves something to chance"
do not convey an accurate image of how national leaders
44
manage crises. Snyder has observed that, while delegating
control of military operations to subordinate commanders (or
threatening to do so) can be used as a coercive tactic in
crisis bargaining, national leaders normally emphasize
maintaining direct control of military forces in order to
45
avoid war. Thus, Schelling's concepts of manipulation of
risk and the threat that leaves something to chance are
better viewed as interpretations of the nature of crisis
interaction, rather than as strategies consciously employed
by national leaders in crises.
National leader:' can be confronted with serious
problems in attempting to maintain control over events in a
crisis. Glenn Snyder identifies four "autonomous risks"
that could cause a loss of control over events: military
action being driven by its own logic and momentum, national
leaders losing control over their military commanders, lack
of military options other than escalatory war plans, and
44 Ibid., pp. 99-105; Schelling, Strategy of Conflict ,
pp. 187-203.
45Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," pp. 244-245.
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impairment of rational calculation by psychological factors
46
under the stress of a crisis. This study will treat these
problems somewhat differently, but Snyder's list of
autonomous risks is a useful summary of the types of
concerns that have been raised in the crisis managment
literature.
A wide range of actions can be taken with military
forces during a crisis in pursuit of military and political
objectives. Coral Bell identifies "signals , " threats or
offers communicated to the other side, as the basic
instrument of crisis management, and notes that some of the
most effective signals are movements of military
47
resources. As Bell suggests, political signalling is a
primary function of military forces in crises, competing
with or even overshadowing their nominal military missions.
Alexander L. George lists five general uses to which
military forces can be put in crises: reducing the
vulnerability and increasing the readiness of theater and
strategic nuclear forces, signaling limited intentions and
an interest in avoiding escalation, engaging in a test of
military capabilities within restrictive ground rules,
conveying military threats for coercive pressure in








neutralizing his coercive threats. These categories show
the ways in which military forces serve both political and
military purposes in crises.
Although attempts have been made to draw distinctions
between actions taken for military purposes and actions
taken for political purposes, virtually all military actions
undertaken in a crisis have a dual political-military
nature. Actions taken for military purposes, such as
increasing the readiness or reducing the vulnerability of
military forces, can have political impact if perceived as a
signal of hostile intent. Conversely, actions taken for
political purposes, such as withdrawing forces from a
contested area to signal limited objectives or increasing
forces in a contested area to apply coercive or deterrent
pressure, can have military impact by shifting the local
balance of forces and altering the capabilities available to
local military commanders. In a crisis, political missions
such as coercion and signalling intentions are assigned to
forces that must also be ready for limited combat operations
and the possibility of sudden escalation to full-scale war.
Studies of crisis management have identified stringent
requirements for its success. Foremost among these, as Bell
points out, are imposing limits on the military means
48Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: The
Interaction of Political and Military Considerations,"
Survival 26 (September/October 1984): 229-33.
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employed that are commensurate with the limited ends of
military action in crises, and maintaining close diplomatic
49
control of military measures. The basic requirement that
national leaders maintain close control of military
operations is central to the more detailed lists of
requirements and techniques proposed in other studies.
In addition to the "political" requirements of crisis
management—limiting objectives and the means employed to
secure those objectives—George also identifies seven
"operational" requirements for crisis management: First,
political authorities must control military operations,
including details of deployments and low-level actions as
well as selection and timing of the moves. Second, the
tempo of military operations may have to be deliberately
slowed, creating pauses for the exchange of diplomatic
signals, assessment, and decisionmaking. Third, military
actions have to be coordinated with diplomatic actions in an
integrated strategy for resolving the crisis acceptably
without war. Fourth, military actions taken for signalling
purposes must send clear and appropriate signals consistent
with diplomatic objectives. Fifth, military options should
be avoided that give the adversary the impression of an
impending resort to large-scale warfare, possibly prompting





should be chosen that signal a desire to negotiate a
solution to the crisis rather than to seek a military
solution. Seventh, military options and diplomatic
proposals should leave the adversary a way out of the crisis
50
compatible with his fundamental interests. These crisis
management requirements have important implications for
manner in which military force is used and controlled in
crises.
Ole R. Holiti has identified six crisis management
techniques, four of which address the use of force in
crises: First, avoiding steps that seal off "escape
routes." This precludes military actions which the other
side would perceive as leaving it no way out of the crisis
other than war. This technique places limits on military
options, calling for carefully limited use of force as
opposed to drastic, precipitous military actions. Second,
orchestrating actions, particularly military actions, with
declarations of intent so as to use multiple channels of
communication to convey the same message. This also affects
the employment of military forces, requiring that their
actions be coordinated with diplomatic moves for signaling
purposes. Third, making efforts to slow the pace of crisis
50George, "Crisis Management," p. 226. An earlier,
slightly different version of this list appeared in his "The
Development of Doctrine and Strategy," in Alexander L.
George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of




•vents. This requires dampening the tempo of military
operations, which typically emphasize speed of execution for
tactical success. Fourth, keeping responsible policy makers
in control of the details of implementation as well as broad
strategic decisions. This raises the civil-military
relations issue of who is to control execution of military
operations in the field, and whether political or military
51
considerations should govern operational decisions.
The requirements and techniques identified by George
and Holsti are similar. Both emphasize close control of
military operations by national leaders, and tailoring of
military options to support crisis bargaining and avoid
escalation of the crisis.
A significant weakness in the crisis managment
literature is that, with few notable exceptions, there has
been scant recognition that tensions can arise in attempting
to reconcile military considerations with crisis management
requirements. This arises from the nature of crisis
management: the objective is to protect vital national
interests as well as to avoid war, and military force is
being employed for signaling and coercion. Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara contributed to, and may have
originated, the lack of attention to the military dimension




Cuban Missile Crisis that "Today there is no longer any such
52thing as strategy, there is only crisis management."
McNamara overlooked that there are requirements for
effective employment of military force just as there are
requirements for effective crisis management, and conflicts
nay arise between the two sets of requirements.
Alexander L. George rejects McNamara 's antithesis
between strategy and crisis management, observing that "in
reality, policy-makers need to employ broad strategic
principles to help them to reconcile and integrate, however
imperfectly, the often competing requirements of force and
53diplomacy." Although he makes it clear that political
considerations are paramount and that close presidential
control of military operations is crucial for effective
crisis management, George points out that "there are likely
to be severe limits on the ability of top-level political
authorities to orchestrate military operations and serious
risks if they attempt to carry •micro-management' of
54
military forces too far." This is an crucial point that
has received little attention in crisis management studies.
The nature of the tensions that can arise between
political and military considerations in a crisis have been
52Quoted in Bell, p. 2.




described by Eliot A. Cohen in an assessment of the Cuban
Missile Crisis:
The events of October 1962 created considerable
tension between military men seeking to protect those
under their command, in the event of an outbreak of
war, and politicians seeking to give the other side
time to think and give in. Had men in fact died as a
result, had ships sunk or airplanes fallen by che
score, the crisis in civil-military relations would
have taken a more dramatic turn, one in which, I
suspect, civilian leaders would have accommodated
commanders far more than they actually did.
Thus, the weakness in the crisis management literature is
that it has not recognized that important, legitimate
military considerations arise when military forces are
employed as a political instrument in crises, and that
tensions can arise in attempting to reconcile military
requirements with crisis management requirements. Crisis
management did not replace military strategy—other than in
the minds of some social scientists—it created complex
challenges for effective formulation and execution of
military strategy on behalf of political-diplomatic
objectives.
In summary, crisis management is the exercise of
detailed control of diplomatic and military activities by
national leaders in order to to avoid war while attempting
to advance their state's interests or protect those
interests against losses during a crisis. The essence of
the crisis management is to find the optimum balance between
55Bliot A. Cohen, p. 6.
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efforts to advance or protect national interests, and
efforts to avoid war. Political signalling is a primary
function of military forces in crises. Virtually all
military actions undertaken in a crisis have a dual
political-military impact: sending political signals and
affecting the balance of military capabilities. Foremost
among the requirements for the success of crisis management
are imposing limits on the military means employed which are
commensurate with the limited ends being sought, maintaining
close top-level control of military measures, and carefully
tailoring military options to support crisis bargaining and
avoid escalation. A serious weakness of the crisis
management literature is that it has not adequately
addressed the tensions that can arise between these crisis
management requirements and military considerations.
Crisis Stability
The third weakness in the crisis management literature
is that the concept of crisis stability is poorly developed
and there is a poor understanding of the escalation
processes that could cause a crisis to escalate to war.
Crisis stability is viewed as being primarily a function of
weapons technology, particularly the degree to which it
gives an advantage to the offense, and military doctrine,
particularly doctrines emphasizing the superiority of the
offensive. Lacking is an appreciation of the operational
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factors that affect crisis stability once a decision is made
to employ military forces in a crisis. The escalation
processes that could cause a crisis to escalate to war are
also poorly developed. There is growing concern over
inadvertent or accidental war, but these concepts are not
well defined and there is a very low probability that any of
the scenarios would occur.
The definition of crisis stability generally accepted
in the crisis management literature is that crisis stability
exists when neither side has an incentive to strike the
first military blow, launching a preemptive attack on the
other side. Alexander George adds a second dimension:
crisis stability exists when neither side perceives that
crisis management had broken down and cannot be restored.
Thus, crisis stability is a function of the strategies each
side is pursuing in the crisis as well as a function of
weapons technology. This will be discussed further below.
The concept of crisis stability has generally been
used to assess the stability implications of particular
weapons technologies and force postures. Weapons that
enhance crisis stability are survivable, providing an
assured retaliatory capability, and do not provide first
strike capabilities for use against the other side. Weapons
that degrade crisis stability are vulnerable to preemption,
potentially confronting leaders with a "use them or lose
them" dilemma in a crisis. The most destabilizing weapons
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re those which are valuable for launching a first strike
—
such as by providing a rapid, precise hard-target kill
capability—but which are themselves vulnerable to
preemption. Crisis stability as a technological
characteristic is also applied to command and control
systems: survivable systems enhance stability by ensuring
that retaliation can be executed, while vulnerable systems
degrade stability by providing the other side an incentive
to preempt for damage limitation purposes.
Although this definition of crisis stability is useful
for assessing weapons and force postures, it is too narrowly
focused on technology for the purposes of this study. What
is needed is a broader definition encompassing the full
range of factors which could cause efforts at crisis manage-
ment and escalation control to fail, resulting in war.
The concept of the security dilemma, originally
proposed by Herbert Butterfield, provides a useful
foundation for defining a broader concept of crisis
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age
(Princeton, NJ: Princetion University Press, 1959), pp. 300-
303; Lebow, Between Peace and War , pp. 238-242; Holsti, pp.
228-233; and Schelling, Arms and Influence , pp. 224-225, 234-
235. On the role of command and control system vulner-
ability in the security dilemma, see Phil Williams, "Crisis
Management: The Role of Command, Control and Communica-
tions, " RUSI Journal 128 (December 1983): 33-39; Garry-D.
Brewer and Paul Bracken, "Some Missing Pieces of the C I
Puzzle," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (September 1984):
451-469; and Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control :
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: Brookings




stability. The security dilemma, as defined by Robert
Jervis, is that "many of the means by which a state tries to
58increase its security decrease the security of others. "'
According to Jervis the intensity of the security dilemma is
• function of three factors: (a) the condition of anarchy in
international politics, in which states tend to pursue
security unilaterally rather than accept the risks of
cooperation with potential adversaries; (b) geography,
commitments, and beliefs, which can create the perception
that the security of the state and its interests (such as
territories abroad, commerce, and allies), requires the
ability to take offensive action against others; and (c) the
perception that military technology and geography give
offense a strategic advantage over defense, which can be
exacerbated by difficulty in distinguishing defensive from
offensive weapons. When a decisive advantage can be gained
by striking first, such as when military forces are
vulnerable to preemption, even a status quo power without
59
expansionist objectives has an incentive to strike first.
The security dilemma is used by Butterfield and Jervis
primarily to explain how arms races and international
57Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations
(London: Collins, 1951), pp. 19-20.
58Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security





tensions arise from unilateral efforts by states to protect
their security and maintain the balance of power. But
Jervis suggests it also applies to crisis stability: "The
second aspect [of the offense-defense balance]—whether it
is better to attack or defend—influences short-run
stability. When the offense has the advantage, a state's
reaction to international tension will increase the chances
of war.** The reason for this is that when there are
incentives for preemption and reciprocal fear of surprise
attack , "There is no way for the state to increase its
security without menacing, or even attacking, the other."
In Jervis' view, this problem arises from the existence of
the security dilemma as a feature of international politics,
as opposed to being a phenomenon unique to crises.
Before applying the security dilemma to crisis
stability, a expansion of Jervis' definition is needed.
Reciprocal fear of surprise attack and incentives for
preemption arise from three sources: the perceived impact of
weapons technology on the nature of warfare, perceptions of
the adversary's military strategy and doctrine, and the
operations being conducted by military forces.
60Ibid., p. 188.
This is derived from Schelling's description of how
weaponry influences the nature of crises and the processes
by which wars start: "To impute this influence to
•weaponry' is to focus too narrowly on technology. It is
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The perceived impact of weapons technology on the
nature of warfare exacerbates the security dilemma in
crises. The offense-defense balance applies to all aspects
of warfare: conventional ground, air, and naval warfare, as
well as strategic nuclear warfare. When the prevailing
weapons technologies in a particular area of warfare are
perceived as giving an inordinate advantage to offensive
action or being the first to strike, military commanders
will have a strong incentive to preempt. The offense-
defense balance varies across warfare areas: as will be
explained in the next chapter, naval warfare is especially
offense-dominant, resulting in great stress being placed on
striking first.
The perceived impact of weapons technology on the
offense-defense balance is not the only factor exacerbating
the security dilemma, perceptions of military strategy and
doctrine are equally important. In fact, the difficulty of
distinguishing offensive from defensive weapons tends to
Bake strategy and doctrine more important than technology.
Most weapons, including virtually all conventional weapons
not emplaced in fixed fortifications, can be used with
nearly equal effectiveness for offense or defense. Their
offensive or defensive nature is predominantly a function of
weapons, organization, plans, geography, communications,
warning systems, intelligence, and even beliefs and
doctrines about the conduct of war that together have this
influence.** Arms and Influence , p. 234.
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the military strategy and doctrine prescribing how those
weapons will be used in war.
Zn assessing the threat posed by a potential enemy's
forces and in making contingency plans against that threat,
decisionmakers attempt to estimate the adversary's
62intentions. Estimating intentions, in turn, requires
either estimating or make assumptions about how the
adversary would use its forces in wartime, which is the
essence of military strategy and doctrine. Thus, the
security dilemma can arise from perceptions held by each
side that the other side has adopted an offensive military
strategy or a military doctrine emphasizing preemption or
surprise attack. In circumstances of mutual perceptions of
offensive strategies, actions taken by each side to increase
its security, even when motivated by defensive intentions,
will be perceived by the other side as decreasing its
security. This idea in implicit in Jervis' definition of
62
J. David Singer, "Threat Perception and the Armament
Tension Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (March
1958): 93-94; Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation
as a Determinant of International Action," in Herbert C.
Kelman, ed. , International Behavior: A Social-Psychological
Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinetvart and Winston, 1965)
,
p. 400; Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International
Crisis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 5.
63The worst case from a crisis stability perspective
is when both sides in a conflict have adopted offensive
strategies, and accurately perceive that the other side has
adopted an offensive strategy. Under these circumstances
each side has an incentive to strike first so as to be able
to effectively execute its own strategy and preempt the
enemy from executing his. The "cult of the offensive"
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the security dilemma, but is subordinated to his emphasis on
technology.
The third source of the security dilemma is the
64
operations being conducted by military forces. In his
study of threat perception, Dean G. Pruitt identifies
military actions as an important source of evidence used to
infer the intentions of an adversary. That military
operations are used as an indicator of intent is, of course,
the basis for using military forces for signalling in
crises. But crisis military operations also help to define
whether the forces being employed have an offensive or
defensive purpose. Military operations can thus perform the
same function as strategy and doctrine: defining or
signalling the offensive or defensive nature of forces that
whose technological characteristics make them suitable for
either role. Naval vessels, for example, may appear
defensive when kept close to their homeports, far from the
scene of a crisis, but appear offensive to an adversary when
deployed off his coast. This can occur regardless of the
school of thought contends that this was the strategic
environment in 1914, when a relatively minor incident
rapidly escalated to war. See Van Evera, pp. 58-107; and
Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 108-146
64Scott Sagan refers to this as "the operational
dimension of crisis stability." See Sagan, "Managing





intention of the deployment, which could well be defensive
or deterrent. Similarly, forward deployed naval vessels can
appear to have offensive purposes even when the national
strategy they support is essentially defensive or deter-
rent. Military operations can also reinforce perceptions of
strategy and doctrine, appearing to confirm estimates or
assumptions that an adversary holds an offensive strategy.
To apply the security dilemma idea to analysis of
crisis stability, this study will use the concept of the
crisis security dilemma : In a crisis, many of the actions a
state takes to increase its security and improve its
bargaining position decrease the security of the adversary,
at least in his perception. This is a particular case of
the security dilemma as defined by Jervis. The primary
difference is that in a crisis the most important sources of
the dilemma are the military strategies and doctrines of the
two sides, and especially the military operations being
conducted by the two sides. Under normal (non-crisis)
peacetime conditions, the "many actions'* Jervis refers to
are primarily force posture and weapons procurement
decisions, in which the technological characteristics of the
forces play an important role in determining the offense-
defense balance. In a crisis, decisionmakers focus on the
adversary's immediate intentions and the actions he is
taking with his military forces, making these factors
predominant in determining the offense-defense balance. The
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implication is that the security dilemma can be much more
severe in a crisis, when military forces are being used for
coercive and deterrent threats.
A second aspect of crisis stability that is not well
developed in the existing literature is escalation from
crisis to war. Concepts that have been used to address this
topic include the escalation spiral and accidental or
inadvertent paths to war. Although some of these concepts
are useful, they have not been well integrated with other
crisis and crisis management concepts. Even the point at
which a confrontation shifts from being a crisis to being a
war is unclear in the literature. We lack a separate term
to describe the transitional state of conflict that exists
during the period after violence erupts but before a limited
war exists. Some analyses implicitly limit crises to
political disputes in which use of military force is only
threatened, not actually carried out. Other analyses
encompass the use of force, such as to achieve a military
fait accompli in a crisis. Both approaches have merit, but
for the purposes of this study the definition of crisis will
include limited use of force as well as the threat of force.
The distinction between crisis and limited war will be
based on the perceptions and strategies held by national
leaders on the two sides. If they perceive themselves as
involved in a crisis or as attempting to prevent a conflict
from erupting in war, then the conflict is a crisis even if

98
fighting has broken out. If they perceive themselves as
launching or fighting a limited war, then the conflict has
transitioned to a state of war, no matter how limited.
There are potential problems with this approach. The
point at which a confrontation shifts from being a crisis to
being a war could be difficult to ascertain in actual cases,
and even be unclear in the minds of leaders on the two
sides. Nations can be involved in a "phony war," in which
there is a declared state of war but no fighting, as were
Britain and France with Germany from September 1939 to May
1940. Nations can also be involved in recurring episodes of
intense but brief fighting without there being a declared
state of war, as were the Soviet Union and Japan along the
Manchurian border from July 1938 to September 1939, and the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in 1969.
Nevertheless, basing the distinction between crisis and war
on the perceptions of the participants is superior to an
arbitrary definition of crisis that excludes the use of
force.
Several studies of conflict and war have proposed that
an escalation spiral can cause tensions and insecurities to
66
erupt in war. In a refinement of this theory, Richard
Smoke concludes that there is an escalation dynamic driven
66For a discussion of spiral theories of escalation,
see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), pp. 58-113.
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by rising stakes in the outcome of a conflict and an action*
reaction cycle. Rising stakes increase the motivation of
national leaders to prevail in the crisis. In the action-
reaction process an escalatory action by one side provokes
an escalatory reaction by the other side in recurring
67
cycles. Although Smoke's analysis is limited to the
escalation processes that occur after war has broken out, it
is equally applicable to the escalation processes that can
arise after fighting erupts in a crisis.
The escalation spiral that led to the outbreak of
World War X is often cited as the classic example of
escalation dynamics at work. Bell has described the 1914
case as being an example of a "crisis slide," in which a
series of crises gather irresistible momentum toward war.
The escalatory impact of a crisis slide is that "the
decisionmakers of one or more of the dominant powers believe
that they see the options available to them steadily closing
68down to the single option of war or unlimited defeat."
The events of 1914 have also led to the view that inflexible
war plans and offensive military doctrines can create a
strategic environment in which national leaders are unable
to control the momentum of events and seek a diplomatic
67Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 23-35, 268-





•olution to a crisis. Thus, the danger of escalation is
not limited to the effects of individual events, but
includes the danger of an uncontrollable escalatory cycle
leading to war.
Understanding the events or pressures that can trigger
an escalatory spiral is at least as important as under-
standing the dynamics that drive the spiral after it
starts. Glenn Snyder has identified four "autonomous risks'*
that could trigger uncontrollable escalation: military
action being driven by its own logic and momentum, national
leaders losing control over their military commanders, lack
of military options other than escalatory war plans combined
with pressure to take action, and psychological factors
impairing rational calculation under the stress of a
crisis. Of these, Snyder views psychological factors
impairing rational calculation as most likely and losing
70
control over military commanders as least likely. All of
these factors are compatible with Smoke's theory of
escalation dynamics.
Several possible paths to war have been proposed. The
basic categories are premeditated attack, catalytic war,
accidental war, preemption, and inadvertent war. A
premeditated war is launched deliberately, usually (but not
eg
Van Evera, pp. 63-65, 71-79; Jack Snyder, "Civil-
Military Relations,- pp. 112-114, 125-129.
70Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining,** p. 241.
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Always) by surprise attack, and is often described as a
••bolt from the blue" attack. Catalytic war is one started
by a third party, which can be either a nation or some other
group, such as a terrorist organization. The typical
scenario is the launching of a nuclear weapon at one of the
two superpowers, which responds by retaliating against the
other superpower thinking it to be the source of the initial
blow. Accidental war is the result of either equipment
malfunctions or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by
military commanders. Equipment malfunctions can occur in
strategic warning systems, providing false warning of an
attack; in command and control or battle management systems,
again providing false indications of attack or spurious
orders to launch an attack; or in nuclear weapons and their
control systems, resulting in accidental launch of nuclear
71
weapons. These three paths to war are generally regarded
as much less likely than the other two. Additionally,
although these three paths to was can occur whether or not a
crisis is in progress, they are probably more likely to
occur in crises as military forces are alerted for readiness
and political signalling purposes.
71Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy
and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961)
,
pp. 10-17; Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Praeger,
1965), pp. 284-6; Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Introduction," in Graham T. Allison,
Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks, Doves
& Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1985), pp. 10-13.
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The remaining two paths to war are particularly
relevant to the study of crises. Preemption is motivated by
perceptions and fears that the other side is about to strike
72first. This is the path to war that results from the
crisis security dilemma. Preemption can, of course, also
result from correct perceptions that the other side is about
to launch a premeditated attack. There are thus two
preemption paths, one generated by the crisis security
dilemma and the other generated by an actual impending
premeditated attack. They are much different in terms of
the analytical questions they raise: the first focuses on
the dynamics of the security dilemma, while the second
focuses on deliberate decisions to resort to war rather than
continue crisis management. This study will address the
preemption path that arises from the crisis security
73dilemma.
Inadvertent war arises from an escalation process in
which the two sides employ increasingly threatening military
and diplomatic moves—including alerts, mobilizations,
deployments of forces, small-scale demonstrative use of
conventional weapons, and ultimatums—in an effort at
gaining leverage in crisis bargaining and improving their
72Allison, Carnesale and Nye, pp. 10-13.
73Derived from Paul Bracken, "Accidental War," in
Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
eds
.
, Hawks, Doves & Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear
War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), pp. 29-37.
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military positions in the event diplomacy fails. Accidents
and other inadvertent military actions can contribute to
this process. Such deliberate and inadvertent actions
increase tensions and harden resolve (similar to the manner
described by Smoke) until the process results in a war that
neither side wanted or expected when the crisis first
arose. This is a useful concept, but suffers from
insufficient specificity as to how the individual actions
contribute to an escalation process and omits significant
factors that can also contribute to inadvertent war.
There are two weaknesses in the inadvertent war
concept. First, it does not directly address the nature of
the decision for war that arises out of the escalation
process. There is just an "unintended eruption" of war, in
74Bracken's words. Even in the inadvertent war scenario,
the decision for war falls into one of two categories:
deliberate or preemptive. A deliberate decision for war
could result from the perception that the other. side cannot
be bargained or coerced into making the concessions being
demanded, leaving war as the only perceived means for
avoiding severe damage to vital national objectives. The
distinction between this type of inadvertent war and
premeditated war is that in the inadvertent path the




crisis, after an escalatory process defeats crisis
bargaining. A decision for preemptive war could result from
the crisis security dilemma—the escalatory process
generates perceptions that the adversary is preparing to
strike first.
The second weakness in the inadvertent war concept is
that it does not capture the true complexity of the crisis
escalation process. In a crisis, interaction is stratified
into multiple interaction sequences that can evolve semi-
independent ly of each other. It is theoretically possible
for fighting to erupt and an escalation process to be set in
notion between the forces of the two sides at the scene of a
crisis without escalation occurring in other interaction
sequences between the two sides. There appear to be factors
that inhibit the crisis escalation process from occurring
and inhibit inadvertent war from resulting even when
escalation does occur in a crisis. Identifying those
factors will make a significant contribution to our
understanding of the inadvertent war path and the strengths
and weaknesses of crisis management.
In summary, the crisis security dilemma is that in a
crisis, many of the actions a state takes to increase its
security and improve its bargaining position decrease, or
can appear to decrease, the security of the adversary. The
most important sources of the dilemma are the military
doctrines and the military operations being conducted by the
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two sides. The definition of crisis used in this study will
include limited use of force as well as the threat of force,
with the distinction between crisis and limited war based on
the perceptions held by national leaders on the two sides.
There is an escalation dynamic driven by rising stakes in
the outcome of a conflict, which increase the motivation of
national leaders to prevail, and an action-reaction process,
in which an escalatory action by one side provokes an
escalatory reaction by the other side in recurring cycles.
The preemption and inadvertent paths to war are
particularly relevant to the study of crises. Preemption is
motivated by perceptions that the other side is about to
strike first. The preemption path to war that results from
the crisis security dilemma is the path that will be
addressed in this study. Inadvertent war arises from an
escalation process in which the two sides employ
increasingly threatening military and diplomatic moves in an
effort at gaining leverage in crisis bargaining and
improving their military positions. Inadvertent military
incidents contribute to this process. The escalation
process increases tensions and hardens resolve until it
results in a deliberate or preemptive decision for war.
Misperception in Crises
One of the most difficult problems of crisis
management is avoiding misperceptions of intentions and
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objectives. Misperceptions can affect crisis management in
three ways. First, they can erode the credibility of
deterrent threats. Second, they can defeat attempts to
signal limited objectives and a desire to resolve the
conflict without war. Third, they can exacerbate the
problem of the crisis security dilemma.
Deterrent threats often play a major role in crisis
management. The effectiveness of a deterrent threat is
dependent upon its credibility. For a variety of military,
political, and cognitive reasons, the nation to be deterred
may not perceive the deterrent threat as being credible, or
may miscalculate the consequences of challenging a deterrent
75threat, leading to a failure of deterrence. The
credibility of extended deterrence can be particularly
difficult. Once again, a variety of factors can cause an
adversary to doubt the credibility of a commitment to defend
76
an ally or client. The relevant points for this study are
that national leaders are generally concerned about the
75William W. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence
(Princeton, NJ: Center for International Studies, 1954), pp.
6-8; Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (hew York:
Harper, 1960), pp. 40-41; Alexander L. George and Richard
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 64;
Schelling, Arms and Influence , pp. 36-43.
76Schelling, Arms and Influence , pp. 49-50; George and
Smoke, pp. 550-65; Lebow, Between Peace and War , pp. 82-90.
On extended deterrence see Brodie, pp. 252-55; and Warner R.
Schilling, et al., American Arms and a Changing Europe (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 5-15.
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credibility of commitments and deterrent threats, and that
in spite of their efforts to enhance the credibility of
deterrent threats, failures of deterrence can occur for
reasons beyond their control.
Concerns over credibility and misperception affect the
use of military force as a political instrument in crises:
the role of military forces is often to enhance the
credibility of deterrent threats, but the threats those
forces are intended to convey may be misperceived or
otherwise fail to deter. Due to credibility problems with
extended deterrent threats, particularly when threatening
punishment by nuclear retaliation, many actions taken with
military forces in crises are intended to enhance the
credibility of extended deterrence by adding a specific
threat of denial with conventional forces to the standing
77threat of punishment with strategic nuclear forces.
Misperception of the intentions of an adversary, and
miscalculation of the costs he is willing to endure or
capable of exacting, can arise from several sources: the
normal cognitive constraints on decisionmaking, from the
particular psychological factors that affect decisionmaking
77On the concept of deterrence by denial and punish-
ment, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 14-16, and
Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton, KJ: Center
for International Studies, 1959), p. 1; George H. Quester,
Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1966) , p. 2-4.
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under stress, from the political and organizational
perspectives of participants in decisionmaking, and from
incomplete or inaccurate information on the adversary and
78
the status of the conflict. Although national leaders
often make efforts to anticipate how adversary decision-
makers Kill perceive various crisis moves, attempting to
predict perceptions and reactions is inherently the weakest
aspect of crisis management. Thus, careful attention to the
clarity of signals being sent to the adversary may not
suffice to prevent escalation of the conflict.
The sources of misperceptions and their general role
in crises are well developed in the crisis management
literature. However, the effect that decisionmaker
awareness of the danger of misperception has on decisions
concerning the use of force in crises remains a weak point.
The danger of signals sent by military forces being
misperceived creates a dilemma for decisionmakers attempting
to use force as a political instrument in a crisis. The
misperception dilemma , as this problem will be called,
pervades all decisions on the use of force in a crisis.
There are actually two misperception dilemmas: the first
affects signals to adversaries, and the second affects
signals to allies and friends. The dilemma in signaling
78Charles Lockhart, Bargaining in International
Conflicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp.
37-87; Holsti, pp. 7-25; Snyder and Diesing, pp. 340-418;
Lebow, Between Peace and War , pp. 148-228.
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adversaries is between inadvertent signals of acquiescence
and inadvertent signals of hostility. This misperception
dilemma is present in both of the categories of crises: a
direct crisis between the United States and another nation,
and an indirect crisis arising from a conflict between two
nations, one of whom is an ally or friend of the United
States. The dilemma in signaling allies and friends is
between inadvertent signals of encouragement and inadvertent
signals of retrenchment. This misperception dilemma only
arises in indirect crises, in which the U.S. role arises
from its support for an ally or friend.
Efforts to signal limited objectives and interest in a
negotiated solution, and to limit the level of tension and
violence in a crisis, can send an inadvertent signal of
acquiescence to an adversary, and be misperceived as showing
lack of resolve, lack of capability, or a willingness to
sacrifice the interests at stake in the crisis in order to
avoid an armed clash. The result can be erosion of
credibility, undercutting of the nation's bargaining
position, and debilitation of efforts to negotiate a
solution to the crisis. Even worse, such misperceptions
could induce an adversary to preempt in an effort at seeking
a military solution with low expectation of concerted
resistance. Thus, an inadvertent signal of acquiescence can
trigger an inadvertent war of the type begun with a
deliberate decision during a crisis.
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Efforts to signal resolve or support for an ally, to
convey coercive military threats for deterrence or
compellence, and to maintain readiness for potential wartime
contingencies, can send an inadvertent signal of hostility
to an adversary, and be misperceived as showing an intention
to seek a military solution to the conflict or to escalate
to full-scale war. The result can be an appearance of bad
faith which interferes with efforts to negotiate a solution
to the crisis, escalation of tensions and hostility in the
crisis, and, worst case, a perception by the adversary that
war is inevitable leading to a decision by him to preempt
rather than suffer the first blow. Thus, an inadvertent
signal of hostility can trigger inadvertent war. This can
be either the type begun with a preemption decision
motivated by the crisis security dilemma— fear of imminent
attack—or the type begun with a deliberate decision
motivated by the perception that the crisis cannot be
satisfactorily resolved short of war.
When a crisis involving the United States arises from
a dispute between two other nations, one of whom is an ally
or friend of the U.S., the second misperception dilemma
comes into play. Studies of naval diplomacy have noted that
allies and friends as well as adversaries can misperceive
73the signals sent by naval forces. Two problems have been
73Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 13,
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described: first, the danger that signals of support may
encourage a friend or ally to be overly aggressive in a
conflict, and, second, the danger that reduction in a
standing presence, regardless of reason, can be misperceived
as signaling reduction in political commitment or even
abandonment. These problems comprise the misperception
dilemma as it affects signals to allies and friends.
Efforts to signal resolve or support for an ally, to
convey coercive military threats for deterrence or compel-
lence, and to maintain readiness for potential wartime con-
tingencies, can send an inadvertent signal of encouragement ,
and be misperceived by the friend or ally as tacit consent
for intensification of hostilities and escalation of politi-
cal demands, or even as overt direct support for initiating
fighting which previously had been viewed as infeasible.
The result can be an appearance of unlimited commitment
which interferes with efforts to negotiate a solution to the
crisis, escalation of tensions in the crisis, and outbreak
or escalation of fighting in the crisis.
Efforts to signal limited objectives and interest in a
negotiated solution, and to limit the level of tension and
violence in a crisis, can send an inadvertent signal of
retrenchment , particularly when the signaling entailed
35; Charles D. Allen, Jr., The Uses of Navies in Peacetime




reduction or withdrawal of a standing presence, and be
nisperceived by the friend or ally as a signal to restrain
his objectives, as wavering commitment or a desire to avoid
involvement in the crisis at hand, or even as abandonment.
The result can be erosion of credibility with the friend or
ally, thus undercutting influence on his behavior, a
decision by the friend or ally to seek support from other
powers or to build up his military power for autonomous
action, or, worst case, a decision by the friend or ally to
preempt and seek a fait accompli before his strategic
situation worsens further.
Although it would appear logical that an inadvertent
signal of hostility to an adversary would tend to be paired
with an inadvertent signal of encouragement to an ally or
friend, and that an inadvertent signal of acquiescence to an
adversary would tend to be paired with an inadvertent signal
of retrenchment to an ally or friend, there is no inherent
reason for misperceptions to occur in these pairs. Misper-
ceptions result from the individual decisionmaking processes
in each nation, responding to stimuli and cognitive factors
which can be much different. Thus, while there may be
grounds for postulating that certain combinations of
perceptions and misperceptions are more likely than others,
the occurrence of such combinations should be couched in




In summary, one of the most difficult problems of
crisis management is misperception of intentions. The
danger of signals sent by military forces being misperceived
creates the misperception dilemma. The dilemma in signaling
adversaries is between inadvertent signals of acquiescence
and inadvertent signals of hostility. The dilemma in
signaling allies and friends is between inadvertent signals
of encouragement and inadvertent signals of retrenchment.
These concepts clarify the problems facing national leaders
as they make decisions on employment of military force as a
political instrument in crises.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed and critiqued the crisis
management literature, explaining the major weaknesses in
current concepts and presenting new concepts to correct
those weaknesses. It began with a review of basic crisis
concepts, presenting the perspectives that will be used in
the study, followed by a critique of the concept of crisis
interaction, particularly the weaknesses in the single
interaction sequence model that implicitly underlies
existing crisis theories. It then reviewed crisis
management concepts, focusing on measures required to
maintain control of events in crises, and critiqued the
concept of crisis stability, presenting a definition that
more accurately reflects the nature of crisis interaction.
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Finally, it reviewed the crisis management problem of
misperception of intentions and resolve, and presented
concepts that more accurately describe the problems
decisionmakers face in trying to avoid misperceptions when
using military force in crises. The following paragraphs
summarize the key new concepts that were presented.
Interaction between the two sides in crises has often
in the past been viewed in terms of an implicit single
interaction sequence model that does not accurately describe
the complexity of crisis interaction. The bureaucratic
politics and organizational process models do not entirely
correct this weakness and have serious problems of their
own. To correct these weaknesses a model containing three
interaction sequences—each sequence associated with a
specific level in the chain of command—was presented.
Crisis interaction is stratified when the military
establishment of a country is sufficiently large and complex
that national leaders are incapable of exercising direct
control over all operational units that could have an impact
on a crisis. Paul Bracken *s concept of "tightly coupled
forces 1*—modified by the observation that tight coupling is
stratified, occurring separately at the strategic and
tactical levels without national leaders necessarily being
involved—then explains how separate interaction sequences
can ari.;e.
One of the most important requirements for the success
of crisis management is maintaining close control of
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military operations by top-level political authorities. A
weakness in the crisis management literature is that it has
not adequately addressed the tensions that can arise between
crisis management requirements and military considerations.
The crisis security dilemma is that in a crisis, many
of the actions a state takes to increase its security and
improve its bargaining position decrease the security of the
adversary. The most important sources of the dilemma are
the military doctrines and the military operations being
conducted by the two sides.
The preemption and inadvertent paths to war are
particularly relevant to the study of crises. Preemption is
motivated by perceptions and fears that the other side is
about to strike first. The preemption path to war that
results from the crisis security dilemma is the path that
will be addressed in this study. Inadvertent war arises
from an escalation process in which the two sides employ
increasingly threatening military and diplomatic moves in an
effort at gaining leverage in crisis bargaining and
improving their military positions. Accidents and other
inadvertent military actions contribute to the process.
The escalation dynamic is driven by rising stakes in the
outcome of a conflict, which increase the motivation of
national leaders to prevail, and an action-reaction process,
in which an escalatory action by one side provokes an
escalatory reaction by the other side in recurring cycles.
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This escalation dynamic increases tensions and hardens
resolve until it results in a deliberate or preemptive
decision for war.
One of the most difficult problems of crisis
management is misperception of intentions. The danger of
signals sent by military forces being misperceived creates
the misperception dilemma for national leaders. The dilemma
in signaling adversaries is between inadvertent signals of
acquiescence and inadvertent signals of hostility. The
dilemma in signaling allies and friends is between
inadvertent signals of encouragement and inadvertent signals
of retrenchment.
The next chapter will build on these concepts to
present the theory of stratified interaction and its
corollaries of decoupled interactions, the stratified crisis
security dilemma, and stratified escalation dynamics.

CHAPTER III
THE THEORY OF STRATIFIED INTERACTION
Studies of crisis management invariably emphasize the
importance of top-level political authorities maintaining
close control of crisis military operations in order to
prevent them from triggering an uncontrollable escalation
spiral. Underlying this emphasis on control is concern that
Interactions between the military forces of the two sides in
a crisis could develop their own momentum, decoupled from
the political-diplomatic objectives and strategies of
national leaders. Although this concern has often been
expressed in crisis management studies, the factors that
could cause such a decoupling have not been adequately
addressed in theories of crisis bargaining and escalation
dynamics.
The principle contention of this study is that the
•ingle interaction sequense model is inadequate for under-
tanding the manner in which nations interact in crises, the
complexities and difficulties of crisis decisionmaking, and
the ways in which crises can get out of control and escalate




in this chapter provides a better understanding of these
crisis phenomena.
This chapter will begin by describing the stratified
interaction model of crisis interactions. With the
underlying model in place, the theory of stratified
interaction and its first corollary, decoupled interactions,
will be defined. The theory of stratified interaction will
then be applied to the concept of crisis stability,
producing the concepts of the stratified crisis security
dilemma and stratified escalation dynamics. Finally, crisis
management will be reexamined to show how efforts to prevent
stratified interactions from becoming decoupled generate
tensions between political objectives and military
objectives in a crisis.
The Stratified Interaction Model
The stratified interaction model holds that there are
three levels of interaction between the two sides in a
crisis: political interaction, strategic interaction, and
tactical interaction. These are separate interaction
sequences between distinct groups of decisionmakers at each
level on both sides in a crisis. In the model, these
interactions represent horizontal linkages between
decisionmakers at the same level.
Vertical linkages connect decisionmakers at the three
levels within each nation. Two types of vertical linkages
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connect the three levels: • policy channel and an
information channel. There are flows in both directions,
downward and upward, in each channel. In the policy
channel, there is a flow of orders and policy guidance
downward from national leaders to strategic and tactical
military commanders, and from strategic level commanders to
tactical level commanders. There is also an upward flow of
requests for permission to take action, recommended courses
of action, reports of intended actions that have not yet
been taken, and reports of actions already intitiated that
had not been ordered by higher authority. In the
information channel, there is a downward flow of
intelligence on the adversary, assessments of the
adversary's intentions and likely moves, and backgound
information on the objectives and strategy being pursued in
the crisis. There is also an upward flow of requests for
these types of information, intelligence and assessments on
the adversary from lower levels, and background information
on the situation at the lower levels (such as force
readiness data) . Vertical interaction between
decisionmakers at the three levels in each country takes
place through these policy and information channels.
Political interaction is between the top-level
political authorities in each nation—the head of government
and his immediate advisors, what I have been calling
national leaders. In the United States this consists of the
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President and those officials present with him during crisis
decisionmaking, which normally includes the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the National Security
Advisor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (sometimes
represented by the Chairman alone) . On the Soviet side the
political level includes the General Secretary of the
Communist Party and certain members of the Politburo, the
Defense Council, and the Headquarters ( Stavka ) of the
Supreme High Command ( verkhonoye qlavnokommandovaniye , VGK,
the command element of the Soviet General Staff) . Although
the term "political" is used to label this top level of
interaction, military considerations will, of course, be at
least as prominent as political considerations in decision-
making. Interactions between the two sides at the political
level encompass the full range of diplomatic and military
interactions under the cognizance of national leaders.
Strategic interaction is between the strategic nuclear
forces and major military commands on each side, thus
encompassing conventional as well as nuclear forces. In the
United States thi-s includes the Commander in Chief,
Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), the Commander in Chief,
Space Command (CINCSPA, which includes the North American
John G. Hines and Phillip A. Petersen, "Changing the
Soviet System of Control," International Defense Review 19
(3/1986): 281-289; U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet
Military Power. 1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1986), pp. 12-18.
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Air Defense Command, NORAD) , the Commander in Chief,
Atlantic Command (CINCLANT, who is also the NATO Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic, SACLANT) , the Commander in Chief,
U.S. European Command (C1NCEUR, who is also the NATO Supreme
Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR) , the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Command (CINCPAC) , the Commander in Chief, Central
Command (CINCCENT) , and the Commander in Chief, U.S.
Southern Command (CINCSOUTH, headquartered in Panama) . In
the Soviet Union, the strategic interaction level includes
the Strategic Rocket Forces, the National Air Defense Forces
(PVO Strany) , and the Commanders in Chief
(glavnokommanduyushchiy ) of the Western, Southwestern,
Southern, and Far Eastern Theaters of Strategic Military
Action ( teatr voyennykh deystiviy , TVD, often translated as
2Theater of Military Operations).
Tactical interaction is between the operational units
(troops, aircraft, and naval vessels) of the two sides.
Tactical interaction occurs primarily at the scene of a
crisis, but can take place anywhere the military forces of
the two sides are operating in close proximity to each
other. Examples, in descending size of the units involved,
would include interaction between the U.S. Sixth Fleet and
the Soviet Mediterranean Eskadra , interaction between a U.S.
i •
2
Ibid. Of the several TVDs identified in Soviet
writings, only the four listed have CINCs appointed to
command them in peacetime.
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naval battle group (a carrier or battleship and its escorts)
and a Soviet naval task group, and interaction between
individual U.S. and Soviet ships or planes. Generally, the
small-scale encounters are part of a larger interaction
between the military commands on each side responsible for
operations in the region encompassing the scene of a
crisis. Thus, in the naval realm, tactical interaction will
generally be regarded as being between larger units, such as
fleets or task forces.
In the stratified interaction model, coupling between
the forces of the two sides in a crisis is stratified.
Tight coupling at each of the three levels of interaction
—
political, strategic, and tactical—can occur because
decisionmakers at each level receive direct inputs from
warning and intelligence systems. The degreee or
"tightness" of coupling at each level can be different,
depending on the availability of intelligence and sensors
and the strategic and tactical environment (i.e., whether or
not tactical-level forces are in close enough proximity for
interaction to occur)
.
The overall U.S. surveillance, intelligence, and early
warning system can be viewed as stratified into three
levels: national-level assets, strategic warning systems,
and tactical sensors. National-level assets include Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA)
intelligence sources, such as reconnaissance satellites,
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electronic and communications intelligence (ELINT and
COMINT) , human intelligence, and certain reconnaissance
missions by military units. Inputs from national-level
assets go to decisionmakers at the political level, but much
of the intelligence also goes to appropriate lower levels in
the military chain of command. The sensitivity and content
of the intelligence determine the recipients of it.
Distribution of certain intelligence can be restricted to a
small group of decisionmakers (and the analysts supporting
them) , who then make the decision whether or not to
promulgate it to lower levels.
Strategic warning systems include the distant early
warning (DEW) radar system, early warning satellites. Pave
Paws SLBM warning radars, certain ELINT and COMINT systems.
Inputs from strategic early warning systems initially go to
appropriate decisionmakers at the strategic interaction
level. With modern computerized command and control and
military data systems, however, certain crucial elements of
the information gathered by strategic warning systems can be
automatically transmitted to appropriate political level
control centers, such as the National Military Command
Center and the White House situation room.
Tactical sensors include radar, sonar, visual and
photographic reconnaissance, electronic support measures
(ESM) , and tactical ELINT and COMINT systems. Most inputs
from tactical sensors initially go to decisionmakers at the
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tactical level, and from there are reported up the chain of
command. However, information from certain of the more
capable tactical sensor systems is simultaneously reported
directly to strategic level commanders, and, with specific
prior arrangements, can be transmitted directly to political
level control centers.
Two important features these warning and intelligence
systems must be noted. First, dual reporting—simultaneous
transmission of intelligence to multiple users at various
levels in the chain of command— is widely used to expedite
the flow of crucial information. Dual reporting generally
involves the political and strategic levels, but can also be
used with certain tactical sensors. Dual reporting has two
effects on the conusand and control system. On the one hand,
it enhances the ability of national leaders to exercise
close control of military operations in crises by keeping
then better informed of events at the strategic and tactical
levels. But, on the other hand, it can increase the
autonomy of decisionmakers at the strategic and tactical
levels by reducing their dependence on higher authority as a
source of warning and intelligence. Which of these two
competing tendencies prevails in a particular crisis, or in
a particular incident in a crisis, depends upon the specific
circumstances in which operational decisions must be made.
The second important feature is that there can be
substantial overlap in the coverage of sensors at the three
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levels. For example, national-level assets and strategic
warning systems can simultaneously detect some military
actions. Even tactical sensors can detect some military
actions being monitored by strategic warning systems and
national-level assets. The effect of overlapping coverage
is the same as that of dual reporting: it can enhance top-
level control of military operations, or it can increase the
autonomy of decisionmakers at the strategic and tactical
levels. Overlapping coverage thus can either intensify or
inhibit stratification of crisis interaction.
Figure 1 provides a diagram of the stratified
interaction model. The circles represent decisionmakers on
the two sides: P designates political level decisionmakers,
S designates strategic level decisionmakers, and T
designates tactical level decisionmakers, with the
subscripts designating the two sides. The diamonds
represent interactions between the two sides: I is
P
political interaction, I is strategic interaction, and I.
s t
is tactical interaction. Horizontal arrows from circles to
diamonds represent actions the two sides take toward each
other, horizontal arrows from diamonds to circles represent
detection of the other side's actions. Vertical arrows
represent flows of information (upward and downward) , orders
This is a simplification of the interaction loop used
by Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 62.
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(downward) , and requests for permission to take specific
actions or recommendations that specific actions be taken
(upward)
.
The Pi-T. arrow and the P 2
~T 2 arrow represent
efforts by political level decisionmakers to exercise
direct, positive control of operational forces in a crisis.
Figure 1. The Stratified Interaction Model
V^~^S^~S^
In summary, the stratified interaction model states
that there are three levels of interaction between the two
sides in a crisis: political interaction, strategic
interaction, and tactical interaction. Political
interaction is between the top-level political authorities
in each nation. Strategic interaction is between the
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strategic nuclear forces and major military commands on each
side, encompassing conventional as well as nuclear forces.
Tactical interaction is between those operational military
units (troops, aircraft, and naval vessels) of the two sides
that are in direct contact. Separate interaction sequences
at these three levels is possible because military
commanders are delegated significant deicionmaking authority
and receive direct inputs from warning and intelligence
systems on the adversary's military activies . In addition
to these three horizontal interaction sequences between the
two sides, there is also vertical interaction between
decisionmakers at the three levels in each country. These
vertical interactions take place through the policy and
information channels that link the three levels.
The Theory of Stratified Interaction
The theory of stratified interaction can now be
stated: Given conditions of delegated command, . tight
coupling, and acute crisis, interactions between the two
sides will have a tendancy to become stratified into
separate political, strategic and tactical interactions.
The definitions of the political, strategic, and tactical
levels of interaction are as given above fur the stratified
interaction model.
As stated in the definition of the theory, three
conditions contribute to stratified interaction. First, the

128
military establishments of the two sides are sufficiently
large and complex that top-level political authorities
cannot exercise constant, direct, positive control over the
actions of all operational units, and must therefore rely to
a large degree on delegated command. Second, the military
forces of the two sides are tightly coupled through warning
and intelligence systems that are vertically integrated with
major military commands and operational forces. This
condition is driven by perceptions that striking first will
accrue significant strategic or tactical advantages, thus
requiring warning of attack to ensure the survival of
operational forces and the ability to effectively execute
wartime contingency plans. Third, stratified interaction
occurs in an acute international crisis, when military
forces are being used as political instrument for crisis
bargaining. This results in actions being taken with
military forces that deliberately or inadvertently convey a
military threat to the other side.
Strategic and tactical level interactions also occur
under normal peacetime conditions and in lesser crises that
do not pose a danger of war. In fact, under normal
peacetime conditions, when national leaders are paying very
little attenion to routine military operations, there could
be numerous interaction sequences taking place between
forces in direct contact with the other side's forces. But
such peacetime interactions are normally not of great
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interest because they do not gather momentum or seriously
affect the overall state of relations between the two
sides. This is because the perception of an acute danger of
war is not present and the interactions do not occur in the
context of deliberate efforts to convey military threats to
the other side.
An example of this is peacetime incidents at sea
between U.S. and Soviet naval forces. The U.S. and Soviet
fleets are almost always in close proximity somewhere in the
world and their interactions occasionally produce incidents,
such as shouldering (forcing a ship clear of a formation)
,
threatening actions with weapons, and even collisions. But
such incidents have never produced more than diplomatic
protests, even at the height of the cold war before the 1972
U.S. -Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement was signed. Another
example is the dozens of American military aircraft fired on
or shot down by the Soviet Union, China, and the Warsaw Pact
4
countries during the 1950s and 1960s. None of these Cold
War incidents resulted in tactical level interactions
between the forces of the two sides that gained their own
local momentum, even though U.S. leaders responded to a few
of the incidents with military shows of force.
The existence of stratified interaction in a crisis is
not in itself important. The interaction sequences at the




strategic and tactical levels can be expected to parallel
the interaction sequence at the political level so long as
national leaders are able to control the overall magnitude
and momentum of military operations—even if they cannot
control every operational decision in the interaction
sequence. The three interaction sequences are described as
being parallel when the intensity of the hostilities and
magnitude of threat (or reassurance) being signaled by
strategic and tactical level interactions are roughly what
national leaders desire to implement their political-
diplomatic strategy for managing the crisis.
What is of analytical interest is the decoupling of
interactions at the three levels, which could cause national
leaders to lose control of events in a crisis and touch off
an escalatory spiral. Decoupled interactions are defined to
be an interaction sequence at the strategic or tactical
level in which the intensity of hostilities, level of
violence, and magnitude of threat being conveyed to the
other side are not under the control of national leaders.
This can occur when there is some sort of interruption or
severe degradation of the vertical policy and information
channels between decisionmakers at the three levels.
When interactions are decoupled, the three interaction
sequences are no longer parallel. The intensity of
hostilities at the strategic or tactical levels no longer
supports the political-diplomatic strategy being prusued by
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national leaders in the crisis. In principle , decoupling
can lead to the intensity of hostilities at the strategic
and tactical levels being either greater or lesser than that
desired by national leaders. Although the escalation
dynamics theory predicts that the tendency would normally be
toward escalation of hostilities, this is a question for
empirical research.
The first corollary to the theory of stratified
interaction is that decoupling of interactions will occur to
the extent that operational decisions on the employment of
military forces made at the strategic and tactical levels
differ from the operational decisions political level
decisionmakers would have made to coordinate those military
actions with their political-diplomatic strategy for
resolving the crisis. Conversely, decoupling of stratified
interaction is averted to the extent that political level
decisionmakers exercise constant, direct, positive control
over operational military forces, or ensure that the
guidance contained in mechanisms of delegated command
produce operational decisions at the strategic and tactical
levels that support their political-diplomatic strategy for
resolving the crisis.
This is not to imply that national leaders always act
wisely while exercising direct control over their military
forces, or *>at tactical-level military commanders have a
propensity to disrupt crisis management efforts when not
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under direct top-level control. Inept or indiscriminate
employment of military force by national leaders can defeat
crisis management efforts as easily as inappropriate
operational decisions by on-scene commanders. Additionally,
•s will be seen in the case studies, on-scene commanders are
quite able to act with prudence and caution when not under
direct control by national leaders. This is discussed in
detail in Chapter IX.
Military commanders are never without operational
guidance of some sort. When direct control is interrupted,
for whatever reason, they will base operational decisions on
the last direct guidance received until the tactical
circumstances change sufficiently to make that guidance
inapplicable—which can happen very quickly. At that point
they revert to the operational guidance contained in the
mechanisms of delegated command. This is an entirely
rational system of command, reflecting the reality that
decisionmaking at the tactical level does not cease simply
because national leaders are unable to make the decisions.
Once operational forces make this de facto shift to
delegated command, even though nominally still under direct
command, decoupling of interactions can occur.
There are seven potential causes of decoupling:
communications and information flow problems, impairment of
political level decisionmaking, a fast-paced tactical
environment, ambiguous or ambivalent orders, tactically
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inappropriate orders, inappropriate guidance in mechanisms
of indirect control, and deliberate unauthorized actions by
military commanders. As these potential causes suggest,
decoupling can occur even when national leaders are
attempting to exercise constant, direct, positive control
over operational forces.
Communications problems can sever the links from
national leaders to operational forces, leaving those forces
at least temporarily under delegated command. The problems
can take many forms, including outright loss of radio
contact, garbled messages, delays in message delivery due to
system overload, misrouting of messages, and deliberate
interference by the adversary. Although the U.S. military
communications system has been vastly improved over the last
four decades—without which the President could not even
attempt to exercise close control of military operations—it
is still not infallible.
A wide range of information problems can contribute to
decoupling. Information flows can be interrupted by communi-
cations problems, excessive secrecy and compartmentation, or
even a simple failure to realize that a particular report
warrants the immediate attention of decisionmakers.
Exclusive information is a resource that confers influence
on policy decisions, which can lead to hoarding or hiding of
crucial facts. Too much information can also cause
problems, particularly when large ammounts of inaccurate and
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irrelevant information must be sifted out to reveal what is
accurate and relevant. Accurate assessment and effective
use of information can be degraded by the cognitive limits
5
on analysis and decisionmaking. Information problems such
as these can prevent national leaders from exercising
effective direct control over crisis military operations by
leaving them unaware of the need to make certain operational
decisions, denying them the capability to make those
decisions, or convincing them that they should delegate the
decisions to lower levels.
Impairment of top-level decisionmaking under the
stress of a crisis, or preoccupation with a particular
aspect of a crisis, can result in real-time guidance not
being provided to operational forces even when communica-
tions channels are intact. Selective and sequential
attention to problems is a well-recognized cognitive limit
on decisionmaking. When decisionmakers become overloaded
with information and urgent problems, "load shedding,** to
use Coral Bell's apt expression, can occur, producing
5See Roberta Wholstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and
Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), p.
394; Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence:
Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (Ne • York:
Basic Books, 1967), Chapter 3; Anthony Downs, Inside
Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 75;
Ole R. Holsti, Crisis Escalation War (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1972), pp. 104-118; Alexander L.
George , Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 121-36; Ronald H.
Hinkly, "National Security in the Information Age," The
Washington Quarterly 9 (Spring 1986): 125-40.
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inaction or much delayed reactions vhen a new problem
arises. Such impairment of decisionmaking by national
leaders can rob them of effective direct control of military
operations, resulting in tactical or strategic level
interactions being decoupled from political level guidance.
In a fast-paced tactical environment, tactical
decisionmakers may not have time to describe their circum-
stances to national leaders and await a decision before
having to take action. To use an exaggerated example, when
missiles are inbound the captain of a ship cannot wait for
the National Security Council to convene and haggle over his
fate. For this reason, operational commanders always have a
certain amount of decisionmaking authority delegated to
them, regulated by the rules of engagement. When urgent
operational decisions must be made on the basis of delegated
command rather than on consultation with national leaders,
what might be called momentary decoupling occurs. If direct
command is immediately reimposed, decoupling ceases. But if
an action-reaction sequence starts at the tactical level,
Coral Bell The Conventions of Crisis (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971), pp. 88-89. Also see the discus-
sions of sequential attention to goals and problemistic
search in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), Chapter 6; Richard M.
Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 118-122;
John D. Steinbruncr, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New
Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton





with operational commanders on both sides making decisions
on the basis of delegated command, momentary decoupling
could lead to an interaction sequence that is decoupled from
the political-diplomatic strategy of national leaders.
National leaders, uncertain as to the implications of
their political-diplomatic strategy for tactical military
operations or even uncertain as to the strategy itself, may
issue orders to military forces that are ambiguous or
ambivalent. To some degreee this problem is inherent in the
nature of crisis management, which consists of the dual
goals of protecting vital national interests while avoiding
unwanted escalation of the confrontation. Ambiguous or
ambivalent orders are particularly likely when they must be
formulated under the stress and time pressures of a crisis.
Thorough evaluation of alternative tactical options may not
be possible before an order must be given. A military
commander faced with ambiguous or ambivalent orders may not
have time to seek guidance on how to interpret them in a
specific situation, forcing him to rely on his own best
judgement. If his decisions, no matter how carefully
reasoned or tactically appropriate they may be, do not
support the political-diplomatic initiatives being pursued
to manage the crisis, then decoupling has occurred. If top-
level control can be immediately re-established, the
decoupling will only be momentary. But if it cannot, the
momentary decoupling could lead to an interaction sequence
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that is decoupled from the political-diplomatic strategy of
national leaders.
National leaders could well decide to exercise only a
small degree of direct control over certain military
operations during a crisis, relying instead on military
commanders to carry out their wishes. When this occurs, the
guidance contained in mechanisms of indirect control— the
alert system, standing orders, mission orders, contingency
plans, and rules of engagement—becomes crucial to eftective
crisis management. If national leaders do not pay
sufficient attention to that guidance, military actions
could occur that they had not anticipated and which exceed
7the scope of operations they had desired. This could cause
momentary decoupling and lead to an interaction sequence
that is decoupled from the political-diplomatic strategy
being pursued by national leaders.
The final possible cause of decoupling is a deliberate
unauthorized action by a military commander. In this case
the commander has specific orders for the mission he is to
carry out, but knowingly decides to disobey those orders and
carry out an action contrary to the letter and intent of his
orders. A military commander might do this because he
7Scott D. Sagan has suggested that this was the case
with the scope of U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare opera-
tions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. "Nuclear Alerts and




disagrees with the political-diplomatic strategy being
pursued by national leaders and seeks to achieve what he
considers to be a superior resolution of the crisis. More
likely, however, would be the case in which a military
commander deliberately takes an unauthorized action because
he perceives his local tactical situation as being much more
threatening than do national leaders, or believes that his
orders are infeasible under the conditions he faces. The
military commander's assessment of the situation could be
entirely correct, but the action is still unauthorized.
In summary, the theory of stratified interaction
states that, given conditions of delegated command, tight
coupling, and acute crisis, interactions between the two
sides will become stratified into separate political,
strategic and tactical interactions. A corollary to the
theory is that decoupling of stratified interactions will
occur to the extent that operational decisions on the
employment of military forces made at the strategic and
tactical levels differ from the operational decisions
political level decisionmakers would have made to coordinate
those military actions with their political-diplomatic
strategy for resolving the crisis.
Stratified Interaction and Crisis Stability
The concept of the crisis security dilemma, as defined
in the previous chapter, is that in a crisis, many of the
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actions a state takes to increase its security and improve
its bargaining position decrease the security of its
adversary. Applying the theory of stratified interaction to
the concept of crisis stability produces the second
corollary to the theory, the stratified crisis security
dilemma : In an acute crisis, the security dilemma is
stratified, arising from the interaction processes occurring
separately at each of the three levels, and affecting the
likelihood of war separately at each level.
This corollary contends that the adversary's military
intentions—whether they are essentially offensive or
defensive—can be perceived differently by decisionmakers at
the political, strategic, and tactical levels of crisis
interaction. Many military moves are ambiguous as to their
offensive or defensive intent, and can increase capabilities
in both areas. Interactions at the strategic and tactical
levels can generate circumstances in which actions taken by
one side to increase the security of their forces or improve
their tactical position can decrease, or appear to decrease,
the security of the other side's forces. Actions by one
side prompt countermeasures by the other side that in turn
contribute to an escalatory action-reaction spiral as
military commanders on both sides seek to maintain or
increase their strategic or tactical advantages.
The danger at the strategic and tactical levels is
that at some point in the interaction one side will take an
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action that increases the perceived threat of attack against
the other side to an intolerable level, prompting the
adversary to preempt. Military commanders could have
authority to preempt for self-defense under conditions
specified in their standing orders or rules of engagement,
or could be required to seek authority to preempt from
national leaders. The key point is that the interaction
process that created the circumstances in which preemption
was perceived to be necessary was not under control of
national leaders.
The mutually reinforcing alert phenomenon described by
Bracken is an example of the stratified security dilemma at
g
the strategic level of interaction. An example at the
tactical level of interaction would evolve like this:
movements of naval forces intended to signal resolve by
placing them within striking range of the adversary's naval
forces increase the vulnerability of the adversary's forces,
prompting them to take measures—authorized in their
standing orders—to increase their ability to defend
themselves. Those defensive measures, in turn, increase the
gBracken, pp. 64-65. In this example, actions taken
by the commanders of one side's strategic forces (in
accordance with their standing orders) intended to reduce
the vulnerability of those forces are quickly detected by
the commanders of the other side's strategic forces, who
cannot distinguish those actions from preparations for
offensive action, and must therefore take actions to




vulnerability of the first side's naval forces, prompting
them to take measures—once again, authorized in standing
orders— to increase their ability to defend themselves.
This type of interaction occurred between U.S. carrier
battle groups and Soviet anti-carrier forces in the
Mediterranean during the 1973 Middle East War. Soviet ships
and submarines armed with anti-ship cruise missiles moved
into positions where they could launch preemptive strikes
against the U.S. Sixth Fleet on short notice. This in turn
prompted the Sixth Fleet to maneuver to evade being
targeted, and to deploy ships, submarines, and armed
aircraft into positions where they could strike Soviet
g
cruise missile platforms upon indication of an attack.
This maneuvering for tactical advantage continued throughout
the crisis until U.S. -Soviet tensions subsided and national
leaders on both sides ordered their naval forces in the
Mediterranean to standdown and resume peacetime operations.
9Lieutenant F.C. Miller, "Those Storm-beaten Ships,
Upon Which the Arab Armies Never Looked," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 101 (March 1975): 23-24; Admiral Elmo
R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle,
1976), pp. 436-47; Robert G. Weinland, "Superpower Naval
Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Case
Study," in The Washington Papers , vol. 6, no. 61 (Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1979), pp. 68-88; Charles D. Allen, Jr., The
Uses of Navies in Peacetime (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980) , pp.
30-33. Also see Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., "View From the
Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 98 (February 1972) : 18-29; Admiral Stansfield
Turner and Commander George Thibault, "Countering the Soviet
Threat in the Mediterranean," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 103 (July 1977): 25-32.
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The stratified crisis security dilemma provides the
basis for the third corollary to the theory of stratified
interaction, stratified escalation dynamics : In an acute
crisis, in which strategic or tactical interactions between
the two sides have become decoupled from political level
interactions (meaning that the strategic or tactical
interactions are no longer under the direct or indirect
control of national leaders), the security dilemma,
operating separately at each level, can trigger an
escalatory spiral at the strategic or tactical levels of
interaction, which under certain circumstances can cause the
crisis to escalate uncontrollably to war. An escalation
spiral can be touched off at any of the three levels. If it
starts at the political level, with national leaders making
the escalatory decisions, it immediately encompass all three
levels and thus is not stratified.
If an escalation spiral starts at the tactical or
strategic level, it will not necessarily be transmitted
upward to higher levels of interaction. National leaders
could, for example, decide to let an uncontrollable
escalation spiral between their forces in direct contact in
the field or at sea (the tactical level) play itself out,
and decide not to escalate the war at the strategic level.
On how such escalation processes work, see Phil





National leaders of the two sides could, in effect, decide
to stand back, wait for the tactical engagement to finish,
then disengage what remained of their forces.
While this scenario is theoretically possible, it is
not likely under the stress of a crisis, when a sudden
outbreak of fighting at the tactical level would appear to
confirm perceptions of the other side's offensive intent and
fears of war being imminent. It is even less likely that
national leaders would be able to let an escalation spiral
at the strategic level, even one involving only conventional
forces, play itself out without a full-scale war resulting.
An escalation spiral at the tactical or strategic levels
would be the loss of control over events that crisis
management is intended to prevent.
Escalation dynamics of this type are possible because
of two factors. First, reliance on delegation of
decisionmaking authority to military commanders at the
strategic and tactical levels can allow interaction
sequences to gain momentum without the direct involvement of
national leaders. Second, decisionmakers at the strategic
and tactical level could, for a number of reasons, base
their operational decisions on their standing orders and
operational doctrines, rather than on direct guidance from
national leaders.
Stratified escalation dynamics are prevented or
controlled by two means: national leaders exercising
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constant, direct, positive control of operational forces at
the strategic and tactical level, or national leaders
ensuring that the operational guidance in the mechanisms of
indirect control supports their political-diplomatic
strategy for resolving the crisis. Both of these means of
controlling escalation can be difficult to implement in
practice. As was dicussed earlier, direct control can be
interrupted or degraded by a wide range of technical,
operational and even psychological impediments. Ensuring
that the mechanisms of indirect control support the
political-diplomatic strategy in a crisis is made
exceedingly difficult by the near impossibility of
anticipating every possible tactical situation that a
military commander might face. Thus, there are ample
grounds for postulating that an escalation spiral beyond the
control of national leaders could arise at the tactical or
strategic levels.
A key point of the stratified escalation dynamics
concept is that the phenomenon can exist under an assumption
of rational decisionmaking. Fully rational strategic and
tactical level decisionmakers, acting strictly in accordance
with approved operational guidance, could well initiate an
action-reaction sequence that becomes an uncontrollable
escalation spiral. There is no need to assume military
evasion of civilian control, as is done in one definition of
inadvertent escalation, or crazed officers disobeying
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orders, which is one of the accidental war scenarios.
Both are highly unlikely and the record of U.S. and Soviet
behavior in superpower crises shows a great deal of caution
on the part of operational commanders, rather than excessive
aggressiveness
.
To contend that stratified escalation dynamics can
occur under an assumption of rational decisionmaking is not
to deny that the stress and confusion of a crisis can
exacerbate the cognitive constraints on decisionmaking.
Misperception and miscalculation are highly likely during a
crisis, and increase the possibility that crisis military
operations could touch off an escalation spiral. The crisis
security dilemma creates a decisionmaking environment in
which misperception and miscalculation are not only more
likely to occur, but are also more likely to touch off an
escalation spiral.
Stratified interactions can cause misperceptions of
the intentions of adversaries. Strategic and tactical level
interactions that result from military commanders acting on
their own initiative, responding within the bounds of their
Military evasion of civilian control is a central
element of Barry R. Posen's definition of inadvertent
escalation. See his "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation
and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security 7 (Fall
1982): 31-32. For a description of the accidental war
thesis see Paul Bracken, "Accidental War," in Graham T.
Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds
.
,
Hawk Doves & Owls; An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1985), pp. 25-53.
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authority to actions by the other side, can be misperceived
as having been deliberately instigated. If viewed as having
been ordered by national leaders, strategic and tactical
level interactions are interpreted in the overall political
and military context of the crisis, rather than the more
limited immediate circumstances that surrounded the
interaction. This can result in strategic and tactical
level interactions being viewed as signals of the intentions
of the adversary's leaders, which may not have been the case
at all. Misperception of intentions can thus arise from
interactions among forces at the strategic and tactical
levels as well as from the signals being exchanged at the
political level.
Inadvertent military incidents are most likely to
occur under conditions of stratified interaction, when
national leaders are relying on mechanisms of delegated
command for indirect control of military forces. An
inadvertent military incident could spark an action-reaction
escalation sequence at the tactical or strategic level
decoupled from interaction at the political level as
military commanders acted in accordance with mechanism of
delegated command. If national leaders then misperceive the
escalating military engagement as a deliberate signal of
hostile intent or as a direct military threat to their
security, a situation likely under the conditions of the
crisis security dilemma, stratified escalation dynamics
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could spread upward, affecting all three levels of
12interaction and leading to war.
Serious fighting could also erupt without escalation
dynamics spreading to the political level, that is, while
national leaders on the two sides were still trying to
resolve the crisis without war. An intense engagement
between the forces of the two sides in direct contact in the
field or at sea (the tactical level) could spread upward to
the major theater commands in charge of those forces (the
strategic level) through the operation of delegated decision-
making authority at the strategic level. Actions taken by
strategic-level military commanders on both sides for
essentially defensive purposes, such as increasing the
readiness of conventional and nuclear forces and initiating
measures to support the forces already engaged at the
tactical level, could set in motion an escalating action-
reaction cycle at the strategic level decoupled from the
objectives of national leaders. The most likely scenario
12The crisis management technique of deliberately
slowing the tempo of military operations and creating pauses
for exchange of diplomatic communications is intended to
halt such an escalation process. See Alexander L. George,
"The Development of Doctrine and Strategy," in Alexander L.
George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, The Limits of
Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p.
9; and "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and
Military Considerations," Survival 26 (September/October
1984) : 226.
The mutually reinforcing alert described by Paul
Bracken is an extreme example of this. See Bracken, Command
and Control of Nuclear Forces , pp. 64-65.
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for war under these conditions would be for conventional
forces in the field, brought to a wartime readiness posture
by escalation dynamics at the strategic level, to react to
deliberate or inadvertent actions taken by the adversary's
forces—actions allowing a defensive response under their
rules of engagement—by initiating combat actions in
accordance with wartime contingency plans.
In summary, the stratified crisis security dilemma is
that, in an acute crisis, the security dilemma is strati-
fied, arising from the interaction processes occurring
separately at each of the three levels, and affecting the
likelihood of war separately at each level. This leads to
the the stratified escalation dynamics corollary: in an
acute crisis, in which interaction between the two sides has
become stratified and decoupled, the security dilemma,
operating separately at each level, can trigger an
escalatory spiral at the strategic or tactical levels of
interaction, which under certain circumstances can cause the
crisis to escalate uncontrollably to war.
Political-Military Tensions
Awareness of the problems inherent in crisis
management and the escalatory impact they could have on a
crisis underlies the emphasis national leaders place on
maintaining close control of military forces in crises. An
irony of crisis management is that efforts to prevent
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interactions at the strategic and tactical levels from
becoming decoupled from the political-diplomatic strategy
being pursued to manage a crisis can generate tensions
between political and military considerations that create
further difficulties for managing the crisis. These
tensions and the manner in which they are resolved directly
affect, and are directly affected by, stratified
interaction. Tensions between political and military
considerations are inherent in the use of military force as
a political instrument. They would arise in a crisis even
without stratified interaction, but their impact on the
ability of national leaders to manage a crisis are
exacerbated under conditions of stratified interaction.
These tensions are actual or potential conflicts
between political and military considerations which force
decisionmakers, knowingly or tacitly, to make trade-offs
among individually important but mutually incompatible
14
considerations. Three such tensions arise in crises:
crisis objectives tensions, operational control tensions,
and wartime readiness tensions.
The first source of tension is conflicts between
political and military considerations: tensions between
political considerations and the needs of diplomatic
14The concept of tensions between political and
military considerations is derived from Alexander L.
George's concept of "interaction of political and military
considerations." George, "Crisis Management," pp. 223-234.
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bargaining, on the one hand, and military considerations and
the needs of military operations, on the other. Both sets
of considerations are those being pursued to influence the
outcome of the crisis. Tensions between political and
military considerations arise because military forces must
always be prepared for the possibility of combat even when
being used for political signaling. Thus, such tensions
arise well before force is actually used in a crisis.
There are two approaches to using military forces
deployed to the scene of a crisis for political signaling.
In the first approach—the symbolic or indirect threat
—
token forces are sent to signal resolve to protect vital
national interests and as a symbol of the overall military
power of the nation. Token deployments are often used in
conjunction with increases in the readiness of other forces
in the theater or forces held in strategic reserve for rapid
deployment to the scene. The token forces at the scene
convey a threat that other, more powerful forces will be
used if the target nation does not respond in a satisfactory
manner to the threat being conveyed. In some circumstances
token forces serve as a tripwire, enhancing, through the
likelihood of their being involved in any fighting that
15
erupts, the credibility of a deterrent threat.
15Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 47; Henry A.
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 242; Glenn H. Snyder,
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Tension between political and military considerations
can arise even when military forces are used in this limited
manner. The token forces typically do not have a mission
other than to be present at the scene of the crisis, leaving
them without a clear military objective other than survival,
and even that may be compromised when the forces are placed
in an exposed position as a tripwire. Military moves by the
adversary that are hardly worth the attention of national
leaders can present an imminent threat to the token force.
It is thus to be expected that on-scene military commanders
will have perceptions and priorities much different from
those of national leaders in this situation.
In the second approach to using military forces for
political signaling, strong forces (well beyond what would
be needed for a token force) are used to convey a direct
threat with their intrinsic warfighting capabilities.
Alerting strategic nuclear forces during a crisis is an
example of a direct threat, intended to achieve deterrence
by threat of punishment. Deployment of substantial ground,
air, or naval forces capable of engaying the adversary's
forces at the scene of a crisis is another example of a
direct threat, intended to achieve deterrence by threat of
denial.
Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1961), pp. 130-131; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution




When military forces are used in a crisis to convey a
direct threat, the tension between political and military
considerations can become acute. This is because the
credibility of the threat being conveyed by the forces is a
function of the adversary's perception of their capability
to carry out the military actions being threatened, as well
as the credibility of the threat to use them if necessary.
The adversary's perception of the likelihood of the forces
actually being used is certainly the more important
consideration, but his perception of their capabilities can
influence that assessment. For example, a threat to
intervene with a battalion of troops to halt an invasion by
a division-sized force would probably not be credible.
Additionally, three separate groups of adversary decision-
makers—at the political, strategic, and tactical levels
—
are assessing the credibility of the force. Different
decisionmakers could well focus on different indicators of
intent. Military commanders, particularly those commanding
forces in contact with the adversary force, are likely to be
more attentive to capabilities as an indicator of intentions
than are national leaders weighing a broader range of
considerations
.
The capability of forces at the scene of a crisis to
carry out the military actions being threatened is a
function of three factors: strength, readiness, and tactical
situation. Strength, the material dimension of credibility,
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it the warfighting capability of the forces employed
relative to the adversary forces they would have to fight.
It is a product of quantity of forces and specific types of
forces and weapons weapons employed. Readiness and tactical
situation are the operational dimension of credibility.
Readiness refers to the readiness posture of the forces
employed: the degree to which they are prepared to conduct
combat operations. It is a product of manpower, logistics
(fuel and ammunition for combat) , and the operational
procedures in effect (arming of aircraft on patrol, manning
of weapons on ships, or deploying troops in combat units).
Tactical situation refers to the impact of geographic
position, relative to adversary forces, on the the ability
of the forces employed in a crisis to effectively carry out
combat operations. The degree to which a particular
tactical situation is advantageous (and therefore credible)
or disadvantageous (and therefore not credible) is a complex
calculation involving geography, the capabilities of each
side's weapons, surveillance and warning capabilities, and
the speed required by each side to react to threats and
launch attacks.
The nature of the tensions between political and
military considerations will be illustrated by contrasting
military considerations with three of the requirements for
crisis management identified by Alexander George: (a)
deliberately slowing the tempo of military operations in
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order to create pauses for the exchange of diplomatic
signals, assessment, and decisionmaking, (b) coordinating
military actions with diplomatic actions in an integrated
strategy for resolving the crisis acceptably without war,
and (c) avoiding military options that give the adversary
the impression of an impending resort to large-scale
warfare. These crisis management requirements can have
two effects on the military forces deployed to the scene of
a crisis: they can adversely affect the three elements of
warfighting capability—strength, readiness, and tactical
situation—and they can severely complicate the tactical
planning of military commanders.
The elements of warfighting capability (strength,
readiness, and tactical situation) were described above.
The second military consideration affected by crisis
management, tactical planning, requires elaboration. In
formulating tactical plans for the conduct of combat
operations, military commanders seek to adhere to or exploit
certain operational considerations believed to provide
tactical advantages in combat, commonly referred to as the
17principles of war. Four of these principles are
16George, "Crisis Management,** p. 226.
17Arguments over the value and proper formulation of
the principles are irrelevent to the point being made.
Regardless of their specific wording or ranking, the
principles provide a convenient describe of what military
commanders try to do in battle. On the origins of the
principles, see John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory
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•specially affected by crisis management requirements:
objective, initiative, concentration, and surprise.
The principle of the objective is that military
operations must be directed toward a clearly defined,
decisive, and attainable military objective. The principle
of initiative, often called the principle of the offensive,
is that seizing the initiative with offensive action is
almost always necessary to achieve decisive results, to
maintain freedom of action (choosing when and where to
engage the enemy, so as to exploit his weaknesses) , and to
control the pace and course of battle. Exploitation (or
pursuit)—rapidly following up initial success with further
offensive action— is an element of initiative, intended to
keep the enemy off balance and on the defensive. The
principle of concentration, often called the principle of
mass, is that superior combat power, a function of quality
as well as quantity of arms, must be concentrated at the
critical time and place for a decisive purpose. The
principle of surprise is that striking the enemy at an
unexpected time and place, and in a manner for which he is
not prepared, can decisively shift the balance of combat
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). For a critique of
the principles see Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science,
"
World Politics 1 (July 1949): 467-488. For contemporary
applications of the principles see Colonel Harry G. Summers,
On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1981), pp. 53-100; Major
Robert L. Earl, "A Matter of Principle," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 109 (February 1983): 29-36.
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power, achieving much greater success for the effort
expended.
Having defined the elements of warfighting capability
(strength, readiness, and tactical situation) and selected
principles of tactical planning (objective, initiative,
concentration, and surprise) , we can now examine why
tensions arise between crisis management requirements and
military considerations. For brevity, this discussion will
present only one aspect of the tensions: the impact of
crisis management requirements on military considerations.
The reverse aspect—the impact of military considerations on
crisis management requirements—should be obvious in each
case. Essentially, unrestrained pursuit of the military
principles will usually preclude meeting the crisis
management requirements.
Deliberately slowing the tempo of military operations
violates the principle of initiative, particularly its
component principle of rapidly exploiting initial success
with further offensive action, and makes it difficult to use
surprise, which depends in part on speed of execution. By
not allowing one's forces to seize the initiative, thus
granting the adversary's forces at least partial control
18Definitions are taken from U.S. Department of the
Army, Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations :
Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
19 February 1962), pp. 46-48, but are simplified and reflect
some terms used by Summers and Alger.
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over the tactical situation, deliberately slowing the tempo
of military operations can place military forces in an
unfavorable tactical situation.
Coordinating military actions with diplomatic actions
can have a wide range of negative impacts. Coordination is
•ought to support an integrated strategy for resolving the
crisis acceptably without war, often with the result that
the military objectives of crisis operations are not well
defined—violating the principle of the objective. In
military planning, objectives are specific and concrete:
such as defending or seizing a specific location, or
defeating a specific force. A principle objective of
crisis management is to avoid war or unwanted escalation of
a limited use of force, which is difficult for military
planners to use as the basis for planning tactical
operations. Resolving the crisis acceptably is achieved
through political-diplomatic bargaining, in which military
forces are used primarily as a means of signaling intentions
and conveying coercive threats, a political mission
difficult for military planners to address as an objective
in the military sense.
Coordinating military actions with diplomatic actions
can also require limiting the size and composition of the
forces employed, violating the principle of concentration
and constraining the strength of the force, an element of
its warfighting capability. Political signaling can require
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deploying military forces close to or in the midst of
fighting, or close to the adversary's forces, as a visible
signal of commitment, thereby placing one's forces in an
unfavorable tactical situation. Limiting the actions that
military forces can take in self-defense or to improve their
tactical situation, normally done for escalation control
purposes, can violate the principle of initiative and
constrain their readiness for combat. Informing the
adversary of one's military operations, an action normally
taken to reinforce the signal being conveyed by military
forces but which can also serve escalation control purposes,
deliberately violates the principle of surprise and
secondarily violates the principle of initiative (It is hard
gain control of the tactical situation when the adversary
knows what you are doing and why you are doing it) . Using
force in gradually increasing increments, a common tactic of
coercive bargaining, is the military planner's second worst
nightmare (second only to being the victim of strategic
surprise) , violating the principles of initiative
(particularly exploitation), concentration, and surprise.
Avoiding military options that give the adversary the
impression of an impending resort to large-scale warfare can
also have a broad range of impacts on military considera-
tions. This crisis management requirement, which is
essentially application of the escalation avoidance strategy
under crisis conditions, can require limiting the size and

159
composition of the forces employed, limiting the tactical
actions they are permitted to take, and using force in
gradually increasing increments. These approaches to the
use of military force violate all four of the principles of
tactical planning (objective, initiative, concentration, and
surprise) , and constrain the elements of warf ighting
capability (strength, readiness, and tactical situation).
The principles of tactical planning essentially dictate that
the military options favored by military planners will be
precisely those which give the adversary the impression of
an impending resort to large-scale warfare, or the appear-
ance of an actual resort to large-scale warfare in the case
of surprise attack. An optimum battle plan calls for
seizing the initiative by concentration of superior force
and launching a surprise attack against a strategic objec-
tive, and then rapidly exploiting that attack with further
offensive action. Such a battle plan is precluded by the
requirements of crisis management.
The second source of tension between political and
military considerations is the issue of operational control:
tensions between the need for direct, positive, top-level
control of military operations in a crisis, and the need for
tactical flexibility and instantaneous decisionmaking at the
scene of the crisis. This tension arises from, and is a
symptom of, stratified interaction. The manner in which it
is handled by national leaders and the military chain of
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command is a major determinant of whether or not stratified
19interactions become decoupled in a crisis.
A fundamental and ubiquitous issue in civil-military
relations is at what level in the chain of command should
operational decisions on the employment of military forces
and their weapons be made? Delegating decisionmaking
authority to lower levels can deprive national leaders of
the ability to control the momentum of a conflict and to
coordinate military operations with diplomatic initiatives.
On the other hand, centralizing decisionmaking authority in
the hands of national leaders can rob on-scene forces of
tactical flexibility, leaving them incapable of adapting to
a rapidly changing situation and vulnerable to surprise
attack. This is a dilemma inherent in the use of military
force in crises. It cannot be resolved, it must be managed
on an on-going basis every time a crisis occurs.
The nature of the interactions at the political and
tactical levels can be quite different, and probably often
are. Given a crisis in which national leaders on the two
sides are pursuing strategies of coercive diplomacy, efforts
by each side to enhance the credibility of its coercive
threats or to counter the adversary's coercive threats by
19Although operational control tensions can also arise
over the control of strategic level forces, this study will
concentrate on tensions arising over the control of tactical
level forces. On operational control tensions affecting
strategic nuclear forces, see Sagan, pp. 99-139; Bracken,
Command and Control of Nuclear Forces , pp. 196-202, 224-232.
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deploying forces to the scene of the crisis will generate
tactical level interaction. The commanders of those forces
are constantly evaluating their tactical situation relative
to adversary forces—assessing the seriousness of the threat
they represent and the ability of his own forces to counter
that threat. When the tactical situation is dynamic, with
both sides acting to maintain or improve their tactical
situation, the result is a test of capabilities at the
tactical level. The test of capabilities is no less real
for no shots having been fired. The tactical commanders are
constantly calculating the likely outcome of an engagement
with each new development in the tactical situation. Thus,
even though political level interaction may be marked by
coercive diplomacy, tactical level interaction can become a
test of capabilities.
This illustrates why the level of control issue can be
a source of tensions. The tactical situation can appear
much different to the on- scene commander, operating under
the guns of the adversary, than it does to top-level
political leaders, negotiating with that same adversary. A
military move by the adversary that is viewed as a political
signal by national leaders can be viewed as an immediate
military threat to the tactical commander. Under the
conditions of a test of capabilities, a tactical commander
is going to perceive an urgent need for as much decision-
making authority as he can get from his chain of command.
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At the same tine, national leaders, particularly when
engaged in coercive diplomacy, are going to perceive an
urgent need for a high degree of direct control over the
actions of their military forces. The result is tension
between the tactical commander's need for flexibility and
initiative, and the politcal leader's need for close control
of military operations.
The third source of tension is wartime readiness:
tensions between performance of crisis missions and
maintaining or increasing readiness to perform wartime
missions. This is a tension between present operations and
possible future contingencies: the immediate political and
military objectives being pursued in a crisis conflicting
with the military objectives that would be pursued if the
crisis escalates to war. This tension arises for four
reasons, which may occur individually or together: dual
crisis-wartime tasking, replacement of crisis forces,
alliance commitments, and execution of contingency plans.
The first reason is that military forces do not
necessarily drop their wartime contingency tasking when
assigned to crisis operations. Their wartime tasking may
change to make it more compatible with their crisis tasking,
for example by assigning them wartime missions in the
vicinity of the crisis, but their wartime tasking is rarely
dropped altogether. The more capable and mobile a military
unit is, the more likely it is to retain significant wartime
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contingency tasking while assigned to crisis operations.
Forces equipped with dual-capable weapons—aircraft and
missiles capable of carrying nuclear as well as conventional
warheads—are most likely to have simultaneous crisis and
wartime tasking.
Tensions arise from simultaneous crisis and wartime
contingency tasking because the military requirements of the
two missions can be significantly different. As an example,
such differences in mission requirements would be
particularly pronounced for U.S. forces when their crisis
tasking entailed small-scale conventional operations against
a much smaller nation (like Libya) , while wartime
contingency tasking entails large-scale conventional or
nuclear operations against the Soviet Union.
The second reason why tensions arise between crisis
objectives and wartime objectives is that forces detached
from major operational units to respond to a crisis may be
replaced by other forces in order to maintain readiness for
wartime missions. For example, moving an aircraft carrier
battle group out of the Western Pacific into the Arabian Sea
for the possibility of operations against Iran can require
that another carrier battle group be surged from its
homeport in the United States to the Western Pacific in
order to cover the wartime commitments of the first battle
group. During an acute Soviet-American crisis, such surging
of forces to replace crisis forces could send an inadvertent
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signal of hostility to the Soviet Union—an example of the
crisis security dilemma.
The third reason why tensions arise between crisis
objectives and wartime objectives is that alliance
commitments can inhibit forces deployed for support of
allies in wartime from being used in a crisis.
Alternatively, if forces normally committed to the defense
of an ally are diverted to a crisis, other forces may have
to be deployed from their home bases to avert sending an
inadvertent signal of retrenchment to the ally. For
example, U.S. forces in Korea are not readily available to
20
respond to crises elsewhere in Asia. Similarly, U.S.
ground and air forces deployed in Western Europe to support
NATO commitments are rarely employed for out-of-area
contingencies. The frequent refusal of U.S. allies, notably
NATO and Japan, to provide forces in support of U.S.
military actions in crises—even crises affecting their
interests more than American interests—further . compounds
21
crisis-wartime trade-offs for the United States. In such
20Joseph F. Bouchard, "The American View of Korean
Peninsula Security," in The Security Challenge in Northeast
Asia: Report of a Conference (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University, Northeast Asia-United States Forum on
International Policy, December 1982), pp. 52-55.
21On NATO, see Gregory F. Treverton, "Global Threats
and Trans-Atlantic Allies," International Security 5 (Fall
1980): 142-158; Edward A. Kolodziej, "Europe: The Partial
Partner ," International Security 5 (Winter 1980-1981):
104-131; Karl Kaiser, "NATO Strategy Toward the End of the
Century," Naval War College Review 38 (January-February
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situations the U.S. must divert forces from unilateral U.S.
wartime contingencies in order to respond to a crisis with-
out diverting forces from alliance wartime contingencies.
The fourth reason why tensions arise between crisis
objectives and wartime objectives is that as a crisis
escalates and military forces are placed at increasingly
higher levels of readiness (DEFCON) , initial preparations to
execute wartime contingency plans commence. Certain of
these preparations can be initiated by strategic level
military commanders on the basis of authority delegated to
them in mechanisms of delegated command, without an increase
22in DEFCON or other orders from political level leaders.
Increased surveillance of the potential enemy is an
immediate measure. For conventional forces preparations for
wartime operations include increased security measures to
thwart enemy surveillance and deployment to wartime battle
positions. If not carefully integrated with the diplomatic
actions being taken to resolve the crisis, preparations to
1984): 69-82. On the NATO out-of-area issue, see A.W.
DePort, "The North Atlantic Alliance: External Threats and
Internal Stress," Naval War College Review 37 (November-
December 1984): 71-79; William T. Tow, "NATO's Out-of-Region
Challenges and Extended Containment," Orbis 29 (Winter
1985): 839-840. On Japan, see Joseph F. Bouchard and
Douglas J. Hess, "The Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes Defense,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110 (March 1984): 88-97.
22Sagan, pp. 99-139; John Steinbruner, "An Assessment
of Nuclear Crises," in Franklyn Griffiths and John C.
Polanyi, eds., The Dangers of Nuclear War (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 34-49.
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execute wartime contingency plans can touch off stratified
escalation dynamics at the tactical and strategic levels of
interactions.
In summary, tensions between political and military
considerations are inherent in the use of military force as
a political instrument. The first source of tension is
conflict between political considerations and the needs of
diplomatic bargaining, on the one hand, and military
considerations and the needs of military operations, on the
other. Tensions between political and military considera-
tions arise because military forces must always be prepared
for the possibility of combat even while carrying out
political signaling missions. The second source of tension
is the issue of operational control: tensions between the
need for direct, positive, top-level control of military
operations in a crisis, and the need for tactical
flexibility and instantaneous decisionmaking at the scene of
the crisis. This is a dilemma that cannot be resolved, it
Bust be managed on an on-going basis every time a crisis
occurs. The third source of tension is wartime readiness:
tensions between performance of crisis missions and
maintaining or increasing readiness to perform wartime
missions. This tension arises for four reasons, which may
occur individually or together: dual crisis-wartime tasking,
replacement of crisis forces, alliance commitments, and




This chapter began by describing the stratified
interaction model and defining the theory of stratified
interaction. The first corollary to the theory, decoupled
interactions, was then presented. The theory of stratified
interaction was then applied to crisis stability, producing
the second corollary to the theory, that of stratified
crisis stability. Extending this corollary to the problem
of escalation resulted in the third corollary to the theory,
stratified escalation dynamics. Finally, stratified
interaction was used to explore the tensions that arise
between political and military considerations when military
force is used as a political instrument in crises.
With the theory of stratified interaction and its
corollaries defined, we can now begin to explore the use of
force as a political instrument in crises. The first task,
which will be undertaken in the next chapter, is to examine
the mechanisms of delegated command. These mechanisms are
important in crisis management because the President, and
even top-level military commanders, cannot possibly exercise
real-time direct control over all the activities of the U.S.
armed forces. The mechanisms of delegated command strongly
influence the degree to which crisis interactions are
stratified, the likelihood of stratified interactions
becoming decoupled, and the intensity of the tensions
between political and military considerations.

CHAPTER IV
MECHANISMS OF INDIRECT CONTROL
There are three major reasons for examining military
command and control and the mechanisms of indirect control.
First, and most important, there is always a danger that
national leaders could lose control of events in a crisis,
allowing crisis military operations to escalate
uncontrollably to war. The methods, capabilities, and
limitations of military command and control are important
factors in the ability of national leaders to maintain
control over events. Second, the occurrence of stratified
interaction in crises is largely a function of the military
command and control procedures being employed to direct
crisis military operations. Third, the nature and intensity
See Alexander L. George, "The Development of Doctrine
and Strategy," in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and
William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (New
York: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 8-15; John
Steinbruner, "An Assessment of Nuclear Crises," in Franklin
Griffiths and John C. Polanyi, eds., The Dangers of Nuclear
War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p. 40;
Phil Williams, Crisis Management (New York: John Wiley,
1976), pp. 94-134; Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and War
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 287;
Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of





of the tensions between political and military considers'
tions that arise in crises are heavily influenced by
military command and control procedures. Thus, greater
familiarity with military command and control will enhance
our understanding of escalation dangers in crises and the
problems of crisis management.
The methods and problems of military command and
control have received scant attention in studies of warfare
and virtually no attention at all in studies of crisis
2
management. Virtually all the attention paid to command
and control has been narrowly focused on technical issues
—
maintaining reliable and rapid communications, improving
information processing and display, and reducing
vulnerability to enemy attacks and countermeasures. The
recent spate of books and articles on the command and
control of strategic nuclear forces has not corrected this
deficiency. These studies have made an important
2For commentaries on this lack of attention, see Roger
A. Beaumont, "Command Method: A Gap in Military
Historiography," Naval War College Review 31 (Winter 1979):
61-74? Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 11. On the role of
command and control systems in crisis management, see Davis
B. Bobrow, "Communications, Command, and Control: The Nerves
of Intervention," in Ellen P. Stern, ed., The Limits of
Military Intervention (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), pp. 101-
120; Phil Williams, "Crisis Management: The Role of Command,
Control and Communications," RUSI Journal 128 (December
1983) : 33^39; Garry D. Brewer and Paul Bracken, "Some
Missing Pieces of the C I Puzzle," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 28 (September 1984): 451-469. These articles




contribution by exploring how operational problems in
command and control systems can impair crisis management and
escalation control. Connectivity issues—ensuring that
operational forces are reliably and securely linked with
National Command Authority—are important, but there is much
more to effective command and control.
The purposes of this chapter are to set military
command and control in the context of theories on delegation
and control in organizations, and to explain how delegation
and control are exercised in the U.S. military command
system. The first section will present organization and
management theories on delegation and control, and show how
they apply to military command and control. The second
section will explore basic concepts of delegation and
control used in the U.S. military command system. The third
section will examine four of the mechanisms of indirect
control: the alert system, standing orders, mission orders,
and contingency plans. The final section will examine rules
of engagement—the fifth mechanism of indirect control.
Vice Admiral G.E. Miller, "Existing Systems of Command
and Control, H in Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Polanyi,
eds.. The Dangers of Nuclear War (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 50-66; Paul Bracken, The Command
and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1983); Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and
Crisis Management, " International Security 9 (Spring 1985):
99-139; Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control:
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner,
and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987) .
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Delegation and Control in Organizations
The principle analytical concept currently employed for
Analysis of organizational behavior and the effect of that
behavior on crisis interaction is the organizational process
4
model. That model has serious deficiencies when used as a
tool for analysis of military command and control. Its
weaknesses stem from two sources. First, it is based on a
narrow and critically flawed conception of delegation and
control in organizations. This weakness will be discussed
in this section. Second, it fails to account for the manner
in which military command and control is exercised,
particularly the significant delegation of decisionmaking
authority and the role of mechanisms of indirect control.
This weakness will be addressed in the following section.
The organizational process model implicitly accepts the
simple public administration distinction between policy-
making and implementation. In the organizational process
model, the President makes policy decisions and government
organizations implement those those decisions. Organiza-
tional processes explain why the actions taken during
implementation differ from the actions the President desired
or expected when he made the decision. There is no
provision in the model for government organizations to have
4Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the




been delegated significant discretion in making operational
5decisions on how to implement policy decisions.
This conception of implementation has long been
discredited by political scientists and organization
theorists. In their study of implementation, Jeffry L.
Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky note that the distinction
between policymaking and implementation is an
oversimplification, and that "the passage of time wreaks
havoc with efforts to maintain tidy distinctions" between
the two functions. They contend that "In the midst of
action the distinction between the initial conditions and
the chain of causality begins to erode. Once a program is
underway implementers become responsible both for the
initial conditions and for the objectives toward which they
are supposed to lead." The implication of this is that the
persons charged with carrying out a policy also have an
5Allison recognizes that "Government action requires
decentralization of responsibility and power." However, his
model is based on the observation that "The necessity for
coordination and the centrality of foreign policy to the
welfare of the nation guarantee the involvement of
government leaders in the processes of the organizations
that share power." This observation, while essentially
correct, leads to an oversimplified model of governmental
behavior as consisting of policy decisions by government
leaders, and subsequent efforts by those leaders to control
organizational routines so as t6 achieve desired results.
The model thus ignores the deliberate delegation of
decisionmaking authority and the role of such delegated
authority in shaping policy. See Allison, pp. 85-87.
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky,




important role in shaping the policy. Michael Lipsky had
made the same argument earlier in even stronger terms:
There are many contexts in which the latitude of
those charged with implementing policy is so
substantial that studies of implementation should be
turned on their heads. In these cases, policy is
effectively "made" by the people who implement it.
Where considerable discretion characterizes the jobs of
people who implement public agency activities, people
"make" policy in hidden concert with others in similar
positions through their patterned responses to the
situation and circumstances in which they find
themselves.
Thus, while organizational processes do have an influence on
policy outcomes, the organizational process model needs to
be revised to reflect the significant decisionmaking
authority—authority to define objectives and design
programs—delegated to certain officials in government
organizations
.
The necessity for delegation of discretionary powers
and the coordination problems that can arise from this have
long been recognized in organization and management theory.
Chester Barnard recognized that delegation of discretion
results in policies being defined at all levels in an
organization, rather than just at the top. According to
Anthony Downs, "At every level there is a certain
7Michael Lipsky, "Standing the Study of Policy
Implementation of Its Head," in W. Dean Burnham and Martha
W. Weinberg, eds., American Politics and Public Policy
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), p. 397.
m
Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 231-2

174
discretionary gap between the orders an official receives
from above and the orders he issues downward, and every
official is forced to exercise discretion in interpreting
q
his superior's orders." This decentralization of
decisionmaking is driven by limitations on the analytical
capabilities of decisionmakers, which are rapidly exceeded
as an organization increases in size and complexity. John
W. Sutherland emphasizes this point: "Simply, as the scope
of a decision-maker's authority increases (as the number of
units for which he is responsible expands) , the probability
that he will make rational, accurate decisions about the
properties of those programs decreases." Thus, authority
to define policies is diffused throughout organizations by
the necessity of delegating discretionary powers in order to
carry out top-level policy decisions.
In a useful refinement of this concept, Jay R.
Galbraith has drawn a distinction between two methods of
delegating decisions in organizations. In the first
approach, rules, programs, and procedures are used to move
repetitive decisions to lower levels in the organization
without delegation of discretion. Decisionmaking by lower-
level officials is guided by directives that specify the
9Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1967), p. 134.
John W. Sutherland, Administrative Decision-Making :
Extending the Bounds of Rationality (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 1977), p. 277.
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actions to be taken those situations that can be anticipated
in advance. According to Galbraith, "The primary effect is
an information processing one—the elimination from
hierarchical channels of communications concerning routine
events. Rules serve the same function as habits for individ-
uals. They preserve the scarce information processing,
decisionmaking capacity for novel, consequential events."
Rule-governed delegation of decisionmaking is the type
recognized in the organizational process model.
The second approach is to delegate discretionary
decisionmaking authority. According to Galbraith, this is
driven by an inability to anticipate situations for rule-
governed decisions:
The combination of rules and hierarchy, like
hierarchy alone, is vulnerable to task uncertainty. As
the organization's subtasks increase in uncertainty,
fewer situations can be programmed in advance and more
exceptions arise which must be referred upward in the
hierarchy. As more exceptions are referred upward, the
hierarchy will become overloaded. Serious delays will
develop between the transmission of information upward
and a response to that information downward. In this
situation, the organization must develop new processes
to supplement rules and hierarchy.
As the task uncertainty increases, the volume of
information from the points of action to points of
decision making overload the hierarchy. In this
situation, it becomes more efficient to bring the
points of decision down to the points of action where
the information exists. This can be accomplished by
increasing the amount of discretion exercised12by
employees at lower levels of the organization.
Jay R. Galbraith, Organization Design (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1977), pp. 43-44.
12
Ibid, p. 44. This is similar to Sutherland, p. 277.

176
Organizations typically use both methods of delegating
decisions: rule-governed delegation of decisionmaking for
standard, recurring situations, and discretionary delegation
of decisionmaking for situations that cannot be
anticipated.
Discretionary delegation of decisionmaking raises the
problem of ensuring that the decisions made by lower-level
officials support the goals established by top-level
officials. When this is not the case, delegated discretion
results in "authority leakage," a divergence of goals
14between top-level and lower-level officials. There thus
arises an inherent tension between autonomy and control when
discretionary delegation of decisionmaking is used to cope
with uncertainty.
Various methods of control can be used by organiza-
tions. Galbraith emphasized two: professionalism, a
reliance on professional training and socialization to
ensure that officials make decisions that support
organizational goals; and goal-setting, in which planned
13
Ibid, p. 46. In practice, at least a small amount of
discretion is allowed under rule-governed delegation—even
if only discretion to determine which rules are applicable
in specific situations—and at least minimal rules govern
discretionary delegation. Thus, it is more accurate to
portray delegation of decisionmaking as a spectrum ranging
from highly rule-governed to highly discretionary, rather
than as a dichotomy between the two types.
14Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy




objectives are set and officials allowed to select
15
appropriate means for attaining the goals. A scheme of
three categories of organizational controls is now commonly
used in organization and management studies: hierarchical
control, which include rules, procedures and directives
(which is Galbraith's rule-governed delegation); collegial
control, which is based on professional training and
identification; and nonhierarchical control, which is based
on internalization of the organization's norms and values.
Organizations use all three of these categories to varying
degrees in order to maintain control under conditions of
discretionary delegation of decisionmaking.
These concepts of delegation and control have been
widely used in studies of school administration. As Kent
D. Peterson points out, the relationship between school
district officials and the principals of individual schools
highlights the issue of autonomy versus control:
Functioning as the linkage between central office and
classrooms as well as between parents and teachers,
principals must keep resources, personnel, and students
working efficiently toward organizational goals and
15Galbraith, pp. 45-6. Also see Arthur L. Stinchcombe,
"Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production: A
Comparative Study," Administrative Science Quarterly 4
(September 1959): 168-87.
Tom K. Reeves and Joan Woodward, "The Study of
Managerial Control," in Joan Woodward, ed., Industrial
Organizations: Behavior and Control (London: Oxford
University Press, 1970), pp. 37-56; William G. Ouchi , "A
Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational




objectives. To do this, they must neither be so
tightly constrained that they cannot respond to
changing conditions, nor so loosely controlled that
they seek personal rather than organizational goals.
Superiors must afford the principal enough autonomy to
cope with unexpected problems or variable local
conditions, while still keeping schools in line. In
short, superiors seek an appropriate balance of control
and autonomy that will maximize organizational
effectiveness.
Studies of school principals consistently find that they are
accorded significant autonomy and depict school districts
and the schools within them as being "loosely coupled.**
Although all three forms of control are used in conjunction,
school principals typically are controlled largely by
collegial and nonhierarchical controls, rather than by
18hierarchical controls.
The organizational process model described by Graham
Allison in 1971 is incapable of accurately analyzing
organizational behavior in this type of situation. The
model would begin with the assumption that top-level school
district officials knew exactly what policies they wanted
implemented, ignoring the fact that they often do not know
what policies would be best for the specific conditions
17Kent D. Peterson, "Mechanisms of Administrative
Control over Managers in Educational Organizations,"
Administrative Science Quarterly 29 (December 1984): 573.
18Dan C. Lortie, "The Balance of Control and Autonomy
in Elementary School Teaching," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., The
Semi-Professions and Their Organizations (New York: Free
Press, 1969)
, pp. 1-53; Karl Weick, "Educational
Organizations as Loosely-Coupled Systems," Administrative
Science Quarterly 21 (March 1976): 1-19; Peterson, 573-97.
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faced by each school and delegate substantial policymaking
authority to the principals. The model would then assume
that the sole function of school principles is to carry out
school district policies, attributing policy differences
among schools and policy disputes between principals and
school district officials to organizational processes.
Allison's organizational process model leads to three
serious analytical errors in this type of organizational
setting. First, his model must assume that school district
officials are always "right" and principals always "wrong"
in order for the actions of principals to be attributable to
organizational processes. The model needs to allow for the
possibility that the policies decided upon by the
implementers (principals) may be more appropriate or
rational than those preferred by the policymakers (school
district officials). Second, Allison's model must assume
that the specific policy preferences expressed by school
district officials when a dispute arises with a school
principal were the policies that they had decided upon to
begin with. The model needs to allow for the pos-sibility
that school district officials may not have known exactly
what policy they preferred until after they saw what the
principal had decided upon. Third, Allison's model excludes
the effect of variation in the environment of different
decisionmakers, particularly the effect of differences in
constituencies and political influences. School district
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officials could well face much different political pressures
than those faced by individual principals. The model needs
to allow for such variations in the external environment.
With these modifications, the organizational process model
becomes applicable to an organization composed of several
independent operating unit—such as a school district or
operational military forces.
Studies of business management reveal patterns of
delegation and control similar to those seen in public
administration. Large business organizations face an
inherent tension between the need to delegate decisionmaking
and the need for centralized control, particularly when
composed of diverse, autonomous operating units. They employ
combinations of management controls (the business equivalent
of the term organizational controls used in organization
theory), including business variants of hierarchical,
collegial, and nonhierarchical controls. The interesting
point, however, is that businesses that decentralize
decisionmaking authority typically perform better than do
businesses that centralize decisionmaking. They are better
able to respond to diverse and rapidly changing market,
resource and regulatory conditions. Centralization of
decisionmaking is widely regarded as stifling creativity,
19
responsibility, loyalty, and entrepreneurship.
19
Kenneth A. Merchant, "The Control Function of
Management," Sloan Management Review 23 (Summer 1982):
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Several observers have noted a trend toward
decentralization of decisionmaking in American businesses
that is increasing their productivity and competitive-
20
ness. This includes allowing autonomous operating units
to define their own goals and strategies within broad,
flexible guidelines (that are often little more than a
corporate philosophy). Thus, in business management as well
as in public administra-tion there is recognition of the
need to balance delegation and control, and of the
advantages of decentralized decisionmaking authority
43-55; C.W.L. Hill and J.F. Pickering, "Divisonalization,
Decentralization and Performance of Large United Kingdom
Companies," Journal of Management Studies 23 (January 1986):
26-50; Michel Lebas and Jane Weigenstein, "Management
Control: The Roles of Rules Markets and Culture," Journal
of Management Studies 23 (May 1986): 259-72; Vijay
Covindarajan, "Decentralization, Strategy, and Effectiveness
of Strategic Business Units in Multibusiness Organizations,"
Academy of Management Review 11 (October 1986): 844-856.
For business views, see Barrry A. Liebling, "Is it time to
(de)centralize?" Management Keview 70 (September 1981): 14-
20; Don Collier, "Strategic Management in Diversified, Decen-
tralized Companies," Journal of Business Strategy 3 (Summer
1982): 85-89; J.H. Smith, "How Can Management Survive in a
Decentralized Environment?" Canadian Business Review ,
Spring 1983, pp. 11-13; Robert E. Levinson, "Why Decentral-
ize? H Management Review 74 (October 1985): 50-53; Roy Hill,
"Centralization or autonomy: which way should a company
jump?" International Management , March 1986, pp. 17-18.
20
In particular, see Thomas J. Peters and Robert H.
Waterman, Jr., In Search of Excellence (New York: Harper and
Row, 1982). Also see Michael Maccoby, The Leader (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981); Allan Cox, The Cox Report on the
American Corporation (New York: Delacorte Press, 1982);
Terrence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy, Corporate Cultures
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982); Rosabeth M. Kanter, The
Change Masters (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) .
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In summary, the study of organizational behavior must
account for significant delegation of decisionmaking
authority. Delegation of decisionmaking is driven by the
limits on decisionmaking, which cause decision-making by top-
level officials to deteriorate as the size and complexity of
the organization increase. Delegation of decisionmaking can
range from highly rule-governed, for standard, repetitive
situations, to highly discretionary, for situations that
cannot be anticipated. Three types of control mechanisms
are used in various combinations: hierarchical (rules and
procedures) , collegial (professionalism) , and
nonhierarchical (organizational and societal norms and
culture) . Tension between autonomy and control is always
present, particularly in organizations consisting of
numerous independent operating units. Studies in public
administration and business management repeatedly show that
optimum results are achieved with decentralized
decisionmaking combined with appropriate controls.
21The trend toward decentralization in American
business management has been accompanied by scathing
criticism of the highly centralized management style that
Robert S. McNamara adopted at Ford and brought with him to
the Department of Defense in 1961. See Robert E. Levinson,
"The high cost of remote control management," Management
Review 72 (April 1983): 12-20; and Gordon Pearson, "Business




Military Command and Control
Command and control is generally viewed in narrow terms
of organizational structures, communications systems, and
information processing systems. Attention to communications
and information processing is certainly warranted, for the
effective exercise of command and control is crucially
dependent on the commander's ability to build a clear
picture of the operational situation. As Martin van Creveld
notes: "From Plato to NATO, the history of command in war
consists essentially of an endless quest for certainty
—
certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy's
forces; certainty about the manifold factors that together
constitute the environment in which the war is fought, from
the weather and the terrain to radioactivity and the
presence of chemical warfare agents; and, last but
definitely not least, certainty about the state, intentions
22
and activities of one's own forces." This imperative
applies to crisis miltiary operations as well as to wartime
operations. Even before the shooting starts, it is crucial
that the chain of command up to top-level national leaders
have as clear a picture as possible of the situation at the
scene of a crisis.
The attention paid to communications and information




from the fundamental command and control functions supported
by those systems. From a crisis management perspective,
ensuring that the radios and computers operate properly is
the lesser problem—knowing how to effectively control
military operations with them is the more difficult
problem. Outside of the military training courses that
train officers for leadership and command, little attention
is paid to the methods, procedures, and mechanisms of
command. Rapid advances in communications and information
processing technology are having a tremendous impact on
military command and control, but the manner in which the
systems are employed operationally is still primarily a
function of the command and control philosophy held by the
personnel using the systems.
Prior to examining command and control procedures and
mechanisms, it is necessary to understand the fundamental
concepts of command and control as they are defined by the
military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff define command and
control as "the exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated Commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of his mission." The essence of command is
authority and responsibility. Authority is the power to
direct the operations and movements of the forces under
one's command. Responsibility is being held accountable for
the performance and well-being of the forces and men under




while authority can be delegated, responsibility cannot.
That is, a commander can delegate authority over a portion
of his forces to a subordinate, but retains responsibility
for those forces.
A closely related principle—unity of command—states
that if a commander is given responsibility for forces, he
must have authority over them commensurate with that
responsibility. This is the principle of command that is
most difficult to uphold. Military commanders and civilian
authorities alike face a constant temptation to restrict the
authority of subordinates even while holding them account-
24
able for the actions of their forces. Ambiguous
delegation of authority almost invariably leads to diffusion
of responsibility, a phenomenon highly visible when military
operations fail. Diffusion of authority and responsibility
can be unintended but nonetheless deleterious side-effects
of modern communications systems.
23See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense
Directory of Military and Associated Terms , JSC Publication
No. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979); United States Navy Regulations, 1973 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 13; Admiral James
D. Watkins, "The Principle of Command,** U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 109 (January 1983): 32-33.
24 See Admiral Harry D. Train III, "Decision Making and
Managing Ambiguity in Politico-Military Crisis,** in James G.
March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds., Ambiguity and
Command: Organizational Perspectives' on Military Decision
Making (Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986), p. 307;
Lieutenant D.J. Marchall, "Communications and Command




Another important principle of military command is the
distinction is drawn between command and control. The two
functions can be exercised separately. A commander can
delegate control over forces he commands. He retains
responsibility for the forces, but grants the subordinate
authority over them. The subordinate commander is then
responsible for the forces under his control. For example,
when a company commander sends a squad out on patrol, he
delegates control of the men to the squad leader, but is
still in command of them. When military command functions
in accordance with this principle, the superior commander
exercises authority over the subordinate commander, not over
the forces placed under the control of the subordinate
commander. The military chain of command is founded on the
principle of delegating control while retaining command.
A key point that is often missed in studies of command
and control is that this distinction between command and
control starts with the commander in chief of the armed
forces—the President. Under the United States
constitution, the President is, in principle, in command of
•very unit and individual member of the U.S. armed forces at
all times. However, while retaining that command, he
delegates substantial control over the armed forces to the
Secretary of Defense, who in turn delegates substantial
control to subordinate commanders. Presidential delegation
of control over military forces varies widely in extent and
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method. For example, the President retains tight control
over release of nuclear weapons, but exercises very little
control over routine peacetime military operations.
Understanding the distinction between command and control
and the delegation of control to military commanders is thus
essential for understanding how crisis military operations
are controlled.
This section will examine four aspects of military
command and control. First, the tension between delegation
and control in the military command system will be explored,
presenting the arguments for and against centralized control
of military operations. Second, the methods of exercising
control—direct versus delegated, and positive versus by
negation—will be explained. Third, the differences between
initiatory actions and contingent responses will be
defined. Finally, the authority of U.S. Kavy commanding
officers will be discussed and illustrated with historical
examples.
Delegation and Control
Tension between delegation of discretionary
decisionmaking authority and maintenance of control is
always present in organizations, particularly in large
organizations consisting of numerous independent operating
units. There is no better example of such an organization
than the United States armed forces. The Department of
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Defense is by far the single largest organization in the
U.S. government, and it consists of innumerable independent
operating units with varying degrees of autonomy. Moreover,
unlike any other organization in the U.S., the armed forces
are charged with a mission crucial to the survival of the
nation. Organization theory would thus lead to the
expectation that there would be significant tension between
delegation of discretionary decisionmaking authority and
maintenance of control in the military chain of command.
That expectation is borne out by substantial empirical
evidence. In fact, centralization versus decentralization
in the control of military operations had been a major issue
in American civil-military relations and the design of the
U.S. military command system since the National Security Act
of 1947. The Truman-MacArthur dispute during the Korean War
and military dissatisfaction with Johnson Administration
"micro-management" of the air war against North Vietnam are
only two of the most prominent examples of such tensions.
It is thus important to understand the roots of such
tensions—the reasons advanced for centralized control and
the opposing reasons advanced for decentralized delegation
of control.
Three primary reasons or explanations for the trend
toward centralized control of military operations have been
advanced. The first is that the increasing complexity of
warfare and concomitant specialization of military forces
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hat increased the need for centralized control over military
operations in order to effectively coordinate diverse
25
weapons and units. This affects almost every aspect of
military operations and is widely recognized within the
military. Since World War II U.S. Air Force doctrine has
called for centralized (theater level) control of tactical
26
air power. Similar control problems arise in amphibious
operations and combined arms ground operations. The second
reason for centralized control, the one most important to
27
civilian leaders, is the threat of nuclear war. This, in
turn, leads to the emphasis on top-level control of military
28
operations for escalation control and crisis management.
25Sir Solly Zuckerman, "Judgement and Control in Modern
Warfare,** Foreign Affairs 40 (January 1962): 203-5; Creveld,
pp. 236-7.
26For a description of Air Force command doctrine for
tactical air power, see General William Momyer, Airpower in
Three Wars (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1978).
27Rear Admiral Donald T. Poe, "Command and Control:
Changeless—Yet Changing," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
100 iOctober 1974): 23-4; Roger A. Beaumont, "The Paradoxes
of C ,** in James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb, eds . ,
Military Leadership (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981), p. 123-4;
Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Esclation and
NATO's Northern Flank," International Security 7 (Summer
1982): 28-54; Steinbruner, p. 40; Williams, pp. 94-134;
Lebow, p. 287.
28See George, "Development of Doctrine and Strategy,**
pp. 8-15, and "Crisis Management," pp. 227-228; Richard G.
Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis
Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and





The third, and most controversial, reason for centralization
is the "force multiplier" concept. The contention is that
effective command and control systems in effect multiply the
combat utility of available forces by allowing them to be
rapidly applied where they are most needed or where they can
29
achieve the greatest results. In principle, the higher
the level in the chain of command at which control is
centralized, the broader the force multiplier effect can be
applied. Of these three reasons for centralized control,
escalation control and crisis management concerns are the
most important factors prompting civilian control of
military operations.
Two primary reasons are advanced for decentralized
control of military operations. First, the ability of top-
level decisionmakers to effectively exercise close control
of military operations is severely constrained by limits on
decisionmaking and information processing. Top-level
decisionmakers can be overwhelmed by information overload,
preventing effective assessment of tactical options. They
may not have sufficient time to effectively control multiple
operations, or may have their attention diverted by one
aspect of the operations, neglecting others. They almost
invariably do not understand the complexities of modern
warfare, which can make even a small-scale operation
29For a discussion of the force multiplier concept, see
Beaumont, "The Paradoxes of C ," pp. 116-20.
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impossible to effectively control from the White House. As
Ernest R. May has pointed out, there have been quantum leaps
in the level of knowledge that the President must have of
military forces in order to be able to employ them effec-
tively. Communications channels typically become overloaded
with the vast amounts of information needed to exercise
close control of military operations, causing excessive
delays in decisionmaking and transmission of orders to
operating forces. Compounding these problems, the quality
of modern communications systems can give top-level
officials a false sense of having complete information and
being in control. That these problems should arise in
centralized control of military operations is not surprising
because, as was noted above, essentially the same phenomena
drive decentralization in all types of large organizations.
The second set of arguments for decentralized control
of military operations are based on the on-scene commander's
superior ability to control the employment of his forces.
His information about the current tactical situation is
normally superior that of his superiors. The on-scene
commander requires initiative and flexibility to
Ernest R. May, "Eisenhower and After,*1 in Ernest R.
May, ed., The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander
in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960), pp. 233-5;
Captain W.T.T. Pakenham, "The Command and Control of Naval
Operations: Principles and Organisation," Naval Forces 7
(1/1986): 50; Beaumont, "Command Method," pp. 65-7, and "The
Paradoxes of C , " p. 133; Creveld, p. 247-51; Poe, pp. 28-9.

192
•ffectively cope with the "fleeting opportunities and sudden
dangers" of combat, to use Edward N. Luttwak's apt
expression. In recognition of the importance of initiative
and flexibility, the German army has since the eighteenth
century based its tactical doctrine and command procedures
on the concept of auf tragstaktik , which emphasizes granting
subordinate commanders the maximum possible freedom of
action in carrying out assigned missions. Only the on-scene
commander can fully appreciate and adapt to the inevitable
••friction" in military operations, the multitude of problems
that shape the execution of military plans. Centralized
control of military operations can stifle initiative, weaken
morale, erode authority, and cause diffusion of
responsibility. These are the concerns in the minds of
military commanders when the White House gets on the radio
to dictate their tactics.
Colonel H.A. Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 88 (October 1962): 87-8; Admiral
Thomas B. Hayward, "An Ex-CNO's Reflection of the Garbage
Can Theory of Naval Decision Making," in James G. March and
Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds., Ambiguity and Command:
Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making
(Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986) , p. 267; Edward
N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge,
HA: Belknap Press, 1987), p. 13; Dan Horowitz, "Flexible
Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the
Israeli Army," Policy Sciences 1 (Summer 1970): 191-205;
Beaumont, "The Paradoxes of C , " pp. 123, 133; Creveld, p.
269-70; Poe, p. 28-9; Train, p. 302-3; Blair, Strategic
Command and Control , p. 75. For a description of
auf tragstaktik , see Lieutenant Colonel Walter von Lossow,
"Mission-Type Tactics versus Order-Type Tactics," Military
Review 57 (June 1977): 87-91.
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The argument is frequently made that improved
communications and information processing systems can
overcome most of the problems that constrain top-level
control of military operations. Such optimism is not
supported by historical evidence. The historical trend has
been for increases in the scale, speed, and complexity of
warfare to exceed the ability of command and control systems
32to keep higher level commanders fully in control. Martin
van Creveld has reached the same conclusion:
Taken as a whole, present-day military forces, for all
the imposing array of electronic gadgetry at their
disposal, give no evidence whatsoever of being one whit
more capable of dealing with the information needed for
the command process than were their predecessors a
century or even a millennium ago. Though modern
technical means undoubtedly enable present-day command
systems to transmit and process more information faster
than ever before, regardless of distance, movement and
weather, their ability to approach certainty has not
improved to any marked extent. Nor, given the fact
that this goal has proved elusive through every one of
the many revolutions in organization, technology and
procedure that have taken place in the past, does there
appear to be much hope of achieving it in the
foreseeable future.
32Beaumont, "Command Method," pp. 62-5; Lieutenant
Colonel Kenneth F.A. Openchowski, "The Role and Location of
the Commander: How Will They Be Affected by C Facilities





The trend toward complexity is particularly acute in
naval operations, which are conducted with a wider array of
sensors, platforms, and weapons than any other type of
military operation—making it the most difficult form of
34
warfare to explain to civilian leaders and advisors.
There is thus little reason to expect that innovations in
communications and information processing systems will sovle
crisis command and control problems.
Methods of Control
The military chain of command, from the President down
to the lowest levels, is founded upon the principle of
delegating control of forces to subordinate commanders. The
methods of exercising control cover a "tightness of control**
spectrum ranging from positive direct control at the tight
35
end to autonomous delegated control at the loose end.
34 See Karl Lautenschlager , "Technology and the
Evolution of Naval Warfare," International Security 8 (Fall
1983): 3-51; Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime
Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (January
1936), special supplement, The Maritime Strategy , pp. 12-
14. Modern naval command and control systems add to the
complexity of warfare, rather than simplifying its control,
by allowing a wider variety of weapons covering larger ocean
areas to be brought to bear on the enemy. This has lead to
enemy command and control systems becoming a primary wartime
target. See Norman Friedman, "C War at Sea," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 103 (May 1977): 126-41.
35The terms used in this section are derived from terms
used by the three services, but are not the exact terms used
by any of the services. There are two reasons for this.
First, terminology varies widely among the three services
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The tightest form of control is positive direct con-
trol. In this method, communications links with operational
forces are used to control their movements and actions on a
real-time basis. Positive direct control allows subordinate
commanders the least amount of initiative and flexibility:
movements and actions are taken only on direct orders. If
the on-scene commander wants to take an action other than
that ordered by higher authority, he must request and
receive permission to do so before initiating the action.
The effectiveness of positive direct control is crucially
dependent on communications connectivity and having the
full, undivided attention of higher authority. This form of
control is rarely used for wartime or large-scale crisis
operations because it is cumbersome and incapable of keeping
pace with a rapidly changing tactical situation.
Toward the center of the tightness of control spectrum
is a method that will be referred to as direct control by
negation. As in positive direct control, communications
links with operational forces are used to control their
movements and actions on a real-time basis. However, the on-
scene commander is delegated partial authority to control
his forces. The scope of the on-scene commander's
decisionmaking authority is defined in his mission orders,
and the joint commands despite efforts by the JCS to
standardize it. Second, the terminology used by the
services is much more complex than the scheme used here,
employing myriad terms for different types of control.
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and can vary widely. The key feature of this method of
control is that the on-scene commander reports his proposed
course of action to higher authority, and then carries it
out unless it is specifically vetoed. Like positive direct
control, the effectiveness of direct control by negation is
crucially dependent on communications connectivity and
having the full, undivided attention of higher authority.
Higher authorities can specify either or two forms of
direct control by negation: tight or loose. In the tight
form, the on-scene commander reports proposed actions before
initiating them (except when immediate action is needed in
an emergency) . In the loose form, the on-scene commander
initiates action before reporting it. The loose form of
direct control by negation is the method of control that
military commanders typically prefer when they must be
placed under direct control.
Toward the loose end of the tightness of control
spectrum are the various forms of delegated control. In
this method of control the immediate commander of a force is
delegated direct control over its operations. The commander
is issued orders to perform a certain mission and then
allowed to carry out that mission on his own initiative.
The scope of his authority and the actions he is permitted
to take in pursuit of the mission are spelled out in his
mission orders, and can range from granting him wide freedom
of action to restricting him to a specific plan of action.
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When direct communications links are available,
monitored delegated control is the form commonly employed.
In monitored delegated control, the on-scene commander is
required to keep his superiors informed of the status of his
forces, the progress of his mission, and his operational
intentions through periodic situation reports and, if
possible, real-time reports of crucial information. The
chain of command intervenes in the conduct of the operation
only when absolutely necessary to ensure that it supports
the overall strategy being pursued or to correct serious
(mission-threatening) errors by the on-scene commander.
Control by negation is often employed in monitored delegated
control, as well as under direct control by negation. The
difference between the two methods is that monitored
delegated control allows the on-scene commander greater
freedom of action than does direct control by negation.
Monitored delegated control is viewed by most military
officers as the ideal method of control, striking an
effective balance between autonomy and control.
When direct communications links are not available or
not feasible, autonomous delegated control is the form of
control that is employed. In autonomous delegated control
the on-scene commander is given his mission orders and is
not expected to report again to higher authority until he
successfully completes or aborts the mission. This type of
control is necessary in covert operations, such as by
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special forces, when stealth is crucial to the effectiveness
of a platform, such as attack submarines, and in situations
where electronic emissions must be curtailed, such as in a
surprise attack or when deception is used in battle. This
method of control is not often favored by military
commanders because it lacks flexibility, and is therefore
only used when absolutely necessary.
The approach the United States armed forces have taken
is to rely on a flexible combination of direct and delegated
methods of control. The balance between autonomy and
control is based on the nature of the operations being
conducted and the tactical environment—including the
political environment. In some cases, different methods of
control can be used in conjunction. For example, an on-
scene commander could be under monitored delegated control,
but have certain tactical options placed under positive
direct control. Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of the
Grenada invasion force in 1983, used this approach to allow
his subordinate commanders maximum freedom of action while
retaining control over weapons with the greatest destructive
36power (such as attack aircraft and naval gunfire) . Forces
36Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, "Decision Making in
the Grenada Rescue Operation," in James G. March and Roger
Weissinger-Baylon, eds., Ambiguity and Command:
Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making
(Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986), p. 281-2. Also
see Poe, p. 28, on flexible command procedures.
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can be rapidly shifted between the different methods of
control as the tactical situation dictates.
initiatory Actions and Contingent Responses
Another concept useful for understanding military
command and control is the distinction between initiatory
37
actions and contingent responses. Initiatory actions are
taken to initiate a new course of action intended to achieve
specific objectives. They may be directed by higher
authority (directly or in advance) , or taken by the on-scene
commander on his own authority (based on general operational
guidance and tactical doctrine) . Although initiatory
actions usually are taken on the basis of an assessment of
the overall political-military environment and the local
tactical situation, they are not the product of rules
designating a particular response to a specific action. The
on-scene commander is taking the initiative, acting rather
than reacting.
Contingent responses, on the other hand, are actions
taken in response to specific actions. The taking of such
actions is contingent upon the prior occurrence of specified
actions or the existence of specified tactical
37As in the previous section, these terms are derived
from terms used by the three services, but are not the exact
terms used by any of the services. The basic idea conveyed
by these terms is deeply ingrained in military thought on
command, and underlies certain commonly-used procedures




circumstances. Contingent responses are rarely ever fully
automatic, they usually require a deliberate operational
38decision by the on-scene commander. The principle
variable is the level in the chain of command at which
various contingent responses can be ordered. Decisions on
the use of force governed by rules of engagement are a form
of contingent response. Other contingent responses, usually
broader in scope, can be included in operations orders,
operations plans, and contingency plans. As a general rule,
the broader the scope and the greater the level of violence
involved in a contingent response, the higher up the chain
of command the decision to employ that response must be
Bade.
This distinction between initiatory actions and
contingent responses cannot be pushed too far—they can be
38Certain naval weapon systems have automatic reaction
capabilities: they can proceed from initial detection of a
target to firing of weapons without an orders from an
operator. The best-known example is the MK 16 Close-in
Weapon System (the white-domed 20mm Vulcan gun installed on
almost all U.S. Navy warships) , which in the automatic mode
will detect, track, and fire on any air target that meets
its engagement parameters. The new Aegis combat system also
has sophisticated automatic reaction and engagement
capabilities. See Captain Joseph L. McClane, Jr. and
Commander James L. McClane, "The Ticonderoga Story: Aegis
Works, H U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 111 (May 1985): 118-
29; Thomas B. Blann, "The State of Surface Antiair Warfare,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 111 (November 1985): 133-
37. However, all such systems have semi-automatic modes
that require an operator to make the decision to engage a
target, and ships are usually given detailed guidance on the
operation and programming of automatic systems so as to




difficult to distinguish in a fast-paced tactical environ-
ment. For example, a retaliatory attack can be either a
contingent response authorized in operational guidance
(other than the rules of engagement) , or an initiatory
action ordered by national leaders--even though taken as a
reprisal for a specific hostile act. Contingent responses
and initiatory actions can have the same political-military
intentions and objectives. A retaliatory attack, to
continue the example, could have as its purpose the
signaling of a coercive threat regardless of whether it was
a contingent response or an initiatory action. The primary
difference between these two types of military actions is
that operational commanders can, on their own authority,
execute contingent responses under specified tactical circum-
stances, whereas appropriate higher authority (normally the
President in peacetime) must approve initiatory actions.
An important feature of the flexible system of direct
and delegated command used by the U.S. military is that
authority to order contingent responses can be delegated
separately from authority to order initiatory actions.
Orders for a particular mission can specify positive direct
control of initiatory actions, while at the same time
employing monitored delegated control of contingent
responses. This approach is particularly useful when ships
are deployed to a tense crisis situation marked by a high-
threat tactical environment: top-level decisionmakers
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retain control of actions most likely to be escalatory
(initiatory actions) while providing on-scene decision-
makers the tactical flexibility they need to defend
themselves (contingent responses). As always, a careful
balance must be struck between direct and delegated command
when using this differentiated approach. The important
point is that the decision on direct versus delegated
command is not an "all or nothing" proposition— flexible
combinations of the two methods are possible.
Authority of Commanding Officers
An important aspect of United States Navy command and
control philosophy, which has no equivalent in the other
services, is the extremely high delegation of authority
granted to the commanding officers of ships and other
operational commanders. This is a tradition in the U.S.
Navy, one inherited from the Royal Navy and centuries-old
traditions of the sea. During the age of sail, when it
could take longer to exchange letters with the homeland than
to fight a small war, British and American naval officers
often played important foreign policy roles on their own
initiative. British naval officers were under standing
orders to "act in the best interests of the Queen" when
deployed to distant stations, granting them freedom of
action to handle situations not covered in their sailing
orders. During the nineteenth century, naval officers
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played an important role in U.S. foreign Policy, often with
39
considerable autonomy. This tradition exerts a strong
influence on Navy command and control philosophy today.
Because the actions of individual commanding officers
could have a major impact on the management of a crisis, it
is important to understand their authority as spelled out in
United States Navy Regulations . Both the 1948 and 1973
editions state the following:
The responsibility of the Commanding Officer for
his command is absolute, except when, and to the
extent, relieved therefrom by competent authority, or
as provided otherwise in these regulations. The
authority of the Commanding Officer is commensurate
with his responsibility, subject to the limits
proscribed by law and these regulations.
A commanding officer's authority and responsibility are thus
"absolute, " limited only by law and Navy Regulations .
39See Samuel Eliot Morison, "Old Bruin H : Commodore
Matthew C. Perry, 1794-1858 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1967); Kenneth J. Hagan, American Gunboat Diplomacy and the
Old Navy, 1877-1889 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973);
Robert E. Johnson, Far China Station: The U.S. Navy in Asian
Waters, 1800-1898 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1979); William N. Still, Jr., American Sea Power in the Old
World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern
Waters, 1865-1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980);
Frederick C. Drake, The Empire of the Seas: A Biography of
Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1984); David F. Long, Gold Braid
and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval
Officers, 1798-1883 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1988)
.
40U.S. Department of the Navy, United States Navy
Regulations, 1948 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1948), p. 75; U.S. Department of the Navy, United
States Navy Regulations, 1973 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 13.
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Commanding officers are, of course, required to carry
out lawful orders from superiors, but Navy Regulations even
has a provision covering situations in which a commanding
officer believes he must act contrary to his orders:
A Commanding Officer who departs from his orders
or instructions, or takes official action which is not
in accordance with such orders or instructions, does so
upon his own responsibility and shall report
immediately the circumstances to the officer from whom
the prior orders or instructions were received.
This is a key provision: It permits a commanding officer,
under unanticipated extraordinary circumstances, to exercise
initiative—even when contrary to his orders—so long as he
immediately informs his chain of command of his action. In
practice, commanding officers are extremely cautious about
taking such an action. Their professional training and
experience instill in them strong respect for the chain of
command and orders issued by higher authority.
Two examples of Navy officers acting on their own
initiative, in one case contrary to orders, will illustrate
how the provisions of Navy Regulations are applied in
practice. The first case occurred in July 1953, two days
after the end of the Korean War. On July 29, 1953, a U.S.
Air Force RB-50 reconnaissance plane patrolling in
international airspace over the Sea of Japan was shot down
by Soviet fighters about thirty miles off the coast of the





Soviet transport over North Korea two days earlier) . All
but one of the crew were able to bail out, and several were
42
spotted in the water by American search planes. Six
ships, a cruiser and five destroyers under the command of
Vice Admiral Walter G. Schindler, were detached to rescue
the survivors. Vice Admiral Schindler' s orders did not
specify how close to the Soviet coast he was allowed to
search, so he sent the following message to his superiors:
Request you relay via appropriate channels to Russian
authorities that if warranted by situation I intend to
take my ships as close to Russian territory as is
necessary to recover the airmen from the crashed
aircraft and that furthermore, in the event I do, I
will brook no interference.
By the time Vice Admiral Schindler received a response
directing him to remain clear of Soviet territorial waters,
he had already recovered the only survivor that could be
located. As it turned out, the lone survivor was found in
international waters, none of Vice Admiral Schindler' s ships
entered Soviet territorial waters, and there was no
44harassment of his force by Soviet ships or planes.
42James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval
Operations: Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1962), pp. 457-9.
43Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, The Pueblo Incident
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1970), p. 57; Vice
Admiral Walter G. Schindler, letter to author, March 19,
1988. Admiral Schindler confirmed that he sent the message
reproduced in Gallery's book.
44Field, p. 459; Gallery, p. 58; Schindler, letter to
author, March 19, 1988.
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This episode illustrates two points. First, it
illustrates monitored delegated control in practice.
Admiral Schindler informed his superiors of his intentions,
allowing control by negation. Second, it illustrates the
authority of a Navy commander. Vice Admiral Schindler had
the authority to order the actions taken by his force, used
a message to his superiors stating his intentions in order
to clarify ambiguous orders, and, by keeping his force clear
of Soviet territorial waters, acted with appropriate caution
in the absence of a timely response.
The second case occurred in Zanzibar, an island nation
off the eastern coast of Africa (now part of Tanzania) , in
January 1964. Zanzibar, a former British protectorate, had
gained independence on December 10, 1963. On January 12,
1964, African rebels overthrew the government of sultan
Seyyid Jamshid Bin Abdullah in a bloody coup. Little was
known about the rebel group or its intentions, leading to
45grave concern for the safety of foreigers on the island.
The United States immediately ordered the destroyer USS
Manley (DD 940) to proceed to Zanzibar from Mombassa, Kenya,
where it had been making a port visit, and to establish a
visible presence off the port city of Zanzibar, the island's
45
"The Sultan Banished," Tanganyika Standard (Dar Es
Salaam), January 14, 1964, p. 1; "African Revolt Overturns
Arab Regime in Zanzibar," New York Times , January 13, 1964,
p. 1; Jules Davids, The United States in World Affairs, 1964
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 278.
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capital. While the destroyer was en route, however, a rebel
leader broadcast a warning that they would not tolerate
interference by foreign powers. In response to this
development, U.S. authorities in Washington (the Secretary
of Defense was directly involved) first ordered Manley to
remain out of sight over the horizon from the island, then
later cancelled Manley 's orders entirely and recalled the
destroyer.
Manley received the first message, ordering her to
remain over the horizon, just as she arrived at Zanzibar and
established radio communications with the American embassy
on the island. The sixty-three Americans on the island,
including the staff of a NASA space tracking station, had
fled to the English Club on the Zanzibar city waterfront.
The American Charge d' Affairs, Frederick P. Picard, informed
the destroyer that their situation on the island was
desperate and that they were in grave danger. He requested
that Manley evacuate the Americans immediately.. Manley 's
Commanding Officer, Commander Robert Ruxton, reported the
evacuation request to his immediate superior, Rear Admiral
46Ibid.; "Coup in Zanzibar Stirs U.S. Concern, H New
York Times . January 14, 1964, p. 1; Captain John H.
Carmichael, Assistant Director of the Fleet Operations
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1964,
letter to author, March 8, 1988; Captain Joseph E. Murray,
Jr., Executive Officer of USS Manley (DD 940) in 1964,
letter to author, 31 March 1988; Captain Murray, letter to





Arnold F. Schade, Commander Middle East Force. Rear Admiral
Schade, acting on his own authority and contrary to the
orders, that had been sent from Washington, ordered Manley
47
to evacuate the Americans on the island.
Manley sent the ship's Executive Officer, Lieutenant
Commander Joseph E. Murray, Jr., ashore—unarmed and in a
white uniform— to organize the evacuation. Murray and
Picard negotiated with the rebel leaders, assuring them that
the U.S. warship would not interfere in Zanzibar's internal
affairs. At one point in the talks, the rebel leader, John
Okello, put a gun to Murray's head and threatened to kill
him if the U.S. ship did not depart. Murray and Picard
persevered, gaining permission from the rebel leaders to
evacuate American women and children. When they returned to
the English Club, Murray and Picard convinced the rebel
guards that they had permission to evacuate all of the
Americans. Murray succeeded in ferrying all of the
Americans (and several non-U. S. citizens) to Manley before
the rebel leaders discovered what had happened. Manley
embarked 61 Americans and 30 other foreign nationals, and
departed for Dar Es Salaam, Tanganyika (leaving behind
Picard and the third secretary to handle relations with the
new government) . Washington was unable to participate





Zanzibar, and did not learn of the evacuation until after
Manley departed. After Manley departed Zanzibar, the order
from Washington cancelling the mission was received.
This episode clearly illustrates the authority of Navy
commanding officers, including their authority to disregard
orders from superiors when the situation warrants. Rear
Admiral Schade and the Commanding Officer of Manley acted on
their own authority and immediately informed their superiors
49
of their actions, as specified in Navy Regulations . The
episode also illustrates why Navy commanders have such broad
authority. U.S. officials in Washington were incapable of
staying abreast of a rapidly changing political situation.
Knowing only that rebel leaders had broadcast a warning
48
Ibid; "Four to be Hanged in Zanzibar," Mombasa Times
(Mombasa, Kenya), January 15, 1964, p. 1.
49Manley received commendations from the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations,
Commander in Chief U.S. Forces Europe, Commander in Chief
U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and Commander Middle East Force
for "outstanding performance, vigilance, and prompt and
correct reactions to unusual conditions." See Chief of
Naval Operations message, CNO 081628Z FEB 64, February 8,
1964 (Unclassified, copy provided to author by Captain
Murray); Commander Middle East Force message, COMIDEASTFOR
170205Z FEB 64, February 17, 1964 (Unclassified, copy
provided to author by Captain Murray); Ship's History, USS
Manley (DD 940), 1964 (Ships History Branch, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, DC) . Manley's Executive
Officer was personally commended for his role in the
evacuation. See James R. Ruchti, First Secretary, U.S.
Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, letter to Commanding Officer USS
Manley (DD 940), March 17, 1964 (provided to author by
Captain Murray) ; "Three Manley Crewmen Commended for
Heroism," Charleston Evening Post (Charleston, SO, December
10, 1964, p. 10A.
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against interference, but not knowing that Manley 'a
Executive Officer and the American Charge d'Affairs were in
contact with the rebels and had gained their permission for
an evacuation, Washington prematurely cancelled the
mission. That the situation was indeed serious enough to
warrant immediate evacuation is shown by what happened to
the American Charge d'Affairs four days later: Picard was
arrested at gun point and expelled from the island due to
50U.S. refusal to recognize the new government. The
situation could have been much more serious with sixty-one
potential hostages on the island, as the United States would
learn later in Iran.
Allison's original organizational process model would
seriously misconstrue both of these incidents. The model
does not account for the substantial authority delegated to
Navy commanders, including authority to disregard orders
when warranted by unanticipated extraordinary circumstances
and lack of immediate communication with higher authority.
In both the 1953 Sea of Japan and 1964 Zanzibar cases,
Allison '8 organizational process model would view the
commanders as mindlessly carrying out pre-established
organizational routines routines regardless of the desires
of higher authorities—missing the crucial points that in
the 1953 case there was ambiguity as to how close the search
50
"Zanzibar Regime Seizes U.S. Consul at Gunpoint," New
York Times . January 17, 1964, p. 1; Davids, p. 279.

211
and rescue force could approach the Soviet Union, and that
in the 1964 case authorities in Washington lacked sufficient
information to effectively control the operation. Admiral
Schindler allowed his superiors to exercise control by
negation when he sent the message stating his intention, and
in the absence of a timely response acted with prudence and
kept his ships clear of Soviet territorial waters. Rear
Admiral Schade disregarded orders issued by the Secretary of
Defense via the military chain of command in order to
respond to the evacuation request, and Manley carried out
the evacuation with caution to avoid incidents in a volatile
situation. Neither organizational routines nor evasion of
51
civilian control was a factor in these two cases.
51The behavior of Navy and Marine Corps commanders
during the 1958 landings in Lebanon was much different from
that of Navy commanders in the Zanzibar episode. In the
Lebanon case, Navy and Marine officers twice refused
requests from the American ambassador to modify their plans
for the landing, which could be cited as an example of the
organization process model at work. The first request was
that the Marines not be landed over the beach to seize the
airport, that they be kept aboard ship and brought into the
harbor. This request was made after the first battalion of
Marines was ashore and deployed, which would have reqired
lengthy backloading of the men and their equipment.
Additionally, President Eisenhower had already announced the
landing to the world. This request simply came too late to
be executed effectively. The second request, made about
thirty minutes after the first, was for a company of Marines
to be sent from the airport to the presidential palace to
guard against a possible coup. Note that in making this
request Lebanese officials and the U.S. ambassdor completely
reversed their position from the earlier request. This
request was refused because the Marine commander thought
that the small force would have been in an exposed and
vulnerable position, and cut off from the main force. He




In summary, the military chain of command, from the
President down to the lowest levels, is founded on the
principle of delegating control while retaining command.
Tension between delegation and control is always present in
the military chain of command. Pressures toward centralized
control are driven by the complexity of modern warfare, fear
of nuclear war, and efforts to exploit the force multiplier
effect. Pressures toward decentralized control are driven
by severe constraints on the ability of top-level
authorities to effectively control tactical operations, and
by the advantages gained by granting the on-scene commander
flexibility to exercise initiative. Improvements in
communications and information processing systems are
unlikely to reduce the need for delegation of control.
The methods of exercising control cover a "tightness of
control" spectrum ranging from very tight to very loose
control. Toward the tight end of the spectrum are positive
to secure the airport and landing area until the second
battalion had deen landed. The Marine commander's caution
appears to have been warranted given that when the first
column of Marines attempted to leave the airport the next
day, they met Lebanese tanks and artillery massed on the
road into Beirut, almost causing an armed clash. Thus,
although even the Marine commander ashore felt his orders
were excessively rigid, valid political and military
considerations were at least as important as organizational
routines in determining the decsions that were made. See
Robert, McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," U.S.




direct control, and direct control by negation. Toward the
loose end of the spectrum are monitored delegated control
and autonomous delegated control. The United States armed
forces rely on a flexible combination of direct and
delegated control. Certain of the methods of control can be
used in conjunction, and forces can be rapidly shifted from
one method to another as the situation warrants. A
distinction between initiatory actions and contingent
responses is used to delegate authority to take certain
actions, while withholding authority to take others. Navy
command and control doctrine is unique in the scope of the
authority granted to commanding officers, which even allows
them to act contrary to orders when the situation warrants.
These are the basic concepts on which military command
and control procedures are based. Emphasis is on delegation
of discretionary decisionmaking authority in conjunction
with appropriate methods of control. In addition to direct
control via communications links, commanders can exercise
indirect control of subordinates even after having delegated
then substantial autonomy. The mechanisms of indirect
control are the subject of the next section.
Mechanisms of Indirect Control
When a military commander delegates control of
operational forces, he does not relinquish all control of
those forces to his subordinate. In most cases, he retains
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a certain amount of direct control, which can vary widely in
tightness. Additionally, the commander has at his disposal
various mechanisms of indirect control. Mechanisms of
indirect control are orders, instructions, or detailed
guidance issued to a commander prior to the start of a
mission in order to ensure that the operational decisions he
makes support the objectives and intentions of his
superiors. Such instructions can range from being very
detailed and specific to very general in nature. As the
method of control being used moves across the "tightness of
control" spectrum from tight to loose—that is, as the
subordinate is granted increasing freedom from direct
control—the importance of the mechanisms of indirect
control increases. When a subordinate is operating under
autonomous delegated control, with no direct communications
links at all, the mechanisms of indirect control are the
only means of control available.
There are five principle mechanisms of delegated
control: the alert system, standing orders, mission orders,
contingency plans, and rules of engagement. The first four
will be discussed in this section. Rules of engagement will
be discussed separately in the next section. The focus of
attention in the following discussion will be on how the
mechanisms are supposed to function in principle, rather
than on hw they actually function in practice, which will be




The U.S. alert system is based on five levels of
Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) , ranging from normal
peacetime readiness (DEFCON 5 and 4) to wartime readiness
(DEFCON 1). The DEFCON system defines the overall framework
for controlling the readiness of U.S. forces, providing a
uniform system for all operational commands. Within this
framework, following guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) , individual commands formulate alert procedures and
readiness postures applicable to their forces. The system
is highly flexible, allowing different major commands to be
placed at different DEFCON levels as the world situation
warrants. It is not unusual for U.S. forces in different
52parts of the world to be at different DEFCON levels.
Much of the detailed guidance for operational forces is
not part of the alert system per se , it is included in
standing orders and contingency plans activated as higher
levels of DEFCON are declared. Thus, the primary impact of
the alert system is that it activates a wide range of
operational guidance contained in previously prepared
standing orders and contingency plans.
52Joseph J. Kruzel, "Military Alerts and Diplomatic
Signals," in Ellen P. Stern, ed., The Limits of Military
Intervention (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), pp. 83-99; Bruce
C. Blair, "Alerting in Crisis and Conventional War," in
Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A.
Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, DC:




The alert system serves as a mechanism of indirect
control by ensuring a uniform response to an order to
increase (or decrease) readiness. A commander need not
issue detailed orders to every subordinate command
specifying the measures he wants them to take. The measures
required for each level of readiness are spelled out in
their standing orders, all the commander needs to do is
state the level he desires and then monitor the messages
that come in reporting attainment of the specified readiness
condition. This frees the commander from having to directly
manage details of implementing the alert, leaving him free
to concentrate on assessing the situation and planning
subsequent military operations.
An important feature of the alert system is that cer-
tain military commanders are delegated authority to increase
the readiness of their forces independent of the DEFCON set
by the JCS. They must maintain the minimum readiness level
set by JCS, but can place their forces at a higher condition
of readiness if warranted by the particular threat facing
their commands. The Commanders in Chief of the unified and
certain of the specified commands—such as the Atlantic Com-
mand, Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, and Strategic
Air Command—have authority to increase the DEFCON of their
forces independently of the worldwide DEFCON. They are
required to immediately report such an action to the JCS
and, time permitting, would normally confer with JCS before
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changing the DEFCON level of their forces. The Commanders
in Chief can also select from among various readiness
postures— tailored for different types of threats—within a
53given DEFCON level. Lower level commanders (who do not
have authority to order changes in DEFCON) can also increase
the readiness of their forces independent of the worldwide
or theater DEFCON level. For example, the commanding
officer of a Navy ship can place his crew at Condition I
("general quarters,'* when the crew is at battle stations) on
his own authority without regard to DEFCON. A Navy battle
group or fleet commander can place his entire force in an
increased readiness status on his own authority. Similar
procedures exist throughout the armed forces.
Standing Orders
Standing orders are detailed guidance on operational
procedures prepared on a routine basis during peacetime.
Although they are revised periodically, the intent is that
they provide stable guidance, thereby minimizing uncertainty
over operational procedures and facilitating the exercise of
delegated control. Standing orders fall into four general
categories: doctrinal publications, operations orders,
operations plans, and long-range schedules.
53JCS SM-833-59, August 25, 1959; JCS 1968/84, Record
Group 218, JCS Records, National Archives, Washington, DC.
Also see Blair, "Alerting in Crisis and Conventional War,"
pp. 114-117; Sagan, pp. 134-135.
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Doctrinal publications define strategic principles,
standard tactics, and routine operational procedures. U.S.
Army Field Manuals (FMs), U.S. Navy Naval Warfare Publica-
tions (NWPs), and NATO Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs)
54
are examples of doctrinal publications. Doctrine serves
as a mechanism of indirect control by allowing a commander
to issue a very brief order directing that a particular
tactic or procedure be executed without having to specify
all the details of the actions every unit is to take.
Doctrine can be taught and rehearsed in peacetime, thus
reducing confusion arising from unfamiliar procedures.
Certain procedures require amplifying information for
coordination purposes, such as direction of movement and
timing of actions, but the prior formulation of a doctrine
for carrying out the action still facilitates controlling
it. Doctrine also reduces communications up the chain of
command by reducing the amount of details that must be
included in situation reports in order to explain the
progress of an operation.
A common misconception about doctrine is that it speci-
fies only a single tactic to be used in each situation.
This misconception leads to the view that a military
54
For a description of U.S. Navy doctrinal publica-
tions, see Commander George Galdorisi, "The Quiet
Revolution," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (April
1986): 42-43; "Surface Tactical Doctrine," Surface Warfare
10 (September/October 1985): 15-17.
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organization's repertoire is limited to a small range of
standard operating procedures, and consequently to
overemphasis of the organizational process model for
analysis of military organizations. In fact, doctrinal
publications typically define a range of options for any
given situation, and provide criteria for selecting among
them. The complexity of doctrine and the range of options
it encompasses has increased in direct proportion with the
complexity of warfare. The greater the variety of sensors,
platforms, and weapons at a commander's disposal, the
greater are his options in any given situation.
The easy part of tactical training is teaching standard
tactical procedures, the difficult part is teaching tactical
decisionmakers how to select the most appropriate option, or
combination of options, for a particular situation. Most
doctrinal publications explicitly recognize that not every
tactical situation can be anticipated, and that the standard
procedures they contain should be used as building blocks
55for constructing an appropriate plan of action. Command
and control would not be as complex as it is if doctrine
were in fact as simple as it is often incorrectly portrayed.
55Lieutenant Christopher H. Johnson, "Tactics," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 104 (October 1978): 37-43;
Lieutenant Commander Miles A. Libbey, III, "Time Out for
Tactics," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 104 (January
1979): 52-57; Captain Robert C. Powers, "The Return of




Standing operations orders (OPORDs) are issued by
operational commands to provide guidance for the routine
peacetime operations conducted by their forces. The term
"operations order" is a Navy term, but the other services
have equivalent documents. A standing operations order
typically defines command relationships, communications
channels, logistics procedures, and other such routine
information. It serves as a mechanism of indirect control
by relieving a commander of having to repeatedly issue the
same orders to cover repetitive routine situations. An
important function of standing operations orders is to
define the scope of decisionmaking authority delegated to
subordinate commanders on a routine basis. Standing
operations orders are a good example of hierarchical
controls or rule-governed delegation of decisionmaking.
An operations plan (OPLAN) is a comprehensive set of
plans for the conduct of a specific operation. Standing
operational plans are those that have been activated for
execution of particular peacetime operations. They serve a
function similar to that of standing operations orders, but
are limited in scope to a single operation. The single
operation could well consist of a prolonged series of
repetitive missions, such as reconnaissance flights. An
operations plan includes the objective of the operation, the
forces assigned to it, command relationships, communications
channels, doctrinal guidance, intelligence procedures,
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logistics, and a multitude of other information as
appropriate. An operations plan serves as a mechanism of
indirect control by relieving a commander of having to
exercise direct control over the routine aspects of an
operation. An important function of standing operations
plans is to define the scope of decisionmaking authority
delegated to subordinate commanders on a routine basis.
Standing operations orders are another good example of
hierarchical controls or rule-governed delegation of
decisionmaking
.
Long-range schedules are prepared for such recurring
activities as surveillance missions, major maintenance
periods for ships and aircraft, ship deployments, and
exercises. Long-range schedules are often "nested,* with
shorter-term schedules filling in the details of longer-
range schedules. Long-range schedules serve as a mechanism
of indirect control by allowing a commander to approve a
large number of recurring routine operations at one time,
leaving the details of planning and executing each one to
subordinates.
Long-range schedules are an important means of indirect
presidential control of the U.S. armed forces. Long-range
schedules function on the principle of control by negation:
Once a schedule is approved, the operations listed in it are
authorized for execution unless specifically cancelled.
Schedules for certain operations that are especially
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sensitive or visible, such as reconnaissance missions and
major exercises, are reviewed by the Secretary of Defense
and National Security Advisor after the long range schedule
is approved (in some cases prior to specific operations) .
They review the schedules to ensure that the operations are
still appropriate and will not interfere with U.S. foreign
policy. If questions arise concerning the political
implications of a particular operation, it may be cancelled
or referred to the President for a final decision. Most long-
range schedules for routine evolutions are not subjected to
this close scrutiny after they are approved. Long-range
schedules are subject to frequent changes due to the fickle
nature of world politics, but they nonetheless serve
important planning and control functions.
Mission Orders
Mission orders include letters of intent (LOIs)
,
operations plans or operations orders issued for a specific
short-term operation, and various other types of orders used
to initiate routine and non-routine operations. Mission
orders are important when the monitored delegated control
method is used, and crucial when the autonomous delegated
control method is used. They are less important when one of
the direct control methods is used. Mission orders can
range from being very detailed and specific to being very
brief and general. At a minimum, a mission order includes
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the objective of the operation, the forces assigned to it,
the identity of the commander, and the time frame for the
operation. But a mission order can include the same amount
of detail as (and in fact be) an operations plan.
Mission orders serve as a mechanism of indirect control
by relieving a commander of having to exercise direct
control over the details of an operation's execution. An
important function of mission orders is to define the scope
of decisionmaking authority delegated to subordinate comman-
ders. A mission order can specify which decisions must be
referred to higher authority and which decisions the subor-
dinate commander is authorized make himself. Thus, mission
orders provide a means of allowing a commander to focus his
attention on the most important decisions that come up in
the course of an operation without being distracted by
routine matters. This in turn helps to prevent communica-
tions channels and decisionmakers from becoming overloaded.
Contingency Plans
Contingency plans are those operations plans (OPLANs)
prepared in advance for execution in the circumstances
56
specified in the plans. Contingency plans are commonly
Note that operations plans can serve as contingency
plans, mission orders, and standing orders. An individual
OPLAN can transition from being a contingency plan (prior to
execution) , to being a mission order (upon execution) , to





prepared for crisis and peacetime emergency scenarios,
various limited war scenarios, and general war scenarios
(the last two types are often collectively referred to as
"war plans"). Contingency plans serve as a mechanism of
indirect control by allowing a commander to rapidly issue a
single order to execute an operation that he and his staff
have had time to prepare in detail ahead of time. Contin-
gency plans are distributed in advance, eliminating the
burden of having to issue a large volume of orders when a
decision in made to carry out the operation. The only
direct orders that are needed are last-minute revisions to
the contingency plan and the mission order directing that it
be executed as modified. Once a contingency plan is
executed, it serves the same functions described above for
operations plans and operations orders.
The single most important U.S. contingency plan is the
Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for the employment
57
of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Contingency plans are
often designed to be mutually supportive with other
57See Henry S. Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine,"
in Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy , Volume 4,
Appendix K, Part III (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, June 1975), pp. 219-34; Desmond Ball,
"Targeting for Strategic Deterrence," Adelphi Papers No. 185
(London: Interrnational Institute for Strategic Studies, Sur-
aer 1983), pp. 8-25; Scott D. Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear
War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy," International
Security 12 (Summer 1987): 22-51.
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contingency plans, as well as capable of being executed
individually. For example, the overall U.S. strategic
objective of attempting to prevent a general war with the
Soviet Union from escalating to a strategic nuclear exchange
requires that the war plans of the unified commands be
capable of execution independently as well as in conjunction
with the SIOP. An important feature of the U.S. alert
system is that increasing the readiness condition activates
preparations to execute designated contingency plans
applicable to the conflict at hand. This type of
preparation is closely linked to the alert system because
the effectiveness of an increase in DEFCON is much greater
when the forces have a specific mission that they are
preparing to execute than when they simply increase their
readiness without being assigned a specific mission.
There are two types of contingency planning: routine
and crisis. Routine contingency planning takes place on a
continuing basis in peacetime to prepare plans for the most
likely and most dangerous situations that can be
anticipated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders
in chief of the unified commands have primary responsibility
for deciding what contingency plans are written. The
National Security Council has cnly a very small role in
routine contingency planning. There is limited liaison
between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs in certain




embassy personnel and their families in crises. The
difficulties in routine contingency planning are
anticipating the possible crises for which planning should
be done, defining specific scenarios for the use of force in
each situation, predicting the forces that will be available
for executing various options, and assessing the political
feasibility of different options.
Crisis contingency planning consists of revising
existing plans or formulating new plans for a range of
military operations after a crisis has arisen. The National
Security Council plays a significant role in determining
which contingency plans are updated or prepared during
crisis contingency planning. Normally, the Joint Staff and
the unified command responsible for the area in which the
crisis is located begin crisis contingency planning as soon
as indications are received that a crisis is about to
59break. Although many of the difficulties in routine
58
William A. Cockell, Jr., Director, Defense Policy
Directorate, National Security Council, interview by author,
February 11, 1988; Ronald St. Martin, Director, Office of
Program Integration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
formerly Director, Crisis Management Center, National
Security Council, interview by author, February 8, 1988;
Colonel Charles J. Bauer, "Military Crisis Management at the
National Level," Military Review 55 (August 1975): 3-15;
"Understanding Military Contingency Planning," Military
Review 61 (July 1981): 33-43; Admiral Robert L. Dennison,
"Reminiscences of Admiral Robert L. Dennison, U.S. Navy
(Retired)," Oral History Program, U.S. Naval Institute,
August 1975, pp. 296-297; Gallery, pp. 27-28, 85-86.




contingency planning are eliminated because planning is
being done for a specific crisis, new problems arise due
time pressures on the planning process and the ambiguity end
confusion that always surround a crisis.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are often described as
incapable or unwilling to provide a broad range of military
options for dealing with a crisis, but this does not appear
to be accurate. When asked about this, the consensus among
present and former National Security Council staff members,
Department of Defense officials, and Joint Staff officers is
that the JCS will provide a range of options when directed
to do so. They always have (and press for) a preferred
option, which typically entails decisive use of superior
force so as to reduce the risk of defeat and to deter
escalation. It is thus not unusual for the option preferred
by the JCS to be viewed as politically infeasible by
civilian authorities. The JCS also tend to resist civilian
involvement in the details of operational planning once the
objectives and basic parameters of an operation have been
defined. 60
Another aspect of military contingency planning for
crises is that the Joint Chiefs and the Commanders in Chief
Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War
Crises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977),
pp. 160-161; Marshall Brement, "Civilian-Military Relations
in the Context of National Security Policymaking," Naval War




of the unified commands can execute a wide range of
preparatory actions as soon as initial indications are
received that a crisis is breaking. These include
activating special crisis management staffs, informing
subordinate commanders of the situation, assembling
personnel with specialized training and experience in the
area, canceling or modifying routine operations that might
exacerbate the crisis or delay a military response,
increasing surveillance in the area, clearing communications
channels and setting up special channels, increasing the
readiness of units iden-tified in contingency plans, and
even deploying certain units that might be needed on short
notice. Many such actions can be executed without prior
approval of the President, though he is normally informed of
them via the Secretary of Defense or the National Security
Advisor as soon as possible after they are taken.
Hayward, p. 261; briefings for author at "Navy Command
Center, National Military Command Center, and National
Security Council, February 1988. Admiral Arleigh Burke,
Chief of Naval Operations 1955-1961, was particularly adept
at quietly alerting Navy units and readying them for
potential crises. It was due to such actions by the CNO
that the Navy was able to conduct the 1958 landing in
Lebanon on short notice. See Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, "The
Lebanon Crisis," in Arnold A. Shapack, ed., Proceedings of
the Naval History Symposium (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval
Academy, April 27-28, 1973), pp. 72-75. On military crisis
management procedures, see Head, Short and McFarlane, pp. 64-
67; Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Crisis Staffing Procedures of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff," SM-481-83 (1983); Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, "Navy Crisis Management
Organization," OPNAVINST 1601. 7G, January 8, 1988. Also see
Blair, "Alerting in Crisis and Conventional War," pp. 114-
117; Sagan, pp. 134-135.
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Preparation of contingency plans for retaliatory
attacks is a routine part of military planning for peacetime
and crisis operations in which hostilities could occur. As
a general rule, authority to order retaliatory attacks is
not delegated to military commanders, it is closely held by
the President. Contingency planning for such attacks makes
an important contribution to the effectiveness of peacetime
and crisis military operations by providing the President
with military options for a prompt response to provoca-
tions. In contingency planning for retaliation, as in all
other types of routine contingency planning, preparation of
a plan is not an indication of intent to execute the plan.
Opinions vary widely as to the value of routine
contingency planning for crisis management. One study found
that from 1946 to 1975 (41 cases) no appropriate contingency
plans were available in 58.5% of the cases, and that the
available contingency plans were inadequate in another 24.4%
62
of the cases. Although these would appear to. be grim
statistics, the study did not address the important value
that contingency plans can have even when inappropriate or
requiring modification (this will be discussed below).
Contingency planning problems are caused by the difficulty
of predicting where crises will arise, the specific
Leo Hazelwood, John J. Hayes, and James R. Brownell,
Jr., "Planning for Problems of Crisis Management," Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 21 (March 1977): 93.

230
political-military circumstances that will surround a
crisis, how the President will react to a crisis, and the
options the President will view as politically feasible.
These factors impose inherent constraints on the ability of
routine contingency planning to provide plans that are
ideally suited for management of particular crises.
Although the plans that are produced by routine
contingency planning may not be appropriate or adequate for
the specific crises that arise, the planning process itself
can make an important contribution to crisis management.
Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, former Deputy Commander in Chief
U.S. Naval Forces Europe and an experienced Navy planner,
has explained the value of contingency planning:
"Contingency planning rarely fits unexpected situations.
Reliance must be placed on uniformed officers. The most
important benefit of contingency planning is that it trains
planners, which is important. H Admiarl Horacio Rivero,
, Jr., former Commander in Chief Southern Europe and Vice
Chief of Naval Operations, has offered similar views: "You
will learn, if you didn't know it before, that available
plans are never carried out as written. They have to be
modified to fit the particular circumstances at the time,
and you have to do a considerable amount of improvising
outside the plans. However, the previously prepared plan is
1988.
63Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, letter to author, April 13,
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essential to serve as a basis for modifications and
improvements, and to make sure that you haven't forgotten
64
anything under the pressure of time." The United States
conducted considerable contingency planning for military
action against Cuba in the year prior to the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis. Although none of the plans were executed as
written, Admiral Afred G. Ward, commander of the Quarantine
Force during the crisis, argues that the planning process
contributed to U.S. readiness when the Soviet missiles were
discovered: "This planning stood us in good stead at the
time of the Cuban confrontation later, in which President
Kennedy decided to take firm action to stop this movement of
equipment, of goods and supplies, into Cuba. We were as
ready as any nation has ever been to win a military victory
65in the period of October 1962."
The comments offered by Admirals Wylie, Rivero and Ward
reveal three reasons for the value of contingency planning.
First, contingency planning educates the staff officers that
prepare the plans and the commanders that review them on the
characteristics of the area in which the operations will be
conducted. Second, the operational and logistical problems
Admiarl Horacio Rivero, Jr., letter to author, March
10, 1988.
65Admiral Afred G. Ward, "Reminiscences of Admiral
Afred G. Ward, U.S. Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis, MD: U.S.
Naval Institute, Oral History Program), p. 171. See Chapter
VII for a detailed description of U.S. contingency planning
prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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likely to be encountered are identified in the planning
process, even though the proposed solutions may not be
deemed appropriate for the specific crisis that arises.
Third, a contingency plan provides a baseline or starting
point for further planning after a crisis arises. It is
almost always easier to modify an existing plan than to
create a new plan from scratch, and even when a plan
requires extensive modification, it usually contains much
valuable information. Thus, the contingency planning
process itself can contribute to crisis management.
The disadvantage of contingency planning is that the
existence of a plan can preclude other options that might be
superior for dealing with the crisis. A perception can
arise that there is not sufficient time to prepare
alternative plans. Support for an existing plan can
restrict the search for alternatives, or can create a bias
against alternative plans that have not been staffed as well
due to time constraints. The officers who prepared the
original plans sometimes resist modifications to them out of
67pride in authorship. However, officials who have had
66Also see Philip A. Odeen, "Organizing for National
Security," International Security 5 (Summer 1980): 118; John
M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1982), pp. 11, 158-159.
67Ole R. Holsti, Crisis Escalation War (Montreal:
McGill-Queens University Press, 1972), pp. 215, 235-237;




first-hand experience with crisis contingency planning
generally agree that momentum for an existing plan and pride
of authorship tend not to be serious problems if the
civilian leadership insists on a range of options and on
68
tailoring a plan that suits its objectives. On balance,
then, routine contingency planning is far superior to doing
no planning at all, but usually cannot eliminate the need
for further planning after after a crisis erupts and can
create pressures that hamper the tailoring of military
options to meet crisis management objectives.
Summary
In summary, this section has reviewed four of the five
primary mechanisms of indirect control: the alert system,
standing orders, mission orders, and contingency plans. The
mechanisms of indirect control relieve higher authorities of
the burden of having to closely monitor the details of
military operations—a burden that can quickly exceed their
information processing and decisionmaking capabilities when
large-scale operations are being conducted in a fast-paced
political-military environment. Relieved of this burden,
top-level authorities are better able to concentrate on
monitoring the overall political-strategic situation, formu-
lating and revising their strategy for dealing with the
68




confrontation, and coordinating the overall execution of
military operations so that they support that strategy. The
mechanisms of indirect control thus aid in striking an
appropriate balance between autonomy and control in the
execution of military operations, and, when used properly by
national leaders, can contribute to crisis managment.
Thus far this discussion of the mechanisms of indirect
control has focused on how they are supposed to work in
principle. Neither the mechanisms themselves nor the
decisionmakers that use them are are perfect. Many things
can go wrong in the stress and confusion of crisis military
operations. More importantly, there are inherent limits on
the ability of these, or any, mechanisms to ensure that
decisions made at one level are those that are most
appropriate for the situation at another level. For
example, national leaders could give tactical orders that
are disastrous for the on-scene forces, or tactical
commanders could take an action that seriously disrupts the
crisis management efforts of national leaders. This problem
is inherent because decisionmakers at the different levels
are operating in different environments. They can develop
much different threat perceptions, priorities of objectives,
and expectations as to the future course of the crisis. How
the mechanisms of indirect control perform in practice will




Zn addition to the four mechanisms of indirect control
already discussed, there is a fifth mechanism: rules of
engagement. Because rules of engagement are particularly
important in crisis management, they will be discussed in
greater detail in the next section.
Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement are orders issued to define the
circumstances in which the U.S. armed forces are authorized
to use their weapons for defense against hostile forces in
peacetime, and to specify the scope and level of violence of
69
combat operations in wartime. Rules of engagement serve
as a mechanism of indirect control by allowing top-level
authorities to specify policies on the use of force prior to
situations in which direct control of the decision to use
force is not possible. As Captain J. Ashley Roach has
pointed out, rules of engagement are a tool for implementing
top-level decisions on the use of force at the operational
level, providing a means of ensuring that "national policy
will be followed in wartime or sudden emergencies which do
not allow time for communications between Washington and the
69
J, Ashley Roach, "Rules of Engagement," Naval War
College Review 36 (January-February 1983): 46-48. The
official JCS definition is that they are "Directives issued
by competent authority which delineate the circumstances and
limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered." See JCS Publication No. 1.
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field." In short, the purpose of rules of engagement is
to provide guidance to operating forces from National
Command Authorities, via the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
operational chain of command, on how to respond to threat of
attack in peacetime, and on limitations on fighting in
wartime.
Wartime rules of engagement place limits on military
71
action when U.S. forces are engaged in an armed conflict.
Certain military options may be deemed undesirable in
wartime due to escalation control, diplomatic, and
humanitarian considerations. For example, an important
70
Ibid, p. 47. Also see Rear Admiral J.R. Hill,
Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1986), p. 127.
71Roach, p. 49; U.S. Department of the Navy, The
Commander's Guide to the Law of Naval Operations , Naval
Warfare Publication No. 9 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, July 1987), pp. 5-3, 5-4 (Cited
hereafter as NWP 9) . This publication was formerly titled
Law of Naval Warfare , (Naval Warfare Information Publication
10-2). On the wartime rules of engagement used by U.S.
forces during the Korean War, see Field, pp. 395-6; Malcolm
W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957), pp. 224-5, 243-
7, 445, 458; Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force
in Korea , 1950-1963 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce,
1961): 142, 208-11, 453. On the wartime rules of engagement
used by U.S. forces during the Vietnam War, see U.S.
Congress, Congressional Record , Vol. 121, Part 14
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp.
17551-17558. On the role of rules of engagement in the 1982
war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands,
see Christopher Craig, "Fighting by the Rules." Naval War
College Review 37 (May-June 1984): 23-27; Max Hastings and
Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1983), pp. 82, 124, 137, 147-8. For a discussion of
how rules of engagement change from peacetime to wartime,
see Hill, pp. 127-9, 133-4, 142.
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escalation control function of wartime rules of engagement
is to prevent incidents with the military forces of non-
belligerents. Wartime rules of engagement can also be used
to prevent geographic expansion of a conflict when it is
politically and diplomatically desirable to confine the
fighting to a limited area (i.e., prohibitions against
attacking the homeland when fighting at sea) . Wartime rules
of engagement allow military action under such circumstances
only for self-defense— the adversary is forced to make the
decision to escalate or expand the conflict.
Peacetime rules of engagement are founded on the right
of self-defense as defined under international law and in
72
U.S. Department of Defense directives. Simply put,
peacetime rules of engagement prohibit U.S. military
commanders from shooting first in peacetime unless
72On United States policy, see NWP 9, pp. 4-1 to 4-5;
U.S. Department of Defense, "DoD Law of War Program,"
Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, July 10, 1979; U.S.
Department of the Army, Law of Land Warfare , Army Field
Manual FM 27-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1956); U.S. Department of the Air Force,
International Law—The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air
Operations , Air Force Pamphlet 110-31 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1977). Also see Lieutenant
Commander Bruce Harlow, "The Legal Use of Force. . .Short of
War,** U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 92 (November 1966):
88-98. On international legal principles, see Derek Bowett,
"Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force," American
Journal of International Law 66 (January 1972) : 1-36; Ian
Brownlie, "The Use of Force in Self-Defense, " British Year
Book of International Law, 1961 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1962), pp. 183-268; D.P. O'Connell, The Influence of





absolutely necessary for self -defense. Peacetime rules of
engagement are intended to prevent unwanted military
incidents and support crisis management. As George Bunn has
pointed out, rules of engagement are intended "to restrain
aggression, prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and to
73limit escalation if shooting starts." Thus, peacetime
rules of engagement are central to the problem of
coordinating military policy with political and diplomatic
objectives in a crisis.
There are two categories of peacetime rules of
engagement: standing and special. Standing rules of
engagement are written for routine peacetime operations.
They are in effect at all times for the forces they cover.
Special rules of engagement are issued to cover particularly
sensitive situations, such as operations near a country
openly hostile to the U.S. and operations during an
international crisis. Special rules of engagement may
replace or supplement standing rules of engagement, and may
be be either more or less restrictive than standing rules of
73George Bunn, "International Law and the Use of Force
in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?"
Naval War College Review 39 (May-June 1986): 69. Also see
Roach, pp. 46-7; Norman Friedman, "The Rules of Engagement
Issue," in E.F. Guertz, et al., NATO's Maritime Strategy:
Issues and Developments (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey *s,
1987), pp. 23-4; Jacquelin K. Davis, et al., "NATO's
Maritime Defenses," in Francis J.. West, Jr., et al. , Naval
Forces and Western Security (Washington, DC: Pergamon-
Brassey's, 1986), p. 46.
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engagement, depending on the political-military circum-
stances. Examples of special rules of engagement include
the rules issued for the 1958 Marine landings in Lebanon,
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the August 1981 freedom of
navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra, the 1983 Marine
peacekeeping force in Beirut, and the 1983 invasion of
74Grenada. A standardized format for ordering and modifying
rules of engagement is used throughout the U.S. armed forces
for ease and clarity when issuing special rules of
75
engagement and modifying standing rules of engagement.
This system allows for ease of adapting rules of engagement
to changing political-military circumstances and to specific
U.S. foreign policy objectives in situations of increased
tensions.
The President, as commander in chief of the armed
forces, is the ultimate source of all rules of engagement.
At the top of the chain of command, overall guidance on
74 See "Department of Defense Operations During the
Cuban Missile Crisis," Naval War College Review 32
(July/August 1979): 85; Admiral William H. Rowden, "Sixth
Fleet Operations: June 1981 to July 1983," in James G. March
and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds., Ambiguity and Command:
Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making
(Marchfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986), pp. 271-5;
Metcalf, p. 281. Navy aircraft supporting the Marines
ashore in Lebanon from July to October 1958 were ordered
Hnot to return fire" when fired on by rebel forces, See USS
Essex (CVA 9), Ship's History 1958, Ships History Branch,
Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
75C.C. Pease, "Comment and Discussion," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 108 (June 1982): 83; Roach, pp. 51.

240
rules of engagement is formulated by the JCS (with the
support of the Joint Staff and individual service chief
staffs) . Civilian authorities are involved in the
formulation, review and approval of rules of engagement,
although in practice the level of their involvement varies
widely. Routine revisions to standing rules of engagement
receive little attention from civilian officials other than
the Secretary of Defense (and his aides that deal with such
natters) . Civilian authorities become directly involved in
the formulation and review of special rules of engagement
and major revisions to standing rules of engagement. The
NSC interdepartmental group chaired by the Deputy National
Security Advisor and composed of top deputies from the
Department of State, Department of Defense, and JCS
(normally the Assistant to the Chairman)—currently known as
the Policy Review Group—reviews proposed rules of
engagement to ensure that they support overall presidential
policies. The role of this group is especially prominent in
crises. The National Security Advisor reviews important
revisions to rules of engagement, and submits revisions
involving relaxations of restrictions to the President for
, 76approval
.
76NWP 9, p. 5-3; Roach, p. 51; Cockell interview; St.
Martin interview; briefings for author at Navy Command




Rules of engagement are promulgated via the operational
chain of command, with increasing specificity at each
successive level— reflecting the unique strategic and
tactical circumstances of individual commands. These
successive additions to the rules of engagement are not
intended to modify the rules of engagement, their purpose is
to tailor what is usually generalized guidance to specific
circumstances. Commanders in chief of the unified commands
and subordinate commanders under them must submit proposed
revisions to their rules of engagement via the chain of
command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. All
rules of engagement promulgated by commanders with authority
to promulgate their own rules are submitted to the JCS, and
the Joint Staff maintains an up-to-date file of them. The
JCS routinely sends copies of the rules of engagement to the
NSC Staff, which keeps them on file for ready reference.
The NSC has an individual on the Situation Support Staff
charged with maintaining the NSC rules of engagement file
and serving as the in-house expert on the rules currently in
77
effect. Thus, top-level military and civilian authorities
directly involved in crisis management have ready access to
all rules of engagement promulgated to U.S. forces.
77
Ibid. For an excellent description of this process
in action, see Department of Defense Commission on Beirut
International Airport Terrorist Act of October 23, 1983,
"Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International
Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983," December 20, 1983,
pp. 44-51. (Cited hereafter as Beirut Commission.)
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Employment of rules of engagement as a method of
indirect control entails a two-stage decision process. In
the first stage, the Secretary of Defense, acting on behalf
of the President, formulates rules of engagement that will
support national political-diplomatic objectives and
policies (the President normally reviews and makes the final
decision on major or particularly sensitive revisions to the
rules) . In the second stage, the on-scene commander (the
senior officer in command of the forces at the scene of a
crisis) and the tactical decisionmakers under him
(commanding officers of individual units and watch officers
with authority to order the use of weapons) use the rules of
engagement as guidance for making operational decisions on
the use of force. Rules of engagement do not require that a
commander attempt to consult with higher authority before
taking action in self-defense. The rules exist specifically
because commanders in the field or at sea may not have the
means or sufficient time to contact higher authority. The
fundamental objective of rules of engagement is for the
operational decisions made by tactical commanders to support
national objectives and policies as well as ensuring the
defense of U.S. forces.
Rules of engagement are a central element in the
flexible U.S. system of direct and delegated control. Rules
of engagement are an important element in the guidance
provided to the on-scene commander defining the scope of
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tactical decisions he is authorized to make. Restrictive
rules of engagement narrow the tactical decision-making
authority of the on-scene commander, in effect imposing a
greater degree of direct control on him. Permissive rules
of engagement broaden his decision-making authority, in
effect shifting him toward greater delegated control.
The authority to revise rules of engagement is itself
an important issue in the balance between direct and
delegated control. Reserving authority to revise rules of
engagement to top-level authorities can have the same
negative impact as attempting direct control of operations,
while delegating authority to revise rules of engagement to
lower levels can raise the same problems of coordinating
national policies as delegated control. Commanders in the
chain of command, including the on-scene commander, usually
have limited authority to revise the rules of engagement,
when such revisions do not result in a significant
relaxation of the rules. Authority to make broader
revisions to the rules of engagement, particularly to issue
significantly more permissive rules, is reserved for top*
level authorities. Rules of engagement are thus affected by
the same tension between delegation and control that affects
all other aspects of command and control.
Guidance from other sources of operational guidance is
often incorrectly attributed to rules of engagement. For
example, there is an important distinction between rules of

244
engagement, which govern how to handle to potentially
hostile forces, and measures to avoid mutual interference,
which govern how to avoid engagements with friendly forces
(these come under the category of standing orders as a
mechanism of indirect control) . The two categories overlap
in that both address requirements for identifying
unidentified contacts. At times during the evolution of
rules of engagement, particularly during the Vietnam War
(when fighter pilots were required to visually identify air
targets in order to avoid firing on other U.S. planes),
measures to avoid mutual interference were included in the
rules, but this has subsequently been corrected. In some
warfare environments, such as in NATO, where friendly forces
from several countries may operate in the same battle area,
measures to avoid mutual interference are particularly
important, even overshadowing rules of engagement. However,
measures to avoid mutual interference do not have a
significant role in crisis management, so will not be
discussed further.
The remainder of this discussion will focus on
peacetime rules of engagement. Although wartime rules of
engagement are of great importance, particularly in the
study of limited war, they raise a different set of issues
than those of interest in crisis management. The topics
that will be examined are the reasons why rules of
engagement are needed, the history of rules of engagement,
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the nature of peacetime naval rules of engagement, how the
decision to use force is made by an operational commander,
the impact of political-military context on decisions to use
force, the problem of rules of engagement being
misinterpreted, and the coordination of rules of engagement
78
among allies.
The Need for Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement are necessary for five reasons.
First, and foremost, commanders in the field or at sea may
not have the means or sufficient time to contact higher
authority. The speed of modern warfare causes the tactical
situation to change much faster than it can be explained to
higher authority, and the destructiveness of modern weapons
can make decisionmaking delays fatal. Rules of engagement
are a form of contingent response: action, in this case use
of force, can only be taken under specified conditions.
Initiatory actions, such as retaliatory attacks or
78This discussion of peacetime rules of engagement is
applicable to all of the U.S. armed forces. The basic
principles and concepts presented in the section on
peacetime naval rules of engagement are also applicable to
the other services, although the focus is on how they apply
to naval forces. Rules of engagement affect the day-to-day
operations of the Navy and Air Force much more than those of
the Army. This is because national borders tend to keep
ground forces separated, but U.S. ships on the high seas and
planes in international airspace are frequently in close
proximity to those of potential adversaries. Differences in
the three services' rules of engagement are primarily due to
differences in their command structures and warfare
environments, rather than differences in basic principles.
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pre-emption in the absence of an imminent threat, are
excluded. Thus, rules of engagement do not require that a
commander attempt to consult with higher authority before
taking action in self-defense.
The second reason why rules of engagement are necessary
is that the lethality of modern weapons
—
particularly the
anti-ship cruise missile—makes it exceedingly dangerous to
79take the first hit. U.S. Navy ships and aircraft are
generally authorized to take defensive action upon clear
80demonstration of hostile intent. United States Navy
Regulations, 1973 state that "The right of self-defense may
arise in order to counter either the use of force or an
81immediate threat of the use of force." In especially
volatile situations, a clear demonstration of hostile intent
may be limited to actual use of weapons by the adversary.
This can lead to what Rear Admiral Hill calls the "concept
of initial casualty": "This is to say that it may be
necessary, in the opening rules of engagement, to accept the
risk of a casualty before the relaxations necessary to allow
82prudent self-defense can be made." Occasionally, the
rules of engagement may prohibit use of force even when
79Friedman, pp. 32-3; O'Connell, pp. 81-2.
80
Roach, pp. 49-50; Bunn, p. 69.
81United States Navy Regulations . 1973, p. 38. Also
see NWP 9, p. 4-4.
82
Hill, p. 128. Also see O'Connell, pp. 82-4.
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fired upon, as was the case for Navy aircraft over Lebanon
83in 1958. A primary function of rules of engagement is
thus to define the actions and indicators that are to be
used to determine that hostile intent is being demonstrated.
The third reason why rules of engagement are necessary
is that not all nations that are potentially hostile to the
U.S. present the same level of military threat to U.S.
forces. U.S. forces legitimately need great leeway toward
certain openly hostile and militarily unpredictable
countries, particularly when they have attacked U.S. forces
in the past. On the other hand, the U.S. has evolved fairly
stable, tacit Mrules of the game" in its military
relationships with other countries, particularly the Soviet
Union. With such countries the threat is more predictable
and greater care can be taken to avoid inadvertent incidents
without unnecessarily risking U.S. forces. The interaction
83USS Essex Ship's History.
84On the concept of "rules of the game" in Soviet-
American relations, see James N. McConnell, "The 'Rules of
the Game': A Theory on the Practice of Superpower Naval
Diplomacy," in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds.,
Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon, 1979), pp. 240-
280; Robert Legvold, "The Super-Rivals: Conflict in the
Third World," Foreign Affairs 57 (Spring 1979): 755-778;
Raymond Cohen, International Politics: The Rules of the Game
(London: Longman, 1981); Joanne Gowa and Nils H. Wessel,
Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional
Conflicts (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy research Institute,
1982); and Neil Matheson, The 'Rules of the Game* of
Superpower Military Intervention in the Third World, 1975-





of U.S. and Soviet naval forces is also regulated by the
international "rules of the road" governing the safe
navigation of ships at sea, supplemented by the Soviet-
American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and
Over the High Seas signed in 1972. The rules of engagement
reflect this wide range in the stability and predictability
potential military threats, providing more permissive rules
when the danger is greater and more restrictive rules when
interactions are better regulated.
The fourth reason why rules of engagement are necessary
is to ensure that in responding to a hostile act or hostile
intent, U.S. forces adhere to the international legal
principles of proportional force and minimum force. The
principle of proportional force requires that the force used
in self-defense be proportional to the force used in the
hostile act or threatened when hostile intent was shown.
The principle of minimum force requires that the level of
force used in response to a hostile act or hostile intent be
limited to the minimum necessary to prevent the threat of
85further attack. Rules of engagement provide guidance on
the types of defensive actions that are authorized under
various circumstances.
The fifth reason why rules of engagement are necessary
is that U.S. forces can be tasked by the President to defend
85
Bunn, pp. 73-74; O'Connell, p. 171; Roach, p. 50.
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civilian U.S. vessels and U.S. citizens ashore overseas, the
military forces and civilian vessels of allies and friendly
nations, and the territory of allies or friendly nations.
Rules of engagement are used to spell out when defensive
86
action iray be taken in such circumstances.
History of Rules of Engag ement
The United States Navy has had almost two centuries of
experience with political limitations on the use cf force
due to its role as an implement of foreign policy in the
nineteenth century. For example, when Commodore Matthew C.
Perry was dispatched to negotiate a commerce treaty with
Japan in 1853, the Secretary of State warned: "He will bear
in mind that, as the President has no power to declare war,
his mission is necessarily of a pacific character, and will
not resort to force unless in self-defense in the protection
of the vessels and crews under his command, or to resent an
act of personal violence offered to himself or to one of his
87
officers." Provisions similar to this were not uncommon
in the sailing orders given to American captains before they
departed for distant stations.
86Bunn, p. 69.
87Quoted in Commander Dennis R. Neutze, "Bluejacket
Diplomacy: A Juridical Examination of the Use of Naval
Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy," JAG
Journal 32 (Summer 1982): 111.
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Prior to World War II, there was little need for rules
of engagement other than for Navy ships on diplomatic
missions. The United States was far removed from potential
enemies and its forces were rarely in contact with those of
potential adversaries. All this changed with the advent of
long-range aircraft and the growth of American global
security commitments. As the Cold War with the Soviet Union
intensified, confrontations between the superpowers became
more frequent and dangerous. This was starkly apparent in
the 1948 Berlin crisis, when Soviet closing of ground access
to the city and harassment of supply flights threatened to
cause armed clashes. In the late 1940s the Soviets began
shooting down American aircraft patrolling the periphery of
Soviet airspace, and there were air battles between American
88
and Soviet planes during the Korean War. There thus arose
a need for guidance on the use of force in peacetime.
88On the 1948 Berlin Crisis, see Lucius D. Clay,
Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950) ; W.
Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1958); Frank Howley, Berlin Command (New
York: Punam's, 1950). There were two serious incidents
between American and Soviet aircraft during the Korean War,
both involving Soviet planes threatening U.S. Navy ships, as
well as several other lesser incidents. See Cagle and
Manson, pp. 469-74; Field, pp. 167-9, 440-1; Futrell , pp.
142, 567. The first incident in which a Soviet fighter
attacked an American plane off the Soviet coast occurred on
October 15, 1945, less than two months after Japan
surrendered. Between 1945 and 1950 there were at least nine
instances of Soviet or Warsaw Pact fighters attacking
American or British planes. See Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations (OP-09B91R4) , "Soviet Attacks on Western
Planes,** memorandum dated July 15, 1960 (Operational




In 1950 President Truman approved a comprehensive
policy statement on interception of aircraft in United
States airspace, the first such policy issued since the end
of World War II. This initial guidance was later assessed
to be overly restrictive, and was replaced by a revised
interception policy in 1952. Although the term rules of
engagement per se had not yet officially entered the
military vocabulary, these two presidential directives
constitute the origins of Unites States rules of engagement.
The U.S. Air Force was the first service to begin using
the term rules of engagement to describe intercept and
engagement policy, and in the fall of 1952 began using the
term in the joint planning arena. In 1958 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff officially adopted the term rules of engagement and
defined them as "that body of authoritative law,
instructions, policies, directives, measures, plans or
decisions which authorize, restrict or describe the
circumstances under which, and at times the means with
which, U.S. forces will or may initially engage enemy forces
89
and the extent to which the engagement will be carried."
The unified commands shifted over to the new term at about
the same time. The Navy, which had long used the term
"measures for self-preservation in peacetime" to describe
the same idea, was slow to convert to the term rules of
89See JCS Publication No. 1
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engagement. In fact, the term was not widely used in the
fleet until the Vietnam War, when rules of engagement became
• major factor in shaping combat operations.
All of the major concepts upon which United States
rules of engagement are based were adopted during the
1950s. The Air Force first proposed allowing the use of
force against aircraft "manifestly hostile in intent" in
1953, leading to adoption of the principle of anticipatory
self-defense on the basis of hostile intent. The Navy
adopted this principle in 1958, allowing anticipatory self-
defense when there was "clear and present danger to the
90
security of the U.S. or its forces." Although this
provision was adopted in 1958, it was not a significant
factor in U.S. Navy operations until the late 1960s, when
the Soviet navy began deploying anti-ship cruise missiles in
large numbers
.
In 1955 the National Security Council proposed and
President Eisenhower approved two of the key provisions in
U.S. rules of engagement: the doctrine of hot pursuit and
the distinction between hot pursuit and punitive reprisals.
Under the doctrine of hot pursuit, U.S. forces could pursue
90Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Protective
Measures to be Taken in Applying the Right of Self-
Preservation in Peacetime," OPNAVINST 03300.8, February 21,
1958; NWP 9, p. 4-4. On the legal basis for anticipatory
self-defense, see John R. Henriksen, "International Claims
to Anticipatory Self-Def ense: A Juridical Analysis,"
(Masters Thesis, National Law Center, George Washington
University, Washington, DC, 1981), pp. 2-24.
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a hostile force out of the area in which they were allowed
to intercept in order to prevent that force from posing a
further threat. Under certain circumstances, hot pursuit
could even be carried into the airspace of another country.
Punitive reprisals, on the other hand, could only be
authorized by the President. Reprisals include attacks
against the territory of the country whose forces had
attacked U.S. forces, and attacks against forces of that
country that were not directly involved in the attack and
91
which were not an immediate threat to U.S. forces. That
these important concepts originated in the National Security
Council illustrates that civilian authorities have long had
a direct role in shaping rules of engagement.
The next significant changes in the rules of engagement
took place during the Vietnam War. The rules of engagement
became detailed, complex, and cumbersome, requiring positive
identification of targets on the basis of features that were
exceedingly difficult to discern in combat. The rules of
engagement for the air war over North Vietnam were viewed by
military commanders as seriously and unnecessarily
endangering the lives of American pilots. Military
dissatisfaction with what was widely viewed as civilian
"micro-management w of the war led to rules of engagement
91On hot pursuit and reprisals, see Roach, pp. 50-1;
O'Connell, p. 176; Gallery, p. 25; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms




gaining a bad reputation among some officers who fought in
92Vietnam.
During the 1960s and 1970s the scope and complexity of
U.S. rules of engagement grew as more sophisticated weapons
and electronic systems entered the U.S. and Soviet
inventories. The complexity of rules of engagement reflect
the complexity of the warfare environment— the more ways in
which an adversary can threaten one's forces and the more
ways in which one's forces can counter those threats, the
greater the number of contingencies that have to be covered
by rules of engagement. There were two major reviews of
U.S. rules of engagement in the 1970s. The first was in
1973-1975, and entailed deletion of the cumbersome and
confusing Vietnam War provisions from the rules as the U.S.
withdrew from the war. The second was in 1979-1981, and
entailed standardization of the format of the rules among
the major commands and expansion of the tactical options for
dealing with threats. The 1979-1981 review produced the
most significant changes to U.S. rules of engagement since
the system of rules originated in the early 1950s. The
result was reformulation of the rules of engagement to
include a wide range of tactical options that allow rapid
92For a critique of Vietnam rules of engagement, see W,
Hays Parks, "Conventional Aerial Bombing and the Law of
War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 108 (May 1982): 98-
117; Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in
Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978);
O'Connell, pp. 176-7; Momyer, pp. 133-5, 176-7, 338-9.
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and precise tailoring of the rules to meet the political
objectives of U.S. leaders while allowing on-scene
93
commanders freedom of action.
Another major review of U.S. rules of engagement was
conducted during the mid-1980s, partially in response to the
Long Commission's finding that poorly written rules of
engagement had contributed to the 1983 disaster at Beirut
International Airport. In this review serious attention was
devoted to ways in which the rules could better meet the
needs of U.S. leaders without creating excessive risks for
94U.S. forces at the scene of a crisis. No conceptual
breakthroughs were made in that review, but the effort
appears to have been worthwhile for educating civilian and
military authorities as to each other's needs.
Peacetime Naval Rules of Engagement
United States Navy ships and aircraft have an inherent
right of self-defense under international law—they may use
their weapons to defend themselves if a hostile act of
95
violence is committed against them. The commanding
93Pease, p. 83; Roach, p. 51; W. Hays Parks, "Crossing
the Line," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (November
1986): 43.
94Cockell interview; Beirut Commission, pp. 44-51.
95See "DoD Law of War Program," (DoD Directive
5100.77); United States Navy Regulations, 1973 , p. 38; and
Commander's Guide (NWP 9). Also see Bunn, 69; Burdick H.
Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers , Fifth
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officer of a U.S. Navy ship cannot claim that the rules of
engagement prohibited him from taking defensive action, for
he always has the right and obligation to defend his ship
96
against attack.
The right of self-defense and the conditions under
which a commanding officer may use force are defined in
United States Navy Regulations . The 1948 edition stated the
following:
1. The use of force by United States naval
personnel against a friendly foreign state, or against
anyone within the territory thereof, is illegal.
2. The right of self-preservation, however, is a
right which belongs to states as well as to
individuals, and in the case of states it includes the
protection of the state, its honor, and its
possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens
against arbitrary violence, actual or impending,
whereby the state or its citizens may suffer
irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the
application of the right of self-preservation cannot be
defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound
judgement or responsible officers, who are to perform
their duties in this respect with all possible care and
forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in
time of peace otherwise than as an application of the
right of self-preservation as above defined. It must
be used only as a last resort, and then only to the
extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the
and required. It can never be exercised with a view to
inflicting punishment for acts already committed.
The term "friendly foreign state" in the first paragraph was
interpreted as meaning any country with which the United
Edition (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp.
143-144; O'Connell, pp. 53-55, 175.
96
Roach, p. 49.
97United States Navy Regulations, 1948 , p. 73.
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States was not in a declared state of war. Note that this
article allows use of force to protect American citizens and
their property when "irreparable injury" is threatened.
This was the guidance (amplified by applicable rules of
engagement) governing the use of force by U.S. Navy
commanding officers from 1948 to 1973.
The 1973 edition of Navy Regulations revised the
wording of this article, but left its intent unchanged:
1. The use of force in time of peace by United
States naval personnel against another nation or
against anyone within the territories thereof is
illegal except as an act of self-defense. The right of
self-defense may arise in order to counter the use of
force or an immediate threat of the use of force.
2. The conditions calling for the application of
the right of self-defense cannot be precisely defined
beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgement of
naval personnel who are to perform their duties in this
respect with all possible care and forbearance. the
right of self-defense must be exercised only as a last
resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely
necessary to accomplish the end required.
3. Force must never be used with a view to _ ginflicting punishment for acts already committed.
The primary difference between the two editions is that the
1973 edition adds the principle of anticipatory defense,
allowing use of force to counter an "immediate threat."
Emphasis in Navy Regulations is on caution and
restraint. Rules of engagement typically take a similar
tone, warning that decisions on the use of force must be
"tempered with judgement and discretion." The right of self-
defense is recognized in all Department of Defense
98United States Navy Regulations, 1973 , p. 38.
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directives related to the law of war and rules of
engagement. For example, as Roach points out, rules of
engagement always contain a statement to the effect that
"Nothing in these rules shall be construed as precluding a
commander from using all means at his disposal to exercise
the inherent right and responsibility to conduct operations
99for self-defense of his forces."
Two terms used in rules of engagement are important for
understanding the application of the right of self-defense
in practice: hostile act and hostile intent. A hostile act
is actual use of force—employment of weapons—against a
Navy ship. Use of force is always authorized for self-
defense when a hostile act is committed. Hostile intent is
clear indication that a hostile act is imminent.
Demonstration of hostile intent activates the principle of
anticipatory self-defense, which authorizes first use of
weapons for self-defense when attack is clearly imminent.
The 1981 U.S. Navy confrontation with Libyan forces in
the Gulf of Sidra illustrate these rules of engagement
provisions in action. On August .18, 1981, a Sixth Fleet
battle force built around the carriers USS Forrestal (CV 59)
and USS Nimitz (CVN 68) commenced a freedom of navigation
exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, on orders from the President,
99Roach, p. 49. Also see Parks, "Crossing the Line,
p. 43.
100
Bunn, pp. 73-75; O'Connell, pp. 70-71; Roach, p. 50.
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to demonstrate United States rejection of Libyan claims of
sovereignty over the gulf. The battle force commander, Rear
Admiral James E* Service, was dispatched to Washington to
brief the JCS and the National Security Council on Navy
plans for the operation, including the rules of engage-
ment. The Commander of the Sixth Fleet at the time, Vice
Admiral William H. Rowden, described the rules of engagement
for the operation: "These rules provided for the right of
self-defense; specifically, if fired upon, we had the right,
indeed the obligation, to meet force with force. Execution
of these rules provided that if we were to fire at any enemy
102target in self-defense, we intended to hit that target."
It was with these rules that the battle force entered the
Gulf of Sidra.
Libyan aircraft flew more than 130 sorties against the
U.S. ships the first day, but none of the Libyan planes were
engaged because they did not fire any weapons against U.S.
forces. The next day, however, during an intercept of two
Libyan Su-22 Fitters by two U.S. Navy F-14s, one of the
Libyan planes fired an air-to-air missile at the Navy jets.
This action was met the definition of "hostile act," and
Dennis R. Neutze, "The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A
Legal Perspective," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 108
(January 1982) : 28-30; Rowden, p. 270; Hayward, p. 260;





the F-14s shot down both Libyan planes. Admiral Rowden
has pointed out an important lesson from this episode:
At the same time the shoot-down occurred, two other
intercepts were in progress. All flight leaders were
able to monitor the engagement on their radios, but no
one else sought to engage the Libyans with whom they
were in contact because, beyond the local F-14/Fitter
incident, there had been no provocation. The rules of
engagement called only for engagement in self-defense,
where firing had actually occurred. This Libyan
incident demonstrates the superb discipline of our
naval aviators, even when the adrenaline is flowing in
a crisis situation, and also refutes the notion that we
are "trigger-happy gunmen" on the lookout to start an
incident. 104
Similar restraint was shown by the battle force commander:
At the time of this attack, ten other Libyan
fighters were in or near the exercise area. Each gave
clear indications of hostile intent, as did a Libyan
Osa missile patrol boat within the exercise area. .
Although his rules of engagement authorized him to
fire, the task force commander elected not to do so.
Just as damage to or loss of any part of the task force
would be translated into a Libyan victory, it is likely
that Gadhafi would have turned the loss of a missile
patrol boat and a dozen fighters into a "victory" by a
martyred David against a bullying Goliath. The
commander's response was proportionate to the immediate
threat. His judicious application of force suggests
the nature of rules of engagement implementation in
peacetime: however carefully articulated, and
notwithstanding international legal rights of self-
defense and a clear designation of authority, there is
no substitute for the training, experience, and
judgement of the on- scene commander.
The 1981 episode thus illustrates the manner in which rules
of engagement govern U.S. Navy operations in highly tense




Parks, "Crossing the Line," p. 43.

261
and volatile situations. When U.S. units needed to use
force in self-defense, they had authority to do so. The on-
scene commander adhered to the spirit of the rules, which is
to use the minimum amount of force necessary for self-
defense, rather than to the letter of the rules, which
authorized much greater force than was actually employed.
Rules of engagement do not always function as
effectively as they did in the Gulf of Sidra in 1981.
Norman Friedman and other analysts have noted that there is
an inherent tension between excessively tight rules that
invite military disaster and excessively loose rules that
allow excessively aggressive behavior. Expanding on that
idea, rules of engagement can fail in one of two modes:
vulnerability failure or escalatory failure. A vulnera-
bility failure is caused by rules of engagement that are
excessively restrictive, ambiguous, or complex and
confusing. In a vulnerability failure the on-scene
commander is unable to take effective action in self-
defense, resulting in a successful attacks on his forces
that otherwise could have been defeated. An escalatory
Friedman, pp. 23-24. Also see Davis, et al., p. 46,
who describe the two failures as Mmilitary disaster brought
about by excessively tight rules, and political catastrophe
caused by excessive looseness in the rules." There are
three problems with this approach: the military disaster
type of failure can have serious adverse political
consequences, the political catastrophe type of failure can
result in serious military losses, and both types of failure
can be caused by excessive ambiguity or complexity in the
rules, as well as by excessive tightness or looseness.
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failure it caused by rules of engagement that are exces-
sively permissive, ambiguous, complex, or confusing. In an
escalatory failure the on-scene commander uses excessive
force on grounds of self-defense, causing escalation of the
scope or intensity of violence beyond that viewed as
desirable by national leaders. Both failure modes have
political as well as military consequences, and both can
result from rules of engagement that are excessively
ambiguous, or complex and confusing.
The deaths of 241 U.S. Marines in a suicide truck
bombing of their quarters at Beirut International Airport
(BIA) on October 23, 1983 is an example of a rules of
engagement failure. It was a vulnerability failure caused
by rules of engagement that were excessively ambiguous and
restrictive. Responding to guidance from higher authority
(originating initially in Washington) that emphasized the
high-visibility, non-combat role of the Marines as part of
the Multi-National Force, the on-scene commander issued two
sets of rules of engagement: permissive rules for Marines
guarding the temporary American Embassy (the original
embassy had been destroyed by a suicide bomber in September,
hence the permissive rules) , and restrictive rules for
Marines at the airport.
The commission that investigated the disaster concluded
that poorly written rules of engagement were a major factor
in the disastrous airport bombing. Updating of the rules of
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engagement lagged behind the escalation of the threat to the
Marines as Lebanese perceptions of the U.S. role in Lebanon
shifted from supportive to hostile. Restrictive rules of
engagement and the emphasis on their high-visibility, non-
combat role created what the Long Commission described as a
lax "mind-set" among the Marines at the airport: "In short,
the Commission believes the Marines at BIA were conditioned
by their rules of engagement to respond less aggressively to
unusual vehicular or pedestrian activity at their perimeter
than were those Marines posted at the Embassy
locations." Consequently, the Marines at the airport
were unprepared to counter the suicide truck bomb attack
that destroyed their quarters.
In addition to the two rules of engagement provisions
described above--a hostile act activating the right of self-
defense and hostile intent activating the right of
anticipatory self-defense— there is a third provision
somewhat broader in scope. Certain designated operational
commanders have the authority to declare a force hostile
108
when it presents a "continuing threat of use of force."
When a force is declared hostile it can be attacked without
Beirut Commission, pp. 50-51. Nearly three decades
earlier, Colonel Hadd, initial commander of the Marine
landing force in Lebanon in 1958, had pointed out the
crititcal importance of staying abreast of a rapidly
changing local political environment. See Hadd, p. 86.




further need to determine hostile intent—additional
specific hostile acts or instances of hostile intent are not
required to take defensive action. The criteria for
declaring a force hostile are quite strict and the authority
to declare a force hostile is reserved for senior
operational commanders. Thus, this is not a provision that
can be used to circumvent the intent of the incident-
specific rules. Rather, it is a provision that provides
additional tactical flexibility in circumstances of
immediate, continuing danger to U.S. Navy ships.
In June 1967, the Commander of the Sixth Fleet, Vice
Admiral William I. Martin, used his authority to declare a
force hostile in response to reports from USS Liberty that
she was under attack by unidentified planes and torpedo
boats. After ordering the two U.S. carriers in the
Mediterranean to launch eight attack aircraft with fighter
escort to defend Liberty , he sent the following guidance to
the carriers:
1. IAW [In accordance with] CINCUSNAVEUR [Commander in
Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe) INST [Instruction]
P03120.5B forces attacking Liberty are declared
hostile.
2. You are authorized to use force including
destruction as necessary to control the situation. Do
not use more force than required. Do not pursue any
unit toward land for reprisal purposes. Purpose of
counterattack is to protect Liberty only.
3. Brief all pilots [on the] contents [of] this msg
[message]
.
4. In addition brief pilots that Egyptian territorial
limit [is] only 12 miles and Liberty [is] right on
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edge. Do not fly between Liberty and shoreline except
as required to carry out provisions [of] para
[paragraph] 2 above. Brief fighter cover that any
attacks on attack aircraft, Liberty, or they themselves
is hostile act and para [paragraph] two above
applies.
In a separate message the Sixth Fleet Commander emphasized
"Ensure pilots do not repeat do not fly over land. 1'
This episode illustrates three points. First, it shows
a fleet commander exercising his authority to declare an
unknown force attacking a U.S. Navy ship to be hostile. The
pilots sent to defend Liberty were not required to make
further judgements concerning hostile intent or the identity
of the attackers. Second, it shows a commander exercising
prudence by imposing limits on the planes— to not fly over
land and to avoid Egyptian airspace— in order to avoid
incidents that could escalate the confrontation and have
political repercussions. Third, it shows a commander
upholding the distinction between self-defense and
reprisals. The planes could engage any force threatening
Liberty , but were not permitted to pursue attackers in
retaliation. Thus, in this instance the rules of engagement
provided the on-scene commander with sufficient freedom of
109A Commander Sixth Fleet message, COMSIXTHFLT 081339Z
JUN 1967, June 8, 1967 (Declassified 1979. Liberty incident
file, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center,
Washington, DC)
.
110Commander Sixth Fleet message, COMSIXTHFLT 081336Z
JUN 1967, June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident




action to exercise initiative in an emergency, but imposed
constraints designed to prevent escalation of incidents.
U.S. Navy operational units receive training on
standing rules of engagement on a routine basis and intense
training in special rules of engagement before commencing
operations under those rules of engagement. This training
is scenario-based, requiring commanding officers and watch
officers to demonstrate their ability to interpret and apply
the rules of engagement in various situations.
Additionally, the training includes exercises in which rules
of engagement situations are simulated, using U.S. Navy
units to portray hostile forces, in order to provide a more
realistic perspective on how threatening situations
develop. The training recognizes that not every possible
situation calling for a decision on the use of force car. b*
anticipated, the purpose is to develop the skills of
tactical decisionmakers at interpreting the rules of
engagement in unfamiliar circumstances. Thus, rules of
engagement are not an obscure document that must be
hurriedly retrieved from a safe and dusted off when threat
of attack becomes imminent. Rather, rules of engagement are
an ever-present element in Navy tactical training.
The Decision to Use Force
The on-scene commander or a tactical decision-maker
controlling a ship's weapons must make two determinations
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when making the decision to use force in self-defense. He
must first determine whether or not the use of force is
authorized under the specific circumstances he facss.
Authorization to use force is a function of three factors:
the national identity of the threatening unit, the national
identity of the threatened target, and the existence of
hostile intent. Having determined that use of force is
authorized, he must then determine the type of defensive
response authorized under the circumstances. These four
factors—identity of threatening unit, identity of target,
existence of hostile intent, and appropriate defensive
response—are the fundamental elements of rules of
engagement.
Identity of threatening force . When a threatening
force has committed a hostile act—firing weapons at a U.S.
ship or plane— there is no requirement that the identity of
the national attacker be established prior to using force in
self-defense. However, the situation is more complex when a
determination of hostile intent must be made. U.S. rules of
engagement do not necessarily treat the forces of all
potentially hostile nations as being equally threatening.
Special rules of engagement, in particular, can specify
additional precautions against the forces of a nation
perceived as posing a threat to U.S. forces, while leaving
the provisions of standing rules of engagement in place for
the forces of other nations, or even requiring additional

268
measures to avoid incidents with them. A second, and
equally important, consideration is to avoid firing on
unarmed civilian vessels and aircraft operating in the
vicinity of hostilities. For these two reasons rules of
engagement often require identification of potentially
threatening ships and aircraft prior to use of force in
anticipatory self-defense.
Soviet ships and aircraft, for example, routinely
approach close to U.S. Navy vessels at sea with little
reaction. The intentions and behavior of Soviet ships and
aircraft are well-known, and under normal peacetime
conditions they are not an immediate threat to U.S. forces.
On the other hand, Iranian planes or warships attempting to
approach U.S. Navy ships operating in the Persian Gulf are
warned to remain clear, and then fired on if they continue
112to close. This reflects Iranian hostility toward the
Davis, et al., p. 47; Friedman, pp. 39-41.
112On U.S. rules of engagement in the Fersian Gulf, see
"U.S. Confirms Naval Incidents in Strait of Hormuz," New
York Times , February 29, 1984, p. A7; U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, "Report on
the Staff Investigation into the Iraqi Attack on the USS
Stark," June 14, 1987, pp. 4-6; "U.S. Copters Fire on
Iranian Ship," Los Angeles Times , September 22, 1987, p. 1;
"U.S. Navy Scares Off Iran's Boats in Gulf," San Jose
Mercury News , October 4, 1987, p. 1A; "Stark's Captain
'Failed Fundamentally'," San Jose Mercury News , October 16,
1987, p. 5A; "U.S. f-14 Fighter Fired at Iranian Aircraft,"
Washington Post , August 11, 1987, p. Al; "U.S. -Iran Missile
Encounter: Pure Aerial Electronics," Los Angeles Times ,
August 13, 1987, p. 6; "U.S. Helicopters Sink 3 Iranian




United States naval presence in the Gulf and prior
threatening actions by Iranian forces against U.S. Navy
units there. Thus, rules of engagement can be tailored to
avoid undesirable incidents with the forces of one country
while allowing early and effective defensive action against
more threatening forces of another country.
Rules of engagement often specify the certainty of
identification required before a determination of hostile
intent may be made. A rough scheme of certainty of
identification, from greatest to least certainty, would be
as follows: positive visual identification by flag or
markings, communications intercept, visual identification by
class of ship or type of aircraft, electronic intercept
(radar, etc.), and pattern of behavior (direction of
approach, flight path, formation, etc.). Often more than
one indicator present, which can increase certainty of
identification. These indicators can be supplemented with
intelligence on military vessels and planes known to be in
the area. Geography can also aid identification by allowing
elimination of forces from countries far removed from the
area. The most important distinction drawn in rules of
engagement is whether or not visual identification is
required prior to using force in anticipatory self-defense.
As was pointed out above, one purpose of rules of
engagement is to avoid inadvertenly using force against non-
combatant civilian ships and aircraft. However, the
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effectiveness of rules of engagement for this purpose can
decline significantly once military forces are engaged in
combat. On July 3, 1988, the U.S. guided missile cruiser
USS Vincennes (CG 48) shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the
Strait of Hormuz. At the time of the incident Vincennes and
another U.S. ship had been engaged in a gun battle with
Iranian small craft that had attacked a Norwegian ship and
fired on a U.S. Navy helicopter. Vincennes sent repeated
warnings over international radio channels for the plane to
identify itself and state its intentions, all of which were
missed or ignored by the Iranian airliner as it flew
directly at the U.S. warship. Vincennes misidentif ied the
plane as an Iranian Air Force F-14 jet fighter and the ship
shot it down with two surface-to-air missiles. Admiral
William J. Crowe, Jr., and other senior naval officers state
that the Commanding Officer of Vincennes fully complied with
the rules of engagement issued to U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf. The lesson of this incident is that in tense
situations—the heat of battle—incidents involving civilian
vessels or aircraft can occur even when military commanders
113
"U.S. Downs Iran Airliner Mistaken for F-14," New
York Times . July 4, 1988, p. 1; "Statement by Joint Chiefs
Head," New York Times , July 4, 1988, p. 4; "U.S. Pushes
Inquiry on Downing of Jet," New York Times , July 5, 1988, p.
Al; "Senators Assert Warship Captain Reacted Properly," New
York Times , July 7, 1988, p. Al; "Navy Won't Alter
Engagement Rules," New York Times , July 8, 1988, p. A6;
"Errors by a Tense U.S. Crew Led to Downing of Iran Jet,
Inquiry is Reported to Find," New York Times , July 11, 1988,
p. 1. Also see NWP 9, p. 8-4.
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are acting cautiously under rules of engagement designed to
prevent such incidents.
Generally, the higher the level of identification that
is required, the more difficult it is for Navy ships to take
timely defensive measures when threatened. In a high
contact-density environment, when the need for positive
identification to avoid unwanted incidents is greatest, the
identification problem is exacerbated, increasing the danger
to Navy ships and the possibility that neutral military
forces or civilian vessels or aircraft might be engaged.
Identity of threatened unit . Rules of engagement vary
depending upon the identity of the vessel or aircraft being
attacked or threatened with attack. Navy units are always
allowed to defend against threats to U.S. military forces
and U.S. territory, and under most circumstances can defend
U.S. civilian ships. Allied military forces can be defended
under circumstances defined by arrangements worked out under
defense treaties. Rules of engagement covering other types
of threatened units—such as civilian ships belonging to
allies or the military forces of non-allied friendly
nations—are usually quite restrictive. For example, from
1980 to mid-1988 U.S. Navy warships in the Persian Gulf were
114
only permitted to defend U.S. flag merchant ships.
114Richard W. Murphy, "International Shipping and the
Iran-Iraq War," Current Policy No. 958 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, May 19,
1987); Michael H. Armacost, "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf
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As before, problems can arise in a high contact-density
environment where military and civilian vessels in several
of the categories are operating in close proximity.
Problems can also arise in a rapidly changing political-
military environment, when a belligerent suddenly changes
the scope of targets he is attacking and rules of engagement
lag behind the expanded threat.
Existence of hostile intent . As noted before, a
distinction is drawn between hostile acts and hostile
intent. Rough categories of indicators of hostile intent,
from most to least certainty, are (a) weapon employment
(missile or torpedo launch, dropping of bombs, firing of
guns—all of which could also be a hostile act in some
circumstances), (b) targeting (detection of fire control
radar, missile guidance radar, or laser target designation)
,
(c) communications (detection of orders to attack, attack
coordination signals, or progress reports), (d) failure to
respond to warnings or to comply with declared exclusion
zones or broadcast avoidance procedures, (e) exhibiting
behavior indicative of imminent weapons employment when in a
position to be a threat. Rules of engagement specify, in
and Kuwaiti Reflagging, H Current Policy No. 978 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, June
16, 1987); "U.S. Denies Scope of Gulf Escort Duty Will
Crow, H Los Angeles Times , July 9, 1987, p. 8; "Broader Gulf
Role is Sought," San Jose Mercury News , October 13, 1987, p.
1A; "Pressure is on U.S. to Act in Gulf," San Jose Mercury
News , October 18, 1987, p. 1A.
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terms of categories such as these, the level of certainty
that hostile intent has been shown that is required before
actions can be taken in anticipatory self-defense.
Problems can arise from ambiguous indicators of hostile
intent. Hostile forces conducting an actual attack, rather
than harassment or a show of force, can be expected to use
deception in order to achieve surprise— a highly desirable
military tactic that increases the effectiveness of an
115
attack while reducing its costs. Deception tactics
include simulating the behavior of non-hostile aircraft and
ships, such as by staying within air lanes or sea lanes
while in transit, and responding to radio challenges with a
civilian identity. Such tactics are particularly effective
in a high contact-density environment, and create very
difficult rules of engagement problems for tactical decision-
makers.
An additional, and even greater, problem is that many
indicators of hostile intent can generated by routine
peacetime evolutions as well as by actual hostile actions.
Spurious indicators of hostile intent can arise during
training exercises, weapons testing, and combat systems
maintenance. Certain communications and electronic
emissions during routine surveillance can also resemble




exercises frequently include tracking and targeting of
simulated enemy forces, launching simulated attacks against
those forces, and firing of training weapons (which normally
do not have warheads) . All these activities are essential
for maintaining a high level of operational readiness, and
by definition generate indicators of hostile intent toward
the simulated enemy. The problem is that such indicators of
hostile intent may also be detected by units of another
country, who may or may not know about the exercise.
Complicating the problem of ambiguous indicators of
hostile intent is the Soviet penchant for conducting
simulated attacks on U.S. naval forces— a highly dangerous
practice. U.S. naval forces have frequently been targets
for simulated attacks by Soviet forces, and in some of these
incidents only the professionalism and forbearance of the
commanding officers prevented a clash. The Soviets have
reduced the number of such incidents since the Incidents at
Sea Agreement was signed in 1972, but occasionally still
conduct simulated attacks. The worst tactical situation
Soviet simulated attacks are discussed in Chapter
V. Two examples will illustrate the nature of such inci-
dents. In August 1979 in the Black Sea Soviet aircraft,
including Backfire bombers, conducted more than thirty
simulated missile attacks against the destroyers USS Caron
<DD 970) and USS Farragut (DDG 6). On February 18, 1984,
again in the Black Sea, a Soviet jet fighter fired its
cannon into the wake of the destroyer USS David R. Ray (DD
971). See "Soviet, in 2 Incidents, Takes U.S. torpedo and
Baits Ships," New York Times , August 11, 1979, p. 4; "High
Seas Diplomacy continuing," Washington Post , February 18,
1984, p. Al. Such actions can indicate hostile intent.
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is when Soviet naval forces are in close proximity to U.S.
naval forces that are at the scene of a crisis in which one
of the local participants is armed with Soviet weapons. A
Soviet simulated attack or other weapons training could be
mistaken by the U.S. ships as an impending attack by the
third party, or similar actions by the third party could be
mistaken for an impending Soviet attack. Such situations
can easily arise in such perennial hot spots as the Eastern
Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Sea of Japan.
Ambiguous indicators of hostile intent raise two types
of problems. First, suppression of valid indicators through
deception can leave ships vulnerable to attack when they
would have been authorized to use force in anticipatory self-
defense. Second, detection of valid indicators generated by
non-hostile activity can result in force being used when it
was not, in fact, needed. Thus, the determination of
hostile intent is highly context-dependent: the overall
political-military environment must also be considered.
Although problems usually arise with the definition of
hostile intent, even the concept of hostile act can be
troublesome. Is a hostile act actual weapon impact on a
defendable category of target, or does it include any weapon
employment, even if the target is not hit? If no vessel was
hit, to what degree of certainty must it be ascertained that
a defendable category of target was the intended target of a
hostile act? In a high contact-density environment it may
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not be clear which contact was the intended target.
Additionally, inadvertent attacks can occur in the fog of
war and the heat of battle: accidently launched weapons,
mistaken identity, misunderstood orders, indiscriminate
attacks (launched without an effort to identify the target),
and blind impact (unintended target between launch point and
intended target) . When a Navy unit is defending itself,
these problems are not at issue. But when other vessels are
to be defended, errors can occur in both directions: failing
to protect a defendable target or taking military action for
a non-def endable target. Both can have serious
consequences.
Appropriate defensive response . The term self-defense
can encompass a wide range of defensive actions, some of
which may be directed (that is, are mandatory when
threatened) and others of which may be prohibited. Rough
categories of defensive actions, in ascending order of
seriousness, are (a) evasion, such as opening the range to
the threat, (b) identification and warning signals to the
threatening unit, informing it that a U.S. Navy ship is
being approached and warning that force may be used in self-
defense, (c) passive measures, such as activating electronic
defense systems (radar jamming) and illuminating the
threatening unit with fire control radars, done as a warning
as well as for their combat value, (d) interposition, such
as placing a U.S. Navy ship between a civilian vessel being
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defended and a hostile ship attempting to board or seize it,
(e) warning shots, (f) employment of weapons to destroy the
threatening unit, and (g) pursuit of units that have
committed a hostile act to prevent them from conducting
further attacks. Measures (b) through (e) are not always
required, but may be specified depending on the level of
danger to U.S. Navy units and the likelihood of undesirable
incidents. Even when specified in the rules of engagement,
employment of measures (b) through (e) can be a function of
the time available to execute them before the danger of
attack is acute. This time constraint is recognized in the
rules of engagement, which do not bar the use of force in
self-defense when there is insufficient time to send
warnings or take other passive measures.
Two categories of military action are not authorized
under peacetime rules of engagement: employment of nuclear
or chemical weapons, and retaliatory attacks. Authority to
order the use of nuclear and chemical weapons rests with the
117President, and is not pre-delegated in peacetime.
Department of Defense and JCS policy prohibit rules of
engagement from usurping the authority and prerogatives of
117Roach, pp. 47-8. The one special case is that after
a valid nuclear release order from the President had
authorized employment of nuclear air defense weapons, U.S.
Air Force interceptors carrying nuclear air-to-air missiles
(the Genie rocket, no longer in service) were governed by
special JCS and North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)
rules of engagement for the use of those weapons.
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the President in any way. The decision to launch
retaliatory attacks for attacks on U.S. Navy units in
peacetime is also a matter of national policy, not a
tactical decision covered by rules of engagement. If
pursuit of attacking units is authorized under the rules of
engagement, it is because they represent a further immediate
threat to U.S., forces. Pursuit may not be used as a




An understanding the overall political-military context
of an incident is essential for the on-scene commander to be
able to make decisions on the use of force that support
national policy as well as uphold the right of self-
defense. In effect, the on-scene commander must determine
whether or not the military action he is contemplating will
support the political and military objectives and intentions
of the President. This requirement is inherent in the two-
stage decision process of the rules of engagement system.
The political-military context of an incident includes
geographic considerations, the political environment, and
the overall military situation. These are the same
variables that affected the first stage of the decision
118Ibid, pp. 50-1. Also see NWP 9, p. 6-3; O'Connell,
p. 176; Gallery, p. 25; Schelling, pp. 168-70.
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process--the original formulation and approval of the rules
of engagement by the President and his military advisors.
Those variables influence the political-military intent of
the rules of engagement, which could vary from strenuous
efforts to avoid a military incident at almost any cost, to
a hair-trigger readiness to deliver a sharp response to the
slightest military provocation. The burden on the on-scent
commander is to interpret the intent of the rules of
engagement in the specific circumstances at hand.
Geographic considerations include the proximity of Navy
units to the scene of a conflict or crisis, the proximity of
hostile territory, and the proximity of the conflict or
crisis to U.S. or allied territory. Rules of engagement
attempt to account for geographic factors by issuing special
rules of engagement when it can be anticipated that a ship
will be operating in a high-threat or politically sensitive
area. But when incidents occur while ships are operating
under standing rules of engagement, or when incidents occur
that do not quite fit the circumstances of special rules of
engagement, the on-scene commander must take geography into
account. A demonstration of hostile intent far removed from
the scene of any conflicts is likely to have much different
motives than one committed in the midst of a crisis. For
example, a ship operating near an announced exercise area
has reasonable grounds for concluding that an action
normally regarded as an indicator of hostile intent, such as
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being targeted by a fire control radar, is inadvertent
rather than a warning of imminent attack (though it must be
on guard against an accidental attack) . The same indicator
could have much more serious implications in the midst of a
military confrontation.
The political environment includes the overall climate
of relations between the U.S. and the nation whose forces
are the potential threat, the stated objectives of the
potentially threatening nation, and U.S. diplomatic
objectives in the conflict. When the potentially
threatening nation is an ally or client of the Soviet Union,
two additional political factors come into play: the overall
climate of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
and the level of support the Soviet Union is providing to
the potentially threatening nation—overall and in the
specific conflict at hand. Other crises or on-going
conflicts, whether or not they are related to the incident
at hand, are also an important part of the political
environment. World opinion toward the crisis and the U.S.
role in the crisis can be a factor depending on the apparent
responsiveness of the U.S. government to such concerns.
Similarly, domestic political opinion
—
particularly the mood
of Congress—can be a factor in on-scene decision-making if
emphasized in background briefings. Normally, however,
world and domestic opinion are among the least significant
political influences in rules of engagement decisions.
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The overall military situation includes the defenso
readiness condition (DEFCON) of U.S. forces, other alerts
ordered for specific U.S. forces, movements of U.S. forces
outside the scene of the crisis, and military incidents
involving U.S. forces in other tension areas. The status cf
these four factors—overall readiness, specific alerts,
movements of forces, and other incidents— in the Soviet
Union and other nations involved in the crisis are
additional major elements the overall military situation.
The tactical situation on-scene is the final element in the
overall military situation. The tactical situation on-scent
is defined by the local balance of military forces, the
apparent combat readiness of potentially hostile forces, and
the movement of those forces into position for further
attacks. Assessment of the military situation is used to
distinguish an isolated hostile act (perhaps inadvertent or
unauthorized) , best answered by a restrained response to
ease tensions, from a deliberate provocation or escalation,
requiring a sharp response to deter further attacks.
To illustrate the role of the political-military
context in the making of rules of engagement decisions,
Soviet reconnaissance planes overflying U.S. Navy ships in
the open ocean under normal peacetime conditions are not
fired on. On the other hand, a Libyan plane attempting to
overfly U.S. Navy ships during the March 1986 Gulf of Sidra
incident, or an Iranian plane attempting to do so during the
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Persian Gulf clashes in 1987 and 1986, would be shot
119down. Analysis of the political-military context of an
incident is a complex task, but U.S. Navy commanders are
routinely called upon to do so—without further reference to
higher authority— in making rules of engagement decisions.
Because an accurate and comprehensive understanding of
the political-military context of an incident is vital to
making rules of engagement decisions that support national
policy, difficult problems for U.S. forces on-scene can be
generated by not informing them of significant military and
diplomatic moves. This problem can be particularly acute
when rules of engagement are used as a substitute for
strategy, that is, when military forces are deployed to the
scene of a crisis without a clear mission, only rules of
120
engagement to govern their behavior.
Decisions to change the state of readiness of military
forces or to move military forces as a political signal can
alter the threat perception and political-military
objectives of the target nation, thus altering the tactical
situation on-scene. For example, a higher DEFCON can be set
119On U.S. rules of engagement toward Iran, see the
sources in footnote 107. On U.S. rules of engagement toward
Libya in 1986, see Parks, "Crossing the Line," pp. 44-52;
Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Stumpf, "Air War with Libya,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (August 1986): 42-48.
120On the importance of keeping the on-scene commander
informed, see Train, pp. 301-4. On not substituting rules




and troops deployed to forward bases in order to send a
threatening signal, or a lower DEFCON can be set and the
troops withdrawn to send a conciliatory signal. If the on-
scene commander and the tactical decision-makers under him
are not aware of such military actions, the threat to on-
scene forces may be perceived as either higher or lower than
it actually is. Thus, their interpretation of the rules of
engagement may not support national policy—inadvertently
sending conflicting signals to the target nation.
Similar problems can arise from diplomatic initiatives:
by changing the threat perception and objectives of the
target nation, diplomatic moves alter the local tactical
environment. Secret communications and "back-channel"
negotiations are undoubtedly an essential part of diplomacy
and statecraft, but they need to be accompanied by
appropriate efforts to keep the chain of command informed of
the political-military context within which operational
decisions are made.
The Problem of Misinterpretation
As has already been pointed out, the on-scene commander
must interpret the intent of the rules of engagement in the
specific tactical circumstances at hand. He is aided in
doing this by statements of U.S. objectives included in the
rules of engagement when they are issued, by background
briefings on the crisis, and by the tailoring of special
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rules of engagement for his specific operation. However,
the rules of engagement can still be misinterpreted,
producing decisions on the use of force that do not support
national policy. These are not tactical decisions made in
deliberate violation of the rules of engagement, which is a
separate—and exceedingly rare—category of problem.
Misinterpretation of the rules of engagement occurs when a
tactical decision-maker has an understanding of their intent
that is different from the intent of the higher authorities
who drafted the rules. U.S. Navy training goes to great
lengths to prevent this from happening, but the possibility
of misinterpretation cannot be completely excluded.
Misinterpretation of the rules of engagement can arise
from three sources. First, verbal orders intended only to
emphasize particular operational details can be
misinterpreted as a modification to the rules of
engagement. For example, a warning that an unusually high
number of non-hostile air contacts can be expected could be
construed as a requiring greater than normal caution before
engaging threatening aircraft. Second, the operational
environment can induce routinized patterns of behavior
(tactical bad habits, of which complacency is the most
common example) that impinge on rules of engagement. For
example, daily non-hostile contact with the aircraft of a
belligerent could create a routine in which defensive
measures authorized in the rules of engagement are not taken
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because they have never been needed in the past. Third, a
psychological environment can develop that affects threat
assessments so as to produce rules of engagement decisions
different than intended by the chain of command. The
results can be too passive as easily as too aggressive. The
constant tension of operating near hostilities can put
nerves on edge and generate an intense desire to "do
something" rather than continue to be a passive observer or
the target of harassment. On the other hand, a feeling
that the Navy ships are not needed in the situation (wasting
their time) or are impotent to act can lead to complacency
and passivity. Personalities can also have an impact—an
overly aggressive or cautious tactical decision-maker may
provide his own interpretation of the rules of engagement.
The professionalism of U.S. Navy officers and their high
state of training generally are sufficient to prevent
misinterpretation of the rules of engagement, but the on-
scene commander and the chain of command needs to be alert
for indications of these problems.
Allies and Rules of Engagement
Operations with allies raise further rules of
engagement problems. Within the NATO alliance, each member
has its own national rules of engagement, which are the
rules in effect in peacetime. Additionally, the NATO
military command has a separate set of rules of engagement
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that govern all member forces after they are transferred to
Allied command upon declaration of a NATO Reinforced
121
Alert. This system raises two problems. First, national
peacetime rules of engagement may differ among NATO
members. This is because threat perceptions, foreign policy
objectives, and domestic political constraints can vary
considerably among allies. An unambiguous threat from the
Soviet Union would undoubtedly be met with a unified
response, but a wide range of lesser threats raise political
difficulties. Some observers have concluded that diversity
in peacetime rules of engagement can interfere with the
ability of forces from different NATO members to respond in
a consistent and coordinated manner in a crisis. They point
out, for example, that while the rules of engagement of most
European NATO members require commission of a hostile act
prior to use of force, U.S. and British rules of engagement
usually permit force to be used upon demonstration of
122hostile intent. Such differences could create severe
difficulties coordinating NATO forces in a sudden crisis.
The second problem is that intense political
consultation would almost inevitably be required prior to
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to Allied command, and bringing NATO rules of engagement
123into effect. This, some observers fear, could leave NATO
forces without clear rules of engagement guidance as a
crisis escalates towards war, and could leave them fatally
vulnerable to a Soviet conventional pre-emptive strike at
124
the start of a war. Thus, peacetime national rules of
engagement formulated for purposes of avoiding war could in
fact provide an additional incentive for a pre-emptive
attack in a severe crisis.
Summary
In summary, rules of engagement are an important
mechanism of indirect control, and are particularly
important in crisis management. Rules of engagement are
orders issued to define the circumstances in which the U.S.
armed forces are authorized to use their weapons for defense
against hostile forces in peacetime, and to specify the
scope and level of violence of combat operations in
wartime. Peacetime rules of engagement prohibit U.S.
military commanders from shooting first in peacetime unless
absolutely necessary for self-defense. There are two
categories of peacetime rules of engagement: standing rules
in effect at all times for the forces they cover, and
123Packenham, p. 49.
124
Davis, et al., pp. 48-9; Friedman, pp. 32-3
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special rules issued for particularly sensitive situations,
such operations during an international crisis.
Rules of engagement are necessary for five reasons:
first , commanders in the field or at sea often not have the
neans or sufficient time to contact higher authorities in an
emergency; second, the lethality of modern weapons has led
to the principle of anticipatory self-defense, so rules are
needed to define indicators of hostile intent; third, not
all nations that are potentially hostile to the U.S. present
the same level of military threat, so rules are needed to
distinguish among them; fourth, the rules ensure that U.S.
forces adhere to the international legal principles of
proportional and minimum force; and fifth, U.S. forces can
be tasked to defend civilian U.S. vessels and U.S. citizens
ashore overseas, the military forces and civilian vessels of
allies and friendly nations, and the territory of allies or
friendly nations.
United States Navy ships and aircraft, like all U.S.
forces, have an inherent right of self-defense under
international law— they may use their weapons to defend
themselves if a hostile act of violence is committed against
them. Emphasis in U.S. policy on self-defense is on caution
and restraint, and rules of engagement warn that decisions
on the use of force must be '*tempered with judgement and
discretion.** The rules of engagement allow force to be used
in self-defense under three circumstances: first, upon
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commission of a hostile act against U.S. forces; second,
upon demonstration of hostile intent, defined as clear
indication that a hostile act is imminent, which activates
the principle of anticipatory self-defense; and third, upon
an authorized commander declaring a force hostile due a
continuing threat of use of force against his command.
An on-scene commander must make two determinations
prior to using force in self-defense. He must first
determine whether or not the use of force is authorized,
which is a function of three factors: the national identity
of the threatening unit, the national identity of the
threatened target, and the existence of hostile intent. He
must then determine the type of defensive response
authorized under the circumstances. Making these
determinations can be crucially dependent on the political-
military context of the operation, which includes geographic
considerations, the political environment, and the overall
military situation. The on-scene commander must consider
whether or not the military action he is contemplating will
support the political and military objectives of the
President. This makes it critical that on-scene commanders
be kept informed of the overall political military
situation.
Rules of engagement can fail in one of two modes:
vulnerability failure or escalatory failure. A
vulnerability failure is caused by rules of engagement that
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are excessively restrictive, ambiguous, or complex and
confusing. In a vulnerability failure the on-scene
commander is unable to take effective action in self-
defense, resulting in a successful attack on his forces—an
attack that might otherwise have been defeated. An
escalatory failure is caused by rules of engagement that are
excessively permissive, ambiguous, or complex and
confusing. In an escalatory failure the on-scene commander
uses excessive force on grounds of self-defense, causing
escalation of the scope or intensity of violence beyond that
viewed as desirable by national leaders. Either type of
failure can result from an on-scene commander
misinterpreting his rules of engagement. Misinterpretation
of the rules occurs when a tactical decision-maker has an
understanding of their intent that is different from the
intent of the higher authorities who drafted the rules.
Conclusion
The first objective of this chapter was to explain how
delegation and control are exercised in the United States
military command system. The previous three sections
examined the principles, methods and mechanisms of command
and control. The United States armed forces rely on a
flexible combination of direct and delegated control. The
methods of control range from positive direct control and
direct control by negation at the tight end of the
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"tightness of control" spectrum, to monitored delegated
control and autonomous delegated control at the loose end.
Certain of the methods of control can be used in conjunc-
tion, and forces can be rapidly shifted from one method to
another as the situation warrants. Commanders can exercise
indirect control of subordinates even after having delegated
them substantial autonomy. This is done via the mechanisms
of indirect control: the alert system, standing orders,
mission orders, contingency plans, and rules of engagement.
The second objective of this chapter was to to set the
United States military command system in the context of
organization and management theories on delegation and
control in organizations. The first section of this chapter
reviewed those theories. Organization and management
studies show that significant delegation of decisionmaking
authority is common in large organizations. Delegation of
decisionmaking is driven by the limits on decisionmaking,
which cause decision-making by top-level officials to
deteriorate as the size and complexity of the organization
increase. These observations apply particularly well to the
military chain of command, which is founded on the principle
of delegating control while retaining command. As
organization theory predicts, delegation of control in the
military command system is primarily due to constraints on




Organization and management studies show that tension
between autonomy and control is always present in public and
business organizations, particularly those consisting of
numerous independent operating units. As before, these
findings apply particularly well to the U.S. military.
Tension between delegation and control is always present in
the military chain of command. Pressures toward centralized
control are driven by the complexity of modern warfare, fear
of nuclear war, and efforts to exploit the force multiplier
effect. Pressures toward decentralized control are driven
by severe constraints on the ability of top-level
authorities to effectively control tactical operations, and
by the advantages gained by granting the on-scene commander
flexibility to exercise initiative.
Organization and management studies show that delega-
tion of decisionmaking can range from being highly rule-
governed, for standard, repetitive situations, to highly
discretionary, for situations that cannot be anticipated.
This also applies to military command and control. The
methods of exercising control cover a '* tightness of control"
spectrum ranging from very tight to very loose control.
Toward the tight end of the spectrum are positive direct
control, and direct control by negation. Toward the loose
end of the spectrum are monitored delegated control and
autonomous delegated control. The guidance contained in
mechanisms of indirect control can also range from being
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detailed and specific (tight indirect control) to general
and flexible (loose indirect control). In military command
and control, as in public administration and business
management, tighter forms of control are more appropriate
for standard situations that are easily anticipated, while
looser forms of control are more appropriate for an
environment marked by uncertainty and ambiguity, in which
specific decisionmaking situations are difficult to
anticipate.
Organization and management studies show that three
types of control mechanisms are used in various combina-
tions: hierarchical (rules and procedures), collegial
(professionalism) , and nonhierarchical (organizational and
societal norms and culture) . All three methods are used in
the military organizations. The mechanisms of indirect
control—the alert system, standing orders, mission orders,
contingency plans, and rules of engagement—are all
hierarchical controls. They relieve higher authorities of
the burden of having to closely monitor the details of
military operations—a burden that can quickly exceed their
information processing and decisionmaking capabilities when
large-scale operations are being conducted in a fast-paced
political-military environment. Relieved of this burden,
top-level authorities are better able to concentrate on
monitoring the overall political-strategic situation,
formulating and revising their strategy for dealing with the
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confrontation, and coordinating the overall execution of
military operations so that they support that strategy
.
Hierarchical controls serve similar functions in public and
business organizations.
Collegial and nonhierarchical controls have not been
discussed, but are more prominent in military organizations
than in any other type of organization. Collegial control
is provided by the professionalism of the officer corps,
which is highly developed and stressed in the training of
125
officers. Non-hierarchical controls—organizational
norms and values—are also widely used in the military.
They are most visible in elite military units, such as Army
Special Forces and the Marine Corps. Members of these units
are indoctrinated that their elite status requires that they
meet superior standards of performance—typically
discipline, endurance, aggressive-ness, and fighting skill
—
unique to their organizations. Similar nonhierarchical
controls are used throughout the armed forces to complement
and reinforce military professionalism.
Collegial and nonhierarchical controls have a major
impact on the effectiveness of delegated command and the
125See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:
The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 7-18;
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and
Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960)
, pp. 3-75;
Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military
Professionalism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 5-54.
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mechanisms of indirect control. On the one hand, controls
such as discipline, loyalty, and respect for the chain of
command are essential for delegated command and the
mechanisms of indirect control to function at all.
Similarly, professional experience and judgement can be
crucial for correctly interpreting ambiguous orders and
carrying out general guidance under rapidly changing
circumstances. The ultimate test of professional experience
and judgement is knowing when to disregard inappropriate
orders in order to take action that better supports the
national interest. On the other hand, collegial and
nonhierarchical controls can generate commitment to
particular operational doctrines or procedures, and
resistance to operations custom-designed for crisis
management purposes. This is the phenomenon emphasized in
the organizational process and bureaucratic politics
models. A further weakness of those models, then, is that
they do not address the full impact
—
positive as well as
negative—of collegial and nonheirarchical controls.
Studies of public administration and business
management repeatedly show that in large organizations
comprised of numerous independent operating units, optimum




nonheirarchical—controls. The issue as to what degree of
centralization or decentralization is optimum for military
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operations was not directly addressed in this review of the
military command system. The strength and weaknesses of the
methods of control and mechanisms of indirect control, and
the arguments for and against centralization of
decisionmaking authority, were discussed, but the focus was
on how military command and control function in principle.
Many things can go wrong in the stress and confusion of
crisis military operations, and there are inherent limits on
the ability of any methods or mechanisms of control to
ensure that decisions made at one level are those that are
most appropriate for the situation at another level. The
optimum degree of centralization or decentralization can
vary widely depending on the nature of the military
operation being conducted and the political-military context
of the operation. This can be seen in the flexibility of
the U.S. military command system and the broad range of
control methods—covering the entire tightness of control
spectrum—available in it.
One of the central requirements of crisis management is
for national leaders to maintain close control over military
126
operations. This requirement can now be addressed in
more specific operational terms. National leaders can
exercise close control of military operations in a variety
of ways. One approach is to shift from methods at the loose
126George, "Development of Doctrine and Strategy,* p.
8; George, "Crisis Management," p. 227.
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•nd of the tightness of control spectrum—autonomous
delegated control monitored delegated control— to methods at
the tight end of the spectrum—direct control by negation
and positive direct control. This is the approach commonly
referred to in the crisis management literature. The image
of Secretary of Defense McNamara giving rudder orders over
the radio directly to Navy ships on the quarantine line
during the Cuban Missile Crisis is often viewed as the model
of close control that should be followed.
This style of direct control has its costs, and can
even impede effective crisis management. Unless the scope
of military operations is very small and simple, direct
control can quickly overload information processing and
decisionmaking. National leaders typically focus on
selectee* aspects of the operations, which may not be the
most important or dangerous evolutions taking place. The
need for close control thus needs be weighed against the
severe constraints on the ability of national leaders to
exercise effective direct control of military operations.
A second approach to maintaining close control of
crisis military operations is through the mechanisms of
indirect control. This entails shifting the guidance
contained in mechanisms of indirect control from being
general and flexible (loose indirect control) , to being
detailed and specific (tight indirect control) . Close
attention to the rules of engagement is particularly
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important in this regard. As was also true with methods of
control, excessive tightness in the mechanisms of indirect
control can be counterproductive--denying the on-scene
commander the flexibility he needs to adapt to rapidly
changing circumstances. The optimum tightness of control
lies somewhere between absolute control and absolute
autonomy. Establishing precisely where the optimum balance
between control and delegation lies is one of the inherent
tensions in crisis management.
U.S. military command and control procedures allow
ample opportunity for stratified interaction to occur in
crises. The U.S. armed forces rely on a flexible combina-
tion of direct and delegated control that emphasizes
delegation of authority and providing on-scene commanders
with freedom of action. Monitored delegated control is the
method of control preferred by military commanders, and when
direct control is necessary, control by negation is
preferred over positive control. Primary emphasis is placed
on use of mechanisms of indirect control rather than on the
exercise of direct control. These preferences are strongest
in the Navy, which has a long tradition of operational
autonomy and which accords "absolute" authority to command-
ing officers. Even in crises, when there is a tendency for
high-level military commanders as well civilian authorities
to centralize control over operations, on-scene commanders
are delegated substantial decisionmaking authority.
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Given that national leaders usually must delegate a
certain amount of discretionary decisionmaking authority to
military commanders, including the on-scene commander, then
it must be expected that military incidents not ordered by
national leaders (or even anticipated by them) will occur.
The next chapter will explore the range of such incidents
that have occurred in the past, and could well occur during
a future crisis. Military incidents can generate tactical
level military interactions with the forces of the other
side in a crisis— interactions decoupled from efforts by




The theory of stratified interaction posits that
crisis interaction takes place in three semi-independent
interaction sequences: political, strategic, and tactical.
Thus far, however, little has been said about exactly what
types of interactions can occur at the tactical level. It
will be useful to explore the nature of tactical-level
interactions prior to commencing the case studies so as to
identify the types of military actions that are of interest.
The purposes of this chapter are to define the scope
of tactical-level interactions that can occur in a crisis
and to define analytical categories of crisis military
actions. In the remainder of this introduction to the
chapter the military actions that can produce tactical-level
interactions will be classified, based on the perspective of
political-level decisionmakers, as deliberate military
actions or inadvertent military incidents. The next three
sections will define and present examples of the three
categories of inadvertent military incidents: unanticipated
authorized actions, military accidents, and unauthorized
actions. The fourth section will examine incidents at sea




Agreement. The concluding section will explain why inadver-
tent military incidents are relatively rare in crises.
Tactical-level interactions will be categorized from
the perspective of political-level decisionmakers. Studies
of international crises have observed that national leaders
generally seek to maintain close control of crisis military
operations. The ideal condition that national leaders want
to achieve is for no military actions to occur other than
the ones they direct. National leaders thus make an an
implicit distinction between military actions they initiated
deliberately and those they did not order but which occurred
anyway. This distinction is the basis for the two major
categories of tactical-level interactions: deliberate
military actions and inadvertent military incidents.
Deliberate military actions are ordered by political-
level decisionmakers. National leaders either issue a
direct command for a specific action to be executed, or
anticipate the action would occur as a result of an order
given previously. Deliberate military actions can thus
occur under delegated as well as direct control, and can be
ordered in mechanisms of indirect control as well as
directly over real-time communications links.
Inadvertent military incidents are military actions
that affect the development of a crisis, but which are not
specifically ordered or anticipated by national leaders.
Avoiding such incidents has been a central concern in the
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study of crisis management. As Phil Willians points out, an
"inadvertent outbreak of violence" could cause national
leaders to lose control of events in a crisis:
The problem is likely to be particularly acute
if military forces are in close proximity to those of
the opponent. Trained specifically for warfare,
military forces are not an ideal instrument in
situations demanding an enormous degree of caution and
restraint. Although it is highly improbable that
hostilities would be initiated without explicit
orders, a clash between opposing forces resulting from
the actions of an over-zealous military commander
cannot be discounted entirely. Thus, policy-makers
could find themselves losing control over a crisis
because of the actions of subordinates. This may be
even more of a problem when geographical distance is
added to the organizational distance between those who
formulate and those who execute policy.
Although the importance that national leaders typically
place on maintaining close control over military operations
has been recognized, the questions of how and why
inadvertent military incidents occur and what effect they
have on crisis management efforts have not been adequately
addressed in the literature on crisis management.
Most professional military officers expect that at
least some things, hopefully minor, invariably will go wrong
Phil Williams, Crisis Management (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 100. Two factors mentioned by
Williams—military forces operating in close proximity to
those of the opponent and at great geographical distance
from policymakers—are a good description of typical naval
operations in crises. The one qualification that must be
put on his analysis is that the on-scene military commander
need not be over-zealous for an armed clash to erupt; even a
cautious commander attempting to act with restraint could
become involved in an outbreak of violence that national
leaders did not desire or anticipate.
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during military operations. In planning military operations
commanders attempt to allow for mistakes, accidents, and
other unforeseen circumstances. Such problems constitute
what Clausewitz described as "friction" in war— the myriad
things that tend to interfere with the smooth accomplishment
of military operations. One of the principles of war
—
simplicity— is followed by military planners because
friction tends to increase with the size and complexity of
an operation. Friction begins to arise as soon as military
operations are launched—well before the enemy is engaged.
It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that friction—things
going wrong—will occur in crisis military operations as
well as in wartime military operations.
Recent studies of crisis management have shown a
growing awareness that inadvertent military incidents are
inherent in the use of military forces as a political
instrument in crises. Eliot Cohen rebuts crisis management
theory, which emphasizes national leaders maintaining close
control of military forces, with the argument that "even if
one were to accept the crisis management theorist's
premises, the statesman must inevitably fall victim to what
Clausewitz called friction, or what we sometimes call
Murphy's Law—the tendency of things to go wrong, of people
not to get messages or to misunderstand or deliberately
2See Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 12-13.
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ignore them, of large organizations to fail in their
3
missions for a host of unforeseeable reasons." Cohen goes
on to argue that despite this, accidents, misperceptions,
and the like are not likely to cause crises to escalate to
wars. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, has proposed a variant of Murphy's Law
applying specifically to use of military force in crises:
I don't think the Cuban Missile Crisis was
unique. The Bay of Pigs, Berlin in '61, Cuba, later
events in the Middle East, in Libya, and so on--all
exhibit the truth of what I'll call "McNamara 's Law,"
which states: "It is impossible to predict with a
high degree of confidence what the effects of the use
of military force will be because of the risks of
accident, miscalculation, misperception, and
inadvertence." In my opinion, this law ought to be
inscribed above all the doorways in the White House
and the Pentagon, and it is the overwhelming lesson of
the Cuban missile crisis.
Cohen and McNamara point out the limitations and dangers of
crisis management, but do not provide an understanding of
the role of inadvertent military incidents in international
crises. There is thus a need to take a closer look at such
incidents and the impact they can have on crisis management.
Eliot A. Cohen, "Why We Should Stop Studying the
Cuban Missile Crisis," The National Interest No. 2 (Winter
1985/6): 8. Interestingly, "Murphy's Law"—which states
that if something can go wrong, it will—was originated by a
military officer (U.S. Air Force Captain Edward Murphy) in
1949. The law has been widely used in the services for
almost forty years to teach maintenance personnel to beware
of mistakes.
4James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A.
Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," Foreign Affairs
66 (Fall 1987): 186.
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There are three categories of inadvertent military
incidents: unanticipated authorized actions, military
accidents, and unauthorized deliberate actions. The next
three sections of this chapter will discuss these three
types of incidents. Although attention will be focused on
incidents involving U.S. forces, examples of accidents
involving the forces of other countries will also be
presented. This will be done to illustrate that both sides
in a crisis can experience inadvertent incidents involving
their military forces.
An additional type of incident— incidents at sea—will
be discussed in a separate section because they can be
either deliberate or inadvertent. Incidents at sea include
various forms of harassment and other dangerous interactions
between Soviet and American naval forces. They may be
initiated deliberately on direct or standing orders from
national leaders (for military reasons or as a political
signal), or may occur inadvertently— that is, without having
been ordered by national leaders. Inadvertent incidents at
sea can fall into any of the three categories of inadvertent
military incidents: unanticipated authorized actions,
military accidents, and unauthorized deliberate actions.
Unanticipated Authorized Actions
Unanticipated authorized actions are military actions
taken by military commanders in compliance with guidance
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contained in mechanisms of indirect control, but not
directly ordered or specifically approved by national
leaders. Such actions are taken by on-scene commanders in
response to events or tactical conditions that national
leaders did not anticipate, are not aware of, or do not
understand. Such actions are authorized, in that they are
taken in compliance with guidance contained in one of the
mechanisms of indirect control— the alert system, standing
orders, mission orders, contingency plans, or rules of
engagement. But they are unanticipated, in the sense that
national leaders did not directly order the specific action
or anticipate that the specific action would result from
guidance contained in mechanisms of delegated control.
National leaders can only react to an unanticipated author-
ized action and try to manage its impact on the crisis.
The most common phenomenon appears to be that national
leaders order a military operation without understanding the
full range of specific military actions that military
commanders have authority to take in order to carry out that
operation. Ambiguous orders, operations initiated without
specific military objectives to guide decisionmaking by on-
scene commanders, and open-ended military operations (those
that drag on without a definitive conclusion) are particu-
larly prone to cause unanticipated authorized actions.
Reliance on methods or delegated command and mechanisms of
indirect control, although unavoidable for effective control

307
of a military organization as large as the U.S. armed
forces, is the most important condition giving rise to the
possibility of unanticipated authorized actions. But such
actions can also occur when tighter methods of control are
being exercised. National leaders exercising control by
negation could approve a military action (by not vetoing it)
without understanding what that action entails. This could
also occur when positive direct control is being exercised,
though in this case it is more accurate to describe the
consequences of the action, rather than the action itself,
as being unanticipated.
Misperceptions on the part of on-scene military comman-
ders are another possible cause of unanticipated authorized
actions. This could occur when a military commander misper-
ceives the political-military context of his local tactical
situation. For example, he might misperceive aggressive
enemy military moves as indicating that friendly forces are
in imminent danger of attack or even that war had started.
Believing that attack is imminent or that war has started,
the commander takes military actions that would be
authorized if one of these situations did, in fact, exist.
The possibility of such misperceptions underscores the
danger inherent in simulating attacks on an adversary's
forces during a crisis—such as the Soviet Navy conducted
against the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean while U.S.
forces were at DEFCON 3 in the 1973 Middle East War. In
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this instance U.S. Navy commanders in the Mediterranean
presumed that Soviet maneuvering to attack was just an
5
exercise and did not attack any Soviet ships. Under other
circumstances, however, such forbearance could be much more
difficult for on-scene commanders.
Contingency plans can be a source of unanticipated
authorized actions if national leaders do not fully
understand the operational implications of the plans or do
not have the time or inclination to carefully review the
content of a plan before ordering it executed. Although
United States military contingency plans contain a broad
range of options for the employment of military forces,
civilian policy-makers tend to view most predefined military
options as inappropriate because the options were designed
for a crisis scenario different than the one at hand, or
were defined to meet purely military objectives rather than
the requirements for employment of military forces in a
crisis. As was discussed in detail in Chapter IV, there
are inherent limits on the ability of contingency planning.
5See the case study of the 1973 Middle East War in
Chapter VII of this study.
See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1971), pp. 83-89; Leo Hazelwood, John J. Hayes, and
James R. Brownell, Jr., "Planning for Problems in Crisis
Management, H International Studies Quarterly 21 (March
1977): 93; Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of




In practice, top-level military and civilian officials
jointly review and revise contingency plans to meet the
needs of the specific crisis at hand prior to executing
them. However, the possibility of a contingency plan
setting in motion military operations that top-level
political leaders had not anticipated cannot be excluded
entirely.
The alert system can also be a source of unanticipated
authorized actions. The President and his advisors—even
the Secretary of Defense—may not be aware of the full range
of actions that result from setting a higher level of
7Defense Condition of Readiness (DEFCON) . Further, they may
not be informed that a particular action has been initiated
until it is too late to halt it or until it has already had
an unanticipated effect on the crisis. The best example of
this was the May 1960 -unintended" DEFCON 3 alert, which was
initiated by an ambiguous message from Secretary of Defense
Thomas Gates, then in France with President Eisenhower. The
message directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to "quietly order a high state of command readiness," but
did not specify a DEFCON level or give sufficient detail for
military commanders to determine exactly what the Secretary
7John Steinbruner, HAn Assessment of Nuclear Crises,"
in Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Polanyi, eds., The Dangers
of Nuclear War (Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1979),
p. 228. Also see Garry-D. Brewer and Paul Bracken, "Some
Missing Pieces of the C I Puzzle," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 28 (September 1984): 454.
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of Defense desired. The result was a much greater level of
highly visible military activity than had been desired.
Such an incident is probably less likely to occur today, but
a wide range of unanticipated authorized actions could still
result from a presidential decision to set a higher level of
DEFCON.
The most important potential source of unanticipated
authorized actions is operational decisions made by tactical
level military commanders on the basis of guidance contained
in standing orders, mission orders, or the rules of engage-
ment. Even when under direct control by top-level political
authorities, operational commanders usually have sufficient
authority to take actions that could significantly affect
the development of a crisis. Ambiguous or ambivalent orders
greatly increase the likelihood of unanticipated authorized
actions by leaving the on-scene commander uncertain as to
the objectives of his mission, the intentions of national
leaders, and the actions he is .uthorized to take. Movement
of forces outside the scene of a crisis into battle posi-
tions, employment of weapons in self-defense in accordance
with the rules of engagement, and stepped up surveillance of
sensitive targets are all actions the President might not
anticipate as resulting from his decisions, but which could
raise tensions in a crisis.
g Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Manage-
ment," International Security 9 (Spring 1985): 102-6.
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Four examples will illustrate the types of unantici-
pated authorized actions that can occur. The first example
concerns two instances of clashes between United States and
Soviet forces during the Korean War. Despite the stringent
measures that had been imposed on air operations to prevent
incidents with the Soviet Union, two serious engagements
between United States Navy aircraft and Soviet aircraft took
place during the war. The first was on September 4, 1950,
over the Yellow Sea. U.S. Navy jet fighters intercepted two
Soviet twin-engined bombers approaching a U.S. carrier task
force, and when one of the bombers fired on the fighters it
was was shot down. The body of one of the bomber's crewmen
was recovered, confirming that the plane had been Soviet.
The second was on November 18, 1952, over the Sea of Japan.
U.S. Navy jet fighters intercepted seven Soviet jet fighters
approaching a U.S. carrier task force, shooting down at
9least two of them. In both cases the carrier task force
commanders were authorized to order an intercept to defend
their ships under the governing "measures for self-
preservation" (the old Navy term for rules of engagement)
.
Neither incident caused a political confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union, but both had the
9Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A Manson, The Sea War in
Korea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957)
, pp. 469-
475; James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval
Operations: Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1962), pp. 167-9, 440-1.
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potential to seriously complicate efforts to keep the Korean
War limited.
The second example occurred in July 1953, when six
ships under the command of Vice Admiral Walter G. Schindler
were dispatched to search for survivors from a U.S. Air
Force RB-50 reconnaissance plane shot down by Soviet
fighters over the Sea of Japan about thirty miles off the
coast of the Soviet Union. Vice Admiral Schindler' s orders
did not specify how close to the Soviet coast he was allowed
to search, so he sent the following message to his superiors
stating "I intend to take my ships as close to Russian
territory as is necessary to recover the airmen from the
crashed aircraft" and that he would "brook no interference"
from the Soviets. By the time Vice Admiral Schindler
received a response directing him to remain clear of Soviet
territorial waters, he had already recovered the only
survivor that could be located. As it turned out, the
survivor was found in international waters, none of Vice
Admiral Schindler' s ships entered Soviet territorial waters,
and there was no harassment of his force by Soviet ships or
planes. However, an action like this could produce a
1 Field, pp. 457-9; Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, The
Pueblo Incident (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1970),
p. 57; Vice Admiral Walter G. Schindler, letter to author,
March 19, 1988. Vice Admiral Schindler confirmed that he
sent the message described by Rear Admiral Gallery.
Field, p. 459; Gallery, p. 58; Schindler letter.
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serious Soviet-American confrontation if handled less with
less skill or undertaken in more tense circumstances.
The third example occurred on July 26, 1954 over the
South China Sea. Two days earlier Chinese fighters had shot
down a British air liner en route from Singapore to Hong
Kong. China apologized for the incident, but harassed U.S.
ships and planes engaged in the search for survivors. In
response, the United States moved a task group built around
carriers USS Hornet (CVA 16) and USS Philippine Sea (CVS 47)
into the Tonkin Gulf in a show of force. On July 26, two
Chinese fighters attempting to attack search planes were
shot down by Navy fighters flying combat air patrol for the
12
search effort. As in the Korean War incidents described
above, the planes acted in compliance with authorized
"measures for self-preservation."
The fourth example occurred during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War. Sixth Fleet movements on the first day of the
war—a significant signal to the Soviets of American inten-
tions—resulted from a decision made on-scene not related to
1
-2 MIG's Downed British Airliner Off Red China
Coast, Pilot Says," New York Times , July 24, 1954, p. 1;
"Plane Loss Laid to Peiping; U.S. Carriers Rush to Scene,"
New York Times . July 25, 1954, p. 1; "Peiping, Apologizing,
Calls Downing of Plane Accident," New York Times , July 26,
1954, p. 1; "U.S. Rescue Planes Fired Upon, Down 2 Red China
Craft," New York Times , July 27, 1954, p. 1. For details on
the downing of the Chinese planes, see Admiral Harry D.
Felt, "The Reminiscences or Admiral Harry Donald Felt, U.S.
Navy (Retired)," Volume I (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval
Institute, Oral History Program, 1974), pp. 268-9.
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crisis management efforts taking place in the White
House. In this instance, the decision of the Sixth Fleet
Commander to move the carrier strike force did not create
any problems in managing the crisis. In other circum-
stances, however, fleet movements unanticipated by national
leaders could complicate crisis management efforts by
sending unintended political signals to the adversary.
Although none of these examples of unanticipated
authorized actions created crisis management problems for
American leaders, similar low-level decisions could be more
troublesome under other circumstances.
Military Accidents
Military accidents are actions not ordered or
deliberately initiated at any level in the chain of
command. Military accidents are troublesome because
decision-makers may fail to realize they are unauthorized
and perceive them as a deliberate provocation, signal of
hostile intent, or escalation. This problem is compounded
by modern communications systems, which in theory give
national leaders in many countries the capability for
detailed control of military operations and the ordering
specific tactical actions. Richard N. Lebow has warned






that since any military action could conceivably be the
result of orders from national leaders, an adversary may
assume that those leaders in fact ordered a given action,
15
whether or not the conclusion is warranted. Thus,
virtually any military actions can assume strategic
importance if believed to have been conceived and personally
supervised by national leaders.
In practice, national leaders and even military
commanders attempt to distinguish accidents from deliberate
provocations or attacks: U.S. naval commanders did so in
the 1967 Israeli attack on the Liberty , and Khrushchev did
so during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when a U.S. U-2
16
strayed over the Soviet Union. Among the factors that are
considered when evaluating whether a particular incident was
a provocation or an accident are (a) the international
political climate (Did the adversary have political and
military motives to make a deliberate provocation or
attack?) , (b) the overall pattern of military operations at
the time of the incident (Was the incident isolated or one
of several attacks?) , and (c) whether the circumstances of
15Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature
of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981), p. 287. Also see Captain W.T.T. Pakenham,
"The Command and Control of Naval Operations: Principles and
Organization," Naval Forces 7 (1/1986): 50.
On the Liberty incident, see the case study in
Chapter VIII of this study. On the U-2 incident, see Roger




of the incident indicate that it was a deliberate action
(Were appropriate combat tactics used?) . However, when
assessment of a military accident must be made in the fog of
a crisis, with possibly incomplete and erroneous information
coming in from the scene and decision makers attempting to
sort out adversary intentions under great stress, the possi-
bility of an accident being misperceived as a deliberate
provocation or attack is heightened.
U.S. and Soviet leaders have used communications with
each other to clarify whether incidents were accidents or
provocations. One tactic is to assume (at least for diplo-
matic purposes) that an isolated incident was an accident,
but warn that further such incidents would be viewed as
deliberate provocations or attacKs. Khrushchev may have
used this approach when a U.S. U-2 strayed over the Soviet
Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, warning President
Kennedy that the incident could have had serious conse-
quences. Both of the superpowers have used the "hot line"
to prevent incidents from becoming confrontations: In the
1967 Middle East War the United States informed the Soviet
Union of its military response to the attack on the Liberty ,
and in the 1973 Middle East War the Soviet Union protested
the sinking of a Soviet merchant ship during an Israeli raid
17
on a Syrian harbor. Communications between the United
17On the 1973 Middle East War incident, see the case
itudy in Chapter VII of this study.
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States and the Soviet Union, particularly over the hot line,
have thus proven valuable for sorting out accidents from
provocations (and for preventing provocations from recurring
by warning against similar "accidents" in the future)
.
Situations could arise, however, in which national leaders
or on-scene military commanders on the side that was the
victim of a military accident perceive that they do not have
time for communications with the other side before taking a
military response to an apparent deliberate attack.
An almost infinite variety of military accidents
conceivably could occur during international crises. For
descriptive purposes, the various types of military
accidents will be grouped into the following categories:
aircraft incidents, ship and submarine incidents, peacetime
weapons incidents, wartime weapons incidents, and
miscellaneous incidents. As will be seen in Chapter VII,
military accidents rarely occur in crises. Accidents that
occurred under noncrisis peacetime conditions and in limited
war situations will therefore be used to illustrate the
range of military accidents that could possibly occur during
a crisis. The reasons why military accidents are rare in
crises will be addressed in the final section of this
chapter.
Aircraft incidents are the most common type of
military accident and can be subdivided into three




crashes. U.S. military aircraft occasionally have strayed
into unfriendly airspace, provoking reactions ranging from
diplomatic protests to use of force to down the planes. The
following paragraphs will briefly describe all known inci-
19dents of this type. The first such incident after World
War II occurred on August 9, 1946, when a U.S. C-47
transport that had strayed over Yugoslavia was forced to
land. The crew and passengers of the plane were released
two weeks later.
The greatest number of incidents occurred during the
1950s. On June 8, 1951, two U.S. Air Force F-80 jet fight-
ers got lost over Germany and landed in Czechoslovakia. The
Czechs returned the planes and their pilots a month later.
18The examples of airspace violations and midair
collisions that will be presented all appear to have been
inadvertent. It is recognized, however, that both
superpowers have motives for taking these actions
deliberately: an airspace violation might be viewed as
necessary for an especially high priority reconnaissance
mission, and a minor midair collision could be used to send
a particularly strong political signal. The crashes that
will be discussed also all appear to have been accidents,
rather than caused by hostile action. It is conceivable,
however, that a deliberate downing of an aircraft could be
portrayed as an accident, at least by the Soviet Union.
19This list is based on published and unclassified
sources, and therefore probably is not comprehensive. . Not
all airspace violations are reported in the press or
protested by the country whose airspace was violated.
However, any additional incidents were probably very minor
and would not affect the findings of this chapter. Excluded
from the list are deliberate U.S. airspace violations, such
as the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union conducted from
1956 to 1960, and inadvertent violations of Chinese airspace





A U.S. C-47 was forced to land in Hungary on November 19,
1951. The four-man crew was returned several months later.
Two U.S. Navy attack planes were attacked by Czech jet
fighters on March 12, 1954, close to or inside Czech air-
space. The Navy planes escaped with minor damage. There
were three incidents in 1958. On June 8 an unarmed U.S.
Army helicopter strayed over East Germany and was forced to
make an emergency landing. East Germany seized the nine
crewmen and passengers, but released them a month later. On
June 27 a U.S. Air Force C-118 cargo plane that strayed over
Soviet Armenia was fired on but managed to crash land. The
nine crewmen and passengers were released by the Soviets
twelve days later. On September 2 a U.S. Air Force C-130
transport with seventeen men aboard strayed over the Soviet
Union and was shot down. This incident increased Soviet-
American tensions because the United States believed that
the Soviets had lured the plane over their territory with
false radio navigation beacons, because the Soviets refused
to admit that they had shot down the plane (the U.S.
recorded conversations of the the Soviet fighter pilots
during the attack) , and because the Soviets refused to
return eleven of the bodies to the United States (raising
20
suspicions that the men were being held prisoner)
.
20See U.S. Department of State, Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1959 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, June 1963), pp. 994-1000; Office of the Chief of
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Incidents involving U.S. planes continued to occur in
the 1960s. U.S. U-2 reconnaissance planes inadvertently
flew over the Soviet Union twice in 1962: on August 30 and
October 27 (at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis). On
May 17, 1963, a U.S. Army helo patrolling the demilitarized
zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea strayed into North
Korean airspace and was shot down, but managed to make a
crash landing. The two-man crew was held prisoner for a
year before being released. On January 28, 1964, a U.S. Air
Force T-39 jet trainer (similar to a civilian Lear Jet) was
shot down by Soviet fighters after straying into East German
airspace, killing all three pilots aboard the plane. On
February 18, 1968, two U.S. Navy jets got lost in bad
weather and flew over North Korean territory, prompting a
21diplomatic protest.
Although the number of incidents involving U.S. air-
craft declined significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, they
Naval Operations (OP-09B91R4) , "Soviet Attacks on Western
Planes," Memorandum, July 15, 1960 (Unclassified. Opera-
tional Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC);
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "List of U.S.
Planes Involved in International Incidents," Memorandum,
n.d. (Unclassified, ca. 1965. Operational Archives, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, DC. Cited hereafter as
OPNAV, "List of U.S. Planes.").
21U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau
of Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, April 1966), pp. 744-45; "U.S. Concedes Air Viola-




continued to occur. On July 14, 1977, an unarmed U.S. Army
CH-47 transport helicopter strayed north over the DM2 into
North Korean airspace and was shot down. Navy jets were
again the culprits on April 4, 1983, when six of them
accidently overflew Scviet-occupied Zeleny Island in the
Kurile chain north of Japan. The Soviets responded by
placing their air defense forces in the Far East on alert,
filing a diplomatic protest, and overflying the Aleutians
with long-range reconnaissance bombers. On April 20, 1984,
a U.S. Army AH-1S helicopter on a routine patrol of the West
German border strayed over Czechoslovakia and was fired on
by Czech jets, but was able to return safely to West
22Germany.
In summary, U.S. planes or helos were shot down in
three of the fifteen incidents {with a loss of twenty-three
lives) ; planes or helos were either forced to land or crash-
landed after being shot down, and their crews seized in six
22Seymour M. Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed (New York:
Random House, 1986), pp. 17-19; "Germans Say U.S. Copter Was
Over Czechoslovakia," Washington Post , April 22, 1984, p.
A17; HArmy Concedes Copter Crossed Czech Frontier," New York
Times , April 27, 1984, p. 8; "Pentagon Says Its Copter
Violated Czech Airspace," Washington Post , April 27, 1984,
p. A32. One other incident illustrates the many ways in
which such incidents can occur. On July 28, 1966, the pilot
of a U.S. U-2 apparently passed out while flying south over
the Caribbean from Shreveport, Louisiana. The U-2 continued
southward on autopilot until it ran out of fuel and crashed
in Bolivia, after flying over Panama, Columbia, Peru and
Brazil. See "U-2 Misses Florida Turn, flies to Panama,
Vanishes," New York Times , July 29, 1966, p. 1; "Wreckage in




of the incidents; and planes or helos were able to escape
unharmed or with minor damage in the remaining six
incidents. Twelve of the incidents occurred between 1946
and 1968— the period of Soviet-American cold war tensions.
Only three incidents occurred after the advent of detente in
the early 1970s. As for geographic distribution, seven of
the incidents occurred in the airspace of Eastern European
countries, five occurred in Soviet airspace, and three
occurred in North Korean airspace. U.S. Air Force planes
were involved in eight of the incidents (this includes the
two U-2 incidents), U.S. Army helos were involved in four
incidents, and U.S. Navy planes were involved in three
incidents. Two of the incidents (September 2, 1958, and
April 4, 1983) significantly increased Soviet-American
tensions, though without provoking crises.
Only one of the incidents occurred during a Soviet-
American crisis: the U-2 that strayed over the Soviet Union
on October 27, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Soviet Premier Khrushchev warned that the incident could
have been viewed as prelude to an American attack. These
findings suggest that inadvertent violations of hostile
airspace by U.S. aircraft are not a particularly great
threat to crisis management, although they can exacerbate
tensions. As a hypothetical example, if the U.S. Army
helicopter that strayed over Czechoslovakia on April 20,
1984, had done so during the 1968 during the Soviet
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invasion, tensions on the Czech-West German border could
have risen considerably.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact military aircraft have
frequently violated NATO airspace in Western Europe since
the 1950s. In a sensational case, a Bulgarian Mig-17
photographic reconnaissance jet crashed in northern Italy on
January 20, 1962. The pilot requested political asylum,
claiming that he had flown to Italy in order to defect; the
Bulgarian Government claimed the pilot had gotten lost and
attempted to land in Italy; the Italian Defense Ministry
suspected the plane was attempting to photograph a nearby
NATO medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) base. On July
14, 1966, an armed Soviet helo entered West German airspace
and forced an unarmed U.S. Army helo to land. The Soviet
helo was driven off when a West German border patrol fired
flares at it. The Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces Europe
(USCINCEUR) protested the incident to the Commander of the
Group of Soviet Forces Germany. Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs Michael Burch stated in an April
26, 1984, Pentagon press conference that Warsaw Pact planes
often violate the airspace of NATO nations, but that the
normal Western response was simply to file diplomatic
23protests.
23
"Photo MIG Down Near NATO Base," New York Times ,
January 21, 1962, p. 1; "Military in Italy Are Sure MIG
Pilot Was Spy," New York Times , January 23, 1962, p. 7;
"Soviet Accused in Copter Crash," New York Times , July 16,
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In contrast to Soviet violations of Western European
airspace, Soviet aircraft have only occasionally violated
U.S. airspace. On March 15, 1963, two Soviet Tu-95 Bear
reconnaissance bombers violated U.S. airspace over Alaska.
U.S. Air Force fighters were scrambled but did not fire on
the planes, and the U.S. Government filed a diplomatic
protest of the incident. However, Soviet violations of U.S.
airspace have been rare since the 1960s. On April 5, 1983,
two Soviet Tu-95 reconnaissance bombers entered U.S.
airspace over the Aleutian Islands, but Soviet planes
24
normally avoid U.S. airspace.
On the other hand, U.S. fighters also frequently
intercept and escort Soviet reconnaissance aircraft entering
the U.S. air defense identification zone (AOIZ) , which
extends hundreds of miles beyond U.S. airspace. Although
Soviet aircraft that only enter the U.S. ADIZ are not
committing an airspace violation per se , the United States
1966; "Army Concedes Copter Crossed Czech Frontier," New
York Times . April 27, 1984, p. 8. Soviet reconnaissance
planes also frequently violate Japanese air.space. On
December 9, 1987, for the first time since the end of World
war II, Japanese interceptors fired warning shots at a
Soviet plane that had entered Japanese airspace. The Soviet
Union apologized for the incident. See "Japanese Jet Warns
Soviet Plane," New York Times , December 10, 1987, p. 6;
"Japan Given Apology by Soviet," New York Times , December
11, 1987, p. A18.
24U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau
of Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments. 1963 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 563-64; Hersh, p. 18.
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(like many nations, including the Soviet Union) requires
prior notification of aircraft entering its ADIZ— a simple,
routine procedure normally accomplished by filing a standard
flight plan (commercial aircraft) or ADIZ request (military
aircraft). U.S. Air Force officials stated in 1983, for
example, that fighters scrambled about 1,750 times a year to
identify commercial and private planes that inadvertently
entered the U.S. ADIZ without prior notification. Soviet
military aircraft, not unexpectedly, do not comply with U.S.
ADIZ procedures, hence are routinely intercepted when they
25
enter the U.S. ADIZ. There are no reported instances of
Soviet aircraft violating the U.S. ADIZ or airspace during a
crisis and exacerbating Soviet-American tensions, but the
possibility of this happening cannot be discounted entirely.
Midair collisions are infrequent, but happen often
enough to warrant attention. At least three such incidents
have occurred between Soviet and U.S. or NATO planes since
1970. On March 31, 1970, a U.S. Navy F-4 jet fighter from
USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42) "brushed" a Soviet Tu-16
Badger reconnaissance bomber over the Mediterranean Sea,
causing minor damage to both. In an almost identical
25See "U.S. Routinely Turns Back Soviet Planes Testing
Defense Zone," Washington Post , September 3, 1983, p. A28;
"U.S. Fighters Track Soviet Bombers," Washington Post ,
September 23, 1985, p. A16; "Soviet Planes Intercepted,"
Washington Post , September 12, 1986, p. A4; "U.S. Fighter
Jets Turn Back Soviet Spy Plane Off Alaska," Washington
Post , September 22, 1987, p. A4.
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incident in October 1973, a U.S. Navy F-4 jet fighter from
USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67) collided with a Soviet Tu-16
Badger reconnaissance bomber over the Norwegian Sea. On
September 13, 1987, a Soviet Su-27 jet fighter struck a
Norwegian P-3 patrol plane over the Barents Sea, causing the
Norwegian plane to lose an engine. In all three incidents
26both planes involved in the collision landed safely.
Ample opportunities for midair collisions arise because U.S.
and Soviet reconnaissance planes and interceptors frequently
meet in international airspace. In a crisis, a midair
collision could well be viewed as a signal of hostile
intent, a coercive threat, or an attempt to intimidate.
Even worse, if one of the aircraft involved in a midair
collision crashed, the side that lost it might think that
its plane had been shot down by the other side.
The United States and the Soviet Union have observed
each other's aircraft crash in accidents on several
occasions over the past forty years. For example, on May
25, 1968, a Soviet Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance bomber
crashed in the Norwegian Sea while conducting low altitude
surveillance of the USS Essex (CVS 9) ASW carrier group.
U.S. Navy helicopters searched for survivors (there were
26
"Naval and Maritime Events January 1970-June 1970,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 97 (May 1971): 66; Vice
Admiral Joe P. Moorer, Commander of the Kennedy carrier task
group in October 1973, letter to author, April 18, 1988;
"Soviet Jet Fighter Brushes Norwegian Patrol Plane," New
York Times . September 14, 1987, p. 15.
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none) and a U.S. destroyer notified a Soviet destroyer of
the crash. A Department of Defense spokesman was quick to
•tate that U.S. ships and planes M in no way interfered with,
hampered, or threatened the Soviet aircraft at any time or
27in any way prior to the crash." It appears that in this
case and the other cases both sides recognized that the
crashes were accidents— at least no public accusations were
made that the other side had caused the crash. In a crisis,
however, the side that lost a plane in a crash at sea might
think that its plane had been shot down by the other side,
exacerbating tensions.
Although this study does not address civil aircraft
incidents per se , they could exacerbate tensions in a
crisis. Civil aircraft have also strayed over hostile
airspace and been forced to land or shot down. A partial
list of some of the more sensational civilian aircraft
incidents shows that they occur often enough to warrant
concern: On April 5, 1948 (before the Berlin Crisis erupted
in June) , a British airliner crashed in Berlin after a
midair collision with a Soviet fighter. On April 29, 1952,
Soviet fighters fired on an Air France airliner over East
Germany. On July 23, 1954, Chinese fighters shot down a
British Cathay Pacific airliner over the Pacific. On July
27, 1955, Bulgarian fighters shot down an Israeli El Al
11
"Soviet Bomber Falls After Pass Near U.S. Carrier,"
New York Times . May 26, 1968, p. 4.
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•irliner over Bulgaria. On February 21, 1973, Israeli fight-
ers shot down a Libyan airliner over the Israeli-occupied
Sinai Peninsula. On April 20, 1978, Soviet fighters fired
on a Korean Air Lines airliner over the Kola Peninsula,
forcing it to crash land. Incidents involving civilian
airliners are not considered to be tactical-level military
interaction for the purposes of this study, but they can
have political effects similar to those of inadvertent
military incidents.
Two sensational civil aircraft incidents—each
involving one of the superpowers—have occurred in recent
years. The first incident occurred on September 1, 1983,
when the Soviet Union shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007
after it strayed over the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin
Island. The Soviets tried to justify shooting down the
South Korean plane by claiming that it had been on an
intelligence mission for the United States, and by claiming
28that they had identified it as a U.S. intelligence plane.
The second incident occurred on July 3, 1988, when the
U.S. guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes (CG 49) shot down
Iran Air Flight 655 over the Strait of Hormuz. At the time
of the incident Vincennes and another U.S. ship were engaged
in a gun battle with Iranian small craft that had attacked a
28 See Alexander Dallin, Black Box: KAL 007 and the
Superpowers (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985), pp. 7-15; Hersh, pp. 131-132, 158, 163-165, 171.
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Norwegian ship and fired on a U.S. Navy helo. Vincennes
sent repeated warnings over international radio channels for
the plane to identify itself and state its intentions, all
of which were missed or ignored by the Iranian airliner as
it flew toward the U.S. warship. Vincennes misidentif ied
the plane as an Iranian Air Force F-14 jet fighter and shot
it down. It is clear from statements made by Admiral
William J. Crowe, Jr., and other senior naval officers that
the Commanding Officer of the Vincennes had complied with
the rules of engagement issued to U.S. forces operating in
the Persian Gulf. A Navy inquiry blamed the incident on an
29identification error on the part of radar operators.
The Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and Iran Air Flight
655 incidents occurred under much different tactical
circumstances—the Korean plane was shot down in peacetime;
the Iranian plane was shot down in the midst of a battle.
But for this very reason the two incidents illustrate how
civilian aircraft, by being misidentif ied as military
aircraft or viewed as on a military mission despite civilian
markings, could inadvertently become the target of military
action and exacerbate a crisis.
29
"U.S. Downs Iran Airliner Mistaken for F-14," New
York Times , July 4, 1988, p. 1; "Statement by Joint Chiefs
Head," New York Times , July 4, 1988, p. 4; "U.S. Pushes
Inquiry on Downing of Jet," New York Times , July 5, 1988, p.
Al; "Senators Assert Warship Captain Reacted Properly," New
York Times , July 7, 1988, p. Al; "Errors by a Tense U.S.
Crew Led to Downing of Iran Jet, Inquiry is Reported to
Find," New York Times , July 11, 1988, p. 1.
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A wide variety of incidents involving naval ships and
submarines can occur on the high seas. Many, perhaps most,
incidents are accidents, but others, particularly incidents
between Soviet and American naval vessels, are deliberate.
This discussion will be limited to accidents, primarily
collisions, involving naval ships and submarines. Deliber-
ate incidents will be discussed later, in the section on
incidents at sea. There will be some overlap in the two
discussions because collisions can be deliberate and in some
instances it is not clear if the collisions were deliberate
or accidental. Furthermore, accidental collisions can occur
during deliberate harassment. The focus of this discussion
will be on apparent accidental collisions.
Soviet violations of the nautical rules of the road
and near collisions with U.S. naval vessels became a serious
problem in 1960. Prior to then the Soviet Navy had been
very small and limited its operations to coastal waters and
adjacent seas. One of first near collisions occurred on
April 26, 1960, when the Soviet intelligence collection ship
The term "incidents at sea" is used by the U.S. Navy
to cover all incidents, whether accidental or deliberate,
involving U.S. and Soviet naval vessels and aircraft. The
Navy term is used in this study in order to provide an
indication of the types of Soviet behavior to which U.S.
Navy commanders object. This is important because, as will
be seen in Chapter VII, in past crises U.S. civilian
authorities have not shown an awareness of what exactly is
going on at sea when they order naval forces to the scene of
a crisis, and have not understood the dangers that can arise
from deliberate Soviet harassment.
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(AGI) Vega nearly collided with the U.S. Navy tug USS Nipmuc
(ATF 157) while monitoring submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) test launches off the coast of Long Island.
This is a good example of an accidental collision nearly
resulting from deliberate behavior— in this case an
extremely aggressive intelligence collection effort. The
United States responded to this and several similar
incidents over the next twelve years with numerous
diplomatic protests, all of which were rejected by the
31Soviet Union.
The first actual collision between Soviet and American
naval vessels occurred on June 24, 1966, when the Soviet AGI
Anemometer collided with the intelligence collection ship
USS Banner (AGER 1) in the Sea of Japan. Almost a year
later the second and third collisions occurred, also in the
Sea of Japan. On May 10, 1967, the destroyer USS Walker (DD
517) , which was participating in an anti-submarine warfare
exercise, was struck by a Soviet destroyer that had been
31U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau
of Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 669-74; "U.S. Tells Soviet It Imperils
Ships, * New York Times , April 4, 1965, p. 1; "U.S. Protests
Harassment of Ships by Soviets; Rejects Soviet Charges,"
Department of State Bulletin 52 (May 3, 1965): 655-58; Naval
Historical Center, "Post-1 JAN 1960 Incidents," Memorandum,
n.d. (Unclassified, ca. April 1965. Post-World War II
Special Lists File, Operational Archives, Naval Historical
Center, Washington, DC. Cited hereafter as "Post-1 JAN 1960
Incidents."). Incidents not otherwise footnoted were found
in Jack Sweetman, American Naval History: An Illustrated
Chronology (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984).
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harassing the U.S. ships. The collision caused only minor
damage to the two destroyers. The next day, May 11, a
second Soviet destroyer collided with the Walker , again with
only minor damage to both ships. The United States promptly
delivered strongly-worded diplomatic protests after each
incident. The Soviet Union, however, blamed the collisions
on U.S. "provocative maneuvers" in the Sea of Japan.
Although some U.S. officials speculated that the two
collisions had been deliberate, perhaps as a political
signal of Soviet displeasure with U.S. involvement in the
Vietnam War, the Captain of the Walker stated that the
32
collisions appeared to have been accidental.
The third and final collision that occurred prior to
signing of the Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972 was
between the U.S. destroyer USS Hanson (DD 832) and the
Soviet tug Diomede in the Korean Strait on May 5, 1971.
This minor collision, which was caused by the Soviet tug
violating the nautical rules of the road, did not have
serious repercussions for Soviet-American relations.
32
"A U.S. Destroyer In Far East Bumped By Soviet War-
ship," New York Times , May 11, 1967, p. 1; "A Soviet Warship
Bumps U.S. Vessel 2d Time in 2 Days," New York Times, May
12, 1967, p. 1; "U.S. Plays Down Sea Harassment by
Russians," New York Times , May 13, 1967, p. 11; "U.S. Says
Incident With Soviet Ships Is a 'Closed* Issue," New York
Times . May 14, 1967, p. 1; "U.S. Skipper Views Bumpings as
Error, But Criticizes Soviet," New York Times , May 18, 1967,
p. 1; U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau of
Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1967 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1969) , pp. 456-59.
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All three of the collisions that occurred from 1966 to
1971 appear to have been accidents, The cause in each case
was Soviet violations of the nautical rules of the road and
dangerous maneuvers close to U.S. naval vessels. The Banner
and Walker incidents were probably cases of accidental
collisions during deliberate harassment. The fact that some
U.S. officials perceived the Walker incident as deliberate
harassment for purposes of political signalling illustrates
the potential political impact of accidents at sea.
Although the number of incidents between U.S. and
Soviet naval vessels declined significantly after the
Incidents at Sea Agreement was signed in 1912, collisions
have not been entirely eliminated. In fact, there have been
as many accidental collisions since the agreement was signed
as there had been before the agreement. On August 28, 1976,
a Soviet Echo II nuclear-powered guided missile submarine
(SSGN) collided with the frigate USS Voge (FF 1047) in the
Mediterranean Sea. The collision was caused by the Soviet
submarine, which had been surfaced and on a parallel course
with Voge , suddenly turning into the U.S. ship's port side.
Voge suffered serious damage to her propeller and had to be
towed into port for repairs? the Soviet submarine was
damaged but left the scene under its own power. On November
17, 1983, the Soviet Krivak I-class frigate Razyashchey ,
which had been shadowing the USS Ranger (CV 61) carrier
group, collided with the destroyer USS Fife (DD 991) in the
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Arabian Sea. Although the Soviet ship caused the collision
by violating the rules of the road, Fife had been
maneuvering to prevent Razyashchey from approaching too
close to Ranger— a tactic aptly described by the Navy as
"shouldering. " The collision caused only very minor damage
to the two ships. The United States filed an Incidents at
Sea Agreement protest over the incident. On March 21, 1984,
the carrier USS Kittyhawk (CV 63) collided with a Soviet
Victor-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) in the
Sea of Japan. The collision, which occurred at night,
apparently was caused by the Soviet submarine surfacing
directly ahead of the carrier at short range. Kittyhawk
suffered minor damage, but the Soviet submarine was forced
to remain surfaced and was escorted back to port on the
surface—an indication of serious damage.
33
"Soviet Sub and U.S. Frigate Damaged in Crash, " New
York Times , August 31, 1976, p. 3; "Soviet Frigate Collides
With U.S. Destroyer," Washington Post , November 18, 1983, p.
Al; "U.S. and Soviet Ships Collide; Navy Says Accident Is
Minor," New York Times , November 18, 1983, p. 4; "Soviet Sub
Bumps Into U.S. Carrier," Washington Post , March 22, 1984,
p. Al; "Soviet Sub and U.S. Ship Collide," New York Times ,
March 22, 1984, p. 3. In addition to these three accidental
collisions, there have two two instances of deliberate
Soviet collisions with U.S. ships since 1972 (described in
the section of this chapter on incidents at sea) . Soviet
naval vessels have also collided with the ships of other
Western navies. On November 9, 1970, a Soviet Kotlin-class
destroyer that had been harassing the British aircraft
carrier Ark Royal and her escorts in the eastern
Mediterranean struck the side of the carrier after a
dangerous maneuver across the carrier's bow. The Soviet
destroyer suffered serious damage and lost two men overboard
(they apparently died) . See "Soviet and British Warships
Collide," New York Times , November 11, 1970, p. 2.
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There are two differences between the pattern of
accidental collisions prior to the Incidents at Sea
Agreement and the pattern since the agreement was signed.
First, whereas before the agreement two of three collisions
occurred during deliberate Soviet harassment of U.S. naval
vessels, after the agreement only one of three collisions
(the Fife incident) occurred during Soviet harassment.
Second, whereas there were no collisions between ships and
submarines before the agreement, there were two such colli-
sions after the agreement. Both of the ship-submarine
collisions apparently were caused by poor seamanship on the
part of Soviet submarine captains. The overall trend—based
on a very small number of cases—appears to be greater
Soviet Navy caution in surveillance of U.S. Navy ships (less
dangerous maneuvering at close quarters) , but more aggres-
sive Soviet use of submarines for close surveillance
(resulting in more ship-submarine incidents). Additionally,
there is an important continuity: the Incidents, at Sea
Agreement has not significantly reduced the frequency of
34
accidental collisions. Despite the agreement's merits, it
has not been sufficient to prevent accidental collisions.
34A statistical analysis tells us little because of
the small number of cases. Using the overall period in
which serious threat of collisions existed (1960-1987)
yields the following frequency of collisions: one every four
years prior to the Incidents at Sea Agreement (1960-1972)
,
and one every five years since the agreement (1972-1987). A
single accidental collision in 1988 would lower the post-
agreement rate to equal the pre-agreement rate.
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There have been several unconfirmed reports of under-
sea collisions between U.S. and Soviet submarines: in late
1969 involving USS Gato (SSN 615), on March 31, 1971
involving an unidentified U.S. SSN, in May 1974 involving
USS Pintado (SSN 672) , in November 1974 involving USS James
Madison (SSBN 627), and in 1986 USS Augusta (SSN 710).
Allegations of additional undersea submarine collisions have
35
also been made. Although none of these incidents can be
confirmed, they suggest an addition type of naval incident
that could complicate crisis management efforts. Neither
the international nautical rules of the road nor the Soviet-
American Incidents at Sea Agreement govern the behavior of
submarines while submerged (surfaced submarines are clearly
governed by the rules of the road and must remain clear of
other vessels) . Interactions between U.S. and Soviet
submarines while submerged are thus regulated only by
policies established by their respective navies, and by the
caution and prudence of their commanding officers.
Accidental collisions, although infrequent, remain a
concern from a crisis management perspective because they
can increase tensions and be misperceived as deliberate
35
•*U,S. and Soviet Submarines Are Said to Have Col-
lided," New York Times , January 2, 1975, p. 16; "Submarines
of U.S. Stage Spy Missions Inside Soviet Waters," New York
Times , May 25, 1975, p. 42; "Collision of U.S. and Soviet
Subs Off Siberia in 1974 Is Recounted," New York Times , July
4, 1975, p. 21; "A False Navy Report Alleged in Sub Crash,"
New York Times . July 6, 1975, p. 1; "U.S., Soviet Subs Appar-
ently Collided," Washington Post , March 2, 1987, p. A12.
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provocations. The very fact that accidental collisions are
relatively rare would make one occurring during a future
crisis automatically suspect, particularly if the ship that
is the victim of the collision suffered much greater damage
than the ship that caused the collision. If a U.S. destroy-
er had collided with a Soviet submarine at the height of the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (Say, on October 27), severely
damaging or sinking the submarine. President Kennedy prob-
ably would have had difficulty convincing Khrushchev that
the incident was an accident. Khrushchev might well have
viewed the collision as deliberate U.S. retaliation for the
shooting down of an American U-2 that same day. Such a
hypothetical incident might not have prevented resolution of
the crisis short of war the next day (October 28) , but
certainly would not have made that resolution any easier.
Collisions also occur between naval ships or
submarines and civilian vessels. On February 1, 1968, the
U.S. destroyer USS Rowan (DD 782) collided with the soviet
merchant ship Kapitan Vislobokov in the Sea of Japan. At
the time, the U.S. Navy was conducting high- tempo operations
in the Sea of Japan in the wake of the North Korean seizure
of the USS Pueblo (AGER 2). On April 9, 1981, the U.S.
submarine USS George Washington (SSBN 598) collided with the
Japanese merchant ship Nissho Maru in the East China Sea,
sinking the ship and killing two of its crewmen. This was
one of at least eight collisions between U.S. submarines and
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civilian merchant ships from 1965 to 1982, but the only one
in which the merchant ship was sunk. Of the eight colli-
sions, four involved SSBNs, two involved SSNs, and two
involved conventional attack submarines (SS) . None of the
U.S. submarines was seriously damaged. No Soviet merchant
ships were involved in any of the collisions with U.S.
submarines (the ships were of Norwegian, Lebanese, West
German, Philippine, Japanese, Turkish, and U.S. registry).
Submarines belonging to the Soviet Union and other
countries have also collided with civilian vessels. On
September 21, 1984, a Soviet Victor-class SSN collided with
a Soviet merchant ship in the Strait of Gibralter, seriously
damaging the submarine and apparently sinking the merchant
ship. On at least two occasions Western submarines have
collided with Soviet Bloc merchant ships: on September 1,
1976, a Turkish submarine collided with a Soviet freighter,
and on January 21, 1983, a West German submarine collided
On the Rowan incident, see "Soviet and U.S. Ships
Collide, H New York Times , February 3, 1964, p. 4. On the
submarine-ship collisions, see "A-Powered Sub Damaged, Hit
By Turkish Ship," Washington Post , March 24, 1982, p. A12;
"Naval and Maritime Events 1981," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 108 (May 1982): 62; "Naval and Maritime Events,
1 July 1968-31 December 1969, M U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 96 (May 1970): 52; "Sub in Collision Off Spain,"
New York Times , August 10, 1968, p. 27; "U.S. Nuclear
Submarine and Freighter Collide," New York Times , January
11, 1965, p. 41; "U.S. Submarine Collides With Freighter Off
China," New York Times , August 12, 1965, p. 54. The author
was told by a retired senior naval officer that there was a
collision between a U.S. submarine and a Soviet merchant




with an East German passenger liner. Thus, consideration
of maritime accidents that could affect international crises
must include the possibility of collisions between
submarines and merchant ships.
During a crisis, an accident involving a naval vessel
of one side and a civilian merchant ship of the other side
could be viewed as a deliberate provocation in two
situations: First, if the naval vessel sank and the cause
was not immediately known, the side that lost the ship could
well suspect hostile action by the adversary. Second, if
the merchant ship was sunk or seriously damaged, and had
been carrying military supplies or other critical materials
to an ally directly involved in fighting, the side that
owned the ship could well suspect that the collision was a
deliberate attempt to prevent delivery of its cargo.
37
"Soviet Sub, Merchant Ship Collide, Damaging Both in
Gibralter Strait," Washington Post , September 22, 1984, p.
A16; Jane's Defense Weekly , October 20, 1984, p. 667;
"Soviet Ship in Collision," New York Time s, September 2,
1976, p. 16; "Ship that Hit Andrea Doria is Hit," New York
Tiroes , January 22, 1983, p. 2. There have also been two
reported instances of Soviet submarines colliding with
Soviet surface combatants on the high seas. See "Damaged
Submarine Is Sighted in the Caribbean," New York Times ,
September 6, 1973, p. 74; "Soviet Sub Damaged in the
Mediterranean," New York Times , February 4, 1970, p. 8.
37Destroyers and frigates are relatively small vessels
that can be seriously damaged by large merchant vessels.
For example, on June 6, 1971, the Soviet tanker Busharov
collided with the French frigate Surcouf in the Mediter-
ranean. The frigate's bow was sheared off and sank, nine of
her crewmen were killed, and what was left of the ship had
to be towed into port. See "9 Lost as Soviet Tanker Hits a
French Warship," New York Times , June 7, 1971, p. 6.
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Peacetime weapons accidents occur primarily during
training exercises and maintenance or testing of weapons
systems. Weapons accidents can also be a collateral result
of other emergencies, such as an aircraft jettisoning
ordnance to lower its weight after losing power or a ship
jettisoning ordnance threatened by a fire. Jettisoned
weapons normally do not cause as much damage as deliberately
launched weapons, but can still cause substantial damage to
ships or aircraft. Three types of peacetime weapons
incidents will be discussed: tactical missile accidents,
naval gunfire accidents, and torpedo accidents.
Tactical missiles are particularly accident-prone, and
on several occasions have been accidently launched or have
gone astray after being deliberately launched. Air-to-air
missiles, probably the least dangerous due to their
relatively short range, have been involved in several
accidents: On May 27, 1974, a U.S. Navy A-7 shot down a
Navy A-4 off the coast of Florida; on July 22, 1974, a Navy
p-4 shot down a Navy helicopter off the Philippines; and on
September 22, 1987, a Navy F-14 accidently shot down an Air
38Force F-4 during an exercise in the Mediterranean. On at
38
"Naval and Maritime Events, January 1974-June 1974,
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 101 (May 1975): 61; "Naval
and Maritime Events, July 1974-December 1974," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 101 (May 197 5) : 141; "Navy F14 Downs
Air Force Jet During Exercise," Washington Post , September
23, 1987, p. A4. The September 22, 1987, incident was
caused by an inexperienced pilot mistaking an order to
conduct a simulated attack as an order to conduct a real
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least two occasions stray air-to-air missiles have struck
•hips: On August 12, 1968, a Navy missile hit a civilian
oil survey Vessel off the coast of California, setting it
afire and injuring three crewmen; and on July 29, 1986, a
civilian tanker was hit by a Navy missile off the coast of
Virginia, causing a small fire but no injuries. On another
occasion a Navy Bulpup air-to-surface missile accidently hit
a Navy rescue craft off the coast of California, sinking the
39
vessel but miraculously not injuring any of the crew.
Anti-ship cruise missiles have also been involved in
accidents. On July 14, 1981, the U.S. Navy guided missile
destroyer USS Coontz (DDG 40) accidently launched a Harpoon
missile in the Caribbean Sea during routine system testing.
The missile crashed into the sea at the end of its flight
without striking anything. On December 28, 1984, an unarmed
Soviet SS-N-3 missile launched during an exercise in the
Barents Sea went astray, flew over northern Norway, and
attack. See MA War Game That Turned Real," San Jose Mercury
News , April 11, 1988, p. 1A. This is significant because
the Soviet Navy frequently conducts simulated attacks on
U.S. Navy ships, and did so even at the height of Soviet-
American tensions during the 1973 Middle East War (See
Chapter VII). During an acute crisis, an anti-ship missile
mistakenly launched at a U.S. Navy ship by an inexperienced
Soviet pilot could easily be misperceived as a deliberate
attack and provoke a sea battle, particularly if other
Soviet units were simulating attacks at the same time.
39
"Naval and Maritime Events, 1 July 1968-31 December
1969, w U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 96 (May 1970): 28;
"Navy Missile Damages Tanker Off Norfolk," Washington Post ,
July 30, 1986, p. A10; "Navy Ship Sunk by Errant Missile,"
New York Times , February 7, 1968, p. 34.
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crashed in Finland. The Soviet Government apologized for
40
the incident. Accidents with tactical missiles have the
potential to cause an incident because both the United
States and the Soviet Union (and their allies) routinely
monitor the other side's naval exercises with ships and
aircraft. Although greater caution is shown during crises,
the possibility of an incident with a tactical missile
cannot be eliminated.
Strategic nuclear missiles—intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) , submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) , and long-range land-attack cruise missiles—are the
safest of all missiles because of their greater safeguards
against accidental launch, but are not immune to accidents.
On May 9, 1973, a U.S. Navy Poseidon SLBM went out of
control during a test flight and crashed in the Atlantic
40
"Naval and Maritime Events, 1982," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 108 (May 1982): 87; "Soviet Cruise
Missile Said to Stray Across Norway and Into Finland," New
York Times , January 3, 1985, p. 1; "Norway and Finland
Report Moscow Apology on Missile," New York Times , January
5, 1985, p. 4. The U.S. Harpoon missile carries only a
conventional warhead; the Soviet SS-N-3 missile can carry
either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. Lest it appear
that such accidents are exclusively a Navy domain, two other
incidents should be mentioned: On January 4, 1967, an
unarmed U.S. Air Force Mace land attack cruise missile being
used as a target drone went astray, flew over Cuba, and
crashed in the Caribbean; and on September 12, 1967, an
unarmed U.S. Army Pershing tactical ballistic missile went
off course during a test flight and crashed in Mexico. See
"U.S. Target Missile Strays Over the Tip of Cuba," New York
Times , January 5, 1967, p. 19; "Unarmed Pershing Missile
Strays Into Mexico," New York Times , September 13, 1967, p.
24. Operational versions of the Mace and Pershing missiles
were armed with nuclear warheads.
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near the Soviet AGI Zakarpatye . One of the more spectacular
strategic missile incidents occurred on September 11, 1986,
when a Soviet SS-N-8 SLBM on a routine test flight crashed
in a remote area of northeastern China. Although an
accident involving an operational strategic nuclear missile
could have catastrophic consequences during an international
crisis, the probability of such an incident appears to be
extremely low due to the safeguards against accidental or
unauthorized launch of strategic missiles. Additionally, an
accident during a strategic missile test flight probably
would not be misperceived as a deliberate attack because the
superpowers carefully monitor each other's test flights.
The remaining types of peacetime weapons accidents
—
naval gunfire accidents and torpedo accidents—rarely have
consequences as serious as tactical missile accidents, but
could still exacerbate tensions in a crisis. On March 8,
1963, and February 5, 1979, shells fired by U.S. Navy ships
during training exercises fell in the vicinity of Soviet
vessels that were near or inside publicly announced training
42
areas. A Soviet Navy Foxtrot-class submarine being towed
41
"Naval and Maritime Events, January 1973-June 1973,
"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 100 (May 1974): 58; "A
Soviet Missile Is Said to Misfire and Hit China," New York
Times , September 16, 1986, p. 1.
42
U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau
of Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1963 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 563-63; "Naval and Maritime Events,
1979," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 100 (May 1980): 50.
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to Cuba was involved in the second incident. Torpedo
accidents normally occur during exercises and testing: On
April 23, 1958, the destroyer USS Yarnall (DD 541) was
struck by a torpedo fired during an exercise, and on
December 19, 1983, the frigate USS Jack Williams (FFG 24)
accidently launched a torpedo that landed on the pier next
to the ship but did not explode. A more dangerous incident
occurred on October 7, 1973, when a Soviet Kanin-class
destroyer that had been shadowing a British aircraft carrier
launched a torpedo in the midst of a NATO naval exercise.
The Soviet destroyer had experienced an explosion and
apparently jettisoned the torpedo to prevent it from being
43
engulfed in the ensuing fire. Although it was clear in
this case that the torpedo launch was not a deliberate
hostile act, a naval gunfire or torpedo incident at the
height of a crisis could well be misperceived as an act of
war
—
particularly if the shells or torpedo struck a warship
belonging to the other side.
Once shooting starts, the probability of serious
accidents greatly increases. Aircraft can easily stray over
national borders into hostile airspace from which they had
43
"Destroyer Docks for Repairs," New York Times , April
24, 1958, p. 27; "U.S. Navy Ship sights Pier, Torpedoes
Same," Washington Post , December 20, 1983, p. A3; "Naval and
Maritime Events, July 1973-December 1973," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 100 (May 1974) : 295; "Soviet Ship
Fires Torpedo During NATO Exercise," The Times (London),
October 8, 1973, p. 1.
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been excluded. During the Korean War U.S. planes were
forbidden from flying over Chinese or Soviet territory, but
occasionally strayed over both countries. On at least two
occasions U.S. planes accidently attacked targets in China.
The most serious incident occurred on October 8, 1950, when
two U.S. Air Force F-80 jet fighters strayed over the border
44
and strafed a Soviet airfield. U.S. planes inadvertently
entered Chinese airspace on several occasions during the
Vietnam War and China publicly protested hundreds of alleged
violations. There were no reported instances of U.S. planes
attacking ground targets in China, but at least eight U.S.
planes were shot down and one U.S. pilot captured by the
45Chinese. Incidents similar to those that occurred in the
Korean War and Vietnam War are to be expected when-ever
sustained air combat operations are conducted close to
international boundaries.
Inadvertent or indiscriminate attacks on naval vessels
and civilian merchant ships also occur occasionally in
44Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force In
Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961),
pp. 142, 208-11, 453, 567.
45
"Chinese Reds Say Fighters Downed U.S. Attack
Plane," New York Times , April 13, 1966, p. 1; "China Charges
Intrusion By U.S. Ship and Planes," New York Times , Sep-
tember 26, 1966, p. 2; "U.S. Says Plane Flew Over Hainan
Accidently," New York Times , February 10, 1967, p. 2; "2
U.S. Navy Jets Downed in China; One Pilot Seized," New York
Times , August 22, 1967, p. 1; "Unarmed Navy Plane Downed by
a Chinese Communist MIG," New York Times , February 15, 1968,




limited war situations. Two serious cases of U.S. planes
attacking U.S. and allied naval vessels occurred during the
Vietnam War. On the nights of June 16-17, 1968, U.S. Air
Force fighters attacked radar targets that they believed
were low-flying North Vietnamese aircraft or helicopters
over South Vietnam. The Air Force planes actually fired on
U.S. and Australian Navy ships off the coast of South
Vietnam, sinking a U.S. Navy gunboat (PCF 19), and damaging
the cruiser USS Boston (CAG 1), the destroyer USS Edson (DD
946), and the Australian destroyer HMAS Hobart (D 39).
Seven American and two Australian sailors died in the Air
46Force attacks. The second incident occurred on April 16,
1972, when a U.S. plane inadvertently fired a Shrike anti-
radar missile at the USS Worden (DLG 18) , seriously damaging
the ships 's antennas and superstructure and killing or
47
wounding thirty crew-men. Inadvertent attacks by U.S.
forces against other U.S. forces dramatically illustrate the
dangers inherent in limited war situations.
"Naval and Maritime Events, 1 July 1968-31 December
1969, w U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 96 (May 1970): 24;
Australian Department of Defence, Navy in Vietnam (Canberra:
Australian Government Printing Service, 1980)
, pp. 59-60;
George Odgers, The Royal Australian Navy: An Illustrated
History (Hornsby, New South Wales: Child and Henry, 1982),
p. 181; Eugene G. Windchy, Tonkin Gulf (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday and Co., 1971), p. 262.
47
"Naval and Maritime Events, January 1972-June 1972,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 99 (May 1973): 56; "'72




Soviet ships have been attacked on at least three
occasions during limited war and crisis situations. On June
2, 1967, two U.S. Air Force F-105 fighter-bombers on a raid
over North Vietnam accidently attacked the Soviet freighter
Turkestan in a North Vietnamese port. Knowing that they had
violated strict regulations against attacks on foreign
merchant ships in North Vietnamese ports, the pilots
responsible for the attack initially attempted to hide their
mistake. Consequently, the U.S. Government denied that
American planes were to blame after the Soviet Union
protested the incident. On October 17, 1969 South
Vietnamese Navy gunboats fired on a Soviet intelligence
collection ship (AGI) allegedly in South Vietnamese waters
near Danang. The Soviet vessel fled the scene trailing
49
smoke. This was a deliberate attack, rather than an
accident, but illustrates the type of unanticipated
incidents that can occur when superpower naval vessels
48
"Moscow Says U.S. Hit A Soviet Ship in Vietnam
Port," New York Times , June 3, 1967, p. 1; "U.S. Denies
Attack on Soviet Vessel in North Vietnam," New York Times ,
June 4, 1967, p. 1; "Moscow Rejects Denial of Attack," New
York Times , June 6, 1967, p. 3; "Colonel Destroyed Proof
U.S. Strafed Soviet Ship," New York Times , April 11, 1969,
p. 11; Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny: Informing the
People on National Security (New York: Harper and Row,
1970), pp. 139-52.
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Soviet Spy Ship," New York Times , October 18, 1969, p. 1;
"Thieu Confirms Attack on Soviet Ship," New York Times ,
October 19, 1969, p. 3; "Naval and Maritime Events, 1 July
1968-31 December 1969," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 96
(May 1970) : 545.
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operate near a war zone. A third incident occurred during
the 1973 Middle East War. Israeli missile boats raided the
Syrian port of Tartus the night of October 11-12, sinking
two Syrian missile boats and the Soviet freighter Ilya
Mechnikov with anti-ship missiles. Israel expressed regret
for sinking the Soviet ship and claimed that its forces had
orders not to attack civilian vessels. In a message
delivered to the U.S. on October 12, the Soviet Union pro-
tested the Israeli attack and warned the "The Soviet Union
will of course take measures which it will deem necessary to
50defend its ships and other means of transportation."
Inadvertent or indiscriminate attacks on merchant ships or
naval vessels could easily exacerbate tensions in a crisis.
The final category of military accidents is miscel-
laneous accidents. Three types of accidents in this
category will be discussed: sinkings of naval vessels other
than those caused by collisions or the adversary's weapons,
explosions at shore bases, and electromagnetic interference
incidents.
50
"Israel Is Accused in U.N. of Sinking a Soviet
Ship,* New York Times , October 13, 1973, p. 1; "3 Freighters
Sunk," New York Times , October 13, 1973, p. 1; Henry




Sinkings of naval vessels can result from causes other
than collisions or an adversary's weapons. The most common
examples are sinkings of Soviet submarines, which are
notoriously accident-prone. For example, on October 7, 1986
a Soviet Yankee-class SSBN on patrol in the Atlantic
suffered an explosion and fire in its missile compartment.
The submarine was able to surface, but sank three days later
51
while under tow. Soviet surface ships have also been sunk
in accidents. On August 19, 1970, a Soviet AGI that had
been monitoring a NATO naval exercise in the North Sea
capsized. A Soviet tug in the area rescued the crew. In
September 1974, the Soviet Kashin-class guided missile
destroyer Otvazhny exploded, burned, and sank in the Black
52Sea, with the loss of almost the entire crew. Incidents
like these could cause serious tensions during a crisis if
the Soviet ship or submarine sank without survivors and U.S.
Navy units in the area were suspected by the Soviets of
complicity in the unexplained loss of the vessel.
Major explosions at shore bases could also cause
crisis management problems. On May 13, 1984, explosions and
51Norman Friedman, "World Naval Developments," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (December 1986): 122; Jim
Bussert, "The Safety of Soviet Nuclear Submarines," Jane '
s
Defence Weekly , April 18 1987, pp. 715-720.
52
"Naval and Maritime Events, July 1970-December
1970," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 97 (May 1971): 337;
"Soviet Ship Capsizes Near Nato exercise," New York Times ,
August 20, 1970, p. 14; "Soviet Destroyer Is Reported Sunk,
New York Times , September 27, 1974, p. 7.
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fires destroyed a Soviet naval tactical missile storage site
in the Severmorsk base complex on the Kola Peninsula. Had
this disaster occurred at the height of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, possibly at the same time an American U-2 was being
pursued over Siberia, it might have triggered a Soviet per-
ception of an American attack on the Soviet Union. Rational
analysis of such an explosion would quickly lead to the
conclusion that had not been of U.S. doing: U.S. forces
would attack air defense sites and operational forces before
ordnance storage sites, and a single, isolated attack would
be highly unlikely. But in an acute crisis, with the two
sides on the brink of war and military commanders on both
sides focusing on worst-case scenarios, rational analysis
could succumb to the effects of tension and stress. Further-
more, if it is safe to assume that the probability of an
accident at an ordnance storage site is directly propor-
tional to their level of activity, and that preparations for
war during an acute crisis include delivery of ammunition to
operational forces as their readiness is increased, then the
contention can be made that an accident like this is more
likely to occur during a crisis than at any other time.
Electromagnetic interference incidents are not
uncommon, but normally do not cause serious problems and
"Soviets' Northern Fleet Disabled, 'Not Viable' for
Six Months," Jane's Defense Weekly , July 14, 1984, pp. 3-4;
Donald C. Daniel and Gael D. Tarleton, "The Soviet Navy in
1984," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 111 (May 1985): 362.
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therefore are rarely reported in the press. Electronic
warfare measures, such as jamming of radars or communica-
tions, commonly conducted for training or maintenance, have
in the past inadvertently degraded other countries' weapons
systems. Chaff, a cloud of metal particles used to confuse
radars, has on occasion drifted astray, interfering with
civilian air traffic control radars and even causing power
outages. On at least one occasion Soviet Tu-95 Bear
reconnaissance bombers operating off the east coast of the
United States used chaff to interfere with U.S. air defense
54
radars. Other common electromagnetic emissions, such as
high-powered radio and fire control radar transmissions, can
interfere with other radios and radars. Such electromag-
netic interference incidents could easily appear to be
deliberate hostile acts in an acute crisis.
In summary, military accidents are actions not ordered
or deliberately initiated at any level in the chain of
command. They are troublesome from a crisis management
perspective because decision-makers may fail to realize that
the accidents were unauthorized and perceive them as
deliberate provocations or signals of hostile intent. In
practice, however, national leaders and military commanders
attempt to distinguish accidents from deliberate provoca-
tions or attacks. Military accidents include aircraft
54
Pentagon Aides Say Soviet Planes Tried to Foil U.S
Radar, M New York Times , October 15, 1977, p. 2.
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incidents, ship and submarine incidents, peacetime weapons
incidents, wartime incidents, and other incidents. These
types of military accidents do not often occur during
crises, but happen often enough under other conditions that
they merit being a concern in crises.
Unauthorized Deliberate Actions
Unauthorized deliberate actions are ordered or
executed by tactical-level military commanders in violation
of orders issued directly by national leaders, or in
violation of operational guidance contained in mechanisms of
indirect control. One way in which an unauthorized
deliberate action can occur is for a military commander to
stretch the limits on the actions he is authorized to take
—
complying with a broad interpretation of the letter of his
orders rather than with what he knows to be the spirit of
those orders. This type of unauthorized action is
especially likely when the orders given to military forces
are vague or ambiguous, leaving ample room for an on-scene
commander to rationalize his actions. Unauthorized
deliberate actions incidents are exceedingly rare. Only a
few such incidents involving U.S. forces have occurred since
World War II, in every case during limited wars.
Not all unauthorized deliberate actions are harmful to
crisis management efforts. An on-scene military commander
with an appreciation of the political objectives being
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pursued by national leaders could well decide to ignore
orders that are inappropriate for the local situation and
pursue a course of action that better supports crisis
management efforts. Two types of unauthorized deliberate
actions can be distinguished on the basis of the military
55
commander's intentions: constructive and malicious. "
A constructive unauthorized action is taken in the
belief that actions called for in existing orders are
inappropriate under the circumstances, and that the
unauthorized action would better support the national
objectives in the crisis. Whether or not the outcome is
constructive is a different matter, and a well-intentioned
action could seriously complicate crisis management
efforts. The decision made by Commander Middle East Force
in January 1964 to disregard orders from Washington and have
USS Manley (DD 940) evacuate American citizens from Zanzibar
is an example of a constructive unauthorized action. The
mark of a constructive unauthorized action is an effort to
inform the chain of command as soon as possible of the
action taken and the reasons for taking it.
55Unauthorized deliberate actions caused by insanity
on the part of a military commander will not be addressed in
this study because there is extremely little empirical
evidence on which to assess such incidents. The author
knows of no cases, other than certain wartime battlefield
atrocities, in which insanity caused an unauthorized
deliberate action.




A malicious unauthorized deliberate action is taken
out of opposition to the objectives underlying specific
orders, disrespect for the chain of command or the method of
control being used, or frustration with particular orders
felt to be unnecessarily endangering the men performing the
mission. The mark of a malicious unauthorized action is an
effort to conceal the action from higher authority.
The most common type of malicious unauthorized action
in United States military history since World War II has
been deliberate killings of non-combatant civilians by
troops in the field, in violation of orders to avoid
civilian casualties. The most notorious example was the
March 1968 My Lai massacre. Such battlefield incidents are
a product of the stress and emotion of ground combat (which
were particularly intense in the guerrilla war fought in
Vietnam) , thus telling us little about how military comman-
ders behave in crises.
Three examples of malicious unauthorized actions will
serve to illustrate the nature of most such incidents. The
first example arose from dissatisfaction with political
constraints on the conduct of wartime air operations over
hostile territory. During the Korean War, the United States
placed strict limits on air operations near the Chinese and
Soviet borders with North Korea in order to avoid incidents
with China and the Soviet Union. U.S. aircraft were not
permitted to enter Chinese or Soviet airspace, bombing
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missions near their borders were tightly controlled from
Washington, and special precautions were taken to ensure
that bombs were not accidently dropped on china or the
Soviet Union while attacking North Korean targets near the
57borders. In his history of the Korean War, Joseph C.
Coulden reports that a requirement for bombers to fly
parallel to the border while bombing the Yalu bridges was
deliberately violated by an Air Force flight commander.
After concluding that the parallel approach was ineffective
and unnecessarily endangered the pilots, the flight
commander ordered his planes to approach perpendicular to
the border. This resulted in them penetrating several miles
into Chinese airspace after dropping their bombs. These
violations of the bombing restrictions were successfully
58kept secret until long after the war.
The second example of a malicious unauthorized action
arose from ill-considered thrill-seeking, but essentially
involved disrespect for the chain of command. On June 13,
1957, USS Hornet (CVA 16) was conducting routine flight
training in the South China Sea after a port visit to Hong
Kong. During this flight training, approximately eight of
Hornet 's pilots decided to "buzz" (make low-level passes
57Futrell, pp. 142, 208-11, 453; Field, pp. 395-6;
Cagle and Hanson, pp. 224-5, 243-7.
58Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the
War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 302-3.
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over) the Chinese mainland near Swatow. Their motive was
simple thrill-seeking (often referred to as "flat-hatting"
or "skylarking"), but their actions were a clear and
deliberate violation of restrictions against entering
Chinese airspace. Chinese anti-aircraft guns fired on the
planes, causing minor damage to a few of them, and China
protested the incident. The responsible pilots initially
tried to keep their action secret, but the bullet holes in
some of their planes exposed their guilt. The pilots were
reprimanded and the Vice Admiral responsible for the Hornet
task group was relieved of command of the Seventh Fleet's
59
carrier task force.
The third example of a possibly malicious unauthorized
action also arose from dissatisfaction with political
constraints on the conduct of wartime air operations over
hostile territory. The secret bombing of unauthorized
targets in North Vietnam directed by Air Force General John
D. Lavelle between November 1971 and March 1972 was out or
dissatisfaction with rules of engagement strictly limiting
the anti-aircraft sites that could be attacked. General
Lavelle and his pilots believed—and could demonstrate with
losses they suffered—that the restrictions endangered the
59
"U.S. Carrier Plane Struck by Red Chinese Gunfire,"
New York Times , June 13, 1957, p. 1; Vice Admiral Herbert D
Riley, "The Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley,
U.S. Navy (Retired)," Volume II (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval
Institute, Oral History Program, 1972), pp. 491-4.
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lives of U.S. pilots by protecting surface-to-air missiles
that were firing on aircraft flying missions over North
Vietnam. General Lavelle directed attacks on anti-aircraft
sites not authorized under the rules of engagement and
submitted false reports listing authorized targets. When
the unauthorized bombings were discovered, General Lavelle
was relieved of his command by General John D. Ryan, Air
Force Chief of Staff. That General Lavelle attempted to
U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Investigating
Subcommittee, Unauthorized Bombing of Military Targets in
North Vietnam , Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp.
7-10; Richard R. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War
Crises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp.
49, 238-9. The evidence in this case is ambiguous. In an
interview with the author, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the
incident, insisted that the chain of command had not
—
tacitly or otherwise—authorized the bombings. Admiral
Moorer emphasized that General Lavelle was relieved of
command for lying to his superiors about the targets he was
attacking. On the other hand, the House Armed Services
Committee subcommittee that investigated the incident
expressed doubt that General Lavelle would have conducted
the secret bombings on his own, and suggested that he may
have been given tacit authorization by the military chain of
command or even top-level civilian authorities to exceed the
letter of his written orders (the rationale being that
secret bombings would be less likely to arouse political
opposition than formal expansion of the bombing) . As an
aside, the dual reporting of targets used by General Lavelle
to keep the unauthorized bombings secret strongly resembles
the dual reporting used to hide the bombing of Cambodia from
March 1969 to June 1970—which had been conducted by planes
not under General Lavelle' s command. The bombing of
Cambodia was ordered by President Nixon and kept secret for
reasons of international and domestic politics. Given the
Nixon Administration's well-known obsession with secrecy and
penchant for covert action, which led to its downfall, the
Lavelle case is an exceedingly poor example to cite as
evidence of military evasion of civilian control.
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conceal his actions from his superiors marks this case as a
malicious unauthorized action even though he was motivated
by legitimate concern over the safety of his pilots.
The pattern suggested by the malicious unauthorized
actions that occurred in the Korean War and Vietnam War is
that political restrictions on air operations over hostile
territory tend to provoke unauthorized actions. Unauthor-
ized actions occur because the restrictions are perceived as
unnecessarily endangering the lives of pilots flying
missions over hostile territory, and are motivated primarily
by a desire to accomplish the mission with as few pilots
shot down as possible. That is an understandable desire,
but actions taken in violation of political restrictions are
still unauthorized. This is an example of acute tension
between political and military considerations. If political
leaders and military commanders are not sensitive to each
other's needs, unauthorized actions are likely to occur.
Such unauthorized actions do not represent military evasion
of civilian control so much as a breakdown in communications
between civilian and military leaders, and a resulting
inability to find an acceptable compromise for managing the
tensions between political and military considerations.
Incidents at Sea
The term incidents at sea is used by the U.S. Navy to
designate potentially dangerous interactions between U.S.
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and Soviet naval forces on and over the high seas. For this
discussion, incidents at sea will be grouped into five
categories: accidental and deliberate collisions, dangerous
maneuvering, threatening actions and simulated attacks, and
incidents between aircraft and ships.
The most dangerous incidents at sea are accidental end
deliberate collisions. Accidental collisions were discussed
earlier in this chapter. There were three apparently
accidental collisions prior to the signing of the Incidents
at Sea Agreement in 1972: On June 24, 1966, the Soviet AGI
Anemometer collided with the intelligence collection ship
USS Banner (AGER 1) in the Sea of Japan; on May 10 and 11,
1967, the destroyer USS Walker (DD 517), was struck by two
different Soviet destroyers that had been harassing a U.S.
task group in the Sea of Japan; and on May 5, 1971, the
destroyer USS Hanson (DD 832) and the Soviet tug Diomede
collided in the Korean Strait. The first collision resulted
from aggressive intelligence collection by the Soviet AGI,
the second incident occurred inadvertently during deliberate
harassment, and the third was caused by carelessness on the
part of the Soviet tug. In all three incidents the Soviet
vessels violated the nautical rules of the road.
Dangerous maneuvering by Soviet naval vessels and
naval-associated auxiliary vessels (AGIs, supply ships,
tankers, etc.) was the most common type of incident at sea
prior to the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Dangerous
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maneuvers at close quarters, usually in violation of the
nautical rules of the road, have been used by the Soviets
for several purposes. The most common incidents were
dangerous maneuvers by Soviet AGIs and warships conducting
aggressive surveillance and intelligence collection against
U.S. Navy operations. Although some of the dangerous
maneuvers may have been inadvertent, most of them fit a
pattern of using such maneuvers for deliberate harassment of
U.S. Navy ships. In some cases such harassment appears to
have had no objective other than to demonstrate Soviet
contempt for the U.S. Navy—a pattern of behavior analogous
to Khrushchev's attempts to intimidate the West with Soviet
strategic weapons. In most cases, however, Soviet
harassment was specifically intended to disrupt U.S. naval
operations, such as exercises and missile tests, launch and
recovery of carrier aircraft, refueling and replenishment at
sea, trailing of Soviet submarines, and oceanographic survey
operations. The U.S. Navy sought, within the bounds of
safety, to resist Soviet intimidation at sea, resulting in
frequent instances of a maritime version of the game of
••chicken." To protect its aircraft carriers from dangerous
maneuvers by Soviet vessels, the U.S. Navy adopted the
tactic of "shouldering"—using destroyers to force Soviet
vessels clear of U.S. naval formations (the Soviets used the
same tactic against U.S. ships to prevent them from trailing
Soviet submarines) . That dangerous maneuvering by Soviet
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vessels only resulted in three collisions between 1960 and
1972 is testimony to the shiphandling skills and forbearance
of the U.S. Navy ship captains that had to put up with the
Soviet harassment.
In 1960 Soviet naval and merchant vessels began
harassing and maneuvering dangerously close to U.S. naval
vessels on a regular basis. From 1960 to 1972 there were
scores of serious incidents and hundreds of instances of
minor harassment. The first reported serious incident
occurred on April 11, 1960, when a Soviet trawler made
radical maneuvers extremely close to the oceanographic
survey ship USS Michelson (AGS 23) in the Norwegian Sea,
fouling the U.S. ship's towed survey gear. A brief review
of six of the serious incidents that occurred over the next
twelve years will illustrate the nature of incidents at
sea. On April 9, 1964, the Soviet merchant ship Polostsk
harassed the seaplane tender USS Duxbury Bay (AVP 38) in the
Red Sea, cutting across the bow of the U.S. ship at barely
ten yards. On September 25-27, 1964, the Soviet ships
Dzerzhiniskiy and Maqmomet Glazkeyv deliberately interfered
with flight operations being conducted by USS Franklin D.
Roosevelt (CVA 42) in the Mediterranean. On January 10,
1965, the Soviet ship Kotelnikov interfered with underway
refueling operations between the carrier USS Saratoga (CVA
60) and the oiler USS Neosho (AO 143) in the Mediterranean.




USS Hornet (CVS 16) task group while it was conducting
axercises in the Sea of Japan, twice colliding with the
destroyer USS Walker (DD 517). On June 7-8, 1967, during
the Middle East War, a Soviet Kashin-class destroyer and
Mirka-class corvette harassed the USS America (CVA 66) task
group in the Mediterranean, almost colliding with the
destroyer USS Lawe (DD 763) and the America . On March 31,
1972, a Soviet Kotlin-class destroyer harassed USS Sims (DE
1059) and USS Pratt (DLG 13) while they were trailing a
Soviet submarine in the Mediterranean. The pattern in
these incidents was deliberate Soviet harassment intended to
disrupt U.S. naval operations, deliberate Soviet violations
of the nautical rules of the road, and dangerous maneuvering
at close quarters frequently resulting in near collisions.
The Soviets occasionally protested alleged incidents
by U.S. Navy ships, but were particularly sensitive about
U.S. patrol planes making low passes over Soviet ships.
"Post-1 JAN 196C Incidents," pp. 1-3; Sweetman,
passim; U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau
of Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 669-74; "U.S. Tells Soviet It Imperils
Ships, " New York Times , April 4, 1965, p. 1; "U.S. Protests
Harassment of Ships by Soviets; Rejects Soviet Charges,"
Department of State Bulletin 52 (May 3, 1965): 655-58; "A
U.S. Destroyer In Far East Bumped By Soviet Warship," New
York Times . May 11, 1967, p. 1; "A Soviet Warship Bumps U.S.
Vessel 2d Time in 2 Days," New York Times , May 12, 1967, p.
1; "Russians Continue to Harass 6th Fleet," New York Times ,
June 9, 1967, p. 1; "U.S. to Protect Espionage Ships," New
York Times . June 12, 1968, p. 6. These references also




Soviet protests against U.S. naval vessels generally alleged
dangerous maneuvers close to Soviet merchant ships. The
U.S. responded to these protests by stating that the U.S.
Navy ships fully complied with the rules of the road while
maneuvering to identify the Soviet vessels. 62 Although
there undoubtedly were instances of U.S. ships and planes
being overly enthusiastic in carrying out their surveillance
missions, it is clear that the U.S. did not conduct a
sustained program of harassment against Soviet naval vessels
and merchant ships.
The Incidents at Sea Agreement was signed May 25,
1972, during the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit. The agreement
committed both sides to respect the international rules of
the road for preventing collisions at sea and provided
guidance for situations unique to naval forces (such as
formations of ships) that were not adequately covered by the
international rules. In addition to specifying behavior for
naval vessels at sea, the agreement set up a standard
62
"Soviet Charges NATO Buzzing," New York Times , March
5, 1964, p. 3; "Soviet Says U.S. Buzzed Ship," New York
Times , July 9, 1964, p. 3; "Soviet Charges U.S. Buzzings,"
New York Times , April 14, 1962, p. 5; "Moscow Assails U.S.
on 'Buzzing'," New York Times , August 8, 1964, p. 6; "1,000
U.S. Ship Buzzings Charged by Soviet Paper," New York Times ,
August 9, 1964, p. 5; U.S. Department of State, Historical
Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), pp. 671-4; "U.S. Protests Harassment
of Ships by Soviets; Rejects Soviet Charges," Department of
State Bulletin 52 (May 3, 1965): 656-7; "Soviet Accuses 7th
Fleet," New York Times , March 30, 1965, p. 19.
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channel for reporting violations to the other side and
called for annual review of the agreement. At the first
annual review, held in May 1973, a protocol to the agreement
was signed that expanded its provisions. The provisions
of the agreement were strengthened by a 1972 revision to the
international rules of the road that explicitly recognized
vessels launching or recovering aircraft and vessels engaged
in underway replenishment as "restricted in their ability to
maneuver"— a privileged status requiring other vessels to
maneuver to remain clear of them. The United States and
almost all other nations had long recognized this provision
(the old rules did not specify which vessels could claim
this status) ; the Soviets had refused to do so, contributing
to the large number of incidents prior to 1972.
"Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and
Over the High Seas," Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook,
1973 (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 36-39. "Proto-
col to the Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and
Over the High Seas," signed May 25, 1973, U.S. Department of
State, United States Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments , Vol. 24, Part 1, 1973 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1974), pp. 1063-64. Also see Anthony
F. Wolf, "Agreement at Sea: The United States-USSR Agreement
on Incidents at Sea," Korean Journal of International
Studies 9 (3/1978): 57-80; Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton,
"The U.S. -Soviet Incidents at Sea treaty," Naval Forces 6
(1/1985): 30-37; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "The Incidents at Sea
Agreement," in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and
Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S. -Soviet Security Cooperation:
Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), pp. 482-509.
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Although incidents between U.S. and Soviet naval
vessels declined significantly after the Incidents at
Agreement was signed in 1972, they were not eliminated
entirely. Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman. Jr., stated
in 1984 that the number of incidents in which there was a
"potential for danger" declined from over one hundred per
year in the 1960s to about forty per year in 1982-1983.
This 60 percent reduction in the number of serious incidents
each year indicates that the Incidents at Sea Agreement has
been at least a partial success. On the other hand, serious
incidents continue to occur at a rate sufficient to warrant
concern.
There have been three apparently accidental collisions
since 1972: On August 1976, a Soviet Echo II-class nuclear-
powered guided missile submarine (SSGN) collided with the
frigate USS Voge (FF 1047) in the Mediterranean; on November
1983, a Soviet Krivak I-class frigate collided with the
destroyer USS Fife (DD 991) in the Arabian Sea; and on March
1984, the carrier USS Kittyhawk (CV 63) collided with a
Soviet Victor-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) in the
65Sea of Japan.
Additionally, there have been two apparently delib-
erate collisions: On September 4, 1973, the U.S. naval
64
"U.S. Officials Weigh Protest of Sea Incident,"
Washington Post , April 4, 1984, p. 1.
65On the accidental collisions, see footnote 33.
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oceanographic survey ship USNS Artemis was deliberately
rammed three times by the Soviet survey ship Nakhodka in the
Atlantic. On February 12, 1988, a Soviet Mirka-class cor-
vette deliberately collided with the destroyer USS Caron (DD
970) and, simultaneously, a Krivak-class frigate collided
with USS Yorktown (CG 48). The Soviet ships carefully
maneuvered to scrape the sides of the U.S. ships, causing
only minor damage to themselves and the U.S. ships. The two
U.S. ships were exercising the right of innocent passage
(recognized under international law) through Soviet
territorial waters off the Crimean Peninsula in the Black
Sea. There is also no doubt that the incident was
deliberate. One of the Soviet ships radioed a warning to
the U.S. ships: "Soviet ships have orders to prevent
violation of territorial waters. I am authorized to strike
your ship with one of ours." There were a total of five
accidental and deliberate collisions between 1972 and 1987
—
compared with only three between 1960 and 1972. The total
number of collisions and the rate at which they occur have
thus been greater since the Incidents at Sea Agreement than
they were before the agreement.
"Soviets Bump U.S. Ships in Black Sea," Washington
Post , February 13, 1988, p. A23.
67The rate of collisions (deliberate and accidental)
was an average of one collision every four years during the
1960-1972 period, but an average of one collision every 3.2
years during the 1972-1988 period.
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Soviet naval vessels have continued the practice of
maneuvering dangerously in close proximity to U.S. ships.
Soviet ships attempted to interfere with the U.S. and
Japanese search for the flight data and cockpit voice
recorders from Korean Air Lines flight 007 in the Sea of
go
Japan from September 2 to October 28, 1983. The November
17, 1983, collision between a Soviet frigate and the USS
Fife (DD 991) , described above, occurred while the Soviet
ship was harassing the USS Ranger (CV 61) battle group.
Thus, while Soviet behavior at sea improved after the
Incidents at Sea Agreement was signed, the Soviets were
still willing to engage in deliberate harassment of U.S.
naval operations.
Threatening actions and simulated attacks have not
been eliminated by the Incidents at Sea Agreement. In fact,
the most serious incident of this type occurred during the
1973 Middle East war, after the agreement was signed. On
October 26, the day after the United States set DEFCON 3
worldwide, the Soviet Navy commenced intensive anti-carrier
68-
"Race to Recover 007' s 'Black Box* Shapes Up at Sea
and in Law Offices," Washington Post , September 17, 1983, p.
Al; "On the Sea of Japan, 20 Ships Comb for the Wreckage,"
New York Times , September 20, 1983, p. A10; "U.S. Says
Soviet Ships Harass Plane-Data Searchers," Washington Post ,
September 21, 1983, p. Al; "U.S. Ships Hear Flight Recorder;
Soviet Is Said to Hamper Search," New York Times , September
21, 1983, p. A10; "Search Goes On for Jet's 'Black Box',"
New York Times , September 23, 1983, p. A3; "U.S. Says Soviet




exercises against the three U.S. carrier task groups and the
U.S. amphibious task group in the eastern Mediterranean.
The anti-carrier exercise consisted of simulated coordinated
•nti-ship missile and naval gunfire attacks against the U.S.
task groups. U.S. Navy commanders were unable to
distinguish the simulated attacks from real attacks until
the Soviet ships pulled away without having launched
missiles or fired guns. Soviet ships and sub-marines armed
with anti-ship cruise missiles were constantly within range
of the U.S. carriers while they were in the eastern
Mediterranean, making the carriers extremely vulnerable to
69
an actual Soviet preemptive strike. The Soviet exercise,
which lasted through November 3, was probably intended as a
signal that the Soviet Navy was prepared to counter the
Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Vice Admiral
Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet, has described the
tactical situation in the Mediterranean during the Soviet
69Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch; A Memoir
(New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp.
436, 447; Robert G. Weinland, "Superpower Naval Diplomacy in
the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Case Study," The
Washington Papers , Vol. VI (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), p.
74; Stephen S. Roberts, "The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War,"
in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds
.
, Soviet Naval
Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) , pp. 195, 204,
206; Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union
and War in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975), p. 162; Rear Admiral James B.
Morin, Commanding Officer of USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA
42) during the crisis, letter to author, April 14, 1988;
Rear Admiral John C. Dixon, Commanding Officer of USS John




anti-carrier exercise: MThe U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet
Mediterranean Fleet were, in effect, sitting in a pond in
close proximity and the stage for the hitherto unlikely 'war
at sea' scenario was set. This situation prevailed for
several days. Both fleets were obviously in a high
readiness posture for whatever might come next, although it
70
appeared that neither fleet knew exactly what to expect."
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations
during the crisis, has described the period of the Soviet
anti-carrier exercise in strong terms: "I doubt that major
units of the U.S. Navy were ever in a tenser situation since
World War II ended than the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean
71
was for the week after the alert was declared." If a
Soviet ship or submarine had inadvertently launched an anti-
ship cruise missile during the exercise, it could well have
72
sparked an intense sea battle in the Mediterranean. This
tense situation at sea lasted for over a week after the Arab-
Israeli cease-fire took hold and tensions in the Middle East
had eased.
70Quoted in Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 447.
71 Ibid, p. 446.
72The Sixth Fleet may have had intelligence indicating
that the Soviets were conducting an exercise, and the
Soviets may have deliberately ensured that the U.S. received
that intelligence in order to avoid misunderstandings.
However, an exercise can be used as cover for a preemptive
attack and an inadvertent launching of an anti-ship missile
could well have been misperceived as an indicator that the
Soviet exercise had been operational deception.
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There have been additional incidents since 1973: On
September 12, 1975, a Soviet Kresta II-class cruiser trained
its missile launchers and fire control radars on the carrier
USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67) in the Mediterranean. In
August 1979 Soviet aircraft, including new Backfire bombers,
conducted more than thirty simulated anti-ship missile
attacks against the destroyers USS Caron (DD 970) and USS
Farragut (DDG 6) in the Black Sea. On September 30 and
October 1, 1982, Soviet Backfire bombers simulated anti-ship
missile strikes against the carriers USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
and USS Midway (CV 41) in the northern Pacific near the
Aluetians. On February 18, 1984, a Soviet jet fighter fired
its cannon into the wake of USS David R. Ray (DD 971) during
a simulated attack and a Soviet helicopter passed within
thirty feet of the destroyer while photographing it. This
incident also occurred in the Black Sea. The danger in
Soviet simulated attacks is that the actions taken by the
Soviet ships and planes are valid indicators of hostile
intent and grounds for firing first in anticipatory self-
defense under U.S. Navy rules of engagement (See Chapter
IV). U.S. navy commanders must show exemplary forbearance
73Sweetman, passim; "Soviet, in 2 Incidents, Takes
U.S. Torpedo and Baits Ships," New York Times , August 11,
1979, p. 4; "New Soviet Bombers Fake Strikes Against U.S.
Navy." Washington Post , November 9, 1982, p. A16; "Soviet
Backfire Bombers Stalk U.S. Carrier Fleet," Washington
Times
. November 9, 1982, p. 1; "High Seas Diplomacy
Continuing," Washington Post , June 8, 1984, p. Al.
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and take what could well be grave risks in not firing while
appearing to be under attack.
A much different incident occurred in 1984 in the
South China Sea. On April 2 the Soviet aircraft carrier
Minsk fired eight flares at the frigate USS Harold E. Holt
(FF 1074), striking the frigate with three of the flares.
The Soviet action was extremely dangerous and prohibited
under the Incidents at Sea Agreement, but the U.S. frigate
was not without blame in the incident. Minsk had hoisted
proper signals requesting the U.S. ship to stay clear, but
Holt had continued to make two passes by Minsk at close
74
range (about 300 yards). This Soviet behavior is ironic,
given the frequent and severe Soviet endangering of U.S.
carriers in the past. Additionally, when contrasted with
the large number of Soviet violations of the Incidents at
Sea Agreement, this incident illustrates that the Soviets
are capable of taking a distinctly one-sided view of the
agreement: complying when it benefits them and violating the
agreement when it does not. On balance, however, the Soviet
Union has elected to comply with the agreement.
Incidents between aircraft and ships have also con-
tinued to occur despite the Incidents at Sea Agreement. It
is routine for Soviet reconnaissance aircraft to make low
"U.S. Ship Hit by Soviet Flares," New York Times ,
April 3, 1984, p. 3; "U.S. Officials Weigh Protest of Sea
Incident," Washington Post , April 4, 1984, p. Al; "Moscow's
Muscle Flexing," Time , April 16, 1984, p. 30.
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passes over U.S. ships while on surveillance flights, and
routine for armed U.S. carrier-based jet fighters to
intercept and escort the Soviet planes as they approach in
order to ensure that they have peaceful intentions.
Similarly, Soviet carrier-based jet fighters (armed since
1982) routinely intercept and escort U.S. planes approaching
75
the Soviet carriers. Such interactions occur somewhere in
the world on almost a daily basis. Normally ship
surveillance and intercept operations take place without
incident, but the Soviets occasionally violate the Incidents
at Sea Agreement. On May 15, 1979, two soviet 11-38 May ASW
patrol planes flew close by USS Midway (CV 41) at 500 feet
in altitude, forcing U.S. planes in the carrier's landing
pattern to take emergency evasive action. The U.S. filed an
Incidents at Sea Agreement protest over the incident. On
September 29 and 30, 1987, the Soviet missile range
instrumentation ship Chukotka illuminated U.S. Navy and Air
Force patrol planes with a laser, causing temporary blind-
ness in an Air Force pilot's eyes for about ten minutes.
Department of Defense spokesmen stated that Soviet ships
75
"Pentagon Aides Say Soviet Planes Tried to Foil U.S
Radar," New York Times , October 15, 1?77, p. 2; "New Soviet
Bombers Fake Strikes Against U.S. "Navy." Washington Post ,
November 9, 1982, p. A16; "Navy: Armed Soviet Jets
Intercepted Ours," New York News
-
December 16, 1982, p. 3;
"Fleet Reports Soviet Air Surveillance," Washington Post ,
December 20, 1984, p. A26; "Navy F14 Fighters Chase Off




had illuminated U.S. planes with lasers before, but this was
76
the first instance of a pilot being affected. The
Incidents at Sea Agreement thus has not been totally
effective in stopping dangerous Soviet actions at sea.
This review of Soviet-American incidents at sea leads
to two conclusions: First, a wide range of dangerous
interactions can occur when U.S. and Soviet naval forces are
operating in close proximity. Incidents at sea have the
potential to exacerbate superpower tensions during an acute
crisis and certain incidents could provoke an outbreak of
fighting if misperceived as indications of an imminent
preemptive attack. Second, although the Incidents at Sea
Agreement has reduced the number of the most serious
incidents, it has not totally eliminated incidents at sea.
The primary reason for this has been lax Soviet compliance
with the agreement. There are thus ample grounds for
concern that incidents between Soviet and American naval
forces could seriously complicate crisis management efforts.
Conclusion
Tactical-level interactions are divided, based on the
perspective of political-level decisionmakers, into two
6
"Naval and Maritime Events, 1979" U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 106 (May 1980): 58; "Light From Soviet
Ship 'Disturbs' U.S. Pilot's Vision," Washington Post ,
October 3, 1987, p. All; "Soviets Flashed Laser, U.S.
Alleges," San Jose Mercury News , October 3, 1987, p. 1A.
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major categories: deliberate military actions and
inadvertent military incidents. Deliberate military actions
are ordered by political-level decisionmakers. They can
occur under delegated as well as direct control, and can be
ordered in mechanisms of indirect control as well as
directly over real-time communications links. Inadvertent
military incidents are military actions that may affect the
development of a crisis, but which are not specifically
ordered or anticipated by national leaders. There are three
categories of inadvertent military incidents: unanticipated
authorized actions, military accidents, and unauthorized
deliberate actions. Inadvertent military incidents are
troublesome because decisionmakers may fail to realize they
are unauthorized and perceive them as a deliberate provoca-
tion, signal of hostile intent, or escalation of a crisis.
This chapter used examples of inadvertent military
incidents that occurred under conditions ranging from
peacetime to wartime in order to define the range of
incidents that could occur in a crisis. As will be seen in
Chapter VII, however, military accidents occur infrequently
in international crises. There are three reasons for this.
First, the military chain of command normally cancels most
military exercises affecting forces committed to or on
standby for the crisis, greatly reducing the possibility of
international incidents arising from exercise-related
accidents. The primary reason why exercises are cancelled
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is that the forces are needed for crisis operations, but
exercises have also been cancelled to avoid potential
political complications. The second reason for the rarity
of crisis incidents is that the military chain of command
usually advises its on-scene commanders to act with caution
and to avoid provocative actions. This will be seen in all
four of the crises examined in Chapter VII. The third
reason for the lack of incidents in crises is best described
as military prudence: on-scene commanders, motivated by self-
preservation, generally avoid deliberately placing their
forces in situations where they are extremely vulnerable to
deliberate or inadvertent attacks. Military prudence is
occasionally violated by top-level political officials
ordering naval forces into dangerous waters, but on other
occasions U.S. leaders have been careful to keep U.S. forces
well clear of fighting in a local conflict. These three fac-
tors counteract other factors--increased tempo of operations
and adversary forces in close proximity—that contribute to
the occurrence of inadvertent military incidents.
The final task to be accomplished before commencing
the case studies is to examine the unique features of naval
operations and the perspectives that the U.S. Navy holds on
crisis naval operations. This is necessary to understand
the role of naval forces in crises and to assess the




NAVAL FORCE AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT
As was discussed in the introduction, naval forces
have characteristics that make them the type of force most
commonly favored by United States leaders for use as a
political instrument in crises. But those same
characteristics can exacerbate the problems of crisis
management. The misperception dilemma can be particularly
difficult to cope with when naval forces are used as a
political instrument. Tensions between political and
military considerations can be exacerbated due to the nature
of crisis naval operations. The crisis security dilemma is
especially acute in the naval warfare environment due to
weapons technology, tactical doctrines, and the tactical
situation created by crisis naval operations. Because naval
forces have unique operational characteristics, the first
step in researching the theory of stratified interaction
will be to explore how the theory and related concepts
presented in the previous two chapters apply to the use of
naval force as a political instrument in crises.
This chapter will first review the U.S. Navy's view of




Navy perspectives influencing employment of naval forces in
crises. Second, the impact of naval forces on crisis
stability will be explored, focusing on their impact on the
security dilemma and the misperception dilemma. Third, the
tensions between political and military considerations that
arise in crises will be examined in the context of crisis
naval operations.
Navy Views on Crisis Response
U.S. Navy leaders have had much to say about the peace-
time role of the Navy since the end of World War II,
particularly since the early 1970s. Understanding the
Navy's view of its peacetime missions is important for
understanding the doctrinal context within which peacetime
naval missions are carried out. This doctrinal context can
be described as a particular bureaucratic perspective on the
use of force, but it reflects the lessons the Navy has
learned over the years on the efficient and effective
operation of naval forces in peacetime, and the Navy's
perception of the principles and dynamics of naval warfare
that would be operative in the event that fighting erupts.
The Navy, like every large organization, has an
organizational philosophy or ideology which shapes and
organizes the attitudes, perceptions, and thought processes
of its members. Because success in combat is crucially
dependent on maintaining effective command and control,
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military organizations place great emphasis on formalizing
their organizational philosophy. This produces a wide
range of formal guidance covering all aspects of military
operations, from strategy to the smallest details of
tactics. Doctrinal and operational guidance is incorporated
into Navy standing orders, which define a broad range of
operational procedures and the decision criteria used to
select specific tactics or operational options in various
circumstances
.
Given that the Navy has significant missions to
perform in peacetime, the formulation of standing orders for
peacetime operations is to be expected. Naval forces
employed as a political instrument are guided in their
actions by much more than the specific orders sending them
on their mission, they are also, in most cases primarily,
operating in accordance with doctrinal and operational
guidance promulgated in various types of standing orders.
See Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A
Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and
Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly 13 (June
1969): 190-222; John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of
Decision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974),
pp. 88-139; Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and
Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1974), p. 28; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), pp. 117-202. On organizational ideologies in
military organizations, see Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the




See Chapter IV for a detailed description of standing
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The guidance in those standing orders is founded on the
basic concepts used by the Navy to describe its peacetime
roles. Thus, an understanding of the Navy's views of its
missions will provide insight on how forces performing those
missions are employed.
Prior to the early 1970s the U.S. Navy did not
conceive of peacetime missions as a category separate and
distinct from wartime missions. That the Navy had peacetime
roles to perform was recognized, but, with the exception of
naval diplomacy, those roles were viewed as being derived
from wartime missions or as preparatory to execution of
wartime missions. Rear Admiral John D. Chase in 1969 listed
the functions of the Navy, in order of their historical
development, as being coastal defense, commerce raiding,
enforcing respect for U.S. interests (especially trade and
shipping), being an instrument of foreign policy, commanding
the sea, direct support of land operations, projecting force
inland from the sea, and strategic deterrence. These
functions reflect the Navy's conception of its missions
during the postwar period, with the exceptions that since
the writings of Mahan coastal defense had been viewed as
best achieved by commanding the sea, and that commerce
raiding had been superseded by broader concepts of blockade
Rear Admiral John D. Chase, "The Functions of the
Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 95 (October 1969):
27-33. Also see Captain Daniel J. Carrison, The United
States Navy (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 36-55.
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and control of sea lines of communication, both elements of
commanding the sea.
Of the eight functions listed by Admiral Chase, three
are applicable in peacetime: enforcing respect for U.S.
interests, being an instrument of foreign policy, and
strategic deterrence. Enforcing respect for U.S. interests
entails use of force to defend against attacks on merchant
shipping, diplomatic outposts, and citizens abroad. Being
an instrument of foreign policy includes "showing the flag"
in port visits to other countries and voyages abroad.
Strategic deterrence is provided primarily by submarine
launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed sea launched
cruise missiles, although carrier aircraft can also
contribute to the mission. The remaining five functions are
wartime missions, their peacetime impact is that the Navy
strives to maintain readiness to perform these missions in
wartime. This is important, because serious conflicts can
•rise between performance of the peacetime functions and
maintaining readiness for wartime functions. As will be
seen later, this tension between peacetime missions and
readiness for wartime missions is one of the most
significant interactions between political and military
factors affecting the use of naval forces as a political
instrument.
During the tour of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., as
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , serious efforts were made
.
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to refine and clarify the Navy's conceptions of its
missions. The result, as described in a 1974 article by
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, then President of the Naval
War College, was a scheme of four missions: strategic
deterrence, sea control, projection of power, and naval
4presence. Sea control and projection of power are wartime
missions. The objectives of sea control are "denying the
enemy the right to use some seas at some times, and
5
asserting our own right to use some seas at some times."
The concept of sea control differs from the earlier concept
of command of the sea in recognizing that submarines and
land-based aircraft had made it virtually impossible to
fully control all seas at all times. Projection of power is
the use of naval force against land forces, and can take
three forms, naval gunfire bombardment, strikes by carrier-
based tactical aircraft or sea launched cruise missiles, and
amphibious assault. Objectives include interdiction, sup-
port of troops ashore, destruction of war-making potential,
and seizure of territory. These two missions encompass the
five wartime missions listed by Admiral Chase: sea control
includes coastal defense, commerce raiding, and commanding
4Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S.





the sea; while projection of power includes direct support
of land operations and projecting force inland.
Strategic deterrence is both a peacetime and a wartime
naval mission. Peacetime objectives of strategic deterrence
are to deter all-out attack on the U.S. and its allies, to
deter lesser attacks with threat of unacceptable risks, and
to maintain a stable political environment in which the
threat of aggression or coercion against the U.S. or its
allies is minimized. The wartime objective is to deter the
enemy from escalating the conflict, particularly from
7
conventional to nuclear warfare.
Naval presence is "the use of naval forces, short of
war, to achieve political objectives," and has two
objectives: "to deter actions inimical to the interests of
the United States or its allies," and "to encourage actions
that are in the interest of the United States or its
m
allies." Naval presence takes two general forms:
preventive deployments, a show of force in peacetime, and
reactive deployments, a show of force in response to a
crisis. The primary difference between preventive and
reactive deployments is that preventive deployments can rely
on the implied threat of reinforcement as well as the combat







reactive deployments must rely exclusively on the combat
capabilities on-scene to convey a credible threat. Naval
presence as defined by Admiral Turner encompasses the
"instrument o£ foreign policy" function described by Admiral
Chase. The naval presence concept was the first effort by
the Navy to clarify its peacetime role as a political
instrument, and continues to be important in Navy thinking
today.
Commander James F. McNulty, then an instructor at the
Naval War College, in 1974 provided a detailed analysis of
the various political-military purposes served by naval
presence. The fundamental purpose of naval presence is to
"contribute to the national aim of deterring conflict."
Commander McNulty identified seven specific roles for naval
forces in the presence mission: (a) supporting U.S.
international military commitments, such as the NATO
alliance, with forward deployed forces, (b) confirming on a
routine basis U.S. political commitments to other nations,
by showing the flag in port visits and holding joint
exercises with other navies, (c) demonstrating the
capability of U.S. naval forces to act in support of
national interests, (d) asserting continuing U.S. interest
in important areas of the world, such as the Persian Gulf,




to deter potential opponents, and serving as an instrument
of crisis management, such as by signaling U.S. intentions,
(f) providing humanitarian aid, and (g) coercing an opponent
to comply with a preferred course of action. As this list
•hows, the presence mission was defined as covering the full
range of naval missions short of wartime missions.
A second study of naval presence from the same period
by Lieutenant Commander Kenneth R. McGruther, then a Naval
War College student, identified six requirements for the
naval forces employed for the presence mission: (a) the
ships should be "dear," valuable assets must be committed to
demonstrate will, (b) the warfighting capability of the
force must be impressive and proven for the political signal
to be credible, (c) the force should be multi-mission
capable for flexibility of signaling and response, (d) the
potential stay-time of the forces should be substantial from
the start to signal an intent to stay until the job is done,
(e) the fleet should be forward deployed so that forces are
readily available close to potential trouble spots, and (f)
superior command, control and communications capabilities
are essential for an effective presence role. This list
Commander James F. McNulty, "Naval Presence—The
Misunderstood Mission," Naval War College Review 27
(September-October 1974): 26-27.
11
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth R. McGruther, "The Role
of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," Naval War College Review
27 (September-October 1974): 12-14.
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of requirements reflects Navy thinking on the presence
mission from the early 1970s onward. Of particular interest
is that the requirements emphasize employment of highly
capable forces—high value, powerful, multi-mission, high
endurance, high connectivity assets. This approach to naval
presence raises a host of potential tensions between
performance of peacetime missions and readiness to perform
warfighting missions.
From 1972 to 1978 the Navy made only minor revisions
to its mission descriptions. In 1976 the CNO, Admiral James
L. Holloway III, reduced the number of Navy missions from
four to two (called "principle functions") by making
strategic deterrence a sub-category of power projection, and
defining naval presence to be the peacetime political impact
of capabilities for sea control and power projection in
wartime (projection of political influence through the
12presence of naval power) . This approach did not introduce
new concepts or revise the old concepts, it merely squeezed
them into two categories—sea control and power projection
—
Admiral James L. Holloway III, "Chief of Naval
Operations Posture Statement," in U.S. Congress, Senate
Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for
Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active
Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths
,
Part 2, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, pp. 1056-7. Also
see Admiral Holloway's 1977 posture statement, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1978
Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and
Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian




in order to emphasize the importance of wartime capabilities
as the foundation for all naval missions.
The primary significance of the "two-mission" approach
for this discussion is that it reveals an element in Navy
thinking that contributes to the inherent tension between
performance of peacetime missions and readiness for wartime
missions. The essential, fundamental purposes of a navy are
to successfully carry out its combat missions in wartime
and, by extension, to maintain readiness for wartime
missions during peacetime. Historically, navies which
have lost sight of this principle have turned out to be
ineffective in wartime. Treating peacetime missions as
derivative of wartime missions is thus an attempt to resolve
the tension between the two categories of missions in favor
of readiness to perform wartime missions.
In 1979, at the initiative of CNO Admiral Thomas B.
Hayward, the U.S. Navy ceased talking in terms of missions
and began emphasizing principles of naval strategy when
14describing its contribution to the nation's defense. Gone
13See James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, The Future
of United States Naval Power (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1970), pp. 70-72, 81.
14Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, "The Future of U.S. Sea
Power,* U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 105 (May 1979): 66-
71. Admiral Hayward' s shift toward strategic principles was
preceded by (and undoubtedly influenced by) the Navy's Sea
Plan 2000 study, completed in March 1978. This study
emphasized maritime superiority, maintenance of stability
with forward deployments, containment of crises with
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was discussion of sea control and power projection, in its
place was discussion of maritime superiority, offensive
warfighting posture, and forward operations. Admiral
Hayward initiated a renaissance in U.S. Navy strategic
thinking. The principles he first outlined in his 1979
posture statement to Congress became the basis for the
Maritime Strategy, which was formally issued in 1982.
The Maritime Strategy is the overall strategic
framework guiding U.S. Navy strategic and operational
planning. In the event of war with the Soviet Union, the
strategy calls for offensive forward operations, seizing the
initiative in the war at sea to destroy the Soviet navy and
15
carry the war to the Soviet homeland. The first phase of
wartime naval operations commences as a Soviet-American
crisis begins escalating toward war. Aggressive forward
deployment of U.S. naval forces would commence on a global
basis in order to be ready for wartime operations in
strategic waters, to put the Soviet Navy on the defensive,
selective use of force and superior naval forces on-scene,
and deterrence of global war with forces capable of
defending sea-lanes, reinforcing allies, and putting
pressure on the Soviets. On Sea Plan 2000 see Paul B. Ryan,
First Line of Defense (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution
Press, 1981), pp. 128-134.
15Admiral James D. Watkins, MThe Maritime Strategy,"
in The Maritime Strategy , a supplement to the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 112 (January 1986) , pp. 4-14; Captain
Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The
Case for the Maritime Strategy," International Security 11




and to deter the Soviets from escalation. Navy leaders
assert that this concept of operations is founded on battle-
proven principles of naval strategy and represents the
optimum operational scenario for successfully prosecuting a
war at sea with the Soviet Union.
The Maritime Strategy addresses the employment of
naval forces as a political instrument with greater
sophistication than any previous formulation of U.S. Navy
missions. The three non-wartime naval functions encompassed
by the strategy are deterrence, forward presence, and crisis
response.
In support of overall U.S. defense strategy, the
Maritime Strategy is primarily a deterrent strategy,
designed to deter aggression across the entire spectrum of
17
conflict, from terrorism to nuclear war. Deterrence is
achieved through strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by
ballistic missile submarines, by maintaining a visible
forward presence demonstrating the capability and intent to
execute offensive forward operations in wartime, and by
responding to crises with credible combat capabilities to
16Watkins, "Maritime Strategy,- pp. 8-10.
17Admiral James D. Watkins, "Posture Statement by the
Chief of Naval Operations," U.S. Congress, Senate Armed
Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1987 , Part 3. Hearings, 99th
Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Priniting Office, 1986) , pp. 1087-8 (Hereafter cited as
Watkins, "Posture Statement FY-87").
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deter Soviet intervention and control escalation of the
conflict.
As this description suggests, the Maritime Strategy
emphasizes deterring the Soviets by denying them military
options— threatening to defeat Soviet forces rather than
threatening retaliation. Using Snyder's analytical scheme,
emphasis in the Maritime Strategy is on deterrence by
denial—altering the aggressor's estimate of the probability
of gaining his objectives—though with naval strategic
. . . 19forces providing a threat of deterrence by punishment. A
strong case can be made that in many circumstances,
particularly in crises located outside the immediate Soviet
periphery, denial is the more effective deterrent threat.
However, as will be seen later, naval forces deployed to
convey denial-type deterrent threats can have an impact on
perceptions much stronger than had been anticipated, and can
be confronted with conflicts between immediate tasking and
the demands of the warfighting operations they would have to
conduct in order to deny the Soviets their objectives should
deterrence fail.
The second peacetime element of the Maritime Strategy
is the routine forward deployment of U.S. naval forces in
18Watkins, "Posture Statement FY-87," pp. 1095-1100,
and "Maritime Strategy," p. 8.
19Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 14-16.
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peacetime. Forward presence contributes to the credibility
of the U.S. deterrent posture by demonstrating denial
capabilities. Forward presence is also intended to further
international stability by demonstrating support for U.S.
allies and other friendly countries, thus maintaining
regional balances of power. In practice, forward presence
is oriented toward likely trouble spots in order to have
forces readily available should fighting flare up, as well
as to deter hostilities. An additional benefit is that
naval forces contribute to U.S. diplomatic objectives by
20
showing the flag in port visits. Forward presence, as
used in the Maritime Strategy, encompasses earlier Navy
concepts of naval forces as an instrument of foreign policy
(Chase) and preventive naval presence (Turner)
.
The third peacetime element of the Maritime Strategy
is crisis response, defined as employment of naval forces to
achieve specific objectives while limiting the scope of the
conflict and terminating military action as soon as
possible. Crisis response serves primarily to control
escalation of a conflict by deterring Soviet intervention
and escalatory actions by other participants. Should
control of escalation not be possible, the objective of
crisis response is to dominate escalation— to prevail over
any threats that may arise with precise use of force, so as
20
Watkins, "Posture Statement FY-87," p. 1095-1100.
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to avoid increased hostilities. Naval forces have
escalation control characteristics that make them well-
suited for this role: mobility, readiness, flexibility,
endurance, and a wide range of capabilities for precision
21political signaling and selective military options.
Emphasis in crisis response is on deterrence by denial and
escalation dominance should deterrence fail. National
objectives are achieved through the political impact, and,
if necessary, the direct military impact, of warfighting
capabilities brought to bear at the scene of a crisis.
Although the Navy's description of its peacetime roles
and missions changed significantly in the early 1970s and
again in the early 1980s, there are strong continuities in
the perspectives underlying these changing mission
formulations. Five views consistently expressed by Navy
leaders are particularly important for this study. First,
warfighting capabilities are the foundation for performance
of peacetime missions. The ability of naval forces to
deter, persuade, or impress is derived from their ability to
fight. Thus, peacetime missions are non-belligerent
extensions of wartime missions, or, since there is always a
threat that deterrence could fail, they are pre-war




Second, and closely related, peacetime missions always
entail maintaining readiness to perform warfighting
missions, particularly in crises. Readiness to perform
warfighting missions operates on two levels: readiness of on-
scene forces to engage in combat at the scene of a crisis
should fighting erupt, and readiness of all operational
forces, particularly forward deployed forces, to perform
wartime missions should the crisis escalate to war.
The third view is that deterrence, at least below the
strategic nuclear level, is achieved by denial: maintaining
the capability to defeat enemy forces in battle, thus
denying the enemy the ability to achieve his military
objectives. Deterrence by denial applies to deterring
Soviet military intervention in crises as well as to
deterring adversaries in crises from aggression or
escalation.
Fourth, the purposes of forward presence (presence for
specific or routine political signaling) are to demonstrate
denial capabilities for deterrence, and to place forces
where they are available to conduct warfighting missions for
denial should deterrence fail.
Fifth, the two objectives of crisis response—crisis
management and escalation control—are both achieved by
employing forces capable of demonstrating deterrence by
denial, and, should it become necessary, capable of
defeating the enemy in battle to achieve denial.
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The theme underlying these five views is that combat
or warfighting capabilities are the basis for conducting
peacetime political missions. That Navy leaders should
espouse this view is no surprise, the raison d'etre of
navies being to win battles at sea. This perspective is not
unique to the Navy, similar views are held by all armed
forces. Beyond this, however, there is merit in military
leaders focusing on readiness to perform warfighting
missions, for coercive threats are by definition threats
that force will be used. The key point is that military
leaders and political leaders may be using the same terms
with much different meanings, and viewing the same military
actions as having much different purposes, in deliberations
on the use of force as a political instrument. Furthermore,
this is not just a problem of civil-military relations: such
differences in views can arise within the military chain of
command, and among political leaders.
Crisis Stability
An irony of naval crisis response is that the
characteristics of naval forces that make them the preferred
type of force for use as a political instrument in crises
also tend to make them relatively more susceptible to crisis
stability problems than other types of forces. There are
three naval crisis stability problems. First, political
signals sent by naval forces are especially vulnerable to
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misperception, making the misperception dilemma particularly
acute in naval crisis response. Second, the nature of
modern naval warfare places a premium on firing first in
tactical engagements, making the crisis security dilemma
particularly acute in naval crisis response. Third, naval
warfare may be more escalation-prone than other forms of
warfare.
The first naval crisis stability problem is that the
political signals sent by naval forces are especially
vulnerable to misperception, making the misperception
dilemma particularly acute. Virtually every study of naval
diplomacy has noted the danger of the signals sent by naval
forces being misperceived by the target nation or third
parties. Naval officers are also aware of the problem of
misperception: Admiral Turner in his article explaining the
Navy's view of its presence mission pointed out th»t the
perceptions of the country to be influenced are a factor in
22
selecting forces for naval presence.
Three primary reasons have been given for the
vulnerability of signals sent by naval forces to being
misperceived. First, warships, being implements of war, are
inherently coercive, even when used for positive,
23
supportive, influence-building purposes. They cannot
22Turner, p. 14
23Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York:
Crane Russak, 1977), p. 27; Nathan and Oliver, p. 77.
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escape their aura of menace. Thus, the signals naval forces
send have coercive connotations that can serve as "noise"
complicating reception of the intended signal. Second, the
flexibility of naval forces, which makes them so valued by
national leaders for political signaling, also makes the
signals they convey inherently ambiguous. As Nathan and
Oliver observe, because naval forces can be withdrawn as
easily as deployed, they can signal uncertainty and lack of
24
resolve, rather than firmness and commitment. Third,
naval forces send highly visible signals which can be
received by a large number of countries in addition to the
intended recipient. Thus, third parties can perceive
25
signals not intentionally sent to them.
The second naval crisis stability problem is that the
nature of modern naval warfare places a premium on firing
first in tactical engagements, making the crisis security
dilemma particularly acute in naval crisis response. The
nature of naval warfare is that the platforms—ships,
submarines and aircraft— are fragile relative to the
destructiveness of the weapons used against them. This
began during the era in which guns were the main armament of
ships. An individual shell hit usually could not do serious
24Nathan and Oliver, pp. 78-79. Also see Edward N.
Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 12-13.
25
Booth, pp. 27, 32, 42; Luttwak, p. 6.
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damage, but massed gunfire could destroy a ship in short
order. This led to emphasis on unilateral attrition—being
able to Hire on the enemy without suffering his return fire--
achieved through longer-range guns and such tactical
26
measures as surprise and maneuver.
Advent of the anti-ship cruise missile greatly
exacerbated the vulnerability of platforms to weapons,
allowing a single weapon to destroy a ship. Even if the
missile does not sink the ship, it can knock the ship out of
the battle—achieving what the Navy refers to as a "mission
kill. H Anti-ship missiles can be difficult to defend
against, making destruction of the launch platform the most
effective defense against them. U.S. Navy tactical doctrine
for the defense of surface ship battle groups thus
emphasizes destruction of launch platforms before they
27launch their missiles. Soviet Navy doctrine places even
26Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory
and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986),
pp. 34-39. For an illustration of the effect of unilateral
attrition, see Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., "Naval Tactics
and Their Influence on Strategy," Naval War College Review
39 (January-February 1986): 10-11. Also see Admiral I'jaac
C. Kidd, Jr., "View From the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet
Flagship," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 98 (February
1972): 18-29; Admiral Stansfield Turner and Commander George
Thibault, "Countering the Soviet Threat in the
Mediterranean," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 103 (July
1977): 25-32.
27Lieutenant Commander T. Wood Parker, "Thinking
Offensively," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 107 (April
1981): 26-31; Captain William J. Rune , "Antiship Missiles
Launch New Tactics," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 108
(December 1982): 60-65; Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 9.
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greater emphasis on the first strike, making it a central
objective of strategy as well as tactics. Soviet naval
writings emphasize the importance of "the battle of the
28first salvo." The tactical doctrines of the superpower
navies interact, producing a war initiation scenario
29described in the U.S. Navy as the "D-day shootout." The
side that gets off the first salvo in the D-day shootout is
likely to accrue a significant tactical advantage that could
determine the outcome of the war at sea.
The technology and tactical doctrines of modern naval
warfare provide conditions for crisis stability problems to
arise in a crisis. Crisis stability exists when neither
side has an incentive to strike the first blow, but in
modern naval warfare both sides have strong tactical
incentives to strike the first blow. The crisis security
dilemma is that, in a crisis, many of the actions a state
takes to increase its security and improve its bargaining
28Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G.
Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1974), pp. 131-132; Charles D. Petersen,
wAbout-Face in Soviet Tactics," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 109 (August 1983) : 57-63; Lieutenant Commander
Alan D. Zimm, "The First Salvo," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 111 (February 1985): 55-60; T.A. Fitzgerald,
"Blitzkrieg at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112
(January 1986) : 33-38.
29Admiral Harry D. Train, "Decision Making and
Managing Ambiguity in Politico-Military Crisis," in James G
March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds., Ambiguity and
Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision
Making (Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986), p. 306.
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position decrease the security of the adversary. When both
sides employ naval forces as a political instrument in
crises, creating tactical-level interaction at the scene of
the crisis, the technology and tactical doctrines of modern
naval warfare almost unavoidably give rise to the crisis
security dilemma. United States and Soviet naval tactical
doctrines in particular emphasize the offensive and striking
first in naval combat. The stratified crisis security
dilemma is that, in a crisis, the security dilemma is
stratified, arising from the interaction processes occurring
separately at each of the three levels, and affecting the
likelihood of war separately at each level. When Soviet and
American naval forces are deployed to the scene of an acute
crisis, the security dilemma is likely to arise at the
tactical level of interaction regardless of the threat
perceptions held by national leaders.
The third naval crisis stability problem is that
escalation control may be more difficult in naval warfare
that in other types of warfare. Several observers have
expressed concern over the escalatory dangers associated
with the employment of naval forces. Of particular concern
to some observers is the escalatory pressure that can arise
when a U.S. Navy ship is attacked. White House aide Chester
Cooper, commenting on the strong Senate reaction to the 1964
Tonkin Gulf Incident, described the emotions aroused by
attacks on United States ships:

399
There is something very magical about an attack on an
American ship on the high seas. An attack on a
military base or an Army convoy doesn't stir up that
kind of emotion. An attack on an American ship on the
high sees is bound to set off skyrockets and the 'Star
Spangled Banneri Qand 'Hail to the chief' and
everything else.
George H. Quester and Sean M. Lynn-Jones have expanded upon
Cooper's remarks. Noting that "It is dreadfully dangerous
to sink a major power's warship today," Quester warns that
"the warships of the world have become highly prized
investments, such that their loss would be likely to enrage
the publics and governments that matter back home—enrage
them enough to trigger off escalations that neither side
night have wanted, thus setting up the deterrence and bluff
mechanisms that are at the heart of 'chicken'." Along the
same lines, Lynn-Jones observed that "Under conditions of
international tension and superpower rivalry, public opinion
in a liberal democracy is likely to demand retaliation after
a provocation by a major rival. Naval incidents seem to
elicit particularly emotional responses in the United
States." He goes on to add that "Is is, of course,
relatively unlikely that a naval incident could provoke a
nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet
Union. ...An incident could, however, increase tensions and
30
"The 'Phantom Battle' that Led to War," U.S. News
and World Report , July 23, 1984, p. 66.
31George H. Quester, "Naval Armaments: The Past as
Prologue," in George H. Quester, ed.. Navies and Arms
Control (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 6-7.
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needlessly disrupt negotiations or other political
discourse, much as the U-2 incident of 1960 forced the
32
cancellation of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit.**
Other observers contend that there is a greater risk
of nuclear war erupting at sea than ashore. This argument
has been made forcefully by Desmond Ball:
The possibility of nuclear war at sea must be
regarded as at least as likely as the occurrence of
nuclear war in other theaters. Indeed, there is
probably a greater likelihood of accidental or unauth-
orized launch of sea-based nuclear weapons, and the
constraints on the authorized release of nuclear
weapons are possibly more relaxed than those that
pertain to land-based systems. Further, there are
several important factors that make it likely that any
major conflict at sea would escalate-to a strategic
nuclear exchange relatively quickly.
Incidents at sea between American and Soviet forces have
been identified as a potential catalyst for the nuclear
32Sean M. Lynn-Jones, **A Quiet Success for Arms
Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea,** International
Security 9 (Spring 1985): 164.
Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International
Security 10 (Fall 1985): 28-29. The factors Ball identifeis
are the occurrence of accidents at sea, the attractiveness
of ships as nuclear targets, the nuclear weapons launch
autonomy of naval commanders, dual-capable wepons systems
and platforms, offensive Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
strategy (including attacks on Soviet strategic ballistic
missile submarines), incentives for Soviet preemption
arising from the vulnerability of Navy ASW and command and
control systems, the Navy doctrine of offensive operations
in forward areas, Navy tactical nuclear weapons doctrine,
Soviet doctrine for war at sea, and lack of Navy contingency
planning for limiting escalation in a war at sea. Also see
Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and
NATO's Northern Flank," International Security 7 (Fall
1982): 28-54; Eric J. Grove, "The Maritime Strategy and
Crisis Stability," Naval Forces 8 (6/1987): 34-44.

401
escalation dangers described by Ball. As John Borawski
notes: "The 1967 Israeli sinking [sic] of the USS L ibert y,
and the subsequent US uncertainty as to whether a Soviet
ship had attacked the Liberty , is often cited as an example
of the type of nuclear Sarajevo that could inadvertently
34lead to war." Thus, there are at least prima facie
reasons for concern that the use of naval forces as a
political instrument in crises has an escalatory potential
that has not been adequately addressed in studies of naval
diplomacy and crisis management.
Political-Military Tensions
There are three political-military tensions: tension
between political considerations and the needs of diplomatic
bargaining, on the one hand, and military considerations and
the needs of military operations, on the other; tension
between the need for top-level control of military options
in a crisis, and the need for tactical flexibility and
instantaneous decision-making at the scene of the crisis;
and tension between performance of crisis political missions
and readiness to perform wartime combat missions. All three
of these tensions are likely to arise when naval forces are
used as a political instrument in a crisis.
34John Borawski, "Risk Reduction at Sea: Naval
Confidence-Building Measures," Naval Forces 3 (1/1987):




The first tension is between political considerations
and the needs of diplomatic bargaining, on the one hand, and
military considerations and the needs of military opera-
tions, on the other. In his study of the political uses of
sea power, Edward N. Luttwak noted that what he termed
"suasion" (the influence effects of political signals)
operates at both a tactical level (on-scene forces) and a
political level (national-level, between states). The
implication of this, according to Luttwak, is that: "Since
men at the tactical and political levels have quite
different responsibilities, contradictions between the two
levels of suasion can be a source of acute internal
controversy, just as the conflict between tactical and
political priorities has been a chronic source of tension
35between soldiers and politicians in times of war." As
Luttwak suggests, the tension between political and military
objectives which can arise in a crisis is a particular
manifestation of an issue in civil-military relations
inherent in war as well as peace.
In a study of the naval presence mission of the
carrier task group led by USS Enterprise (CVN-65) during the
1971 Indo- Pakistani War, McGruther provided a good example
of this problem:
It is presumed that the Navy will continue to play a




of American intent and capability, but if the crisis
managers themselves are playing for much higher
•takes, it follows that they are not particularly
concerned with the alternatives which are left to the
opponent when a force is sent into a crisis theater.
For instance, Enterprise while in the Bay of Bengal
was under the guns and missiles of two Soviet
anticarrier warfare groups capable of destroying her
by a barrage of surface-to-surface missiles before a
plane could have been launched. To the national
decision-makers that war not an element of the - 6political problem and, therefore, was not the point.
McGruther goes on to add, "To us in the Navy, however, it is
very much the point." In this case the tension was between
the self-defense needs of the naval forces on-scene, and the
political objective of having those forces in a highly
visible position for political signaling. The trade-off
made was to pursue signaling at the cost of extreme
vulnerability of the ships on-scene.
Another manifestation of the tension between political
and military considerations is that military contingency
plans are often inappropriate for the particular crisis at
hand, requiring last-minute revision prior to being
executed. In assessing the reactive mode of naval presence--
deployments made after a crisis erupts—McNulty observed
that "reactive situations are usually characterized by gross
McGruther, pp. 9-10. Rear Admiral J.R. Hill has
made the same point. After explaining that political
considerations may make it necessary to risk an initial
casualty before the rules of engagement can be relaxed to
allow prudent defensive measures, he wryly observes that
"Nevertheless the command and crew of HMS Initial Casualty
are not likely to welcome their predicament." Hill,
Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1986), p. 128.
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uncertainties which require ad hoc revisions to plans on a
near real-time basis. Such improvisation is a chancy
business when the issue of war or peace hangs in the
37balance." Operational plans are, of necessity, developed
for specified scenarios, which may resemble the crisis at
hand closely or remotely, but never anticipate it
precisely. Contingency plans may be inappropriate for
military as well as political reasons, but even in this case
their military weaknesses are likely to be the result of the
manner in which the crisis developed politically.
Operational crisis management requirements that can be
imposed on the use of force include limiting the size and
composition of the naval force employed, placing naval
forces close to or in the midst of fighting as a visible
signal, limiting the actions that naval forces can take in
self-defense, informing the adversary of military operations
in progress against his forces (such as tracking his
submarines) , deliberately slowing the tempo of military
operations and creating pauses in the action, and using
force in gradually increasing increments. On the other
hand, battle-proven principles for the successful conduct of
military operations include security {keeping one's
intentions secret) , seizing the initiative with offensive




objective, and speed in the execution of an operation and
exploitation of further opportunities. The potential
38
conflicts are obvious. Because naval forces must always
be prepared for the possibility of combat even while on
political signaling missions, this tension between political
and military considerations arises well before force is
actually used.
The second tension is between the need for top-level
control of military options in a crisis, and the need for
tactical flexibility and instantaneous decisionmaking at the
scene of the crisis. Studies of naval diplomacy and naval
command and control have recognized that maintaining control
of naval operations, particularly when naval forces are used
as a political instrument in a crisis. As Luttwak observed:
••continuous political guidance of the highest possible
quality is a crucial requirement of overseas deployments: a
modern oceanic fleet needs a political 'radar' as much as it
39
needs the electronic variety." The simplest, and
therefore most attractive, means of ensuring such continuous
political guidance is for top-level decision-makers to have
direct communications with and control of on-scene forces.
Supporting this view, McGruther argues for "direct and
specific dialog between the crisis manager and the on-scene




commander," warning: "To go through a chain of command
requires too much time and increases the risk of either
question or answer being incorrectly understood due to
40
oversimplification or normal relay distortion." Thus, a
strong case can be made for direct top-level political
control of on-scene naval forces in a crisis.
Although virtually all senior military commanders
recognize the need for a certain degree of direct control by
top-level political authorities, there is a strong belief
—
particularly among naval officers— that the on-scene
commander must be delegated as much authority and freedom of
action as possible. Top-level decisionmakers can be
overwhelmed by information overload, have insufficient time
to effectively control multiple operations, and have their
attention diverted by one aspect of the operations to the
neglect of others. They generally do not understand the
complexities of modern warfare, which can make even a small-
scale operation impossible to effectively control from the
White House. Communications channels often become
overloaded, causing excessive delays in decisionmaking and
41transmission of orders to operating forces.
40McGruther, pp. 14-15. Also see Rear Admiral Donald
T. Poe, "Command and Control: Changeless—Yet Changing,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 100 (October 1974): 24-25.
41Captain W.T.T. Pakenham, "The Command and Control of
Naval Operations: Principles and Organisation," Naval Forces
7 (1/1986): 50; Beaumont, "Command Method," pp. 65-67;
Creveld, p. 247-51; Poe, pp. 28-29.
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Naval officers invariably believe that the on-scene
commander has a superior ability to control the employment
of his forces. His information about the current tactical
situation is inherently superior that of his superiors. The
on-scene commander requires initiative and flexibility to
effectively cope with a rapidly changing tactical situa-
tion. Only the on-scene commander can effectively adapt to
the inevitable "friction" in military operations—the
multitude of problems that shape the execution of military
plans. Centralized control of military operations can
stifle initiative, weaken morale, erode authority, and cause
42diffusion of responsibility. These are the reasons why
senior naval commanders generally favor granting the on-
scene commander as much freedom of action as possible.
McGruther has well described the tension arising from
level of control issue:
It is important for the task force commander to know
exactly what lines the opponent cannot cross and what
the appropriate responses should be if the lines are
crossed. Knowing in advance what the response should
Colonel H.A. Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 88 (October 1962): 87-8; Admiral
Thomas B. Hayward, "An Ex-CNO's Reflection on the Garbage
Can Theory of Naval Decision Making," in James G. March and
Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds
.
, Ambiguity and Command:
Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making
(Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986), p. 267; Admiral
Roy L. Johnson, "The Reminiscences of Admiral Roy L.
Johnson, U.S. Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval
Institute, Oral History Program, April 1982)
, pp. 182-3;
Commander Linton Wells II, "Plus ca Change," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceeding s 111 (June 1985): 30-37; Poe, p. 28-9;
Train, p. 302-3, 307.
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be is a joint responsibility of the on-scene commander
and the crisis manager. Left to themselves in a
particular situation, the former might be likely to
respond too strongly and at an earlier point in
developing events; the latter is likely to prefer more
restraint than.a rapidly heating crisis environment
may tolerate.
The tactical situation can appear much different to the on-
scene commander, operating under the guns of the adversary,
than it does to top-level political leaders, negotiating a
way out of the crisis with that same adversary. The
political-military dynamics of the two levels of interaction
can also be quite different, with a non-violent test of
capabilities being played out on-scene as an element in a
political strategy of coercive diplomacy.
The third tension is between performance of peacetime
missions and readiness to perform wartime missions. Martin
observed that when naval presence is exercised in an area of
acute military tension, political demonstration purposes
blend into preparations for warfare. That is, despite the
ostensibly non-belligerent purpose of the presence mission,
the naval forces must in fact have "a posture capable of
44
accepting combat." Naval forces deployed to the scene of
a crisis to lend credibility to a deterrent threat are also
43McGruther, p. 10. Also see Captain Frank Andrews,
"The Prevention of Surprise Attack," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 106 (May 1980): 134.
44 Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (New
York: Praeger, 1967), p. 143. Luttwak, p. 23, refers to
this phenomenon as a "duality of mission requirements."
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on-scene to take military action should deterrence fail.
They thus have two missions: to carry out their assigned
peacetime tasks, and to maintain readiness to conduct
wartime combat operations.
Although tension between performance of peacetime
missions and readiness to perform wartime missions is
inherent in crises, its impact on decision-making is a
function of the specific organizational perspectives of the
armed forces involved in the crisis. McNulty has described
the perspective commonly held by Naval Officers of presence
as opposed to the other Navy missions (deterrence, sea
control, and projection of power):
In all instances, our naval forces are organized and
optimized toward one or more of the other three roles,
and their commitment to the presence mission in any
given case must frequently conflict with their
readiness to perform tasks in support of what is
almost inevitably perceived as their primary mission.
This tendency to see the presence mission as
competitive and mutually exclusive with the remaining
mission areas seems to pose the gravest hazard to the
success of our Navy in support of the basic goal of
conflict avoidance."
This perspective, that wartime missions have priority over
and are the foundation for peacetime missions, was also
clearly evident in the Navy's own descriptions of its
missions, reviewed in the previous section. This view has
been consistent and strongly held for over forty years, and




The Maritime Strategy attempts to set crisis naval
operations and wartime naval operations into an overall
strategic framework. Should crisis response fail and a
Soviet-American crisis begin escalating toward war, the
first phase of what the Maritime Strategy refers to as
wartime naval operations would commence. This phase of
operations is intended to be executed (and, if possible,
completed) before war erupts. Aggressive forward deployment
of U.S. naval forces would take place on a global, basis in
order to deter the Soviets from launching a conventional
war. Again, the emphasis is on deterrence by denial,
deterring the Soviets by making it clear to them that they
cannot achieve their wartime aims. When this prewar deploy-
ment phase of operations commences, the tension between
peacetime operations and readiness for wartime operations is
resolved in favor of readiness for wartime operations.
As one would expect, given the wide range of crisis
scenarios that can be envisioned, the Maritime Strategy is
deliberately imprecise on when or under what circumstances
the transition from peacetime crisis response to the prewar
deployment phase of operations would occur. In all
likelihood, though this is not stated explicitly, the two
phases of the strategy would proceed simultaneously. Early
transition to the prewar deployment phase of operations in a
Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," pp. 9-11.
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crisis could create serious political and crisis management
problems.
Crisis management and escalation control entail much
more than deterrence by denial and escalation dominance, the
central strategic concepts of the Maritime Strategy. The
President could well decide upon a crisis management
strategy in which he is willing to accept much greater risks
to U.S. naval forces than are envisioned in the Maritime
Strategy. This could preclude execution of the strategy in
the manner preferred by the Navy. Conversely, naval forces
organized, trained, and positioned for execution of the
Maritime Strategy might not be immediately responsive to
unanticipated ad hoc operational requirements created by the
President's crisis management strategy.
The decision to shift from crisis response to the
first phase of wartime operations (prewar deployment) would
undoubtedly be a momentous and difficult one for the Presi-
dent. He can be expected to put off making this decision
for as long as possible while seeking a negotiated solution
to the crisis. Equally likely is the probability that the
President would order the first phase of wartime operations
incrementally, to use the forward deployments as further
signals of resolve and to convey increasingly strong coer-
cive threats. This raises the question of whether or not
the Navy's wartime operations plans have sufficient flexi-
bility to allow successful conduct of wartime operations
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under conditions of delayed and incremental execution of the
Maritime Strategy.
According to navy leaders, delayed or incremental
execution of wartime operations could seriously threaten the
ability of the Navy to achieve its wartime objectives.
Admiral James D. Watkins pointed this out in his 1986
description of the Maritime Strategy:
Keys to the success of both the initial phase
and the strategy as a whole are speed and decisiveness
in national decisionmaking. The United States must be
in position to deter the Soviets* "battle of the first
salvo" or deal with that if it comes. Even though a
substantial fraction of the fleet is forward deployed
in peacetime, prompt decisions are needed to permit
rapid forward deployment of additional forces in
crisis.
Admiral Watkins was arguing, in effect, for the decision to
commence the first phase of wartime operations to be made
earlier in a crisis rather than later, and decisively {all
at once) rather than incrementally. This clearly illus-
trates the nature of the tension between performance of
crisis missions and readiness to perform wartime missions.
Early and decisive execution of prewar naval deployments are
viewed by Navy leaders as crucial to the success of the
Maritime Strategy, but could well be viewed by the President
as a serious threat to crisis management. This tension is
not unique to the Maritime Strategy—it is inherent in the





The tension between performance of crisis political
missions and readiness to perform warfighting missions also
raises concerns among naval officers over political
restrictions imposed in mechanisms of indirect control,
48particularly the rules of engagement. Lieutenant
Commander T. Wood Parker has expressed concern that overly
restrictive rules of engagement could leave the Navy
vulnerable to a pre-emptive surprise attack:
Our specific rules of engagement, although classified
and dependent on the given situation, generally
require us to assume a ''defensive position" and to
react to a hostile act. This, of course, is not all
bad, for a different type of rules might result in a
miscalculation which could have catastrophic
consequences. Even so, our rules of engagement put us
at a disadvantage because our unit commanders and
individual commanding officers are forced to think
defensively prior to taking offensive action.
Moreover, our present rules put us in a very
unpalatable situation in that the enemy can start the
war at the time and place of his choosing. Within the
context of the "battle of the first salvo," so
important in Soviet military thinking, our rules of
engagement give the Soviet Navy a tremendous
advantage. The U.S. Navy can ill-afford to absorb a
massive, coordinated attack prior to being able to
take offensive action.
This concern arises fundamentally from the nature of modern
naval warfare, in which a premium is placed on striking
48 See Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, The Pueblo
Incident (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co. , 1970) , pp. 24-
26; Lieutenant Commander Michael N. Pocalyko, "25 Years
After the Blink," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 113
(September 1987): 43; Hill, pp. 127-8.
49Parker, p. 29. Also see Norman Friedman, "The Rules
of Engagement Issue," in E.F. Gueritz, et al., NATO '
s
Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments (Washington, DC:
Pergamon-Brassey * s , 1987), pp. 25-32.
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first. The possibility that a crisis could erupt in war
exacerbates the tension between political and military
considerations inherent in rules of engagement.
In a severe crisis, one in which Soviet-American
hostilities have risen to the point that wartime options
must start receiving consideration, the tensions between
political and military objectives becomes acute. Peacetime
political missions are prone to put naval forces in
locations other than where contingency plans for wartime
operations would have them, and can employ forces of a size
and composition other than would be optimum for wartime
50
operations. This can have two effects. First, the naval
force carrying out the political mission may not be suitable
or available for immediate employment in wartime operations
should war break out. It could well be sunk in the first
seconds of the war, its position being well known and its
presence being an aggravation. Second, the ability of the
fleets from which the units were drawn to conduct preplanned
wartime operations can be degraded by the absence of the
units.
Efforts to minimize the impact of these effects can
entail actions which may not be compatible with the
political objectives national leaders and the diplomatic






ships from their homeports to replace ships pulled from
forward deployed forces to perform political mission could
be misperceived by an adversary as a signal of intent to
seek a military solution to the crisis. Using a naval force
suitable for wartime operations for a political mission, or
attempting to keep it in a location and condition of
readiness suitable for wartime operations, could cause the
same misperception. On the other hand, failure to maintain
the readiness of naval forces for wartime missions be
misperceived as signaling a lack of resolve or a willingness
to sacrifice national interests to avoid an armed clash,
thus eroding credibility, undercutting the nation's
bargaining position, and debilitating efforts to negotiate a
solution to the crisis.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the U.S. Navy's view of its
role as a political instrument, examined the impact of naval
forces on crisis stability, and discussed the tensions
between political and military considerations that arise in
crisis naval operations.
Five views consistently expressed by U.S. Navy leaders
are particularly important for understanding their percep-
tions of the role of naval forces in crises. First,
warfighting capabilities are viewed as the foundation for
performance of peacetime missions. That is, peacetime
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missions are viewed as non-belligerent extensions of wartime
missions or as pre-war precursors of wartime missions.
Second, and closely related, Navy leaders strongly believe
that peacetime missions must entail maintaining readiness to
perform warfighting missions, particularly in crises.
Third, deterrence, at least below the strategic nuclear
level, is viewed as being achieved by threat of denial:
maintaining the capability to defeat enemy forces in battle,
thus denying the enemy the ability to achieve his military
objectives. Fourth, the purposes of forward presence are
viewed as demonstrating denial capabilities for deterrence
and placing forces where they are available to conduct
warfighting missions should deterrence fail. Fifth, the two
objectives of crisis response—crisis management and
escalation control—are viewed as best achieved through
employing forces capable of threatening deterrence by
denial, and therefore capable of defeating the enemy in
battle to achieve denial.
The theme underlying these five views is that combat
or warfighting capabilities are the basis for conducting
peacetime political missions. That Navy leaders should
espouse this view is not surprising, as the raison d'etre of
navies being to win battles at sea. The key point is that
political leaders and military commanders may be using the
same terms with much different meanings, and viewing the
same military actions as having much different purposes.
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Civilian leaders may view a crisis naval deployment as
serving escalation deterrence purposes, while naval leaders
view it as serving escalation dominance purposes. Civilian
leaders could authorize prewar naval deployments as a signal
of resolve, while naval leaders execute the deployments to
increase readiness for wartime operations. Such differences
in perspective—civilian leaders focusing on the political
considerations while military leaders focus on military
considerations—can give rise to tensions between political
and military considerations.
These differences in perspective are not a problem so
long as the deplyments succeed in acheiving their political
objectives, that is, so long as the other side refrains from
escalation. Two problems could arise, however, if fighting
does erupt—which could result from some sort of inadvertent
incident as well as from a deliberate decision by the
adversary. First, civilian leaders may not understand that
by executing (either incrementally or fully) military
contingency plans, they are authorizing U.S. forces to
conduct combat operations under certain circumstances—such
as in self-defense or anticipatory self-defense. Contin-
gency deplyments in support of allies involved in a crisis
can exacerbate thsi problem if U.S. forces are authorized to
use force in support of the ally. Second, civilian leaders
could unknowingly be limiting their future options to a
narrow range of military operations once fighting erupts.
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Viewing a particlar naval deployment as a political move,
civilian leaders may not task military leaders to prepare a
wide range of contingency responses to an outbreak of
fighting. Military leaders always have such contingency
responses, but, because their focus is on protecting their
forces and ensuring victory in any engagement that might
arise, the intensity and scope of combat operations they
envision could well exceed what civilian leaders would have
desired had they participated in the planning process.
Differences in perspective can thus have serious latent
implications that to not become apparent until an
unanticipated incident occurs.
The characteristics of naval forces that make them the
preferred type of force for use as a political instrument in
crises also tend to make them relatively more susceptible to
crisis stability problems than other types of forces. There
are three naval crisis stability problems. First, political
signals sent by naval forces are especially vulnerable to
misperception, making the misperception dilemma particularly
acute in naval crisis response. Second, the nature of
modern naval warfare places a premium on firing first in
tactical engagements, making the crisis security dilemma
particularly acute in naval crisis response. Third, naval




There are three political-military tensions: tension
between political considerations and the needs of diplomatic
bargaining, on the one hand, and military considerations and
the needs of military operations, on the other; tension
between the need for top-level control of military options
in a crisis, and the need for tactical flexibility and
instantaneous decision-making at the scene of the crisis;
and tension between performance of crisis political missions
and readiness to perform wartime combat missions. All three
of these tensions an likely to arise when naval forces are
employed as a political instrument in crises.
This completes the first phase of the research design,
which examined three major aspects of crisis military
interaction: military command and control, tactical-level
military interaction, and the role of naval forces in
crises. Discussion of these topics was necessary to develop
specific concepts for operationalizing the theory of
stratified interaction. With that task completed, the
second phase of the research design can now commence. The
second phase consists of four case studies of crisis naval
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CHAPTER VII
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN CRISES
The second phase of the research design consists of
four case studies of crisis naval operations. The four
cases are the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis, the 1967 Middle East War, and the 1973
Middle East War. The criteria for case selection were (a)
significant U.S. naval operations were conducted and
influenced the outcome of the crisis, (b) the naval
operations were conducted in the immediate proximity of
adversary naval forces or land-based forces that could
threaten naval forces, and (c) there was a possibility of
fighting erupting between the United States and the other
side in the crisis.
Eight questions addressing specific aspects of the
theory of stratified interaction will be addressed in each
case study. The first three questions address the
conditions necessary for stratified interaction to occur:
delegated control, tight coupling between the forces of the
two sides, and conditions of acute crisis. The first
question is to what degree were interactions between the




result of actions taken in accordance with mechanisms of
indirect control, rather than direct control by national
leaders? The second question is were the forces of the two
sides at the scene of the crisis tightly coupled with each
other? The third question is were the forces of the two
sides being used by their national leaders to convey
political signals in support of crisis bargaining?
The fourth question is did crisis interactions at the
tactical level become decoupled from the strategy being
pursued by national leaders? There are seven potential
causes of decoupling: communications and information flow
problems, impairment of political-level decisionmaking, a
fast-paced tactical environment, ambiguous or ambivalent
orders, tactically inappropriate orders, inappropriate
guidance in mechanisms of indirect control, and deliberate
unauthorized actions by military commanders. To establish
that stratified interactions became decoupled in a crisis
requires two findings: first, that one of the seven factors
just mentioned was present, creating conditions for
decoupling, and, second, that operational decisions made by
tactical-level decisionmakers differed from the decisions
that political-level decisionmakers would have made in order
to coordinate those actions with their political-diplomatic
strategy for resolving the crisis.
The fifth question is did national leaders and on-
scene commanders hold different perceptions of the
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vulnerability of on-scene forces to pre-emption and the need
to strike first in the event of an armed clash? This
question addresses the second corollary to the theory of
stratified interaction, that the security dilemma can become
stratified in crises. The implication of this is that
decision-makers at the political and tactical levels can
hold different perceptions of the offense-defense balance,
vulnerability to pre-emption, and the need to strike first.
The sixth question is, when tactical-level
interactions become decoupled, what factors inhibit
escalation dynamics from occurring at the tactical level and
being transmitted upward to the strategic and political
levels of interaction? This question addresses the third
corollary to the theory of stratified interaction, that
escalation dynamics can be stratified in a crisis. Although
escalation dynamics cannot be addressed directly—none of
the cases escalated to war—research was done to identify
conditions which may have inhibited escalation dynamics from
occurring.
The seventh question is did actions taken with
military forces send inadvertent signals to either
adversaries or friends, and did inadvertent military
incidents occur that affected efforts to manage the crisis?
This question addresses crisis management problems that
arise when military forces are employed in crises: the
misperception dilemma and inadvertent military incidents.
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The eighth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the crisis? There are three tensions between political and
military considerations that can arise when military forces
are used as a political instrument in crises: tension
between political considerations and the needs of diplomatic
bargaining, on the one hand, and military considerations and
the needs of military operations, on the other; tension
between the need for top-level control of military options
in a crisis, and the need for tactical flexibility and
instantaneous decision-making at the scene of the crisis;
and tension between performance of crisis political missions
and readiness to perform wartime combat missions. All three
tensions arise from the requirements of crisis management,
the essence of which is placing political constraints on
military operations.
The next four sections of this chapter present the
case studies of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the
1973 Arab-Israeli War. Each case study opens with an
overview of the background crisis and its context, followed
by a description objectives and strategies of each side.
After a review of the command and control methods that were
used, United States naval operations during the crisis are
discussed. Each case closes with a summary of findings on
the eight research questions.
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The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis
The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted in August when
the Chinese Communists launched an artillery blockade of
Quemoy Island, cutting off the flow of supplies to the
Nationalist Chinese garrison on the island. The United
States responded by announcing a commitment to the defense
of Quemoy and assisting the Nationalists in breaking the
blockade of the island. The crisis tapered off in October
1958, after the Chinese Communists announced that they would
not shell Quemoy on even days, allowing supplies to reach
the island. The United States Navy played a prominent role
in the crisis, escorting Nationalist convoys to Quemoy and
patrolling in the Taiwan Strait.
Background
During World War II, the United States was allied with
the Republic of China, ruled by President Chiang Kai-Shek
end the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) . Although nominally
fighting the Japanese, the Nationalists were more concerned
with suppressing the revolution that had been launched in
1927 by the the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) . Clashes
between Nationalist and Communist forces occurred during the
war and intensified afterwards despite United States efforts
at Mediating between the two sides. Full-scale civil war
erupted in 1947 and, after soundly defeating the National-
ists in several battles, the Communists proclaimed the
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People's Republic of China (PRO in Peking on October 1,
1949. Nationalist leaders fled the mainland to Taiwan on
December 8, 1949, and re-established their government in
Taipei. 1
The Nationalists and Communists were irreconcilable
because both sides claimed to be the only legitimate
government of all China. The Communists proclaimed the goal
of reuniting Taiwan with the mainland under Communist rule,
and the Nationalists proclaimed the goal of returning to the
mainland to place it under Nationalist rule. Thus was born
the confrontation in the Taiwan Straits between the
Nationalist Chinese and Communist Chinese.
The United States remained committed to the National-
ists and refused to recognize the People's Republic of
China. When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25,
1950, one of the first actions taken by the United States
was to send the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan against
invasion. U.S.-PRC relations deteriorated badly during the
Korean War, especially after Chinese "volunteers" launched a
See James P. Harrison, The Long March to Power (New
York: Praeger, 1972)
, pp. 91-431; O. Edmund Clubb, 20th
Century China . Third Edition (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1978), pp. 149-297; John King Fairbank, The Great
Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985 (New York: Harper and Row,
1986), pp. 204-269. On the American role, see U.S.
Department of State, "United States Relations With China,
With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949," Department
of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, August
1949, pp. 59-411; Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in




devastating offensive against United Nations Command forces
in October 1950 and President Eisenhower "unleashed" Chiang
Kai-shek against the mainland in February 1953. The
Nationalist-Communist confrontation became firmly embedded
in the Soviet-American cold war when the PRC signed a thirty-
year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on February 14,
1950, and the ROC signed a Mutual Defense Assistance
2Agreement with the United States on February 9, 1951.
The Nationalists occupied several islands off the
coast of mainland China as they fled to Taiwan. Many of the
islands were soon abandoned, but the Nationalists maintained
garrisons on a few: the Quemoy (Jinmen) group, off the port
city of Araoy across the straights from Taiwan; Matsu, off
the port city of Fuchou across from the northern end of
Taiwan; and the Tachen group, off of Wenchou about 200 miles
north of Taiwan. The offshore islands had little value for
the defense of Taiwan, but were useful as bases for military
raids and intelligence missions against the mainland. The
offshore islands also had important symbolic value to the
Nationalists. Quemoy had been the site of the only
significant Nationalist success in battle against the
Communists, a victory commemorated with a large monument on
the island.
2See Roderick MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations,
1949-71 (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 78-100; DuPre Jones,
ed., China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly, 1980), pp. 85-96*.
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Nationalist forces were forced to evacuate the Tachen
Islands during the 1954-1955 Taiwan Straits Crisis under the
pressure of PRC air attacks. The crisis erupted on
September 3, 1954, with heavy shelling of Quemoy by the
PRC. The Nationalists returned fire and four days later
began launching large-scale air attacks against the
mainland. The United States responded by immediately
ordering the Seventh Fleet to resume its patrol of the
Taiwan Straits. By February 1955 the Nationalist position
on the Tachen Islands had become untenable, and the United
States convinced the ROC to withdraw its garrison with
Seventh Fleet support. The withdrawal was conducted
successfully without interference from the PRC, which
declared a ceasefire in the area two days before the
evacuation. The crisis tapered off after this as the PRC
adopted a less militant line toward Taiwan and the United
States. This policy, first apparent at the April 1955
Bandung Conference of African and Asian nations, called for
peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and lasted until July 1958.
China and the United States also commenced diplomatic discus-
sions in Geneva, which would continue until December 1957.
See Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan
Strait," Orbis 3 (Fall 1959): 336-38; 0. Edmund Clubb,
"Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-
1955," Political Science Quarterly 74 (December 1959): 517-
31; Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "United States Policy
Toward the Offshore Islands," in John D. Montgomery and
Arthur Smithies, eds., Public Policy , Volume 15 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 119-38; J.H.
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The most important consequence of the 1954-1955 Taiwan
Strait Crisis was a deepened United States commitment to the
Nationalists. The United States signed a Mutual Defense
Treaty with the ROC on December 2, 1954, and Congress passed
the Formosa Resolution in January 1955. The Formosa
Resolution authorized the President "to employ the Armed
forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the
specific purpose of securing and defending Formosa and the
Pescadores against armed attack." The resolution did not
explicitly state that the United States would defend the
offshore islands, but stated that the President's authority
to defend Formosa and the Pescadores included "the securing
and protection of such related positions and territories of
4that area now in friendly hands." The Eisenhower Admini-
stration chose not to make a formal, public commitment to
defend the offshore islands, but did make a private commit-
ment to Chiang Kai-shek on January 31, 1955, that the United
• 5States would defend the islands. It is not clear, however,
Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises; Political-
Military Interactions in the 1950s (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1975), pp. 120-55; Bennett C. Rushkoff,
"Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955,"
Political Science Quarterly 96 (Fall 1981): 465-80; Gordon
H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the
Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," International Security 12 (Spring
1988) : 96-122.
4U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy,
1950-55: Basic Documents , Volume II (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 2486-87.
5Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink," pp. 102, 104, 120.
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that the commitment to defend the offshore islands, which
was made as part of an agreement with Chaing to evacuate the
Tachens, was intended to last indefinitely. The fact that
in making the private commitment the Eisenhower Administra-
tion was breaking an earlier promise (January 19) to make a
public commitment, suggests that the the private commitment--
better described as informal assurance—was intended only to
resolve the immediate crisis. President Eisenhower would
later interpret the Formosa Resolution narrowly to mean that
the United States could not defend the offshore islands
unless their loss would threaten the defense of Taiwan.
Everett F. Drumwright, the U.S. ambassador to the Republic
of China in 1958, has stated categorically that "we had no
private agreement with Chiang to defend the islands." The
Eisenhower Administration thus did not perceive itself in
1958 as bound by the informal assurances it had given Chiang
in 1955 that the U.S. would defend the offshore islands.
Between 1954 and 1957 the Nationalists increased the
Quemoy garrison from 30,00 to 86,100 troops—almost one-
third of their ground forces. Chiang Kai-shek probably
wanted to ensure that the United States would help defend
Quoted in Jonathan T. Howe, Multicrises; Sea Power
and Global Politics in the Missile Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1971), p. 170. Also see Dwight D. Eisenhower, The
White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday and Co., 1965), pp. 293-5; Fred I. Greenstein, The
Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York:
Basic Books, 1982), pp. 20-24; Howe, pp. 167-72, 184-93.
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the island in the event of a Communist attack—loss of a
third of the Nationalist army would seriously weaken the
defense of Taiwan. Chiang also had not abandoned the option
of someday taking offensive action against the mainland, and
may also have deployed the troops to Quemoy so as to be able
to rapidly exploit political upheaval on the mainland. The
Eisenhower Administration was concerned over Chiang's
aggressive designs and sought to restrain him by hedging the
7American commitment to defend the offshore islands.
Tension in the Taiwan Straits remained at a relatively
low level from April 195b to July 1958. The Nationalists
used the offshore islands for limited political and military
operations, such as infiltration of agents into the mainland
and broadcasting propaganda over loudspeakers. The Commun-
ist Chinese occasionally shelled the offshore islands or
buzzed them with aircraft. Neither side increased the
gintensity of such operations prior to late August 1958.
7Eisenhower, p. 296; Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio
Chiang Kai-shek and the United States ," Western Political
Quarterly 12 (December 1959): 1075-77; Leon V. Sigal, "The
'Rational Policy' Model and the Formosa Straits Crisis,"
International Studies Quarterly 14 (June 1970): 126-7;
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in
American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974)
, pp. 369-70; Leonard H.D.
Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the
Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962," Journal of American History 72
(December 1985): 640-644; Howe, pp. 173-76.
8Morton H. Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis:
A Documented History," Memorandum RM-4900-ISA (Santa
Monica, CA: Rand, December 1966, declassified March 1975),
pp. 8-12; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under
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The more important factor appears to have been that
the PRC was growing frustrated over its lack of progress in
peacefully liberating Taiwan. Ambassadorial talks with the
United States in Poland had failed to yield any American
9
concessions on the Taiwan issue. In July 1958, the PRC
shifted to a more militant policy toward the Nationalists,
and began building up its air and naval forces in Fukien
Province, across the Straits from Taiwan. On August 23,
1958, the Communist Chinese commenced an intense artillery
bombardment of Quemoy, firing over 40,000 shells in two
hours according Nationalist spokesmen. This marked the
start of the second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 79-81. These two
studies disagree as to whether or not Nationalist military
activities on the offshore islands contributed to
precipitating the crisis. Gurtov and Huang contend that.
Nationalist activities during the first half of 1958 were a
serious provocation. Halperin, on the other hand, contends
that the level of Nationalist activities had actually
declined, and were much less provocatory in 1958 than in
earlier years. The evidence presented in the two studies
supports Halperin* s view, but the low level of Nationalist
military operations that were being conducted from the
Offshore islands were probably still an annoyance to the
Communist Chinese.
9Gurtov and Hwang, pp. 75-83.
"Chinese Communists Shell Quemoys in Record Attack,"
New York Times , August 24, 1958, p. 1; Morton H. Halperin
and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in Morton H.
Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 274-5; Allen S.
Whiting, "Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations," China
Quarterly 62 (June 1975): 265-6; Harold C. Hinton, China's
Turbulent Quest (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,




The PRC probably had three objectives in launching the
artillery bombardment of Quemoy. The first objective was to
deter the Nationalists from using the offshore islands for
harassment of the mainland, or as a base for a future
invasion of the mainland. This would reduce the annoyance
of Nationalist military activities from the offshore islands
and perhaps lead to a reduction in the Nationalist garrison
on the islands. The second objective was to force the
Nationalists to withdraw form Quemoy, similar to the manner
in which they had been force'", to abandon the Tachen Islands
in 1955. The blockade of Quemoy appears to have been
designed to cause logistical problems similar to those that
forced evacuation of the Tachens. The third objective was
to avoid war with the United States, which could well result
in U.S. atomic attacks on the mainland. The advantage of a
blockade over an outright invasion was that it was less
likely to provoke the United States into attacking the
mainland in support of the Nationalists. The fourth
objective was to discredit the American commitment to the
Nationalists and weaken U.S. -ROC relations. This could have
been the outcome if the United States did not intervene to
break the blockade and the Nationalists were forced to
evacuate Quemoy. Weakening U.S. -ROC relations might make
the Nationalists more amenable to negotiations and even
weaken the defense of Taiwan. The fifth objective was to
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prompt the United States to resume the Ambassadorial talks
in Poland, which the Americans had broken off and refused to
resume despite a request from the PRC. If none of the other
objectives were achieved, negotiations would offer an
opportunity to gain American and Nationalist concessions in
the Taiwan Strait.
The strategy adopted by the PRC has been described by
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke as a limited probe:
"In initiating their potent but limited probe via an
artillery blockade, the Chinese Communists correctly
perceived both the ambiguity of the U.S. commitment to
Quemoy that had been written into the Formosa Resolution and
the high probability that Washington would observe important
limits on its military response if it decided to react to a
low-level threat to Quemoy. Peking chose an appropriately
cautious military operation for testing and clarifying the
U.S. commitment, and for exerting pressure to erode the
administration's willingness to accept risks in order to
12help defend Quemoy." The essential features of the
Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956 -
1961 {Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp.
206-8; George and Smoke, pp. 371-6;. Halperin and Tsou, "The
1958 Quemoy Crisis," p. 275; Whiting, pp. 264-7; Sigal, pp.
142-4; Gurtov and Hwang, pp. 92-94; Gordon, p. 645.
12George and Smoke, p. 370. Gurtov and Hwang, p. 91,
reject the probe thesis. They are correct in contending
that it was not Peking's objective simply to test American
resolve, but the ambiguity of the American commitment to
Quemoy made such a test an important element in the
Communist Chinese strategy .
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strategy were strict limits on the use of force against the
Nationalists, avoidance of military engagements with
American forces, and employment of a military option that
could readily be scaled back or halted to avert United
States intervention. As Tang Tsou has pointed out, the
Chinese Communists "shifted to the United States the
decision as to whether there would be a direct encounter
14between American and Communist Chinese forces in Asia."
Peking thus adopted a strategy that allowed it to adapt its
military campaign to the intensity of the American reaction
—
maintaining pressure on Quemoy if the U.S. commitment was
weak, or backing off and settling for lesser objectives if
the U.S. threatened escalation against the mainland.
Although Communist China primarily relied on an
artillery barrage to blockade Quemoy / it also used PT boats
Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War, H pp. 338-341; George
and Smoke, pp. 365, 373-5; Zagoria, pp. 206-8; Thomas E.
Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), pp. 86-87. The strategy employed by
the Communist Chinese in the 1358 Taiwan Straits Crisis is
an example of the approach to use of force they employed
from 1950 onward. See Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the
Security of Asia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 202-224;
Alan S. Whiting, "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the
People's Republic of China," Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 402 (July 1972): 55-66; Alan
S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and
Indochina (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
1975), pp. 196-223; Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus
and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Crisis
Management," World Politics 30 (April 1978): 391-410; Edward
W. Ross, "Chinese Conflict Management," Military Review 60
(January 1980) : 13-25.
l4Tsou, "Mao's Limited War," p. 341.
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to attack Nationalist ships and occasionally attacked the
island with aircraft. On August 24 the Communists made an
attempt to seize Tung Ting Island, a tiny Nationalist-
occupied island eighteen miles southwest of Quemoy. The
Nationalists repelled the invasion force and there were no
further Communist attempts to invade any of the islands in
the Quemoy group. It is likely that Tung Ting was the only
island that the Communist Chinese intended to invade at the
outset. Tung Ting had minor military value: it was close to
the sealanes to Quemoy, so Communist possession of it would
aid their blockade of Quemoy. However, the primary reason
for seizing Tung Ting would have been the psychological
impact of its loss on the Nationalists. Loss of the island
sight have demoralized the Nationalists and, the Communists
nay have hoped, led the Nationalists to believe that Quemoy
was also indefensible. Additionally, seizing a single, tiny
island would be a low-level test the U.S. commitment to the
defense of the offshore islands. If seizing Tung Ting did
not evoke a strong U.S. response, other small islands in the
Quemoy group probably would have been seized as part of
protracted campaign against Quemoy.
The Soviet Union played a peripheral role in the
crisis. Strains had begun to develop in the Sino-Soviet
alliance in 1956 and 1957, but as of 1958 both sides were
still trying to forestall the rupture that would occur .




Peking, Mao may have informed Khrushchev in very general
terms of China's intention to take action against the
offshore islands. In his memoirs, Khrushchev states that
his government supported Chinese military aid requests for
the upcoming operation. However, once the Chinese
bombardment of Quemoy began, the Soviets were circumspect in
their propaganda support until the Communists had taken
15
steps to avert a direct clash with the United States.
The Soviets appear to have had two objectives in the
crisis. The first Soviet objective was to improve Sino-
Soviet relations, the deterioration of which had in part
been due to Chinese displeasure with the Soviet handling of
American "imperialism.** As long as the crisis did not
result in war, the costs would be small—some military aid,
propaganda support, and deterrent threats to the United
States. The second Soviet objective was to avoid being
dragged into war with the United States by the actions of
Communist China. The Soviet strategy in the crisis
reflected these objectives. The Soviets supported the
limited Chinese objective of neutralizing the offshore
islands as a threat to the mainland, but sought to restrain
15Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last
Testament , translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 261-3; John R. Thomas,
"Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958, " Orbis 6
(Spring 1962): 38-64; Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's
Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1962), pp. 123-7; Halperin and Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy




the Chinese from taking action that might provoke a war with
the United States. By remaining circumspect in their
support of Peking during the crucial opening phase of the
crisis, when it was not clear how far the Chinese were
willing to go in provoking the United States or how strongly
the United States would react, the Soviets moderated the
intensity of the crisis.
The Eisenhower Administration had three primary
objectives, all of which were clearly articulated in
American policy statements issued during the crisis. The
first objective was to prevent Quemoy from falling into
Communist hands. This objective was driven by the specific
United States commitment to the Nationalist government on
Hsieh, pp. 119, 122, 129; Thomas, pp. 39-40;
Zagoria, pp. 216-7; Halperin and Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy
Crisis,- pp. 287-94; Howe, pp. 178-80, 193-200, 218-24.
Analysts are divided on whether Moscow and Peking agreed or
disagreed on the level and type support the Soviets would
provide. One view is that the Soviets provided much less
support than they had led the Chinese to expect. The
Chinese made this accusation in a bitter 1963 denunciation
of the Soviets, after the Sino-Soviet split had erupted in
public acrimony. See Thomas, p. 63; Zagoria, p. 217; John
Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968)
, pp. 89-92; Alfred
D . Low , The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics
(Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
1976), pp. 86-90. A second view is that Mao and Khrushchev
were in agreement on the level of support the Soviets would
provide. See Halperin and Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,"
p. 287; Sigal, p. 142; Gurtov and Hwang, p. 89. A third
view is that Mao and Khrusuchev did not discuss the issue at
all and the anticipated level of Soviet support was not a
major factor in Chinese decisionmaking. The key point for
this study is that in any case the Soviet strategy was to
restrain the Chinese Communists from taking action that
might provoke war with the United States.
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Taiwan, the policy of containment of Communist China, which
meant resisting moves viewed as expansionist, and the
general principle of resisting use of force to achieve
territorial changes. The second objective was to prevent
the crisis from involving the United States in a war with
Communist China and the Soviet Union. This objective
required that the United States restrain the actions taken
by the Nationalists against the mainland and limit the role
of U.S. forces in the conflict. The third objective was to
stabilize the situation in the Taiwan Strait with a cease-
fire, to be followed by an effort to get both sides to
renounce the use of force against the other and to get the
Nationalists to reduce their garrison on the offshore
islands.
The United States strategy in the crisis had four
elements: first, to deter Communist China from invading
Quemoy, expanding the conflict to Taiwan or the Pescadores,
or attacking U.S. forces; second, to break the blockade of
Quemoy with a minimum amount of force, in particular without
17See "Dulles Cautions Peiping on Isles," New York
Times . August 24, 1958, p. 1; "Eisenhower Sees Increased
Need to Guard Quemoy," New York Times , August 28, 1958, p.
1; "U.S. Warns Peiping After Red Threat to Invade Quemoy,"
New York Times . August 29, 1958, p. 1; "U.S. Decides to Use
Force if Reds Invade Quemoy," New York Times , September 5,
1958, p. 1; "President Says nation Must Fight if Necessary
to Bar Quemoy Fall," New York Tiroes , September 12, 1958, p.
1; Eisenhower, pp. 294-300, 691-3. Also see George and
Smoke, pp. 364-5; Gordon, pp. 644-650; Kenneth T. Young,
Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States
Experience, 1953-1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 147.
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attacking the Chines* mainland; third, to restrain the
Nationalists from launching military operations that could
escalate the conflict; and fourth, to pursue negotiations
with the Nationalists and Communists toward reducing
18tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The thrust of this
strategy was to turn the tables on the Chinese Communists.
Apparently assuming that the Nationalists and Americans
would not be able to break the blockade without attacks on
the mainland, Peking had adopted the limited probe strategy
in order to force the decision to escalate on the United
States. By adopting a strategy emphasizing a limited
response—breaking the blockade without attacking the
mainland—the United States passed "the onerous burden of
deciding whether to accept the existing situation or to
1 q
escalate** back to the Chinese Communists."
The key requirement for the American strategy to
succeed was to break the blockade of Quemoy without
attacking the Chinese mainland. Militarily, this strategy
carried a high risk of defeat. Early in the crisis American
military and naval commanders in the Far East were not at
18
"Dulles Hints U.S. has Specific Plan for China
Parlay," New York Times , September 10, 1958, p. i; MText of
Eisenhower Speech on Taiwan Situation," New York Times ,
September 12, 1958, p. 2; "Washington Bars China Coast
Raids," New York Times . September 24, 1958, p. 1; "Chiang
Promises not to Use Force to Win Mainland," New York Times ,
October 24, 1958, p. 1; Eisenhower, pp. 294-300; Gordon, pp
644-650; Young, p. 149.
19George and Smoke, p. 367.
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•11 confident that they would be able to resupply Quemoy
under the artillery barrage. The Chinese Communists had in
effect written the rules for the military contest that was
to follow, and those rules were highly unfavorable for the
American strategy. Alexander L. George has aptly described
the strategy adopted by the Eisenhower Administration as a
"test of capabilities under restrictive, initially
20
unfavorable, ground rules. If the strategy succeeds, as
it did in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the expected
21
outcome is reversed without escalation of the conflict.
Using the categories of crises presented in Chapter
II, which distinguished between direct and indirect crises,
for the United States it was an indirect crisis. The United
States was brought into the confrontation through its
alliance with the Nationalists on Taiwan. This meant that,
in addition to controlling the actions or its own forces,
the United States also had to be concerned with the behavior
of its Nationalist allies, lest they provoke a war with
Communist China. It also aeant that the United States had
to avoid the appearance of being overly conciliatory toward
the adversary, lest an inadvertent signal of retrenchment be
20Alexander L. George, "The Development of Doctrine
and Strategy,'* in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and
William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston
Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 20-21.
21Ibid. Also see Alexander L. George, "Crisis
Management: The Interaction of Political and Military
Considerations," Survival 26 (September/October 1984): 230.
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sent to the Nationalists and an inadvertent signal of
acquiescence be sent to the Communists.
In summary, the essence of the 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis was a limited probe by Communist China against the
Nationalist-held offshore islands, countered by a United
States strategy of engaging in a test of capabilities under
restrictive ground rules. Both sides sought to achieve
limited political objectives while preventing the crisis
from escalating to war.
Command and Control
Prior to discussing the United States naval operations
conducted in the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, it will be
useful to review the command structure that existed at the
time. The 1958 defense reorganization, which removed the
Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command,
had not yet been implemented. The unified commands reported
to the JCS for operational control. The JCS used a system
of designating one of the service chiefs to act as the
"executive agent" for the JCS in controlling a particular
operation. This ensured that a single commander, rather
than a committee, was responsible for detailed management of
the operation at the JCS level. The JCS executive agent was
responsible to the JCS, but was normally accorded
substantial authority and could work directly with the
Secretary of Defense so long as he kept the JCS informed.

442
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, was the
22
JCS executive agent for the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
The next level in the chain of command was the
Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) , Admiral Admiral Harry
D. Felt, the unified commander for all United States forces
in the Pacific theater. CINCPAC reported to the JCS,
usually through its executive agent. In his oral history,
Admiral Felt states that he reported to the JCS and had
substantial operational authority: "I had a way of
operating which turned out very well... I'd send in
something and, unless otherwise directed, I'm going to do
this or that. That would be the Joint Staff's solution to
the problem. And I never once got countermanded on
that."23 Admiral Felt is describing JSC control of CINCPAC
by the method of control by negation, in which the
subordinate commander reports his operational intentions
rather than waiting for direct orders.
There were three component commands under CINCPAC:
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) , and
Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific (CINCARPAC) . Admiral
Herbert G. Hopwood was CINCPACFLT during the Taiwan Strait
22
Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 62.
23Admiral Harry D. Felt, "Reminiscences of Admiral
Harry Donald Felt, U.S. Navy (Retired)," Volume II




Crisis. Under CINCPACFLT were two operational commands (the
First Seventh Fleets), eight administrative commands (for
training and readiness of specific types of forces, such as
aircraft or destroyers), and six area commands (for U.S.
naval forces assigned to particular areas, such as Japan and
the Philippines). 24 Commander Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT)
as the command responsible for naval operations in the
Western Pacific, including the seas around Taiwan.
During the Taiwan Strait Crisis, COMSEVENTHFLT was
Vice Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, relieved on October 1,
1958, by Vice Admiral Frederick N. Kivette. The Seventh
Fleet was divided into five Task Forces (TF) and one Task
Group: Task Force 72, the Formosa Patrol Force; Task Force
73, the Logistic Support Force; Task Force 76, the
Amphibious Assault Force; Task Force 77, the Attack Carrier
Striking Force; Task Force 79, the Fleet Marine Force; and
Task Force 70.4, the ASW Hunter-Killer (HUK) Group. 25 The
units assigned to these task forces changed as ships and
squadrons deployed from the United States for duty with the
Seventh Fleet. Command of each task force was assigned to
the senior flag officer commanding the units assigned to it,
24Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, "Commander in
Chief United States Pacific Fleet, Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 1959,- July 27, 1959 (declassified 1983), p. 5, Opera-
tional Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC





so changed with the rotation of ships from the United
States.
The Formosa Patrol Force originated during the Korean
War, when President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to
guard Taiwan against Communist attack. The Navy ships and
patrol planes assigned to patrol the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait
were designated a separate task force (TF 72) on August 24,
1950. Task Force 72 became the Formosa Patrol Force in
1953, reflecting the nature of its duties, and was renamed
the Taiwan Patrol Force in 1957. Rear Admiral Paul P.
Blackburn, Jr., was Commander of the Taiwan Patrol Force in
1958. During the crisis, the force consisted of a cruiser,
approximately twelve destroyers (the number varied) , two
patrol plane squadrons, and two seaplane tenders, one of
26
which served as the force flagship.
The United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC) was
established on December 1, 1953, as the Formosa Defense
Command. From establishment of the command until February
1957, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet was "dual hatted**
as Commander of the Formosa Defense Command. Although
nominally a unified command (technically, a "sub-unified"
command reporting to CINCPAC) , the Formosa Defense Command
was in fact only an administrative and liaison agency for
26Enclosure to Commander U.S. Taiwan Patrol Force
letter. Serial 386, August 10, 1959 (Operational Archives,
Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC); Vice Admiral Paul
P. Blackburn, Jr., letter to author, May 30, 1988.
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coordinating (vice controlling) the defense of Taiwan. The
Commander of the Formosa Defense Command had operational
control of the Formosa Patrol Force, but only because he was
also COMSEVENTHFLT. 27
In February 1957, the Formosa Defense Command received
its own commander and was renamed the U.S. Taiwan Defense
Command (COMUSTDC) . This upgraded the status of the command
and allowed more effective planning and coordination, but
the commander still did not have operational control of U.S.
forces defending Taiwan. On September 11, 1958, the U.S.
Taiwan Defense Command became a true unified command with
the commander having operational control of all U.S. forces
committed to the defense of Taiwan. The U.S. Taiwan
Defense Command consisted of three component commanders:
Commander Taiwan Patrol Force (TF 72) , Commander Air Task
Force Thirteen (Provisional) , and the Chief of the Military
Assistance Advisory Group (U.S. Army units) . The Commander
of the Taiwan Defense Command during the 1958 Taiwan Strait
28Crisis was Vice Admiral Roland N. Smoot.
27
Ibid; Commander U.S. Taiwan Patrol Force, "Review of
Actions Occurring During Kinmen Resupply and Recommendations
Based Thereon; Report of," letter, Serial 0019, November 22,
1958 (declassified 1972), Operational Archives, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, DC (Cited hereafter as
"Taiwan Patrol Force Review").
28 Ibid; "CINCPACFLT Annual Report," p. 8; Halperin,
"The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," pp. 62, 370; "U.S. Unifies
Force Guarding Taiwan for Quick Action," New York Times ,
September 20, 1958, p. 1.
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United States communications capabilities in 1958
forced employment of delegated methods of control, rather
than direct methods of control. Neither the Defense
Communications System (DCS) nor the Worldwide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS) were in existence (DCS
was established in 1960 and WWMCCS was established in 1962)
.
Existing communications systems had been created well before
the unified command system was established and thus were not
designed to support it. Washington could not establish
direct radio communications with naval forces at sea, and
excessive time delays precluded real-time control of forces
on Taiwan. In his 1966 study of the crisis, Morton H.
Halperin noted that "it sometimes took several days for
classified messages to reach Washington from Taipei or vice
versa," and that such delays were "significantly to hamper
29policymaking throughout the crisis . " The primary
communications channels between commanders ashore were
telegraph and teletype lines. Long-range high frequency
radio communications were also available, but subject to
atmospheric interference and limited to radiotelegraph
(manual morse code) and slow radioteletype (major ships
only) . Direct radio communications between Washington and
the Far East (or CINCPAC in Hawaii) were not possible, but
telephone communications were available to Hawaii and were
29Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 250.
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Heavy reliance had to be placed on mechanisms of
indirect control and the good judgement of the on-acene
commanders. Washington did not provide detailed operational
guidance to Navy operational commanders in the Far East.
Vice Admiral Alexander Heyward, Director of the Politico-
Military Affairs Division of the CNO*s staff during the
crisis, states that "civilian authorities did not attempt to
exercise detailed control over those operations." Navy
commanders were delegated substantial decisionmaking
authority and given relatively broad freedom of action.
COMUSTDC and COMSEVENTHFLT originated and planned virtually
32
all of the operations that were conducted. Vice Admiral
For an overview of communications technology, see
Ashton B. Carter, "Communications Technologies and
Vulnerabilities," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner,
and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987), pp. 233-257. For a brief
history of the evolution of U.S. communications systems, see
Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Refining the
Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), pp. 51-53.
Vice Admiral Alexander S. Heyward, Jr., letter to
author, May 27, 1988. Vice Admiral Heyward was responsible
for Navy liaison with the State Department and played a key
role in coordinating naval policy with political policy
during the crisis.
32Felt, "Reminiscences," pp. 392-3; Vice Admiral
Herbert D. Riley (Chief of staff to CINCPAC in 1958), "The
Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, U.S. Navy
(Retired)," Volume II (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute,
Oral History Program, 1972), pp. 360-1; Halperin, "The 1958




Blackburn, Commander of the Taiwan Patrol force, states that
ha experienced "very little interference from the powers in
Washington" during the crisis. The only detailed guidance
they received concerned limits on the operations they could
conduct, such as how close U.S. Navy ships could approach
the mainland.
Two of the mechanisms of indirect control warrant
further attention. First, the United States, including the
U.S. Taiwan Defense Command and the Taiwan Patrol Force, did
not have contingency plans for assisting the Nationalists
with the resupply of Quemoy. These commands began
formulating plans for resupply and convoy escort in late
August, when it became apparent that the Nationalists could
not resupply Quemoy on their own, but the plans were not
completed until September 3 (ten days after the Communist
artillery barrage started) and the first convoy was not
34
ready to sail until three days later. As it turned out,
however, this delay did not have a major impact on the
crisis—the Eisenhower Administration did not commit itself
to the defense of Quemoy until September 4, and the garrison
on Quemoy had adequate supplies to hold for • the additional
two weeks that were required for substantial supplies to
reach the island.
Blackburn, letter to author, May 30, 1988.
34
"Taiwan Patrol Force Review,** Enclosure 4, p. 1;




One aspect of contingency planning caused particular
problems for U.S. military commanders in the Pacific. Under
the Eisenhower Administration's strategy of "massive
retaliation," primary emphasis in war planning had been on
plans calling for use of nuclear weapons from the onset of a
conflict. Planning, training, and logistical preparations
for extended conventional operations had been neglected,
particularly in the Air Force. The Eisenhower Administra-
tion had previously directed, during the 1954-55 Quemoy-
Matsu Crisis, that plans be made to defend the offshore
35islands with nuclear weapons. When the 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis erupted, some U.S. commanders in the Pacific, such as
General Lawrence Kuter, Commander in Chief Pacific Air
Force, expected that if a decision were made to defend
Quemoy, it would be with nuclear weapons. However, the
Eisenhower Administration, which was not enthusiastic about
defending the offshore islands to begin with, directed that
planning proceed on the basis that only conventional weapons
would initially be used. Nuclear weapons would only be used
as a last resort with specific approval of the President.
This was a significant change in Administration policy, for
which some commanders were not prepared. The problems
caused by this policy shift primarily affected the Air
Force, but also caused problems for the Navy, which had a




significant nuclear delivery role in 1958. This sudden
shift from emphasis on nuclear weapons to their use only as
a last resort is an extreme example of t'ie problems military
commanders can have when, in the process of drafting
contingency plans, they must anticipate the approach
civilian leaders will want to take in managing a crisis.
CINCPAC, the JCS, and the Eisenhower Administration
paid close attention to the authority delegated to
operational commanders. President Eisenhower states in his
memoirs that he "saw no need to delegate to any subordinates
my authority as Commander-in-Chief to commit United States
forces to action," and that he therefore retained this
37
authority himself. However, the classified documentary
record compiled by Morton H. Halperin shows that the
President did delegate certain authority to the JCS. The
President on September 6, 1958, approved a JCS request that
it be delegated authority to take the following emergency
actions, but only "under those circumstances when time does
not permit securing the President's specific approval in
each case":
Felt, "Reminiscences," p. 396; Admiral Charles K.
Dennison (Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations at
CINCPAC, 1956-1958), "The Reminiscences of Admiral Charles
K. Dennison, U.S. Navy (Retired)," Volume I (Annapolis, MD:
U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program, November 1978)
,
pp. 536-41; Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," pp.




2. In the event of a major emergency arising from an
attack on Taiwan and the offshore islands moving so
rapidly that it would not permit consultation with the
President, JCS would take the following actions on
behalf of the Secretary of Defense: a) CINCPAC would
be authorized to augment U.S. forces engaged in the
defense of Taiwan from the resources of his own
command; b) all U.S. forces worldwide would be
alerted; c) oppose any major attack on Taiwan and
attack mainland bases with all CINCPAC forces that can
be brought to bear.
3. In the event of a major landing attack on offshore
islands, authority for the following actions not now
authorized would be desirable: a) approve CHINAT
[Chinese Nationalist] Air Force's striking enemy
forces and mainland targets; b) authority for U.S.
forces to strike with conventional weapons and CHICOM
[Chinese Communist] assault of major proportions
moving against Offshore Islands.
4. Use of atomic weapons and U.S. air attack in
support of CHINAT Air Force in 3(a) above [air strikes





necessary, only as approved by the President.
In approving this JCS request, the President specifically
did not delegate authority for U.S. forces to strike
mainland bases in the event of an attack on the offshore
islands (paragraph three) , nor did he delegate authority for
U.S. forces to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances
(paragraph four). As Halperin points out, the JCS did not
further delegate this authority: "The Joint Chiefs looked
upon the authority given to them as not subject to delega-
tion to commanders in the field and hence did not pass on
38Quoted in Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits
Crisis," pp. 285-6. Also see "Eisenhower Sees Increased
Need to Guard Quemoy," New York Times , August 28, 1958, p.
2; "U.S. Decides to Use Force if Reds Invade Quemoy," New
York Times . September 5, 1958, p. 1; "Dulles Hints U.S. has




the authority to defend Quemoy." The President and the
JCS thus gave careful consideration to the authority they
delegated to subordinate commanders, striking a balance
between delegation and control.
The rules of engagement authorized U.S. ships and
aircraft to use force in self-defense, but prohibited them
from taking offensive action against the mainland. The CKO
warned CINCPAC that U.S. forces must "avoid any action which
is provocative or might be made to appear provocative before
40
world opinion. H The rules of engagement issued by
Commander Seventh Fleet authorized use of force to protect
Nationalist ships under attack by Communist ships, aircraft,
or submarines, but warned that U.S. forces were not to
provoke fire from Communist shore batteries or engage in
gunfire duels with them other than as necessary for self-
defense and defense of Nationalist ships. Vice Admiral
Beakley sent this admonition: "Remember, the shot you fire
will be heard around the world, maybe in the floor of the
UN. Be right. However, the objective is to get the
41
supplies through."
39Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 287.
40Gordon, p. 647. Also see Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan
Straits Crisis," pp. 207-208; "Eisenhower Sees Increased
Need to Guard Quemoy," New York Times , August 28, 1958, p.
2; "U.S. to Answer Any Air Attack," New York Times ,
September 12, 1958, p. 3; Gordon, p. 644
41Quoted in Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits
Crisis," p. 208. Also see Riley, "Reminiscences," p. 630.
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Vice Admiral Blackburn, Commander of the Taiwan Patrol
Force, states that U.S. forces could engage Communist
Chinese forces "only in reponse to overt offensive action by
the ChiComs against our forces/' and that "TF 72 commanders
were enjoined to avoid getting into any shooting with the
ChiComs" and were instructed to avoid confrontations with
the Chinese Communists.
The rules of engagement issued by Commander in Chief
Pacific and U.S. Taiwan Defense Command for the air defense
of Taiwan were highly restrictive prior to the 1958 crisis.
American fighters on Taiwan were only permitted to fire on
hostile aircraft entering Taiwan's airspace and were not
permitted hot pursuit in international airspace. U.S.
combat air patrols were required to remain east of the
"Davis Line," which ran approximately down the center of the
Taiwan Strait. After the crisis erupted, the U.S. Air Force
commander on Taiwan convinced CINCPAC and the JCS that these
rules would cripple air defense efforts in the event of
concerted Communist air strikes against Taiwan. In
September the JCS approved three relaxations to the rules of
engagement: first, U.S. fighters were authorized to engage
Communist aircraft crossing the Davis Line on an apparent
course toward Taiwan or allied forces; second, U.S. fighters
were authorized hot pursuit in international airspace and
42Blackburn, letter to author, May 30, 1988.
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into Communist airspace; and, third, U.S. and Nationalist
forces were authorized to fly combat air patrols to a limit
43
of three miles of the mainland.
The distinction between hot pursuit (which was
authorized in self-defense) and retaliation (which required
approval of the President) had been proposed by the National
Security Council and approved by President Eisenhower in May
1955. By August 1956 this distinction had been incorporated
into all rules of engagement issued to U.S. forces. The
distinction between hot pursuit and retaliation was applied
by the Eisenhower Administration to the rules of engagement
for the air defense of Taiwan. If Communist Chinese
aircraft threatened U.S. forces, Nationalist forces outside
of three miles from the mainland, or Taiwan and the
Pescadores, those Comminst planes could be pursued by U.S.
fighters. If necessary, hot pursuit could continue into
Communist Chinese airspace and even over the mainland.
However, attacks by U.S. forces against the mainland
airfields from which the Communist Chinese planes operated
were defined to be retaliation, and had to be approved by
44the President.
43Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," pp. 200,
286? "U.S. to Answer Any Air Attack," New York Times ,
September 12, 1958, p. 3; "Dulles Hints U.S. has Specific
Plan for China Parley," New York Times , September 10, 1958,
p. 1; Blackburn, letter to author, May 30, 1988.
44Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," pp. 200,
286; Gordon, p. 644.
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Zn summary, United States communications capabilities
in 1958 forced employment of delegated methods of control,
rather than direct methods of control. Heavy reliance had
to be placed on mechanisms of indirect control and the good
judgement of the on-scene commanders. The President and the
JCS gave careful consideration to the authority they granted
to subordinate commanders, striking a balance between
delegation and control. For operations approved by the
President, such as escorting Nationalist convoys to Quemoy,
Navy commanders were delegated substantial decisionmaking
authority and given relatively broad freedom of action.
Washington did not provide detailed guidance on the conduct
of operations to Navy commanders in the Far East.
Naval Operations
The United States Navy began stepping up its
operations in the vicinity of Taiwan more than a month
before the crisis erupted in August. On July 14, 1958, in
response to the crisis in the Middle East, the Chief of
Naval Operations had directed CINCPAC to place the Pacific
Fleet alerted in accordance with the General Emergency
Operations Plan (GEOP) . In response to the GEOP alert, the
First and Seventh Fleets were put on four-hour readiness to
get underway, an additional attack carrier was deployed to
the Western Pacific (for a total of three) , an ASW Hunter-
Killer (HUK) Group in Hawaii was readied for deployment on
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short notice (to augment the HUK Group already in the
Western Pacific) , a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) of
1,300 troops was embarked in amphibious ships and departed
for the Indian Ocean, and other forces were readied for
45
wartime contingencies.
In August 1958, as Nationalist concerns grew over the
Communist military buildup in Fukien Province across from
Taiwan, the United States took additional actions to
increase its readiness to defend Taiwan. Communist China's
deploying jet fighters to previously unoccupied coastal
airfields in Fukien Province was a major concern to the
Nationalists. Accordingly, the U.S. buildup emphasized air
defense of Taiwan and the capacity to strike Communist
airfields. On August 3, the Air Force deployed six F-lOOs
to Taiwan. On August 5, the CNO directed that an attack
carrier group remain in the Taiwan area and that a two-
destroyer patrol be maintained continuously in the Taiwan
Strait. On August 6, U.S. Air Force Pacific (PACAF) was
placed on alert. These were all movet that Communist China
could have detected. On August 17 the Strategic Air Command
placed five Guam-based B-47 jet bombers on alert. U.S.
WCINCPACFLT Annual Report, " p. 8; Howe, p. 193; E.B.
Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, eds., Sea Power: A Naval
History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 880;
Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 60. The
General Emergency Operations Plan was the forerunner to the
Defense Condition of Readiness (DEFCON) alert system
instituted in November 1959.
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Military commanders in the Pacific also sought further
guidance on rules of engagement for the defense of Taiwan
and on American. policy concerning defense of the offshore
46islands. These actions reveal a pattern of prudent
preparations in response to indications of an increased
Communist Chinese threat in the Taiwan Straits.
Although the GEOP alert that had been declared on July
14 was partially relaxed on August 7, U.S. forces in the
Pacific were still at a high state of readiness when the
shelling of Quemoy started on August 23. The U.S. Navy had
substantial forces in the Western Pacific. The four Navy
carriers in the Western Pacific were located as follows: the
attack carrier USS John Hancock (CVA 19) and four escorts
were at sea south of Taiwan, the attack carrier USS
Lexington (CVA 16) and four escorts were at sea east of
Japan, the attack carrier USS Shangri-La (CVA 38) and three
•scorts were in port Yokosuka, Japan, and the ASW carrier
USS Princeton (CVS 37) and six escorts were at sea northeast
of Taiwan. The Taiwan Patrol Force had two destroyers on
patrol in the Taiwan Strait and two in port Kaohsiung,
Taiwan. Most of the Seventh Fleet's amphibious force was in
Buckner Bay, Okinawa, and a four-ship amphibious group with
a Marine BLT embarked was in port Singapore. A dozen
destroyers of Destroyer Flotilla One were scattered around




the Western Pacific. Additionally, several ships were
scheduled to deploy to the Western Pacific in the near
future for routine rotation of Seventh Fleet ships: the
attack carrier USS Midway (CVA 41), the ASW carrier USS
47Bennington (CVS 20), and six destroyers.
The U.S. Navy responded immediately to the Communist
shelling of Quemoy. On August 24 Commander Taiwan Patrol
Force ordered two destroyers to proceed to Tung Ting Island
(eighteen miles southwest of Quemoy) , which the Nationalists
had reported as being invaded. The destroyers withdrew on
finding no Communist Chinese activity in the area. Comman-
der Taiwan Patrol Force also ordered USS Hopewell (DD 681)
to proceed to the assistance of a Nationalist tank landing
ship (LST) under attack by Communist torpedo (PT) boats, but
directed Hopewell to remain clear of fighting and not fire
unless fired upon. Communist PT boats circled Hopewell as
she approached, but departed without firing on the American
ship. The Commanding Officer of Hopewell , adhering to the
rules of engagement in a tense and dangerous situation,
refrained from firing on the PT boats. Thus, caution
4 Of fice of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-333E)
,
"Summary of U.S. Navy Action Accomplished During Taiwan
Crisis," memorandum for the record, no date (declassified
1974), CNO Command File, Operational Archives, Naval




"Taiwan Patrol Force Review, w Enclosure 1, p. 1;
Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 158.
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on both sides averted the first potential clash between
Communist and American forces in the Straits.
Commander Seventh Fleet ordered Commander Taiwan
Patrol Force to station three destroyers twelve miles east
of Quemoy in the Straits, ordered Hancock readied to
commence combat air patrols over the straits and air strikes
if directed by the President, ordered Lexington and
Princeton to proceed to stations northeast of Taiwan at best
speed, and ordered all available minesweepers to report to
the Taiwan Patrol Force for duty. Commander Seventh Fleet
also issued rules of engagement for the Taiwan Strait,
authorizing Taiwan Patrol Force destroyers to fire on
Chinese Communist units attacking U.S. or friendly ships in
international waters, and directed that U.S. Navy aircraft
remain at least twenty miles off the coast of the mainland.
CINCPAC set Readiness Alert Condition Yankee, defined as
"war imminent, be prepared to execute war plans" (roughly
equivalent to DEFCON 2) . The CNO directed CINCPAC to
position the Seventh Fleet for support of Taiwan, an action
already initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT. 49 Thus, by the end of
the first full day of the crisis, U.S. naval forces had been
mobilized to support the Nationalists, but with restrictions
placed on their actions by the on-scene commanders in order
to avoid clashes with Communist forces.
49
"CNO Summary of Action," p. 2, 5; "Taiwan Patrol
Force Revie'w," Enclosure 1, p. 1.
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President Eisenhower approved the first Joint Chiefs
of Staff operational directive for the crisis on August 25
and it was sent to CINCPAC and Commander Taiwan Defense
Command the next day. This JCS directive authorized
reinforcement of U.S. air defence forces on Taiwan,
preparations to assume total responsibility for the air
defense of Taiwan, preparations to escort and protect
Nationalist resupply convoys to the offshore islands,
augmentation of the Seventh Fleet as necessary, and
preparations to assist the Nationalists in defending the
offshore islands against invasion, to include air attacks on
coastal air bases on the mainland. The message stated that
"It is probable that initially only conventional weapons
will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons to
extend deeper into Chinese Communist territory if
50
necessary." With only minor changes these were the
operations and preparations carried out by U.S. forces
throughout the crisis.
Over the next week, the U.S. Navy built up powerful
forces in the waters around Taiwan. On August 25, the CNO
ordered USS Essex (CVA 9) and four escorts, then in the
Eastern Mediterranean supporting the marines ashore in
Lebanon, to proceed to the Western Pacific via the Suez
50
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Canal, providing the Seventh Fleet with a fourth attack
carrier. On August 26, Commander Seventh Fleet ordered the
attack carrier Shanari-La to proceed to Taiwan, and arranged
for Marine Air Group Eleven (MAG-11) , consisting of three
fighter squadrons, to be transferred from Japan to Taiwan.
That same day CINCPACFLT ordered several actions to increase
Seventh Fleet strength: Midway and her escorts were to
immediately depart Pearl Harbor for the Western Pacific, the
heavy cruiser USS Los Angeles (CA 135) was to depart Long
Beach for Pearl Harbor that day, and Seventh Fleet was to
halt normal rotation of ships back to the United States
until the reinforcements that had been ordered in arrived.
Shangri-La joined Hancock and Lexington off Taiwan on August
30. Midway joined them on September 6, replacing Hancock
off Taiwan. Essex joined them on September 16, allowing
Hancock , which had been extended past its normal rotation
date, to return to the United States. Commander Seventh
Fleet also ordered additional destroyers and a cruiser added
to the Taiwan Patrol Force, raising its strength from four
destroyers to twelve destroyers and a cruiser. By mid-
September the Seventh Fleet included four attack carriers,
one ASW carrier, three cruisers, 41 destroyers and destroyer
51
escorts, and seven attack submarines.
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In late August the U.S. Navy began operations in
support of the Nationalists and prepared to execute any
contingency operations the President might order. Day and
night combat air patrols over the Taiwan Strait commenced on
August 25, remaining outside of twenty miles from Communist
territory. The Taiwan Patrol Force increased the number of
destroyers on patrol in the Straits from two to four, added
a heavy cruiser to the patrol, armed its patrol planes with
depth charges and torpedoes, and increased their patrols of
the mainland coast. On August 26 CINCPACFLT directed
Commander Seventh Fleet to prepare for conventional air
attacks against coastal targets and nuclear strikes against
inland targets if directed by the President, and the attack
carrier force (TF 77) prepared plans for the strikes. The
Seventh Fleet Cruiser-Destroyer Force (TF 75) prepared to
bombard Communist artillery positions on the mainland in
52
support of Nationalist convoys to Quemoy. Floyd D.
Kennedy, Jr., has observed that, because of the the Navy's
presence, "the panoply of military options open to the
President ranged from the passive device of resupply under
53fire to nuclear attack of selected Chinese targets."
52
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JCS sent the second major operational directive
approved by the President to CINCPAC on 29 August. JCS
authorized escort of Nationalist convoys if the Nationalist
navy could not do so, directed that freedom of the seas be
protected in the Taiwan Strait by operations confined to
international waters, authorized the U.S. Taiwan Defense
Command to assume responsibility for the air defense of
Taiwan so that Nationalist planes would be free to defend
the offshore islands, and directed that a total of 36
landing craft be turned over to the Nationalists to assist
their resupply effort. The Commander of the U.S. Taiwan
Defense Command was delegated authority to make the
determination as to whether or not U.S. escort of
54Nationalist convoys was needed.
After the start of the artillery blockade on August
23, the Nationalists made a reluctant and unsuccessful
effort to continue resupplying Quemoy with LSTs. One
Nationalist LST was sunk and second damaged on August 24
while evacuating wounded from Quemoy. On August 28 Rear
Admiral Smoot, Commander of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command,
identified resupply of Quemoy as the critical issue,
estimated that the Quemoy garrison could hold out another 15
to 30 days, and recommended that the U.S. commence escorting
convoys immediately as a demonstration of support for the
54
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Nationalists. On September 2 the Nationalists denied a
Communist claim that the supply line to Quemoy had been cut,
but on September 4 the Nationalists admitted that they could
not get sufficient supplies to the island to keep pace with
consumption. Ammunition was the critical item (particularly
artillery shells) , but fuel was also a serious concern.
Pood apparently was never a problem. Nationalist sources
stated on September 5 that three of the last four LSTs sent
to Quemoy had been forced to leave before they completed
unloading supplies. U.S. records indicate that all five
Nationalist attempts to resupply Quemoy with LSTs between
August 23 and September 3 were turned back by Communist
55
artillery fire and PT boats.
The United States had great difficulty getting
accurate and timely information on the Quemoy garrison's
supply situation from the Nationalists. Many U.S. Navy
commanders and civilian officials, including Rear Admiral
Smoot, believed that the Nationalists were not making a
concerted effort to resupply Quemoy. The Nationalists, it
was suspected, might be trying to make it appear that air
55
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attacks on the mainland were urgently needed in order to
resupply Quemoy. Chiang Kai-shek asked for United States
concurrence on air' strikes against the mainland, a request
that President Eisenhower turned down. The convoy escort
option was thus a compromise between doing nothing, which
might have eroded Nationalist morale and strained U.S. -ROC
relations, and attacking the mainland, which risked a direct
clash between Communist and American forces.
Soon after the crisis erupted, American leaders
anticipated that U.S. Navy escort might be necessary to get
Nationalist convoys through to Quemoy. On August 25
President Eisenhower approved a JCS directive authorizing
preparations to escort and protect Nationalist resupply
convoys to the offshore islands. On August 26 CINCPACFLT
directed Commander Seventh Fleet to prepare to escort and
protect Nationalist resupply convoys to the offshore islands
while they were in international waters, and on August 27
Commander Seventh Fleet directed Commander Taiwan Patrol
Force to commence planning for convoy escorts . Fighter air
cover for the convoys would be provided by U.S. Navy carrier
aircraft and, during the day, by Nationalist and U.S. Air
Force fighters on Taiwan (neither had night fighters) . On
56Vice Admiral Roland N. Smoot, "Reminiscences of Vice
Admiral Roland N. Smoot, U.S. Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis,
MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program, 1972), p.
315; Riley, "Reminiscences," pp. 628-33; "CNO Summary of




August 29, in response to a request from Chiang Kai-shek for
even greater assistance, the President approved a JCS
directive authorizing the Navy to escort and protect
Nationalist resupply convoys to the offshore islands while
they were in international waters. Commander Seventh Fleet
on August 30 authorized Commander Taiwan Patrol Force to
commence escort operations, plans for escorting were ready
on September 3, and the first Nationalist convoy was ready
57
to sail or* September 6.
The most important issue in the decision to escort
Nationalist convoys was how close U.S. navy ships would be
allowed to go to Quemoy. In his oral history then-CNO
Admiral Arleigh Burke states that President Eisenhower
initially wanted the escorts to remain twelve miles
offshore, whereas Burke recommended they go in to three
58
miles. There were also pressures to escort Nationalist
convoys all the way to the beach, and even to have U.S.
ships carry the supplies to the beach. Chiang Kai-shek
requested that the U.S. escort to the beach, and Rear
Admiral Smoot and U.S. Ambassador Everett Drumright
supported his request. Admiral Burke recommended having
57
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U.S. ships land supplies for the Nationalists, who had great
difficulty offloading supplies over the beach. The
arguments against going within three miles of Quemoy were
that it implied an intent to directly defend the island (as
opposed to assisting resupply) , that escorting to three
miles offshore would be sufficient to deter Communist PT
boats, and that the three mile limit kept U.S. ships out of
59
range of almost all Communist artillery. President
Eisenhower decided to halt the escorts at three nautical
miles from Quemoy. The August 29 JCS directive specified
that convoy escorts and fighter air cover were to remain in
international waters and airspace, meaning outside of
Communist China's three-mile territorial limit and no closer
than three miles to Quemoy. Convoy escorts were further
advised to avoid known Communist shore batteries that could
reach them in international waters.
On September 4, Communist China, perhaps anticipating
that the United states was about to join in the Nationalist
resupply effort, announced that it was increasing its
territorial waters from three to twelve nautical miles. The
Communist Chinese announcement specifically included all of
the Nationalist-held offshore islands in its territorial
59Burke, "Reminiscences , " p. 43; Halperin, MThe 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis," pp. 201-206.
"CNO Summary of Action," pp. 9, 11; "Taiwan Patrol




waters and stated that "No foreign vessels for military use
and no foreign aircraft may enter Chinese territorial sea
and airspace above it without permission of the Government
of the People's Republic of China." The United States
promptly rejected the twelve-mile limit, stating it would
continue to act as if Communist China had a three-mile
62limit. The orders to the convoy escorts and their air
cover were not changed.
The Nationalist Chinese were informed on September 3
that the U.S. would commence escorting their convoys. That
same day the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command completed its plans
for escort operations. Commencing the next evening
(September 4), U.S. Navy ships began small-scale escorting
of Nationalist supply ships in the Taiwan Straits,
apparently for training and familiarization in preparation
for daylight convoys three days later.
61
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"U.S. Rejects Red Claim," New York Times , September
5, 1958 p. 1.
63
"Taiwan Patrol Force Review," Enclosure 1, p. 3;
"Quemoy Garrison Supplied Under U.S. Fleet's Escort," New
York Times , September 8, 1958, p. 1; Halperin, "The 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 246. The small-scale night
convoy escort operations conducted September 4-6 were not
revealed to the press until after the first daylight convoy
on September 7. These night convoys delivered only a very
small amount of supplies to Quemoy. In addition to training
the Nationalist and U.S. navies in operating together—
a
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Commander Taiwan Patrol Force issued Operation Plan
(OPLAN) 124-58 and Operation Order (OPORD) 324-58 for convoy
escort operations on September 6. The U.S. -escorted
Nationalist convoy operation was code-named "Lightning."
The first Lightning convoy was on September 7. The convoy
consisted of two Nationalist medium landing ships (LSMs)
escorted by two patrol boats and two corvettes. The U.S.
escort consisted of four destroyers and two cruisers,
including USS Helena (CA 75) with Commander Seventh Fleet
embarked. The Communists did not interfere with the U.S.
escorts or the unloading of supplies, but the Nationalist
unloading effort was hampered by poor organization and
training on the beach. Also on September 7 , two Nationalist
merchant ships delivered supplies to Matsu without Communist
interference.
The second Lightning convoy on September 8 did not
fare as well. Chinese Communists artillery opened fire on
the two Nationalist LSMs two hours after they reached the
beach at Quemoy, damaging one and forcing them to withdraw.
One LSM had unloaded only a small amount of supplies, while
the other had not started unloading. Lack of organization
and training on the beach were again blamed for delays in
64
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unloading. The next two Lightning convoys, on September 11
and 13, experienced a similar fate, coming under heavy
Communist artillery fire, unloading negligible amounts of
supplies, and suffering one LSM destroyed and one LSM
damaged. The fifth Lightning convoy, on September 14,
marked the first use of tracked landing vehicles (LVTs)
launched from LSTs for carrying supplies to the beach.
Using this method, lightning convoys five through nine
(September 14 to 19) were able to land an average of 151
tons each (compared with 33 tons each for convoys two
62through four) . By late September it was clear that the
Nationalists would be able to keep the Quemoy garrison
resupplied under fire.
On the night of September 18 the U.S. Navy used a dock
landing ship (LSD) , a type of ship with a floodable well
deck in which landing craft could be carried and launched at
sea, to deliver three eight-inch howitzers to Quemoy. In
addition to being powerful conventional weapons—far
superior to Communist artillery shelling Quemoy—the eight-
inch howitzers were capable of firing shells with atomic
warheads. The United States did not provide the National-
ists with atomic shells for the howitzers, but the mere
presence of the howitzers on Quemoy sent a strong deterrent
65
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signal to the Communist Chinese. USS Catamount (LSD 17)
carried three Nationalist landing craft that successfully
delivered the howitzers to the beach. Catamount success-
fully delivered three more eight-inch howitzers to Quemoy
67
the night of 20 September. The success of this resupply
method further reinforced the belief that the Communist
blockade had been broken.
Great caution was exercised during the Quemoy resupply
operations to avoid clashes with Communist Chinese forces.
On September 7 The CNO directed that, as long as the
Communists refrained from shelling Nationalist supply ships,
only one destroyer was to be positioned within view of
Quemoy and the mainland while Nationalist convoys were
unloading supplies, the rest of the escorts were to remain
just over the horizon ready to respond in the event of a
Communist PT boat attack. This restriction was lifted on
September 10 by Commandar Seventh Fleet in response to
Communist shelling of the second convoy, but on-scene
commanders remained cautious. Captain Edward W. Behm,
"U.S. Navy Lands Guns at Quemoy, " New York Times ,
October 1, 1958, p. 10; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Reminiscences
of Hanson Weightman Baldwin, U.S. Navy (Retired), H Volume II
(Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program,
1976), p. 527; Blackburn, letter to author, May 30, 1988.
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commander of a convoy escort during the crisis, states that
the escorts were directed to remain at least five miles from
the mainland. This limit was probably set by Commander
Taiwan Patrol Force to avoid Communist artillery, even
though the JCS directive allowed ships to approach as close
as three miles. When JCS authorized use of U.S. Navy LSDs
in the resupply effort, CNO specified that they remain at
least three miles offshore from Quemoy. On October 8
Commander Taiwan Patrol Force increased this distance to 12
miles. In response to the Communist ceasefire announced
October 6, the CNO suspended escort operations and directed
Taiwan Defense Command to avoid provocative actions (by the
time this order was received two more convoys had been
escorted on October 7, the last Nationalist convoys escorted
during the crisis). On October 23, three days after the
Communists resumed shelling Quemoy, the CNO authorized
convoy escorting to resume if needed, but no further escorts
68
were required. Due to these precautions and Chinese
Communist restraint there were no clashes between United
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Training in amphibious unloading operations provided
by the U.S. Navy to the Nationalist Chinese Navy was crucial
to the success of the Quemoy resupply operation. Early
Nationalist resupply efforts were largely ineffective due to
their lack of experience with unloading supplies over the
beach rather than in port. U.S. Navy assistance led to the
shift from beaching LSMs and unloading them by hand, which
had proven disastrous under fire, to the method of launching
LVTs from LSTs offshore. Another U.S. Navy technique taught
to the Nationalists was launching landing craft from an LSD
offshore. This resupply method required U.S. participation
because the Nationalists did not have LSDs of their own. By
October the Nationalists had become so proficient at
unloading supplies over the beach that further U.S. navy
70
assistance in this area was no longer necessary.
In addition to the resupply operation, the U.S. Navy
participated in the crisis in several other ways. A joint
U.S. -Nationalist amphibious landing exercise, code-named
"Land Ho," was held on Taiwan on September 8. The exercise
was publicized to make it a signal of the U.S. defense
relationship with Taiwan. U.S. Navy cruisers and radar
picket destroyers monitored Communist air activity over the
Taiwan Strait and provided air control and intercept
70
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services for Navy carrier-based fighters and U.S. fighters
on Taiwan. A radar picket destroyer provided air control
and navigation services for Nationalist transport aircraft
dropping supplies to Quemoy by parachute. The attack
carriers around Taiwan maintained a combat air patrol over
the Taiwan Strait from August 25 to September 6, when it was
cancelled due to the low level of Communist air activity and
the buildup of aircraft on Taiwan. Navy fighters made high-
altitude, high-speed dashes up and down the strait to ensure
that Communist radar operators knew that the latest U.S.
jets were on-scene. The Taiwan Patrol Force kept at least
four destroyers on patrol in the Straits from August 25 to
October 29, and periodically had a destroyer make an appear-
ance off Matsu to show U.S. interest in the Nationalist-held
island. Patrol planes of the Taiwan Patrol Force kept a
close watch on the mainland coast. Navy ships and aircraft
conducted electronic intelligence collection against Commun-
ist Chinese radar sites, an important preparation in the
71
•vent that air strikes had been necessary. These opera-
tions contributed to U.S. readiness in the Taiwan Strait and
sent a strong deterrent signal to Communist China.
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Vice Admiral Beakley, Conunander of the Seventh Fleet
st the height of the crisis, described the climate in the
Taiwan Straits in a candid letter on September 8, 1958, to a
former Seventh Fleet Commander:
Times have been busy out here, mainly in trying
to keep up with answers to dispatches from Washington
and Pearl [Harbor, location of CINCPACFLT and
CINCPAC] . I guess we do forget to tell them each
change of course for each ship at times. [CNO Admiral
Arleigh] Burke wanted us to impress the ChiComs
[Chinese Communists] by flexing our muscles, and after
the show yesterday, we should nave won the world
championship weight lifting contest. My CVA [attack
carrier] group commanders were a little too enthusias-
tic, and we had 4 bad crashes and lost 3 pilots before
I got them slowed down. I have to get some of these
carriers off the line pretty soon or we'll have break-
downs in more ways than one. I believe Taiwan has got
all the forces that they need at present on the island
itself, and with CVA back-up, we should relax the rest
of us. [Rear Admiral Paul H.] Ramsey [Commander
Carrier Group One in Hancock ] has worked out a plan
for 4 carriers using conven-tional weapons, mainly
against Communist air targets, which I have salted
away to draw out when I need them [sic] . I think we
could take the heart out of ChiCom air without much
trouble. I think if the ChiNats [Chinese National-
ists] would slow down now on provocative actions that
the situation would quiet down. I think they know we
mean business and are not going to let Quemoy and the
Matsus starve.
Vice Admiral Beakley 's comments are revealing for three
reasons. First, he shows mild annoyance toward the many
73
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Second, he reveals that the Navy paid a price for the show
of force put on by the combat air patrol over the Taiwan
Straits, losing four planes and three pilots in accidents.
Third, he expresses the view that the situation would quiet
down if the Nationalists would "slow down on provocative
actions," a sentiment similar to those expressed by Rear
74Admiral Smoot on Taiwan and Vice Admiral Riley at CINCPAC.
U.S. Navy commanders in the Pacific were well aware of the
danger of the Nationalists dragging the United States into a
war with the Communists.
The final step in this review of U.S. Navy operations
Is to examine the interactions with Communist Chinese forces
that could have occurred and the interactions with Communist
Chinese forces that did occur during the crisis. The
following interactions conceivably could have occurred
during the crisis: Communist artillery fires on U.S. ships,
prompting counterbattery fire; Communist planes, PT boats,
or submarines attack U.S. ships, prompting return fire or an
air battle; Communist fighters attack U.S. fighters or
patrol planes over the Straits, prompting an air battle; or
Communist planes attack Nationalist ships or threaten
Taiwan, prompting an air battle. Additionally, a wide range
of accidents could have occurred, including U.S. ships or
planes stray into Communist waters or airspace, prompting a
74See Smoot, "Reminiscences, H pp. 313-15; Riley,
'Reminiscences, H pp. 619-21.
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Communist attack, and indiscriminate Communist attacks on
U.S. forces mistaken for nationalist forces. The high level
of U.S. Navy forces in the waters around Taiwan provides
grounds for expecting that there was ample opportunity for
inadvertent military incidents to occur. And, given the
high level of tension in the Taiwan Straits, any of these
incidents could have triggered a clash between the United
States and Communist China.
There was, in fact, very little tactical-level
interaction between United States and Communist Chinese
forces, despite the intensity of U.S. Navy operations close
to the coast of the mainland. Both sides took actions to
avoid clashes with the other side. During convoy escort
operations, Communist planes and PT boats were sometimes
seen in the vicinity of Quemoy, but they never challenged
U.S. navy units. Vice Admiral Blackburn states that during
U.S. convoy escort operations, "Our presence seemed to be a
sufficient deterrence to cause the ChiCom naval forces to
75
avoid a naval confrontation." U.S. ships were careful to
remain clear of Communist artillery as much as possible, and
were never fired upon by the Communists even when National-
ist ships nearby were being shelled. U.S. destroyers on
patrol in the Taiwan Strait were directed to remain at least
twelve miles from the mainland and Communist-held islands, a
75Blackburn, letter to author, May 30, 1988.
.
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distance that was increased to fifteen miles on October 21.
There were no reported instances of U.S. ships on patrol in
the Straits encountering Chinese Communist naval vessels or
submarines. Communist fighters did not venture out over the
Straits to challenge U.S. Navy combat air patrols, although
they did engage in several air battles with the Nationalist
Air Force. According to the commanding officer of a U.S.
radar picket destroyer in the Taiwan Straits, Communist
aircraft were occasionally detected over the Straits, but
they stayed to the west of the Davis Line that marked the
limit of the Taiwan air defense intercept zone. The U.S.
Navy, for its part, was careful to keep its fighters at
76least twenty miles off the coast of the mainland. Thus,
overall, there was surprisingly little tactical-level
interaction between the two sides.
The closest that the United States and Communist China
came to a clash during the crisis was the standoff between
the U.S. destroyer Hopewell and Communist PT boats on August
24, described above. No shots were exchanged in this or any
other incident during the crisis. A second incident similar
67
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to this occurred in mid-October. USS McGinty (DE 365) was
patrolling southwest of Quemoy when a Nationalist patrol
craft (PC) close to Quemoy was taken under fire by Communist
shore batteries. The Nationalist PC fled seaward at best
speed and McGinty closed the PC at 24 knots to cover its
withdrawal with a smoke screen. Six rounds of Communist
artillery fire landed astern of McGinty but neither the U.S.
77
nor the Nationalist ship were damaged. It appears that
the Communists ceased firing as soon as McGinty joined the
PC, the same pattern as in the Hopewell episode.
There were relatively view military accidents during
the crisis. The U.S. Navy lost at least four jet fighters
in flying accidents, but none of these incidents caused or
resulted from interaction with Communist forces—they were
caused by maintaining an excessively high tempo of
operations. There was one incident in which Nationalist Air
Force planes attacked Nationalist Navy ships in the Taiwan
Straits, but the correct identities of the attackers and
victims were established before U.S. forces became
involved. Communist China made two allegations that U.S.
ships or planes had violated their twelve-mile territorial
waters (apart from their frequent protests over the convoy
escorts) . On September 11 the Communist Chinese claimed
that a U.S. Navy patrol plane had overflown two Communist
77Behm, letter to author, February 19, 1988.
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held islands the previous day. Commander Taiwan Patrol
force investigated the allegation and determined that the
plane had not approached Communist territory closer that
thirty miles. On October 9 the Communist Chinese charged
that two U.S. navy destroyers had invaded their territorial
waters. Although the ships initially denied the charge,
Commander Taiwan Defense Conuaand later determined that one
leg of the patrol they had been on could have taken them
close to Communist waters. Commander Taiwan Patrol Force
changed the patrol route to open the closest approach to
78Communist territory and no further incidents occurred.
Communist China announced a one-week ceasefire around
the offshore islands on October 6, on the condition that
U.S. ships not escort Nationalist resupply convoys to
Quemoy. The U.S. ceased escorting Nationalist convoys on
October 8 and never resumed the escorts. On October 12
Peking extended the ceasefire, but then on October 20
resumed the shelling, claiming that U.S. ships had escorted
a Nationalist convoy on October 19. There was a Nationalist
convoy on October 19 , but Taiwan Patrol Force did not escort
it. However, the evening of October 19 a U.S. LSD, with
U.S. escorts, had conducted a resupply mission off of
Quemoy, remaining 12 miles off the island. This was
probably the event that the Chinese Communists used as
78
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grounds for breaking the ceasefire. There had also been LSD
resupply operations the evenings of October 8, 12, and 13,
all without protest from the Communists, making it doubtful
that the October 19 LSD convoy was the primary reason why
79
the Communists decided to resume shelling. The most
likely cause of the renewed shelling was the visit of U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Taiwan. Dulles
arrived in Taipei on October 20 for discussions with Chiang
Kai-shek. The Communist Chinese shelling was probably
intended to disrupt the Chiang-Dulles talks, perhaps increas-
ing U.S. pressure on Chiang to make concessions on the
offshore islands, and to signal continuing dissatisfaction
with the status quo in the Taiwan Straits.
In summary, U.S. Navy forces in the seas around Taiwan
provided the President with a wide range of military options
for dealing with the Communist Chinese probe of the offshore
islands. Navy attack carriers provided a potent deterrent
threat, and the Taiwan Patrol Force provided the escorts
crucial for the test of capabilities strategy that the
President adopted in the crisis. Navy commanders imposed
restrictions on their forces to avoid clashes with the
Communists and, as shown by the performance of the destroyer
Hopewell , exercised restraint when in potentially dangerous
situations with Communist units. Very little tactical-level
79
"Taiwan Patrol Force Review," pp. 8-10.
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interaction took place between United States and Chinese
Communist forces because both sides took steps to prevent
clashes from occurring.
findings
This section will review the 1958 Taiwan Straits
Crisis to answer the eight research questions. The first
question is to what degree were interactions between the
forces of the two sides at the scene of the crisis the
result of actions taken in accordance with mechanisms of
delegated control, rather than direct control by national
leaders? The Eisenhower Administration was concerned about
the danger of events getting out of control in the Taiwan
Straits. The position paper approved by the President on
September 4 noted that, because U.S. destroyers would be
operating up to three miles from the mainland, "There is
thus a possibility of a deliberate or accidental hit by the
Chicoms, which would have potential and unplanned reactions
80
which might involve at least limited retaliation.** To
control the risk of escalation, the President retained total
control of nuclear weapons and delegated authority to
retaliate with conventional weapons against mainland targets
only under circumstances in which the Joint Chiefs did not




Beyond this, however, United States communications
capabilities in 1958 forced employment of delegated methods
of control and heavy reliance on mechanisms of indirect
control. U.S. Navy commanders in the Pacific had signifi-
cant authority to conduct operations as they saw fit—within
the policy limits set by the President and the JCS—and
exercised that authority to its limits. The only detailed
instructions provided by the JCS concerned rules of
engagement and the limit on how close ships could approach
Quemoy and the mainland. Although there would later be
pressure to allow U.S. ships to go right up to the beach in
Quemoy, when the crisis erupted Commander Taiwan Defense
Force and Commander Taiwan Patrol Force were keeping their
ships twelve miles away from the mainland and the offshore
81islands. Thus, the three mile limit imposed by JCS was
actually a relaxation of the restriction for the forces on-
scene. Throughout the crisis Washington was ill-informed of
the status of operations currently in progress, which
precluded American leaders from exercising close control of
the operations.
The overall picture that emerges is of the Eisenhower
Administration exploiting the flexibility of the U.S.
command system for crisis management purposes. Operational
decisions that held the greatest risk of escalation were
81
"Taiwan Patrol Force Review," Enclosure 1, p. 1;
Blackburn, letter to author. May 30, 1988.
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closely held. In emergencies, when the need for action was
absolutely clear (such as a Communist attack on Taiwan) and
could not await Presidential deliberation, certain
•scalatory decisions (such as conventional air strikes on
the mainland) were delegated to JCS. On the other hand,
decisions on the details of executing operations previously
approved by the President were delegated to on-scene
commanders.
The second question is were the forces of the two
sides at the scene of the crisis tightly coupled with each
other? Both sides appeared to have good intelligence
concerning the other side's forces and operations. The
Taiwan Defense Command observed that the pattern of
Communist Chinese shelling suggested that they had good
82intelligence on the convoys. Chinese protests of alleged
U.S. violations of their airspace and territorial waters
also suggests that they were able to keep close tabs on U.S.
navy operations in the Straits. U.S. on-scene commanders
had similarly good information on Communist military
activities. The Taiwan Patrol Force maintained intensive
patrol and surveillance of the mainland coast. However,
detection of actions by the other side did not automatically
generate tactical reactions. The United States and
Communist China both took steps to prevent clashes between
82
Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 304.
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their forces and those measures largely prevented
interactions from occurring. When U.S. and Communist forces
came into contact, as in the Hopewell and McGinty episodes
,
they disengaged rather than fighting. Thus, although the
intelligence requirement for tight coupling of the two
sides' forces was met, tactical reactions tended to be
dampened by measures taken to avoid clashes.
The third question \s were the forces of the two sides
being used by their national leaders as a political
instrument in the crisis? Both Communist China and the
United States were using their forces for political purposes
as well as military purposes. Communist China was
conducting a limited probe of an ambiguous American
commitment to the offshore islands, and exerting carefully
controlled pressure on the Nationalists and the United
States. The United States responded by accepting a test of
capabilities under the ground rules established by the
Chinese Communists, backed by a massive concentration of
naval and air power in the Straits to convey a strong
deterrent threat. Faced with a choice between escalating
the confrontation or accepting an unfavorable outcome, the
Chinese backed down and salvaged as much as they could
politically.
The answers to these first three questions suggest
that conditions necessary for stratified interaction existed
in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: the United States relied

486
on methods of delegated control, U.S. and Chinese Communist
military forces were tightly coupled, and both sides used
their forces as a political instrument under conditions of
acute crisis. Interactions occurred at the tactical level
that were not directly controlled by American leaders. For
example, President Eisenhower had no control over the
actions of the destroyer Hopewell on August 24. The
findings of this case suggest, however, that stratification
is not an absolute concept—there can be degrees of
stratification. Measures taken by both sides to prevent
confrontations between their forces can greatly reduce
opportunities for tactical-level interaction to occur.
The fourth question is did crisis interactions at the
tactical level become decoupled from the strategy being
pursued by national leaders? Three of the potential causes
of decoupling arose on the American side in the crisis:
communications problems, a fast-paced tactical environment,
and ambiguous orders. The communications problems have
already been discussed. When the President suspended convoy
escort operations on October 6 in response to the Communist
unilateral ceasefire announcement, the order was not
received by Commander Taiwan Patrol Force until after two
83
more Nationalist convoys had been escorted on October 7.
83
"Taiwan Patrol Force Review," Enclosure 1, p. 8. In
fact, the Commander of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
initially responded to the Communist ceasefire by informing
his forces on October 6 that it did not change their orders.

487
As it turned out/ the extra day of escort operations did not
adversely affect U.S. efforts to resolve the crisis, but it
could have had a much more serious impact—the Chinese
Communists had made the ceasefire contingent on the U.S. not
escorting Nationalist convoys. This was the most serious
instance of decoupling in the crisis.
The impact of a fast-paced tactical environment and
ambiguous orders were most apparent on August 24, the first
full day of the crisis. It would be August 26 before the on-
scene commanders received the first JCS directive on the
crisis, but they had to respond immediately to a Communist
Chinese threat of unknown proportions. In the early hours
of the crisis it was not clear whether the Communists
intended to attack Taiwan, invade Querooy or neighboring
islands, or just harass the offshore islands with artillery
fire. The Nationalists were appealing for assistance to
repel an invasion of one of the islands. Compounding this
rapidly evolving situation was the ambiguous Eisenhower
Administration policy toward defense of the offshore
islands. U.S. military commanders in the Pacific had sought
clarification on the offshore islands earlier in August as
tensions rose in the Straits, but the President was
unwilling to state a definitive policy until September 6.
On-scene commanders had ample authority to take military
action under the terms of the defense treaty with the
Nationalists and the Formosa Resolution if Taiwan were
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threatened, but initially had no specific guidance on the
offshore islands. Commander Seventh Fleet and the Chief of
Staff at CINCPAC would later complain about this lack of
guidance from Washington. Left to their own devices, the
on-scene commanders took actions on August 24 and 25
—
sending U.S. destroyers to the assistance of Nationalist
forces defending' the offshore islands—that the President
nay not have authorized had he been able to make the
decisions himself. This is another example of decoupling
during the crisis.
The fifth question is did national leaders and on-
scene commanders hold different perceptions of the
vulnerability of on-scene forces to pre-emption and the need
to strike first in the event of an armed clash? This
appears not to have been a significant problem in the 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis. The entire chain of command, from
the President down to commanding officers at sea in the
Straits, appear to have been aware of the danger of
incidents with Communist Chinese forces. The emphasis in
JCS operational directives was on avoiding clashes with the
Communists, and on-scene commanders took similar measures on
their own initiative. These steps had the effect of
84Riley, "Reminiscences, " p. 630; Halperin, "The 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis," p. 133. Vice Admiral Blackburn also
states that he was not kept informed of U.S. political
objectives and diplomatic initiatives during the crisis.
Blackburn, letter to author, May 30, 1988.
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preventing U.S. forces from operating in the sights of Com-
munist guns, thus reducing their vulnerability to preemption
by the Communists. Although some U.S. commanders in the Far
Bast may have wanted to take more vigorous action against
Communist China, they did not perceive a significantly
greater threat to U.S. forces than did officials in
Washington. Thus, the security dilemma was not stratified.
The sixth question is, when tactical-level
interactions become decoupled, what factors inhibit
escalation dynamics from occurring at the tactical level and
being transmitted upward to the strategic and political
levels of interaction? In the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,
when decoupling occurred it did not produce tactical-level
escalation. Instead, interactions remained at a relatively
low intensity and when U.S. and Communist forces did come in
contact, they quickly disengaged. There appear to have been
two reasons for this. First, U.S. on-scene commanders
exercised caution in the absence of guidance from higher
authority. For example. Commander Taiwan Defense Command
and Commander Taiwan Patrol Force initially ordered ships to
remain twelve miles from the mainland and aircraft to remain
twenty miles from the mainland—a policy more restrictive
than that approved by the President later. This tactical-
level prudence compensated for lack of operational guidance
when decoupling occurred, preventing escalation even when
actions took place that the President had not ordered.
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The second factor inhibiting escalation was that both
sides took steps to avoid military clashes and adhered to
the tacit ground rules for the test of capabilities between
their forces. Those ground rules included no Communist
Attacks on U.S. forces, no U.S. attacks on Chinese forces
except in salf-defense (and defense of Nationalist forces in
international airspace or waters), and no U.S. attacks on
the Chinese mainland. The CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke,
pointed this out in 1959 testimony to Congress:
As this situation generated, we sort of abided by
rules of the other side, and they abided by our
rules. They were very careful never to come out to
sea, beyond their own coastline. We were careful not
to go beyond their coastline, too, so that we sorg^of
had an unofficial agreement and nothing happened.
Vice Admiral Blackburn, Commander of the Taiwan Patrol
Force, states that HOur people were instructed to avoid
confrontations, and apparently the ChiComs had similar
ground rules, as they would break off contact when a
86
confrontation appeared imminent. H This is exactly what
happended in the Hopewell and McGinty incidents.
J.H. Kalicki argues that a Sino-American "crisis
system" evolved during the 1950s. In this system, "the life
cycle of each crisis became increasingly self-regulated H and
85U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Disarmament and Foreign Policy , Hearings, 86th
Congress, 1st Session, Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 98. Also see Young,
pp. 224-29; Williams, pp. 112-13.
86Blackburn, letter to author. May 30, 1988.
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"the ability of each actor to handle crises with the other
87became increasingly sophisticated." Both sides, he
contends, learned to respect the other's commitments
,
limiting their interactions to probes confirra-ing the
strength of those commitments. He also argues that American
and Chinese leaders improved their skills as crisis
managers, orchestrating actions with words more sensibly and
88imaginatively, and sending more effective signals. This
study of tactical-level military interactions in the 1958
crisis—the last major crisis in the period studied by
Kalicki--supports his view that the United States and
Communist China had evolved tacit rules of crisis behavior.
The seventh question is did actions taken with
military forces send inadvertent signals to either
adversaries or friends, and did inadvertent military
incidents occur that affected efforts to manage the crisis?
This appears not to have been a serious problem during the
1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The military moves taken by
each side were carefully designed to signal their
intentions.
The principle problem that the United States
experienced arose from the ambiguity of the Eisenhower
Administration's commitment to the defense of the offshore
87
Kalicki, p. 213.
88 Ibid, pp. 213-215.
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islands. U.S. leaders were caught between deterring an
adversary and restraining an ally: too strong a commitment
might encourage the Nationalists to be overly aggressive,
while too weak a commitment might encourage the Communists
to be overly aggressive. The Eisenhower Administration
attempted to resolve this dilemma with a calculated policy
of ambiguity, but only prompted the Communist probe of the
American commitment and subsequent efforts by the National-
ists to use the crisis as grounds for striking back at the
mainland. The problem was not that the Communists and
Nationalists misperceived U.S. intentions, but rather that
they correctly perceived the ambivalence in U.S. policy.
The final question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the crisis? All three of the tensions arose in the crisis,
but none was severe. Tension between political
considerations and military considerations arose in the
restrictions placed on the support that could be provided
for the Quemoy resupply effort. The most efficient way of
resupplying the Nationalist garrison would have been to
carry their supplies in U.S. amphibious ships escorted right
up to the beach by U.S. warships. However, this would have
been a serious provocation to the Communists, who might not
have refrained from shelling the American vessels. That, in
turn, probably would have led to U.S. naval bombardment and
air strikes against Communist shore batteries, air fields,
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and naval bases. The political restrictions on the resupply
operation were thus prudent from a crisis management
perspective, even if they required the U.S. and Nationalist
navies to improvise ways to get supplies ashore under fire.
Tension arose between the need for top-level control
and the need for on-scene flexibility and initiative, but
overall a workable balance appears to have been struck.
President Eisenhower implies in his memoirs that he was
89
satisfied with command arrangements during the crisis.
Efforts by officials in Washington to manage the crisis were
hampered by lack of information from the field, prompting
the CNO to increase reporting requirements and send several
queries to commanders in the Far East. Rear Admiral Smoot
made several requests for authority to make decisions
himself rather than having to refer them to Washington, some
90
of which were granted. According the Vice Admiral Heyward
(on the CNO's staff), minor tensions arose within the Navy
chain of command due to Admiral Burke's operational style:
"Admiral Burke was a 'hands on' CNO, so he may have exer-
cised a little more detailed control of operations of the
naval forces involved than Admiral Felt or COMSEVENTHFLT
91desired." That this was the case is confirmed by Vice
89Eisenhower, p. 299.
90Smoot, "Reminiscences," pp. 313-16; Halperin, "The
1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis," pp. 155, 249-50, 365, 370.
91Heyward, letter to author, May 27, 1988.
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Admiral Beakley's comments on "trying to keep up with
92
answers to dispatches from Washington." However, methods
of delegated control were used and officials in Washington
relied heavily on mechanisms of indirect control, thus
muting tension over centralization of control.
Tensions arose between performance of crisis missions
and readiness to perform wartime missions. The Politico-
Military Policy Division of the CNO's staff prepared a
position paper on August 24 in which the President was
warned that "The United States must undertake operations
which bring action to a halt quickly. Prolonged operations
will diminish military capabilities for operations in other
93
areas or for general war." Transferring the attack
carrier Essex from the Mediterranean to the Western Pacific
illustrates this problem: it reinforced the forces around
Taiwan but reduced U.S. strength on NATO's southern flank
and in the Middle East. The CNO refused to authorize
similar actions that would have further drawn down Atlantic
Fleet strength. After the crisis, Admiral Burke would
testify that U.S. naval forces were "stretched pretty thin"
during the crisis and would have been hard pressed to
respond to an outbreak of fighting elsewhere while committed
92Beakley, letter to VADM A.M. Pride, September 8,
1958.





in the Taiwan Straits. The CINCPACFLT assessment of the
crisis praised the ability of naval forces to rapidly
augment the defense of Taiwan, but closed with a warning:
"However, as a corollary, it is also considered that such
augmentation is expensive and results in long lasting
95deleterious effects upon material and personnel. H Thus,
tensions between crisis missions and readiness for wartime
missions arose during the Taiwan Straits operations. Of the
three types of political-military tensions, this one was the
most serious during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis erupted in October when
American U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance planes
photographed Soviet medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)
and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites under
construction in Cuba. The United States responded by
demanding that the missiles be withdrawn, imposing a naval
quarantine of offensive arms shipments to Cuba, preparing to
launch air strikes against the sites and an invasion of
Cuba, and alerting its strategic nucear forces. After a
94
"CNO Summary of Action," pp. 2-3; **CNO Congressional
Testimony, pp. 106-7
95
-CINCPACFLT Annual Report," p. 1. Vice Admiral
Beakley, Commander Seventh Fleet, expressed concern in the
letter quoted previously that the attack carriers off Taiwan
would start breaking down if kept on the line for too long
without maintenance. See footnote 72.
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tense week of diplomatic bargaining, Moscow agreed to
withdraw its offensive missiles in exchange for a pledge
from Washington to not invade Cuba and an informal
understanding that the U.S. would later withdraw its MRBMs
from Turkey. The United States Navy played a prominent role
in the crisis, enforcing the quarantine and carrying out a
wide range of operations in support of President Kennedy's
strategy.
Background
Soviet-American relations had begun to improve in
1959, marked by the "spirit of Camp David" engendered during
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's September visit to the
United States. This tentative thaw in the cold war ended in
May I960, when Khrushchev walked out of the Paris Four-Power
summit meeting. Khrushchev had demanded that the United
States apologize for violating Soviet airspace with the U-2
that the Soviets had shot down on May 1, 1960. When
President Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev scuttled the summit
96
meeting. John F. Kennedy won the presidential election in
November 1960, running on a platform that included a .promise
to close the "missile gap" alleged to exist with the Soviet
Union. In his inaugural address in January, Kennedy
96Michael R. Breschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower,
Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper and Row,




declared that the United States would "pay any cost, bear
any burden** In the defense of freedom. This came two weeks
after Khrushchev had announced a Soviet commitment to
support "wars of national liberation" in the Third World.
Thus, the ideological and political confrontation between
the superpowers would continue in the new Administration.
The Kennedy Administration soon discovered that there
was no missile gap with the Soviet Union and that the United
states in fact held a lead in strategic nuclear forces.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara revealed that there
was no missile gap on February 8, 1961. Khrushchev's
intercontinental ballistic missile claims had largely been a
bluff—the Soviets had few ICBMs and was producing them at a
low rate. Nevertheless, the Kennedy Administration launched
an ambitious program to strengthen U.S. strategic forces
with Minuteman ICBMs and Polaris submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) . As a result of this program,
U.S. strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviets would
97
continue to grow.
97William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1964)
, pp. 38-50; Roger Hilsman, To
Move A Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967)
, pp. 162-4; Edgar
M. Bottome, The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of
Military and Political Policy (Cranbury, NJ: Associated
University Presses, 1971); Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the
Nuclear Age: Developing; U.S. Strategic Arms Policy
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1975), pp. 84-94; John Prados,
The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet
Strategic Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1982), pp. 75-95, 111-22; George and Smoke, pp. 449-56.
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The Kennedy Administration faced two major crises in
1961. The first was the "Bay of Pigs" humiliation in
April. American relations with Cuba had been deteriorating
since Fidel Castro overthrew the Batista dictatorship in
January 1959. As Castro imposed a Communist dictatorship on
Cuba and turned to the Soviet bloc for political support and
economic and military aid, pressure grew in the United
States to take action against him. This led to the CIA plan
to mount an invasion by anti-Castro exiles, which was well
along when Kennedy came into office. The attempted invasion
failed, with most of the exile force killed or captured,
producing a propaganda triumph for Castro. President
Kennedy admitted U.S. complicity in the invasion accepted
responsibility for the disaster. This did not, however,
mark the end of U.S. opposition to Castro. Soon after the
Bay of Pigs episode the Kennedy Administration established a
Cuban Coordinating Committee chaired by Attorney general
Robert Kennedy to explore actions that could be taken
against Castro. The CIA launched "Operation Mongoose," a
series of guerrilla raids by Cuban exiles. Additionally,
the Joint Chiefs were directed to prepare contingency plans
98for air strikes and invasion of Cuba. Thus, Cuba was high
98Arthur M. Schle singer, Jr., A Thousand Days; John F.
Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965),
pp. 215-97; Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1964); Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) . On anti-Castro
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on the Kennedy Administration's list of foreign policy
concerns.
The second crisis faced by the Kennedy Administration
was in Berlin. Berlin had been on the Soviet foreign policy
agenda since 1948. In response to Britain, France and the
United States unifying West Germany, which the Soviets
viewed as a first step toward a separate Western peace with
Germany in violation of the Potsdam agreement, the Soviets
cut off rail and road access to Berlin in June 1948. The
blockade was broken by the Berlin airlift and was lifted in
May 1949. In November 1958 Khrushchev had given the West
six months to withdraw from Berlin and sign a German peace
treaty. The Western powers rejected the Soviet demand,
which was dropped during Khrushchev's May 1959 visit to the
United States. Khrushchev took a hard line on Berlin when
he met Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961 and on July 8, 1961
demanded that the Western powers withdraw from the city.
The West refused, and in August the Soviets and East Germans
began erecting the Berlin Wall around the Western occupation
sectors of the city. The crisis then tapered off without
resolution of the issues that had provoked it. The crisis
further strained Soviet-American relations and led the
activities, see Captain Alex A. Kerr, "The Reminiscences of
Captain Alex A. Kerr, U.S. Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis, MD:
U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program, 1984), pp. 404-
7; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 468-98.
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Kennedy Administration to expect the Soviets to make another
99
move against Berlin in the near future.
In 1962 Kennedy Administration attention shifted back
to Cuba. In January, at the Punta del Este Conference of
the Organization of American States (OAS) , the United States
persuaded the OAS to declare its opposition to Cuban
revolutionary activity in Latin America. On February 4,
1962, President Kennedy declared an embargo on all trade
with Cuba other than medical supplies. Meanwhile, Cuba and
the Soviet Union were forging closer ties. Osmoni
Cienfuegos, Cuban Minister of Public Works, visited Moscow
in April, Raul Castro, Minister of Defense, visited Moscow
in early July, and Che Guevara, Minister of Finance, visited
Moscow in late August. These visits produced Soviet pledges
of economic and military assistance.
The Cuban Military Bu: ld-up
In mid-July ships carrying arms destined for Cuba
began leaving Soviet ports. The military build-up on Cuba
was dramatic and immediately detected by the United States.
99See Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet
Foreign Policy, 1917-72 , Second Edition (New York: Praeger,
1974), pp. 440-55, 619-20, 653-4; Jean Edward Smith, The
Defense of Berlin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1963); Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971);
Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) ; Schlesinger, A
Thousand Days . pp. 343-405; Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 668-9.
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The number of Soviet freighters (dry cargo ships) arriving
in Cuban ports, which had averaged about 15 ships a month
during the first seven months of 1962, suddenly Increased to
37 in August and 46 in September. Additionally, four to six
passenger ships arrived per month in July, August and
September, each carrying hundreds of Soviet technicians,
troops, and support personnel. U.S. intelligence estimates
were that the Soviets had 3,000-5,000 personnel in Cuba by
the end of September. The Soviets supplied the Cubans with
Mig-21 jet fighters, tanks, radar-controlled anti-aircraft
guns, short-range conventional tactical ballistic missiles
(FROG-type) , coastal defense anti-ship cruise missiles,
Komar-class fast attack craft armed with SS-N-2 anti-ship
cruise missiles, and extensive radar and communications
equipment. On August 29 U-2 photographs confirmed SA-2
Guideline surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba. An August
22 CIA Current Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet military
aid to Cuba concluded that "Together with the extraordinary
Soviet bloc economic commitments made to Cuba in recent
months, these developments amount to the most extensive
campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by
the USSR."100
100Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence
Memorandum, "Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba," August 22,
1962 (National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban
Missile Crisis file) . Also see Central Intelligence Agency,
Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, "The Mili-
tary Buildup in Cuba," September 19, 1962 (National Security
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The United States closely monitored the military build-
up in Cuba. In early August the United States stepped up
its surveillance of Cuba and Soviet bloc shipping to the
island. This included photographic reconnaissance of all
Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba, frequent peripheral
photographic reconnaissance flights around the island, twice-
monthly U-2 flights over the island, and assignment of the
intelligence collection ship USS Oxford (AG 159) to monitor
Cuba. The CIA and NSC prepared detailed studies of the
intentions and implications of the build-up, and in late
August the CIA began issuing daily intelligence reports on
101Soviet arms shipments to Cuba.
Archives, Washington, DC, Cuba file, Record no. 1714); U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee, "Interim Report on the Cuban
Military Buildup," 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 5-8 (Cited
hereafter as Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee Interim
Report); Commander in Chief Atlantic, "CINCLANT Historical
Account of Cuban Crisis 1962," April 29, 1963 (declassified
1986), pp. 4-9 (Operational Archives, Naval Historical
Center, Washington, DC. Cited hereafter as "CINCLANT
Historical Account."); National Indications Center, "The
Soviet Bloc Armed Forces and the Cuban Crisis: A Chronology,
July-November 1962," June 18, 1963 (declassified 1985), pp.
1-7 (National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban
Missile Crisis file. Cited hereafter as "National
Indications Center")
.
National Indications Center, pp. 6-7, 13; Hilsman,
p. 170; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy , p. 505; Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, "The Naval Quarantine of Cuba,"
December 1962 (partially declassified 1984), pp. 1-2
(Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC. Cited hereafter as "CNO Historical Narrative."); USS
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History Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC).
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The Kennedy Administration drew a distinction between
offensive and defensive weapons: Offensive weapons were
those that could strike U.S. territory from Cuba, and
included surface-to-surface missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) and
bombers. All other weapons , including the surface-to-air
missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, were considered
defensive. President Kennedy made public statements on
September 4 and 13 describing the buildup of defensive arms
in Cuba and warning that the United States would not
tolerate offensive arms there. Additionally, U.S. officials
discussed the arms build-up directly with Soviet officials,
and were told on at least three occasions that the arms were
102
strictly defensive. In retrospect, the Kennedy Adminis-
tration's effort to draw a distinction between offensive and
defensive weapons appears not to have eliminated the
ambiguity inherent in such matters. Khrushchev would later
claim that Soviet missiles were deployed in Cuba to defend
the island against the threat of U.S. invasion—reflecting
an offense-defense distinction based on political intent
rather than the capability of the weapons.
102See "U.S. Reaffirms Policy on Prevention of
Aggressive Actions by Cuba: Statement by President Kennedy,"
Department of State Bulletin 47 (September 24, 1962), p.
450; "The President's News Conference of September 13,
1962, " Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy,
1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1963), p. 674. On the meetings with Soviet officials, see
Sorenson, Kennedy , pp. 667-9; Raymond L. Garthoff,
Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 1987), p. 15; Hilsman, pp. 166-67.
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Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was covertly deploying
offensive missiles to Cuba. Khrushchev apparently proposed
the idea of deploying offensive missiles to Cuba sometime
between late April and late May of 1962. By early July Cuba
had agreed to allow the missiles on its soil, plans for the
deployment had been completed, and launch sites had been
identified. The initial Soviet missile deployment plan
is summarized in Table 1. The Soviets planned initially to
deploy 24 launchers for SS-4 (Soviet designation '^-12**)
Sandal 1,100-mile range MRBMs with two missiles per launch-
er, for a total of 48 MRBMs, and 16 launchers for SS-5
(Soviet designation HR-14") Skean 2,200-mile range IRBMs
with two missiles per launcher, for a total of 32 IRBMs. Of
this missile force, only 42 MRBMs were actually deployed to
Cuba before the United States imposed the quarantine on
offensive weapons. Additionally, the Soviets deployed 42 IL-
10428 Beagle twin-engine light bombers to Cuba. These were
There are a wide range of estimates as to when the
decision was made. Khrushchev states in his memoirs that it
was during a May 14-20, 1962, visit to Bulgaria that the
idea of deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba occurred to him.
See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers , translated
and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970),
p. 493. For discussions of the Soviet decision, see Michael
Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosyqin (New
York: Viking Press, 1969), pp. 233-39; Hilsman, To Move a
Nation , pp. 159-61; Garthoff, Reflections , pp. 6-8.
104Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, "The
Crisis USSR/Cuba: Information as of 0600," October 28, 1962,
pp. 1-1, 1-4 (National Security Archive, Washington, DC,
Cuban Missile Crisis file); Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p.
796; Hilsman, p. 159; Garthoff, Reflections , pp. 19-20.
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regarded as offensive weapons by the United States because
they had sufficient range to reach U.S. territory and
theoretically could carry nuclear bombs.
Table 1
Soviet Missile Deployment Plan
Site Type Launchers Missiles
San Cristobal site no. 1
San Cristobal site no. 2
San Cristobal site no. 3
San Cristobal site no. 4
Sagua la Grande site no.
Sagua la Grande site no.
Guanajay site no. 1
Guanajay site no. 2
Remedios site no. 1





1 MRBM 4 8





Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, "The
Crisis USSR/Cuba: Information as of 0600," October 28, 1962,
pp. 1-1, 1-4; Garthoff, Reflections , pp. 19-20; Schlesinger,
A Thousand Days , p. 796; Hilsman, p. 159.
In late July Cuba began evacuating residents from the
ports at which the missiles would arrive and in early August:
the Soviets began establishing their own security zones at
those ports, including construction of fences and guard
posts. In mid-August equipment for construction of the
launch sites began arriving in Cuba and in late August
clearing of roads and launch areas started at the Sagua la
Grande MRBM sites. In early September MRBM and IRBM
associated equipment began arriving in Cuban ports. The
first MRBMs appear to have arrived in the Cuban port of
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Casilda on September 8 and were delivered to Sagua la Grande
by September 15. Also in early September construction began
at the Guanajay IRBM sites and Cuban residents were evicted
from what would become the San Cristobal MRBM sites. In mid-
September construction began at one of the two Remedios IRBM
sites and clearing of roads and launch areas started at the
San Cristobal MRBM sites. The second shipment of MRBMs
appears to have arrived in the Cuban port of Mariel on
105September 15 for delivery to San Cristobal. Soviet
deployment of offensive missiles in Cuba was thus well along
by mid-September.
The Soviets sought to mask their deployment of
offensive missiles to Cuba with what Roger Hilsman has
described as a program of "cover and deception." From the
Soviet-Cuban communique released on September 2 at the end
of Che Guevara's visit to Moscow, to Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's meeting with President Kennedy on October 18, the
Soviets on at least eight occasions stated that they were
sending only defensive weapons to Cuba.
105National Indications Center, pp. 1-7, 13-15;
Hilsman, pp. 183-6; Garthoff, Reflections , pp. 19-20; Elie
Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966)
,
pp. 41-2. The one serious disagreement among these accounts
is that Hilsman states construction started at Sagua la
Grande in late September, while the National Indications
Center report states it started in late August.
Garthoff, Reflections
, p. 15. Also see Hilsman,
pp. 165-7; National Indications Center, pp. 13-14; Sorenson,
pp. 667-8, 690; Abel, pp. 37-8, 61-3; Schlesinger, A
Thousand Days , pp. 798-9, 805.
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U.S. Suspicions and Preparations
The United States was slow in coming to the realiza-
tion that the Soviet Union was deploying offensive missiles
in Cuba. Although a few officials, particularly CIA
Director John A. McCone, had concluded as early as July 1962
that the build-up of defensive forces in Cuba was for the
defense of offensive weapons to be introduced later, the
consensus among the President's advisors and intelligence
officials in the CIA and State Department was that the
107Soviets would not put offensive missiles in Cuba. A
Special National Intelligence Estimate issued September 19,
1962, concluded that the Soviets would be unlikely to place
MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba because it would be "incompatible
with Soviet practice to date" and would indicate "a far
greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-
108Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far. H
On McCone' s warning, see Arthur Krock, Memoirs:
Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York: Funk and Wagnalls,
1968), pp. 378-80. Robert Kennedy and Roger Hilsman contend
McCone never expressed his concern to the President. See
Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy
, p. 506; Hilsman, p. 173. On
the view that the Soviets would not put offensive missiles
in Cuba, see Sorenson, p. 670; Hilsman, pp. 172-3; Abel, p.
5; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 798; George and Smoke,
pp. 477-81; Garthoff, Reflections , p. 26. Robert Kennedy
apparently anticipated in April 1961 and September 1962 that
the Soviets might put offensive missiles in Cuba. See
Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy , pp. 471, 505.
108Central Intelligence Agency, Special National
Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, "The Military Buildup in
Cuba," September 19, 1962 (National Security Archive,
Washington, DC, Cuban Missile Crisis file), p. 2.
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Controversy has persisted over the causes of this
intelligence failure. Robert Kennedy stated in his memoir
of the crisis that "No one had expected or anticipated that
the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface missiles in
109
Cuba.** There are two explanations for this. Roger
Rilsman contends that the U.S. did not have accurate and
reliable intelligence on the Soviet missiles until the
October 14 U-2 photographs. The opposing argument is that
there were numerous indicators of the Soviet move, but U.S.
analysts, working under an erroneous conception of Soviet
behavior and perceptions, ignored or misconstrued evidence
contradicting their belief that the Soviets would not put
offensive arms in Cuba. The two sides agree, however, that
the Kennedy Administration was taken by surprise and caught
unprepared when the Soviet missiles were discovered on
October 14. 110
The U.S. may not have had accurate and reliable
intelligence, but there were several pieces of evidence that
should have raised suspicion that the Soviets were placing
offensive missiles in Cuba. In fact, the available evidence
97Robert P. Kennedy, Thirteen Days; A Memoir of the
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 24.
98Hilsman, pp. 159-92; also see Sorenson, p. 675. On
the intelligence failure argument, see Klaus Knorr,
"Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of
the Cuban Missiles," World Politics 16 (April 1964): 455-
67; Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight
and Foresight," Foreign Affairs 43 (July 1965): 691-707;




did raise suspicions among some analysts and officials, but
those suspicions were not taken seriously by officials with
access to the President. On the other hand, contrary to the
intelligence failure argument, the Kennedy Administration
did anticipate the possibility that offensive weapons might
be placed in Cuba and initiated actions to prepare for that
possibility. The pattern was a gradual accumulation of
ambiguous intelligence that the arms build-up in Cuba could
pose an offensive threat to the United States, accompanied
by a search for confirmation that offensive weapons were
being deployed in Cuba and a series of low-level
preparations to counter that possibility. This pattern
—
gradual accumulation of intelligence, search for
confirmation, and low-level preparations for action
—
strongly influenced the manner in which the crisis was
handled after the discovery of MRBMs on October 14.
In late August 1962, the United States began receiving
reports out of Cuba on construction and preparations for
installation. of MRBMs. The reports lacked details posi-
tively linking the activities with offensive missiles, so
were assessed as related to the build-up of defensive arms.
After mid-September, as the Sieverts Report notes, "a few
reports, of varying reliability and precision, were sugges-
tive enough to arouse suspicions." The Preparedness
Frank A. Sieverts, "The Cuban Crisis, 1962,
"
Department of State, Washington, DC, August 22, 1963
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Investigating Subcommittee's report on the Cuban military
build-up states that these intelligence reports "resulted in
the conclusion—apparently reached near the end of September
1962— that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic mis-
sile (MRBH) site in Pinar del Rio Province.
"
Xi This led,
on October 4, to the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
(COMOR) designating western Cuba highest priority for U-2
overflight. Thus, although the fragmentary and ambiguous
(declassified 1984)
, pp. 11-12 (Cited hereafter as "Sioverts
Report") . Allegations have been made that reports from
Cuban exiles and agents in Cuba— ignored or given little
credence at the time—in fact provided significant evidence
that offensive missiles were in Cuba. See James Monahan and
Kenneth O. Gilmore, The Great Deception (New York: Farrar
and Strauss, 1963), pp. 201-5; Philippe L. Thiraud de
Vosjoli, "A Head That Holds Some Sinister Secrets," Life ,
April 26, 1964, p. 35; Forrest R. Johns, "Naval Quarantine
of Cuba, 1962," (Masters thesis, University of California
San Diego, 1984), pp. 43-46, 66-67. For explanations why
reports out of Cuba were discounted, see Maxwell D. Taylor,
Swords and Ploughshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), p.
263; Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course: The Cuban Missile
Crisis and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 8;
Abel, pp. 40-41; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 800;
Robert Kennedy, pp. 28-29.
112Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee Interim
Report, p. 7.
Hilsman, pp. 175-76; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days ,
p. 800? Abel, p. 15. To avoid the threat of an inter-
national incident arising from a U-2 being downed by Soviet
SAMs, the President had directed on September 10 that U-2
flights not be conducted over known SAM sites in western
Cuba. See Hilsman, p. 173-74; Abel, p. 14. Consequently,
western Cuba had not been overflown since September 5. By
designating western Cuba highest priority for U-2 flights,
COMOR was recommending that the ban on flights over SAM
sites be rescinded. On October 9 this recommendation was
taken to the President, who approved flights over western
Cuba. See Hilsman, p. 176; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p.
801; Sorenson, p. 672; George and Smoke, pp. 475-77.
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intelligence on offensive missiles that was received in
August and September failed to sway the President's advisors
from their belief that the Soviets would not deploy
offensive weapons in Cuba, it was carefully assessed and
used to focus the search for photographic confirmation of
the missiles.
Intelligence analysts in the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and the military services appear to have
concluded by the end of September that the Soviet Union
would soon deploy offensive missiles in Cuba. Aviation Week
and Space Technology reported on October 1 that "Pentagon
strategists consider the present arms buildup in Cuba the
first step toward eventual construction of intermediate-
114
range ballistic missile emplacements.** That same day,
during a regular weekly JCS meeting attended by Secretary of
Defense McNamara, DIA photographic intelligence analyst
Colonel John R. Wright, Jr., presented a briefing on his
assessment that the Soviets were preparing a launch site for
115
offensive missiles in the San Cristobal area. Vice
114
"U.S. Watches for Possible Cuban IRBMs , " Aviation
Week and Space Technology , October 1, 1962, p. 20.
115Johns, "Naval Quarantine," p. 73. He contends
Colonel Wright presented photographs from the September 26
and 29 U-2 flights of construction at the Sagua la Grande
MRBM site and Remedios IRBM site. Admiral George W.
Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations in 1962, has stated "I
first saw the photographic intelligence showing that the
missiles were in Cuba on about 1 October." See Admiral
George W. Anderson, "As I Recall... The Cuban Missile




Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Director of the Joint Staff in
1962, stated in his oral history that by early October the
Joint Staff was convinced the Soviets had deployed offensive
missiles in Cuba: "We knew three weeks before it ever came
out to the public in general what was going on down there,
that there were missile sites. The military got the
information and passed it on to the Chiefs and to the White
House, and they sat on it for a while hoping it would go
away. • . . But we had beautiful pictures of these sites and
116
the stuff going in." Although, as Vice Admiral Riley
suggests, forceful action was not taken immediately,
McNamara and the Joint Chiefs did commence a wide range of
low-level actions to increase U.S. readiness for military
action against Cuba.
U.S. Navy surveillance of Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba
also appears to have raised suspicions—at least among the
senior Navy leadership—that the Soviets were deploying
1987): 44. However, Arthur C. Lundahl, Director of the
CIA's National Photographic Intelligence Center in 1962,
states that U-2 photographs taken prior to October 14 did
not reveal the presence of MRBM sites. Lundahl, interview
by author, April 28, 1988. Also see Hilsman, p. 174;
Sorenson, pp. 674-75; Abel, p. 14; Schlesinger, A Thousand
Days , p. 799. Colonel Wright probably presented to the JCS
the same briefing he would give to the COMOR three days
later. In the COMOR briefing, he pointed out that the
pattern of SA-2 SAM deployments in the San Cristobal area
seen in U-2 photographs taken September 5 resembled the
pattern seen around MRBM/IRBM sites in the Soviet Union.
See Hilsman, pp. 176, 181; Abel. p. 26. These are probably
the photographs recalled by Admiral Anderson.
116
Riley, "Reminiscences," p. 756.
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offensive missiles to Cuba. Hilsman contends that "Shipping
intelligence did not reveal the contents of the ships," and
that the significance of ships with hatches large enough to
accommodate MRBMs arriving in Cuba riding high in the water
(thus carrying a high-volume, low-weight cargo) was not
117
realized until after the MRBMs were discovered in Cuba.
However, there is persuasive evidence that shipping
intelligence did in fact provide important clues that
offensive missiles were en route to Cuba.
The history of the Cuban Missile Crisis prepared by
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations states that the
intelligence on offensive missiles included "descriptions of
suspicious cargoes aboard Cuba-bound ships, obtained from
118
sources at ports of loading and unloading." Suspicions
that the Soviet ships were delivering offensive missiles
were strong among the Navy's leadership, including the CNO
(Admiral Anderson) , the director of the Joint Staff (Vice
Admiral Riley) , the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Fleet Operations and Readiness (Vice Admiral Charles D.




117xx Hilsman, pp. 167, 186-87.
118CNO Historical Narrative, p. 2.
119Admiral Anderson, interview by author, January 25,
1988; Riley, "Reminiscences," p. 756; Admiral Charles D.
Griffin, letter to author, April 6, 1988; Vice Admiral
Francis J. Blouin, letter to author, March 1, 1988.
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Vice Admiral Turner F. Caldwell, Director of the
Strategic Plana Division of the CNO's staff in 1962, has
described the Navy's suspicions:
OPNAV [the CNO's staff] as a whole, or rather
the pertinent parts (as opposed to individuals such as
myself), became overtly suspicious of Russian
intentions in about the middle of July 1962. My
personal suspicions had been aroused earlier, say
May. The pattern of Russian ship movements to Cuba
altered in the spring. The presence of construction
equipment as deck cargo indicated large-scale
construction to be contemplated. My personal opinion
was that nuclear missiles would be introduced. I set
up an informal committee, with representatives from
DCNO (Operations) [Deputy CNO for Operations] , DCNO
(Logistics) [Deputy CNO for Logistics] and a couple
others. All our procedures were oral, there was no
written record. I made several presentations to the
CNO at his weekly DCNO conference.
Thus, the Navy's top leadership was being appraised on a
regular basis of suspicions and evidence that the Soviets
were deploying offensive missiles to Cuba.
Navy suspicions were based largely on evidence gained
through shipping intelligence. Offensive missiles and
missile-associated equipment apparently were photographed on
the decks of Soviet ships bound for Cuba. The 1963 CINCLANT
history of the crisis states "Strategic material was
photographed inbound to Cuba but was not associated with the
buildup of offensive weapons until just prior to October,
121
when intelligence confirmed that fact." Navy officers
120Vice Admiral Turner F. Caldwell, letter to author,
March 14, 1988.
121CINCLANT Historical Account, p. 5.
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that participated in the crisis are more specific. Admiral
Griffin states in his oral history that some of the MRBMs
122
were shipped on deck. Vice Admiral Caldwell described
this in detail:
Photographs by patrol planes showed large
cylindrical objects on the decks of several ships en
route to Cuba. Though the objects were covered with
tarpaulins, it was easy to see what they were. I
never did decide whether the Russians wished us to
know what they were doing, or the operation had been
mounted so hastily there was not time to camouflage
the cargoes properly, or they did not care, assuming
we would find out very soon by some means anyway.
Although Admiral Griffin and Vice Admiral Caldwell
were convinced by the photographs, the evidence was probably
viewed as ambiguous at the time. Vice Admiral William D.
Houser, Naval Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
during the crisis, states "We may have seen missile
122Admiral Charles D. Griffin, "Reminiscences of
Admiral Charles D. Griffin, U.S. Navy (Retired)," Volume II
(Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program,
December 1975), p. 553. General David A. Burchinal, USAF,
Director of Plans on the Air Staff in 1962, states that
missile transporters and erector-launchers were also spotted
"coning in undercover, as deck loads on ships." See General
David A. Burchinal, transcript of oral history interview,
April 11, 1975 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
History), p. 113.
123
Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1988.
Admiral Alfred G. Ward, Commander Second Fleet during the
crisis, states that two of the Soviet ships initially
designated for intercept were selected "Because of the
photographs showing the missile cases along the deck. A
missile is too large to get into the hold below decks and
had to be put in bizarre-shaped tubes along the side of the
deck, and were quite easily identified." See Admiral Alfred
G. Ward, "Reminiscences of Admiral Alfred G. Ward, U.S. Navy
(Retired),** (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral
History Program, 1972), p. 196.
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cannisters on deck, but not have known what they were until
124the missile sites were photographed." Vice Admiral
Houser's view is supported by the CINCLANT history of the
crisis, which states that "Strategic material was photo-
graphed inboud to Cuba but was not associated with the
buildup of offensive weapons until just prior to October,
125
when intelligence confirmed that fact." Thus, the
•vidence of Soviet offensive missiles en route to Cuba
provided by shipping intelligence was probably ambiguous.
Although many senior Navy officers were convinced that
the Soviets were deploying offensive missiles to Cuba, their
perceptions were not widely shared outside the Navy other
than by a few senior Air Force officers. One Navy flag
officer related how he and his Air Force counterpart spent a
total of five or six hours briefing the Chiefs during weekly
JCS meetings in August and September on the evidence that
the Soviets were deploying offensive missiles to Cuba. They
supported their arguments with photographs of possible MRBMs
or IRBMs on the decks of Soviet ships. However, they were
unable to convince JCS Chairman General Maxwell D. Taylor,
who did not pass their warnings on to McNamara or the
124Vice Admiral William D. Houser, interview by
author, February 11, 1988.
125CINCLANT Historical Account, p. 5. The confirma-
tion was probably the SAM site photographs used by Colonel
Wright to brief JCS and COMOR on the possibility of MRBM
sites in western Cuba.
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President and refused to authorize preparations to counter
126
the shipments. Others shared Taylor's skepticism. John
Hughes, special assistant for photoanalysis to DIA Director
Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll, testified in 1963 that
Navy photographs of Soviet deck cargo did not reveal
evidence of missile equipment, a conclusion shared by
127Hilsman. Thus, although Navy shipping intelligence
convinced many in the Navy (and some in the Air Force) that
the Soviets were deploying offensive missiles to Cuba,
outside the Navy it was not regarded as sufficiently
unambiguous to warrant taking action against the Soviets.
Purther confirmation of the missiles would be required.
There is also reason to belive that the United States
gained intelligence on the Soviet missile deployments from
signals intelligence (SIGINT) . Signals intelligence
consists of communications intelligence (COMINT) , on
•missions from enemy radio and other telecommunications
systems, and electronic intelligence (ELINT) , on enemy
radars and other non-communications emissions. The
intelligence collection ship USS Oxford (AG 159) was
126Letter to author. The individual requested
anonymity. I verified that he held the position he
described, attended JCS meetings in the August-September
period, and worked with the Air Force officer he named.
127U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964 , Hearings,
88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), p. 8; Hilsman, p. 167.
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deployed off the coast of Cuba almost continuously from
128
early August 1962 onward. In 1968 testimony, Secretary
of Defense McNamara confirmed Oxford's role in the crisis:
"To show you how valuable these systems are to us, let me
remind you that one of these ships was off the coast of Cuba
during the Cuban missile crisis. It provided invaluable
information, on the basis of which national policy was
formulated.-'1"* This would have been COMINT and ELINT
collected by Oxford , the only intelligence collection ship
covering Cuba at the time. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, former
Chief of Naval Operations and JCS Chairman, has stated that
"electronic intelligence acquired by surface ships led to
the photographic intelligence which gave us undisputible
evidence of the . • . Soviet missiles in Cuba." Admiral
Moorer thus indicates that SIGINT collected by Oxford played
an improtant role in discovery of Soviet offensive missiles
in Cuba.
Very little additional information is available on the
role of SIGINT in discovery of the Soviet missiles due to
128x* USS Oxford (AG 159) Ship's History 1962, January
25, 1961 (Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center,
Washington, DC)
.
129U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and
Development, Fiscal Year 1969, and Reserve Strength ,
Hearings, 90th congress, Second Session (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 42.
Quoted in Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Account-
ability (New York: Cooward-McCann, 1970), p. 183.
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the classification of materials on sensitive intelligence
sources and methods. Thus, it cannot be determined
precisely when Oxford first gained indications of Soviet
offensive missiles in Cuba or exactly what it was that
Oxford learned. The date of the first SIGINT indications
could have been as early as the first week in August, but
was probably some time between September 15 (when the first
MRBMs were delivered to Sagua la Grnde) and October 1 (when
JCS commenced preparations for military action against
Cuba) . The last week in September was the most likely
period, based on the timing of U.S. surveillance and
military moved directed against Cuba. SIGINT could have
been used to butress Colonel Wright's conclusion
—
presented
to the JCS on October 1 and to the COMOR on October 4—that
the Soviets were deploying offensive missiles in Cuba.
Question naturally arise as to the clarity and relia-
bility of the intelligence collected by Oxford . Since
intelligence professionals generally place great confidence
in SIGINT, the apparent lack of a significant U.S. reaction
to intelligence on Soviet offensive missiles is puzzling. A
clear indication of Soviet MRBM deployments in late Septem-
ber should have enabled the the United States to take
decisive action three weeks earlier than it did. The
blockade, at least, could have been implented within a few
days of a decision to act, and further actions could have
followed later (as they did in the crisis) . There are two
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complementary explanations as to why the United States did
not react vigorously to such SIGINT: First, the intelli-
gence may have been suggestive but not conclusive. Further
confirmation—U-2 photographs of clearly identifiable
missile sites—was needed. Second, the source of the Intel*
ligence had to be protected by providing an alternative
source for the knowledge—again meaning U-2 photographs.
Under these conditions SIGINT would not have led to
immediate and decisive U.S. action against the missiles.
The most important factors determining the manner in
which the Kennedy Administration reacted to intelligence on
Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba were President Kennedy's
determination not to take action
—
particularly the use of
force—until he had incontrovertible evidence that offensive
missiles were in fact being deployed in Cuba, and his
determination not to let his policy options be narrowed by
political or military pressure prior to his having that
evidence. President Kennedy set an extremely high standard
of evidence—indisputable photographic confirmation of '
offensive missiles—as the requirement for taking action
against Cuba or the Soviet Union. He had important reasons
for doing so: ensuring American public support for his
actions, convincing reluctant allies the need for action,
avoiding the Soviet propaganda victory that would result
from taking action unnecessarily, and, above all, not




certain force was warranted. The negative impact of the
requirement for photographic confirmation was that it
implicitly denigrated other intelligence sources and led to
action not being taken until some Soviet missiles were close
132
to being operational. Had the Soviet Union taken greater
care to camouflage the missile sites in Cuba while they were
being readied, the requirement for photographic confirmation
could well have led tc President Kennedy being confronted
with a fait accompli .
Further dangers of the photographic confirmation
requirement were that internal distribution of intelligence
on offensive weapons in Cuba could build pressure for
military action and that leaks of such intelligence could
build pressure in Congress and the public to take forceful
action. Such internal and external pressures could narrow
the President's options, force him to take action before he
was convinced it was warranted, and even provoke a crisis
that night have been avoided. To avoid such pressures, the
President used the tactic of restricting internal dissemina-
tion of specified intelligence—a procedure that had been
used for especially sensitive intelligence since early in
World War II. For example, on August 31, 1962, the
Sieverts Report, p. 14; Hilsman, p. 190;
Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy , p. 511; George and Smoke, pp.
473-74.
132Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee Interim
Report, pp. 10-11; George and Smoke, pp. 473-74.
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President ordered that intelligence on Soviet SAM sites in
Cuba be withheld from normal dissemination in the
intelligence community until he had decided upon a course of
action. On October 11, the day after Republican Senator
Kenneth Keating made his sensational allegations on Soviet
IRBMs in Cuba, the President directed that intelligence on
offensive weapons in Cuba be strictly limited "only to
specific individuals on an eyes only basis who by virtue of
their responsibilities as advisors to the President have a
133
need to know." This restriction on dissemination went
into effect on October 12, with the code word M Psalm M
assigned to intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba.
The restriction functioned as intended after MRBMs were
discovered in Cuba, preventing leaks for almost a week while
the President decided upon a course of action.
133Sieverts Report, pp. 15-17 (Emphasis in original
directive) .
134Hilsman, p. 187; Presidential Recordings Tran-
scripts, "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 16, 1962,"
transcript of 11:50 A.M. -12:57 P.M. off-the-record meeting
on Cuba (Presidential Papers of John F. Kennedy, President's
Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. Cited
hereafter as "October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript."), p.
18, exerpts reproduced in "White House Tapes and Minutes of
the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security 10 (Summer
1985): 171-181. At this meeting, McNamara explained to the
President how U-2 photographs were handled prior to October
12: "Normally, when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the
films. The duplicated copies go to a series of commands. A
copy goes to SAC. A Copy goes to CINCLANT. A copy goes to
CIA." See p. 19. A copy also went to DIA, where Colonel
Wright worked on them. This appears to have contributed to
different commands arriving at different conclusions on
whether or not there were offensive missiles in Cuba.
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As the Cuban military buildup gained momentum and
tentative indicators that the Soviet were deploying
offensive missiles to Cuba were received, the Kennedy
Administration began studying options for dealing with
offensive missiles and the Pentagon initiated a series of
low-level military preparations. The first actions taken,
in early August 1962, were to increase surveillance of Cuba
and Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba. Beginning in late August
the CIA, NSC and State Department conducted a series of
studies on the Cuban military build-up and U.S. policy
options for dealing with it. Some of these studies directly
addressed the issue of offensive missiles, although through
September 19—well after deployment of MRBMs had started
—
the conclusion was that the Soviets would not put such
135
missiles in Cuba. Nevertheless, these studies mark
increasing attention to the situation in Cuba.
A significant step in the evolution of U.S. policy was
taken on August 23, 1962, when President Kennedy approved
National Security Action Memorandum No. 181 (NSAM-181)
.
See Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelli-
gence Memorandum, "Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba,"
August 22, 1962 (National Security Archive, Washington, DC,
Cuban Missile Crisis file) ; Special Inter-Departmental
Committee, Memorandum for the President, "Report on
Implications for U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy of Recent
Intelligence Estimates," August 23, 1962 (Declassified
1981. National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban
Missile Crisis file); Central Intelligence Agency, Special
National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, "The Military
Buildup in Cuba," September 19, 1962 (National Security




In this document the President directed a series of actions
and studies be undertaken in light of increased Soviet
activity in Cuba. Three items in NSAM-181 addressed the
possibility that the Soviet Union might deploy offensive
nissiles in Cuba:
5. An analysis should be prepared of the
probable military, political and psychological impact
of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air
missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could
reach the U.S.
6. A study should be made of the advantages and
disadvantages of making a statement that the U.S.
would not tolerate the establishment of military
forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a
nuclear attack from Cuba against the U.S.
7. A study should be made of the various
military alternatives which might be adopted in
executing a decision to eliminate any installations in
Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S.
What would be the pros and cons, for example, of
pinpoint attack, general counter-force attack, and
outright invasion?
These tasks were assigned to specific agencies, who were
directed to report the names of the action officers working
on these studies. Additionally, a meeting with the
President was scheduled for September 1 to review progress
on these studies.
Although not specifically tasked by NSAM-181 to
contribute to these studies, Attorney General Robert F.
The White House, Office of the Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs, National Security Action
Memorandum No. 181, August 23, 1962 (declassified 1978.
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA, National Security
Files, Box 338, "Cuba (4). 8/23/64" folder).
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Kennedy directed Norbert A. Schlci, head of the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel, to prepare a study of
the international legal issues that would be raised in the
•vent that the U.S. took action against Soviet missile bases
in Cuba. The central conclusion of Schlei 's memorandum,
submitted to the Attorney General on August 29, was that
"international law would permit use by the United States of
relatively extreme measures, including various forms and
degrees of force, for the purpose of terminating or
preventing the realization of such a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Hemisphere. An obligation would
exist to have recourse first, if time should permit, to the
procedures of collective security organizations of which the
137United States is a member.** The Schlei memorandum also
noted that either a total blockade or a "visit and search**
blockade would be appropriate actions for observing the
138international legal principle of "proportionality.**
Proportionality requires that use of force in self-defense
be proportional to the force used against a state and be the
minimum necessary to restore and ensure its security. Thus,
use of a selective blockade directed only against offensive
137Norbert A. Schlei, Memorandum for the Attorney
General, "Legality Under International law of Remedial
Action Against Use of Cuba as a Missile Base by the Soviet
Union," August 29, 1962, reproduced in Abram Chayes, The
Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of




arms shipments to Cuba was considered by at least some
civilian officials as early as late August.
In September the Kennedy Administration began taking
preliminary steps to respond to the Cuban military build-
up. The President made public statements on the build-up on
September 4 and 13, noting its apparent defensive nature and
warning against installation of offensive missiles.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with Latin American
ambassadors on September 5 concerning Cuba and proposed that
a closed Organization of American States (OAS) meeting be
held in early October. That meeting was held October 2 and
included a U.S. briefing on the Cuban military build-up.
These meetings laid groundwork for the possibility that the
OAS might have to take concerted action against Cuba in the
future. On September 20 the Senate passed a Joint Resolu-
tion on Cuba authorizing the President to use force to
defend against Cuban aggression and prevent the creation of
an external military capability in Cuba that threatened the
United States. The House passed this resolution on
139September 26 and the President signed it on October 3.
Thus, by early October the Kennedy Administration had taken
several political and diplomatic steps to prepare for the
possibility of action against Cuba.
139Johns, "Naval Quarantine," pp. 77-79; Pachter, p.
18. The Joint Resolution is reproduced in David L. Larson,
The "Cuban Crisis" of 1962 , Second Edition (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1986), p. 33.
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Military preparations were also being made. On
September 7 the President requested from Congress authority
to call up 150,000 reservists. On September 18 the Air
Force began extensive training exercises for air strikes
against Cuba, including simulated combat missions against
mock Soviet SAM sites. On September 19 a detachment of Navy
F8U Corsair jet fighters was transferred to Key West in
order to bolster the base's air defense. On September 21
CINCLANT issued a planning directive to subordinate commands
tasking them to update existing contingency plans for
military action against Cuba. Throughout September the
Joint Staff and CINCLANT updated Cuban contingency plans.
In response to NSAM-181, the Air Force, Navy, and Joint
Staff studied air strike options for dealing with offensive
missiles.
The regular weekly meeting of the JCS with the
Secretary of Defense on October 1, 1962, marked a major
turning point in U.S. military preparations related to
Cuba. The first shipment of suspected IL-28 Beagle light
bombers, regarded as an offensive weapon, had arrived in
Cuba on September 30—the first offensive weapons confirmed
140**
"CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 19; Hilsman, p.
171; Abel, p. 9; Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Memorandum, "Department of Defense Operations During the
Cuban Crisis," drafted by Aaam Yarmolinsky, February 12,
1963 (declassified 1979), pp. 1, 7 (Cited hereafter as "DOD
Operations"), reproduced in Dan Caldwell, ed., "Department
of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis," Naval War




to be in Cuba. The delivery of IL-28s and the briefing
by Colonel Wright, which warned that an offensive missile
site was likely to be built in the San Cristobal area, had a
significant impact on the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of
Defense. McNamara directed the Chiefs to intensify
contingency planning for for military action against Cuba
and to increase the readiness of U.S. forces for Cuban
contingencies, including blockade, air strikes and
invasion. He did not, however, order execution of existing
142
air strike and invasion contingency plans.
On October 2 McNamara sent a memorandum to the JCS
specifying the contingencies in which military action might
be taken against Cuba:
During my meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on October 1, 1962, the question arose as to the con-
tingencies under which military action against Cuba
may be necessary and toward which our military plan-
ning should be oriented. The following categories
141National Indications Center, p. 16; CNO Historical
Narrative, pp. 9-10; Hilsman, p. 167. Navy patrol planes
first photographed a Soviet ship carrying suspected IL-28
crates on September 16. Over the next two weeks two
additional ships carrying suspected IL-28 crates were
discovered. These ships were closely tracked en route to
Cuba. During early October the confirmed arrival of IL-28s
in Cuba seems to have been at least as great a cause for
concern as the possibility of offensive missiles.
142
"DOD Operations," pp. 1, 7. Johns contends that
during this meeting McNamara ordered execution of the
preparatory phases of the Cuban contingency plans. See
Johns, "Naval Quarantine," p. 74. However, there is no
evidence to support this and Admiral Anderson denies that




would appear to cover the likely possibilities:
a. Soviet action against Western rights in
Berlin calling for a Western response indicating among
other actions a blockade of Communist or other
•hipping to Cuba.
b. Evidence that the Castro regime has
permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapons
systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors.
c. An attack against the Guantanamo base, or
against U.S. planes or vessels outside Cuban
territorial air space or waters.
d. A substantial popular uprising in Cuba, the
leaders of which request assistance in recovering
Cuban independence from the Castro Soviet puppet
regime.
e. Cuban armed assistance to subversion in
other parts of the Western Hemisphere.
f
.
A decision by the President that affairs in
Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing
U.S. national security.
May I have the views of the Chiefs as to the
appropriateness of the above list of contingencies and
answers to the following:
a. The operational plans considered appropriate
for each contingency.
b. The preparatory actions which should now and
progressively in the future be taken to improve U.S.
readiness to execute these plans.
c. The consequences of the actions on the
availability of forces and or our logistic posture to
deal with threats in other areas, i.e. Berlin,
Southeast Asia, etc.
We can assume that the political objective in
any of these contingencies may be either:
a. The removal of the threat to U.S. security
of Soviet weapons systems in Cuba, or
b. The removal of the Castro regime and the
securing in the island of a new regime responsive to
Cuban national desires.
Inasmuch as the second objective is the more
difficult objective and may be required if the first
is to be permanently achieved, attention should be
focused on.a-capability to assure the second
objective.
143Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2, 1962 (declassified 1984),
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This memorandum was important for two reasons. First,
In the eyes of the Joint Chiefs—and possibly McNamara as
well—three of the six contingencies had already arisen:
offensive weapons, in the form of IL-2S bombers, were
already in Cuba, Cuban forces had previously attacked and
buzzed unarmed Navy planes over international waters (August
30 and September 8) , and Cuba was suspected of supporting
Communist movements in other Latin American nations.
Second, McNamara emphasized planning for the worst case
—
forcible removal of the Castro regime. The Chiefs were thus
oriented—with McNamara' s full knowledge—toward prepara-
tions for large-scale air attacks and invasion of the
island, rather than toward planning for a strictly limited
use of force, such as a quarantine on offensive weapons.
This appears to have been the origin of at least some
of the tensions between civilian and military leaders
experienced during the crisis: the military was originally
directed by McNamara to prepare for operations that the
President was not willing to execute when the time came to
decide upon a course of action. On the other hand, by
making initial preparations for air strikes and invasion,
the JCS increased the range of military options available to
the President on short notice. The flaw in McNamara'
s
reproduced in CINCLANT Historical Account, pp. 41-42; CNO
Historical Narrative, Appendix II. Also see Johns, "Naval
Quarantine," pp. 87-88. This is the memorandum alluded to
in the Yarmolinski report. See HDOD Operations," p. 7.
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October 1 memorandum was that in focusing on the overthrow
of Castro it inadvertently excluded JCS attention to limited
operations, such as a quarantine, that would suffice to
achieve lesser objectives.
Military preparations for action against Cuba rapidly
gained momentum from October 1 onward. On October 1
CINCLANT notified his Navy and Air Force commanders
responsible for tactical air operations "to take all
feasible measures necessary to assure maximum readiness" to
execute the contingency plan for air strikes against Cuba on
October 20. Navy and Tactical Air Command fighters and
attack planes were placed on six, twelve, and 24 hour alerts
for the air strike contingency. On October 3 Commander in
Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) issued a contingency
144
operation order (OPORD) for a Naval blockade of Cuba.
144X
**CINCLANT Historical Account, pp. 39-40; "DOD
Operations," p. 1; Admiral Alfred G. Ward, "Personal History
of Diary of Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, U.S. Navy, While
Serving as Commander Second Fleet," n.d. (declassified
1984), p. 2 (Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center,
Washington, DC. Cited hereafter as Ward, "Diary."). The
October 20 deadline to complete preparations for air strikes
against Cuba appears to have been set by McNamara at the
October 1 JCS meeting and passed to CINCLANT that day.
McNamara mentioned the October 20 target date in the October
16 morning and evening meetings with, the President. See
"October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript," p. 24; Presidential
Recordings Transcripts, "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings,
October 16, 1962," transcript of 6:30-7:55 P.M. off-the-
record meeting on Cuba (Presidential Papers of John F.
Kennedy, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston, MA. Cited hereafter as "October 16 Evening Meeting
Transcript."), p. 19, exerpts reproduced in "White House
Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis," Interna-
tional Security 10 (Summer 1985): 181-94.
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This OPORO was for a total blockade of Cuba and included the
option of mining Cuban ports. On October 4 McNamara sent a
memorandum to the President in which he stated M I have taken
steps to insure that our contingency plans for Cuba are kept
145
up to date.** On October 6 CINCLANT directed increased
readiness to execute contingency plans for invasion of
Cuba. Designated Army airborne forces, Marine landing
forces, and Navy amphibious forces were directed to begin
prepositioning for invasion of Cuba. Prepositioning of bulk
supplies, such as fuel and ammunition, also commenced.
Plans were made to deploy the Fifth Marine Expeditionary
Brigade from Camp Pendleton, California to the Caribbean.
On October 8 a squadron of Navy F4H Phantom jet fighters was
moved to Key West and placed under Continental Air Defense
Command (CONAD) control to augment air defenses in southern
Florida. On October 10 CINCLANT suggested further prepara-
tions to JCS and recommended that cover and deception be
used to hide invasion preparations. In an unusual move, the
CNO on October 12 directed that Vice Admiral Horacio Rivero
immediately relieve Vice Admiral Ward as Commander
Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet so that Vice Admiral Ward
could assume command of the Second Fleet by the October 20
145Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President,
"Presidential Interest in SA-2 Missile System and Contingen-
cy Planning for Cuba," October 4, 1962 (Declassified 1978.
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA, National Security
Files, Cuba folders)
, p. 2. The President was thus being
kept informed of the actions being taken by the military.
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target date for action against Cuba. On October 16 the
attack Carrier USS Independence (CVA 62) and four escorts
left port and proceeded to a contingency station northeast
of Cuba in order to be within air strike range of Cuba on
October 20 (a mission planned and ordered well before the
146MRBMs were discovered on October 14). Thus, when the
President was informed on October 16 that offensive missiles
had been discovered in Cuba, the military had already taken
a number of actions to be ready for operations against Cuba.
In summary, the the last three months prior to the
Cuban Missile Crisis were marked by a gradual accumulation
of fragmentary and inconclusive indications that the Soviets
were deploying offensive missiles in Cuba, a search for
photographic confirmation of the Soviet deployment, and a
series of low-level preparations for military action against
Cuba. The most important factors determining the manner in
which the United States reacted to intelligence on Soviet
offensive missiles in Cuba were President Kennedy's
determination not to take military action until he had
McNamara comments in "October 16 Morning Meeting
Transcript," p. 24; Taylor and McNamara comments in "October
16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 28-29; CINCLANT
Historical Account, pp. 40-44; "DOD Operations," p. 1; Ward,
"Diary," pp. 1-2; Abel, pp. 141-2; Anderson, interview by
author, January 25, 1988; Vice Admiral Robert J. Stroh,
commander of the Independence task group during the crisis,
letter to author, February 18, 1988; Admiral George W.
Anderson, Jr., "The Cuban Crisis," in Arnold L. Shapack, .
ed., Proceedings: Naval History Symposium (Annapolis, MD:




incontrovertible evidence that offensive missiles were in
Cuba, and his determination not to let his policy options be
prematurely narrowed by political or military pressure.
These were prudent policies, but the photographic confirma-
tion requirement implicitly denigrated other intelligence
and led to action not being taken until some Soviet missiles
were close to being operational. By initially focusing JCS
attention on major operations to overthrow the Castro
regime, McNamara inadvertently diverted attention from
limited operations designed to achieve lesser objectives
—
operations that would later be selected by the President.
Political-Strategic Context
The Soviet Union had two primary objectives in
deploying offensive missiles in Cuba: defending their Cuban
clients and improving their position in the strategic
147
nuclear balance with the United States. Khrushchev
147For the assessments of Soviet motives that were
Dade during the crisis, see Central Intelligence Agency,
Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-62, "Soviet
Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba," October
19, 1962 (declassified 1975)
, pp. 1-3 (National Security
Archive, Washington, DC, Cuba file, Record No. 199. Cited
hereafter as H SNIE 11-19-62") ; Central Intelligence Agency,
Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-19-62, "Major
Consequences of Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba,"
October 20, 1962 (declassified 1975), pp. 3-5 (National
Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuba file, Record No. 20.
Cited hereafter as "SNIE 11-19-62"). Disagreements exist
over which of these motives was most important to the
Soviets, but are irrelevant to this study. See Robert D.
Crane, "The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic Analysis of American




states in his memoirs that defending Cuba was his primary
objective, not only for the sake of the Castro regime but
also to protect Soviet influence and prestige in Latin
148America and among the Communist nations. However, the
strategic balance was also very much on Khrushchev's mind.
As he states in his memoirs, "In addition to protecting
Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes
149
to call 'the balance of power'."
The missiles had an even greater impact on the
political and psychological aspects of the strategic
balance, enhancing the image of Soviet power. Khrushchev
states in his memoirs that U.S. nuclear forces in Europe
Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet
Calculations and Behavior," World Politics 16 (April 1964):
364-377; Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, "Controlling the
Risks in Cuba,** Adelphi Papers No. 17 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1965), pp. 8-12;
Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis:
October 1962 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1976), p. 156; George and Smoke, pp. 459-66; Hilsman, pp.
161-65; Ulam, pp. 668-77; Sorenson, pp. 676-78. Some
American officials thought the Soviet venture in Cuba was
related to Berlin. See Abel, pp. 47-48; Wohlstetters, pp.
14-15; Tatu, p. 232-34; Pachter, p. 24. Although this idea
may have occurred to some Soviet officials, there is no
evidence that it was a major consideration.
148Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers , pp. 492-3.
Khrushchev's mention of Soviet standing among Communist
nations appears to be a veiled allusion to Soviet relations
with Communist China, which were strained in 1962 due to,
among other things, Chinese accusations that the Soviets
were overly accommodating with the imperialist camp. Also
see Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last
Testament , translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 509-11.
149Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers , p. 494.
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influenced his decision to put offensive missiles in Cuba:
"The United States had already surrounded the Soviet Union
with its own bomber bases and missiles. We knew that
American missiles were aimed against us in Turkey and Italy,
150
to say nothing of West Germany. " Thus, it is likely that
Khrushcehv also desired to balance—politically if not
militarily—U.S. "forward based systems" with Soviet nuclear
151
missiles in Cuba.
The Soviet strategy at the time the decision was made
to deploy offensive missiles in Cuba was to achieve a fait
152
accompli . Khrushchev states that his plan was to install
"missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the
United States find out they were there until it was too late
to do anything about them." He goes on to say "My thinking
went like this: if we installed the missiles secretly and
then the United States discovered the missiles were there
150i=>uIbid., p. 493.
151See Secretary of State Rusk's comments in "October
16 Morning Meeting Transcript," p. 15. The Soviets took the
same approach in reaction to the December 1979 NATO decision
to deploy American Pershing II MRBMs and Ground Launched
Cruise Missiles in Western Europe commencing in 1983. On
March 16, 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warned that
deployment of the U.S. weapons "would compel us to take
retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including
the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous
position." See "Soviet Announces Freeze on Missiles in
European Area," New York Times , March 17, 1982, p. 1.
152See Horelick,,p. 385; Sorenson, p. 678; Young, p.
235; Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink:
An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 55.
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after they were already poised and ready to strike, the
Americans would think twice before trying to liquidate our
153installations by military means." The Soviet diplomatic
cover and deception effort mounted during deployment of the
missiles and the efforts that were made to conceal the
deployment lend credence to the conclusion that the Soviets
154
sought to achieve a fait accompli .
United States discovery of the Soviet missiles before
they were operational effectively defeated the fait accompli
153Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers , p. 493.
154Some observers have speculated that the slipshod
Soviet effort to conceal deployment of the the missiles may
have indicated that the Soviets did not care whether or not
the Umited States discovered the missiles, or even that they
intended for the U.S. to discover the missiles. See
Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1938; Pachter, p. 10;
Quester, p. 235. This view is contradicted by the efforts
the Soviets made to conceal delivery of the missiles, such
as convoying the missiles only at night, and by Soviet
diplomatic deception efforts. Three other factors appear to
offer a better explanation. First, the Soviet deployment
plan emphasized speed rather than stealth—objectives that
are often mutually exclusive. See Pachter, p. 9. This
appears to have been a deliberate decision, perhaps driven
by a deadline for making the missiles operational. Second,
the operation was mounted in a rush, with minimum advance
planning. Concealment measures were included in the plan,
but appear not to have covered all requirements necessary to
be effective. This would explain the easily identified
trapezoidal pattern of SAM sites at San Cristobal. The SAMs
were deployed to provide the standard interlocking field of
fire around the target to be defended, without an effort to
avoid a previously used pattern. Third, the Soviets did not
have a sufficient number of large hatch ships to carry all
of the missiles to Cuba below decks in the desired time
frame. Some of the missiles and their bulky support
equipment had to be shipped on deck to expedite delivery.
Griffin, "Reminiscences," p. 553. Inadequate concealment
thus appears to have been caused by hasty planning and
deliberate emphasis on speed rather than stealth.
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strategy. The Soviet Union appears not to have been able to
formulate an overall political-military strategy from
October 22 onward. The Soviets were placed in a position of
reacting to American initiatives, which effectively
precJuded them from pursuing a strategy of their own. The
initial Soviet response was belligerent denouncement of the
quarantine accompanied by an effort to expedite completion
of the missile sites. However, the Soviets did not place
their nuclear or conventional forces at a high state of
alert in an effort to coerce the United States and ordered
their ships carrying weapons to Cuba to turn back rather
than contest the quarantine. These actions have widely, and
probably correctly, been interpreted as Soviet recognition
of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and conventional
155
superiority in the Caribbean.
Once American resolve became apparent during the
October 22-26 period, Khrushchev commenced diplomatic
bargaining to resolve the crisis on the best terms
possible. His primary objectives appear to have been to
avoid war with the Unites States and to avert an American
155Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers
, p. 496; Tatu, pp.
261-65; Carthoff, Reflections
, pp. 36-42; Crane, pp. 546-47;
Wohlstetters, pp. 16-17; Horelick, pp. 370-71, 387; Hilsman,
226-27; Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis,
1962," in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E.
Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Little, Brown,
1971), p. 133; Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear
Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security
10 (Summer 1985): 137-63.
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invasion of Cuba, which he apparently perceived to be
imminent;. A U.S. invasion of Cuba would have threatened one
of his primary objectives for sending the missiles to Cuba
in the first place. Additionally, Khrushchev sought to
achieve certain concessions in exchange for removing the
missiles: a pledge that the United States would not invade
Cuba and an formal commitment that the United States would
withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. " President
Kennedy agreed to the no-invasion pledge, but offered only
private, informal assurances that U.S. Jupiter missiles
would be removed from Turkey, which Khrushchev accepted.
However, these American concessions harcly compensated for
the political-military setback suffered by the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy had two principle objectives in the
Cuban Missile Crisis: elimination of Soviet offensive
weapons from Cuba and avoidance of nuclear war with the
Soviet Union. In. his first meeting with advisors on the
discovery of MRBMs, held the morning of October 16, the
President made clear his view that the missiles had to be
eliminated, by force if necessary. Both objectives were
expressed in the President's televised speech on October 22
announcing the Cuban quarantine. The objective of removing
the missiles from Cuba was also clearly stated in the
156Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers
, p. 495-500;
Khrushchev, Last Testament , p. 512; George, "Cuban Missile
Crisis," pp. 118-29; Tatu, pp. 265-73; Crane, pp. 546-48;
Garthoff, Reflections , pp. 57-58.
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October 23 quarantine proclamation and the President's
157October 27 letter to Khrushchev.
The Kennedy Administration limited the political
objectives it sought to achieve in order to facilitate
peaceful resolution of the crisis. Other objectives, such
as removal of all Soviet forces from Cuba or overthrow of
the Castro regime, were weighed by the President and his
advisors, but quickly rejected in order to limit the scope
of the crisis and avoid provoking escalation by the
158Soviets. On the other hand, the option of doing nothing
about the missiles—living with the new threat rather than
trying to eliminate it—was also considered, but quickly
157
"October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript," p. 27;
Robert S. McNamara, "Background Briefing on the Cuban
Situation," transcript, October 22, 1962, p. 2; Robert
Kennedy, p. 33; Hilsman, p. 202; Schlesinger, A Thousand
Days , pp. 801-2; Sorenson, p. 683; Pachter, p. 13. For the
texts of the President's October 22 speech and October 23
quarantine proclamation, see "The Soviet Threat to the
Americas," Department of State Bulletin 47 (November 12,
1962): 715-20. For the text of the President's October 27
letter, see "U.S. and Soviet Union Agree on Formula for
Ending Cuban Crisis," Department of State Bulletin 47
(November 12, 1962): 743.
158Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 804; Hilsman, p.
202, 228; Sorenson, pp.. 680-83; George, "Cuban Missile
Crisis," p. 94-. Later in the crisis, when advisors would
express support for additional objectives, such as removing
Castro from power, the President remained firm that the U.S.
objective was removing the Soviet missiles from Cuba. For
example, see the exchange between CIA Director McCone,
Secretary of State Rusk, and the President in Bromley Smith,
"Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 6,
October 26, 1962, 10:00 AM," p. 5 (declassified 1978.
National Security Archive, Washington, DC, .Cuban Missile




rejected. Although McNamara believed that the missiles had
little impact on the strategic nuclear balance, other
advisors perceived a serious military threat from the
missiles. Additionally, there was a consensus that the
missiles would have a political and psychological impact
159
that posed a grave threat to U.S. interests. American
leaders thus perceived that vital national interests were at
stake and that those interests had to be protected, but they
also perceived that U.S. objectives in the crisis had to be
limited in order to avoid war with the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy's second major objective was to
limit the use of force, in order to avoid war with the Soviet
Union. Some of the President's advisors—Dean Acheson,
John McCone, Paul Nitze, and Douglas Dillon—as well as many
159For McNamara' s views, see his comments in "October
16 Evening Meeting Transcript," p. 12. Also see Abel, pp.
51, 60; Hilsman, p. 195; Sorenson, p. 683; Schlesinger, A
Thousand Days , p. 803. For the opposing view, see SNIE 11-
18-62, pp. 2-3, Annex B; SNIE 11-19-62, pp. 3-5; comments
made by the President, Robert Kennedy, General Taylor, and
Douglas Dillon in "October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript,"
pp. 12-15. Also see Sorenson, p. 678; Hilsman, p. 201;
Abel, pp. 50-52; Wohlstetters, pp. 12-14; George, "Cuban
Missile Crisis," pp. 89-94; Raymond L. Garthoff, Intelli-
gence Assessment and Policymaking: A Decision Point in the
Kennedy Administration (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1984),
pp. 27-53.
This is readily apparent in the President's remarks
during the October 27 meeting of the Executive Committee.
See "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the
BxComm,** transcribed by McGeorge Bundy and edited by James
G. Blight, International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 50-





military men, including General Taylor, felt that American
conventional superiority in the Caribbean and overall
strategic nuclear superiority meant that there was little
likelihood the Soviets would launch a war. On the other
hand, the President, Secretary McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and
others were deeply concerned that an armed clash with the
Soviet Union could escalate to war. Their concerns were
over the unpredictability of Soviet reactions and the danger
of a military clash getting out of control. Additional-
ly, the Soviet Union on September 11 had accused the U.S. of
••preparing for aggression against Cuba" and warned that "if
the aggressors unleash war our armed forces must be ready to
162
strike a crushing retaliatory blow at the aggressor.**
161On the view that American military superiority made
war unlikely, see Burchinal, oral history, p. 116; Vice
Admiral Turner F. Caldwell, letter to author, March 14,
1988; Rear Admiral Paul E. Hartmann, Assistant Chief of
Staff for Operations at CINCLANT during the crisis, letter
to author, February 22, 1988; James G. Blight, Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis
Revisited,** Foreign Affairs 66 (Fall 1987): 174-75; Eliot A.
Cohen, "Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile
Crisis, " The National Interest No. 2 (Winter 1985/6): 5. On
the President's and McNamara' s escalation concerns, see
"October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 10, 22-23;
"October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 52, 58,. 74-75. Also
see Robert Kennedy, pp. 98-99; Sorenson, pp. 680-81;
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 804; Hilsman, p. 204;
Williams, pp. 116-17; Weintal and Bartlett, p. 67; Blight,
•t al., "Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," pp. 173, 176.
162
"Soviet Says A U.S. Attack on Cuba Would Mean War,"
New York Times , September 12, 1962, p. 1. The President's
advisors were aware of this warning and apparently con-
sidered it in formulating a course of action. See Sorenson,




Thus, although military options entailing greater force than
the quarantine, such as air strikes and invasion, were
seriously considered, they were deferred in order to avoid
an armed confrontation with the Soviets for as long as
possible.
The Kennedy Administration intuitively employed the
"coercive diplomacy" strategy in the Cuban Missile
164Crisis. The strategy evolved in an ad hoc manner, rather
than having been articulated at the outset. Alexander
George has described the President as following a "try and
see" approach, in which improvisation was the key feature,
from October 22 to October 26. The diplomatic communica-
tions and limited military actions initiated during this
period were based on certain principles in the minds of U.S.
policymakers, which will be described below, an informal
crisis management strategy.
President Kennedy's intuitive strategy for managing
the crisis was based on four considerations, which would
See "October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript," pp. 8-
13; "October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 6-10, 22-
25; "October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 65-66, 88-90.
Also see Sorenson, pp. 682-83; Hilsman, pp. 202-4;
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days
, pp. 803-4; Abel, pp. 60-63;
George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 95.
George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 88-89. Also
see Alexander L. George, "The Development of Doctrine and
Strategy," in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and
William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Little,
Brown, 1971), pp. 18-19.
165George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 95-96, 104.
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later be described as principles of crisis management. The
first consideration was that the U.S. had to seize the
initiative by keeping U.S. knowledge of the Soviet missiles
secret until ready to announce a course of action. The
effort apparently succeeded: by all accounts Khrushchev was
taken by surprise when President Kennedy suddenly announced
the quarantine. This precluded Soviet diplomatic efforts to
forestall an American attempt to force removal of the
missiles and enabled the United States, rather than the
Soviet Union, to define the political context and
significance of the crisis. President Kennedy thus was able
to portray the Soviet missile deployment as an unprecedented
threat to the Western Hemisphere and to draw a sharp
distinction between Soviet missiles in Cuba and U.S.
missiles in Turkey.
What was missing was a plan, or even a concept, of
action for exploiting the initiative after it had been
seized. After initial success—unanimous OAS support for
the quarantine and a tentative Soviet decision not to
challenge it—the United States started losing momentum.
The Kennedy Administration knew that the passage of time
would make it more difficult to get the missiles out of
"October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript,** pp. 16-19,
28-29; "October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript,** pp. 10-11,
16-17; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 810; Hilsman, pp.
198-200, 207; Sorenson, p. 676. Also see Pachter, p. 15;
George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 99.
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Cuba, but initially did not have a plan for maintaining
167initiative by increasing pressure on the Soviets.
The second consideration on which the President's
approach was based was that of preserving military and
diplomatic options, dividing military options into discrete
increments, and applying military force in a graduated
response. By starting with the quarantine—the least vio-
lent and provocative of his military options—the President
avoided taking action that might have irreversibly committed
the United States to an armed confrontation with the Soviet
Union. Similarly, by deliberately not issuing an ultimatum
on October 22, the President avoided an irreversible
168political commitment to an armed confrontation.
167George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 95-98, 100-1,
115; Sorenson, pp. 687-88; Pachter, p. 47; Garthoff,
Reflections , p. 44; David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The
Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction
to the ExComm Transcripts," International Security 12
(Winter 1987/88) : 26.
168 See comments by Rusk in "October 16 Morning Meeting
Transcript," pp. 8-10; comments by the President and
McNamara in "October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 17,
23, 49-50; comment by McNamara on "applying force gradually"
in Bromley Smith, "Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee
Meeting No. 5, October 25, 1962, 5:00 PM," pp. 2-3
(declassified 1978. National Security Archive, Washington,
DC, Cuban Missile Crisis file. Cited hereafter as "October
25 Evening EXCOMM Meeting Summary Record."); "October 26
EXCOMM Meeting Summary Record," p. 2; comments by the
President in "October 27 Meetings Transcript," p. 88; Robert
Kennedy, p. 83; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 806;
Hilsman, pp. 213-16, 228; Sorenson, pp. 694, 708, 711. Also
see George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 104-5, 116-17; Abel,
pp. 81, 173; Wohlstetters, pp. 19-20; Young, pp. 236-40;
Williams, pp. 119-20; Ole R. Holsti, Crisis Escalation War




Military operations were extensively subdivided in
Executive Committee (EXCOMM) deliberations during the
crisis. The blockade option was subdivided into the initial
quarantine on offensive arms, an expanded quarantine that
would include POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) and
perhaps other strategic commodities, and a total blockade of
shipping in and out of Cuba. The President had additional
naval options: a plan for destruction of Soviet submarines
should they threaten an expanded blockade, and a plan for
mining Cuban harbors as a form of blockade. The air strike
option was conceptually subdivided into small-scale, "tit-
for-tat" attacks on SAM sites or anti-aircraft guns that
fired on U.S. planes, large-scale air strikes against the
Cuban air defense system, and full-scale strikes against the
Soviet offensive missile sites and Cuban defenses. The next
169level of military response was invasion of Cuba. The
President could execute these options incrementally in order
to progessively increase coercion in support of diplomatic
bargaining.
169See comments by the President, Robert Kennedy,
McNamara, and Bundy in "October 16 Morning Meeting
Transcript,- pp. 17-18, 20-21, 25-27; comments by the
President, McNamara, Bundy, and General Taylor in "October
16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 7-9, 17-18, 21, 49-50;
comments by McNamara in Bromley Smith, "Executive Committee
Minutes, October 23, 1962, 10:00 AM," p. 2 (declassified
1978. National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban
Missile Crisis file. Cited hereafter as "October 23 EXCOMM
Minutes."); "October 25 Evening EXCOMM Meeting Summary
Record," p. 3; "October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 52, 56,




The problem with the graduated response approach was
that although President Kennedy had carefully preserved his
military and diplomatic options, he did not devise a scheme
for employing those options in an integrated strategy of
coercive bargaining. This is shown by the uncertainty over
what the President's next step would have been had
Khrushchev not agreed on October 28 to dismantle the
missiles in Cuba. Practical operational problems with
employing some of the military options (such as the small-
scale air strike option, which was hard to keep small) , as
well as uncertainty over the Soviet response to any of the
options, were probably the major reasons for the lack of
even a tentative plan for using the options. However, at
least part of the problem was that the EXCOMM was distracted
by operational details. Records of EXCOMM deliberations
reveal military options being dissected in incredible
detail, while attempts to formulate future courses of action
rarely went beyond the next immediate step that would be
taken. 170
170See comments by the President, and McNamara in
"October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 22-23; Bromley
Smith, "Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting
No. 4, October 25, 1962, 10:00 AM, M p. 1 (declassified
1980. National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban
Missile Crisis file. Cited hereafter as "October 25 Morning
EXCOMM Meeting Summary Record."); "October 25 Evening EXCOMM
Meeting Summary Record," pp. 1-6; "October 26 EXCOMM Meeting
Summary Record," pp. 1-7; comments by the President,
McNamara and Taylor in "October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp.
52, 64 , 68; Robert Kennedy, p. 96.
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The third consideration was maintaining control of
•vents, paying close attention to the details of military
operations, and pacing events to allow time for communica-
tion and decisionmaking. The EXCOMM discussed military
operations in great detail and certain military operations,
such as the intercept and boarding of Soviet ships and low-
level photographic reconnaissance flights, were closely
controlled. On October 23 the President gave some sort of
order for the quarantine force to delay its initial
boardings of Soviet ships specifically for the purpose of
giving Khrushchev more time to react to the quarantine.
Later, on October 27, the President directed that air
strikes on Soviet SAMs and Cuban air defenses, which had
already shot down a U-2 and fired on low-level flights, be
postponed until the Soviets had a chance to react to his
171latest diplomatic proposals. As will be discussed later,
EXCOMM attention to military operations was uneven and
focused on a few specific areas.
171See the discussion on whether or not to intercept
an East German passenger ship in "October 25 Evening EXCOMM
Meeting Summary Record,** pp. 4-6; and the decision to delay
night reconnaissance flights and blockade of POL in "October
26 EXCOMM Meeting Summary Record," p. 2. On the decision to
delay retaliatory strikes on Cuban air defenses, see
"October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 66, 74, 78, 88-90. On
EXCOMM attention to the details of military operations, see
Robert Kennedy, pp. 37, 76; Hilsman, 198, 213, 215, 221;
Sorenson, pp. 708-9, 713; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , pp.
818, 822, 827-28. Also see George, "Cuban Missile Crisis,"
pp. 109, 115; Abel, p. 32; Wohlstetters, p. 15; Young, p.
238; Williams, p. 116.
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President Kennedy was probably the ultimate source of
the emphasis on maintaining close control of military
operations. The President had read Barbara W. Tuchman's The
Guns of August and was heavily influenced by her
descriptionof Europe's leaders losing control of events as
the crisis in the summer of 1914 spiraled to war. According
to Rear Admiral Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., Naval Aide to
President Kennedy, prior to the crisis the President had
suggested to the Joint Chiefs that they should read The Guns
of August because he wanted them to "think, not just plow
172
ahead.** The President's bitter experience in the Bay of
Pigs fiasco reinforced his determination to carefully
consider and closely control military moves, rather than
173
risk being dragged along by events beyond his control.
What was missing was detailed consideration of how to
effectively control military operations. No thought was
given to the practical operational problems that would arise
from attempting to control large-scale military operations
directly from the White House. McNamara and his assistants
did not understand the military command system and had
little respect for it. The optimism (military men called it
172Rear Admiral Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., interview by
author, February 10, 1988. Also see Robert Kennedy, pp. 62,
127; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 832; Abel, pp. 207-8.
173Anderson, "As I Recall, M p. 44; Hilsman, pp. 33-34,
575; Sorenson, p. 708; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , pp. 295-
97, 426, 818; Abel, p. 40; Jack Raymond, Power at the
Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 284.

550
arrogance) and energy that marked the Kennedy Administra-
tion's style greatly influenced the approach it took to
military operations. McNamara and his assistants appeared
to believe that they could run a better military operation
the same way they could write a better defense budget.
However, their approach to military command and control was
intuitive and impulsive, rather than reasoned and planned.
They had not worked with the military prior to the crisis to
develop and refine methods and procedures for direct control
that both sides would understand, with the result that the
military was caught off-guard by their sudden intrusion into
operational matters. McNamara and his assistants apparently
did not stop to consider that matters as minor as not
knowing military jargon or how to talk properly on radio
nets could seriously impede communications and even defeat
their well-intentioned efforts to control military
174
operations.
174The most striking indication of the lack of
preparation for exercising direct control was the havoc it
created in the military communications system. Admiral
Robert L. Dennison, Commander in Chief Atlantic during the
crisis, states in his oral history that when the White House
tried to get on the radio it would "gum up" his command
circuits: "It happens all the time, I guess. But I had to
tell all these Washington stations to get off my circuits
and stay off because they were interfering with
operations." Admiral Robert L. Dennison, "The Reminiscences
of Admiral Robert Lee Dennison, U.S. Navy (Retired),"
(Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program,
August 1975), p. 4,21. The lack of attention to the
organizational, procedural, and operational requirements for
effectively exercising direct control is discussed in detail
in the following section on command and control.
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The fourth consideration was Soviet leaders must not
be confronted with a choice between war and surrender, and
that they roust be left a way out of the crisis other than in
total humiliation. This consideration derived from the
objective of avoiding war with the Soviet Union, discussed
above. The implication of this consideration was that, if
the Soviet Union could not be compelled to remove the
missiles by coercive pressure alone, the United States would
have to offer concessions in diplomatic bargaining.
President Kennedy and some of his advisors recognized from
the start that concessions might have to be made. The
President seems to have been willing, as a last resort, to
offer to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey in exchange
for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in order to avoid
taking military action against Cuba. However,, the President
did not formulate a negotiating strategy other than his
insistence that no concession would be offered until after
American resolve had been impressed upon the Soviets. Nor
was an effort made to identify a list of possible
concessions. The obvious offers, a Turkey-Cuba deal or
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Guantanamo, were quickly
rejected. The key concession that produced the settlement
—
an American pledge not to invade Cuba—was proposed by
Khrushchev in his October 26 letter. The President also
sought initially to avoid the appearance of delivering an
ultimatum to the Soviets and specifically avoided setting a
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deadline for removal of the missiles. However, when it
became apparent on October 27 that the vague threat of
further action at some future date was not having a
sufficiently coercive effect, the President delivered an
ultimatum to the Soviets via his brother Bobby—threatening
that military action would be taken against Cuba unless a
commitment to remove the missiles was received the next
175day. Thus, although the Kennedy Administration was aware
of the consideration that the Soviets must be left with a
way out of the crisis other than war or humiliation, it did
not formulate an overall negotiating strategy for resolving
the crisis.
175The option of delivering an ultimatum to the
Soviets was mentioned by the President (who contemplated
delivering an ultimatum when he met with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko on October 18) and discussed by his
advisors in their second meeting of the crisis. See
"October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 17, 31, 46-47.
On the October 27 ultimatum, see Robert Kennedy, pp. 108-9;
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 829; Sorenson, p. 715;
Abel, p. 199; George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 125. On
not humiliating the Soviets, see Sorenson, p. 694, 717;
George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 88-89; Weintal and
Bartlett, p. 68. On leaving the Soviets a way out of the
crisis, see Sorenson, p. 682, 691; Schlesinger, A Thousand
Days , p. 821; George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 88-89;
Pachter, p. 54; Young, p. 238; Williams, p. 120; Holsti,
p. 186. On not bargaining until after resolve had been
demonstrated, see George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 98-
100; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 810. On the lack of a
negotiating strategy, see George, "Cuban Missile Crisis,"
pp. 100-103, 117-18; Sorenson, p. 695. On the Cuba-Turkey
deal, see "October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 35-61, 75-
77, 81-83; Abel, pp. 195-95; Welch and Blight, pp. 12-18;
George, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 101. Adlai Stevenson had
proposed offering Guantanamo as a bargaining chip, which the
President quickly rejected. See Robert Kennedy, p. 49;




The Cuban Missile Crisis marked the first major
employment of U.S. forces under the command structure
established by the 1958 defense reorganization. However,
the command procedures actually used did not adhere to the
chain of command established by that reorganization. Under
the 1958 reorganization the chain of command ran from the
President, to the Secretary of Defense, and then to the
appropriate unified or specified commander. The JCS was to
function as an advisory body to the President and as an
executive agent for the Secretary of Defense, rather than as
a separate level in the chain of command. The National
Military Command Center (NMCC) should have been the
Secretary of Defense's operational control center.
In actuality, the chain of command was structured
essentially as it had been prior to the 1958 reorganiza-
tion. McNamara passed orders to General Taylor, rather than
176to the Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) . This was
probably unavoidable given to the immense scale of military
operations conducted during the crisis, which involved
several commands in addition to CINCLANT.
176General Maxwell D. Taylor, Transcript of Recorded
Interview by Elspeth Rostow (Boston, MA: John F. Kennedy
Library, Oral History Program, 1964), p. 8; Vice Admiral
John L. Chew, Deputy Director for Operations (J-3) , Joint
Staff during the crisis, "The Reminiscences of Vice Admiral
John L. Chew, U.S. Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis, MD: U.S.
Naval Institute, Oral History Program, February 1979), pp.
316-17; Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988.
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Reverting to pre-1958 procedures, the JCS on October
19 designated the Clio, Admiral Anderson, as its executive
177
agent for CINCLANT* s Cuban operations. This had three
primary implications. First, it placed the CNO in the chain
of command between the Secretary of Defense and CINCLANT.
General Taylor passed orders he received from McNamara to
Admiral Anderson, who who in turn issued orders to
CINCLANT. It is important to note that Admiral Anderson was
not just a conduit for orders from the President, he was
deeply involved in planning and execution of the opera-
178tions. Second, it shifted responsibility for planning
and preparing orders from the Joint Staff to the the CNO's
staff, known as OPNAV (Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions) • The Joint Staff was largely on the sidelines during
179the crisis. Third, it caused Flag Plot, which was
177Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Deputy CNO for Plans and
Policy during the crisis, letter to author, February 24,
1988; Captain John H. Carmichael, Assistant Director, Fleet
Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV), and Director of Flag Plot during the crisis, letter
to author, March 8, 1988; Houser, interview by author,
February 11, 1988; Shepard, interview by author, February
10, 1988; Griffin, "Reminiscences," p. 552.
178Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988;
Griffin, "Reminiscences," p. 552. Admiral Dennison,
CINCLANT during the crisis, states that "I never got a call
from the White House during the entire operation."
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 421.
179Shepard, interview by author, February 10, 1988;
Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988. Vice
Admiral Chew states that McNamara "paid very little




(and still is) the CNO's operations control (OPCON) center,
rather than NMCC, to be the OPCON center for all CINCLANT
180
naval and military operations during the crisis. Admiral
Anderson insisted on this at the time, remarking to then-
Captain Houser that "this is a Navy show, we're going to
181
show them how it's done." However, after the crisis he
admitted in retrospect that it would have been better to run
the extensive joint operations from NMCC rather than from
182Flag Plot. Thus, the manner in which the military chain
of command actually functioned during the crisis was much
180Flag Plot thus was the OPCON center for all Array
and Air Force preparations for invasion and air strikes
against Cuba, as well as Navy quarantine operations and
preparations for air strikes and invasion. This is because
all Army and Air Force units assigned to operations against
Cuba were placed under the command of CINCLANT, who reported
to the CNO (as executive agent for the JCS) . There were
only three areas for which Flag Plot was not the OPCON
center: aerial surveillance of Cuba (high-altitude, low-
altitude, and peripheral) , which was controlled directly by
JCS through the Joint Reconnaissance Center; air defense of
the United States, controlled by the Continental Air Defense
Command (working closly with CINCLANT) ; and Strategic Air
Command alert operations, also controlled directly by JCS.
181Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988.
182Admiral Anderson makes a revealing remark in his
oral history: "It was also apparent to me, and this is a
lesson that I had from the operation, that to control the
naval operation through Flag Plot up in the Navy Department
Section was not a satisfactory way of handling it. It would
have been better to have those things handled by the JCS
command post in the JCS area, rather than decentralization
like my doing the quarantining from up above [in Flag
Plot]." Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., "The Reminiscences
of Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired),"
Volume II (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History
Program, 1983), p. 551.
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different than had been envisioned when the 1958
reorganization was enacted.
The significance of all this is that these pre-1958
command arrangements were designed to support a command
philosophy emphasizing substantial delegation of control,
rather than highly centralized control. The JCS executive
•gent system presupposed that commanders in the field or at
sea had substantial autonomy and need only be given an
objective and overall guidelines for their operations. It
was not a system for facilitating close control of opera-
tions by the White House. There is no evidence that
McNamara attempted to modify JCS command procedures prior to
the crisis. This stands in stark contrast to the revolu-
tionary changes he made in the Defense Department's
administrative organization and management procedures
—
changes that emphasized centralization of decisionmaking
authority. During the crisis, McNamara 's interventions in
the command system were impulsive and lacked planning or
prior coordination with the military, producing hurried, ad
hoc changes in support of the President's desire to maintain
control of events. In effect, the President and McNamara
were attempting to exercise centralized control through a
command system designed for decentralized control.
The White House Situation Room and the CNO's Flag Plot
played a prominent role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The
White House Situation Room was established in 1961 at the
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suggestion of Captain Shepard, the President's Naval Aide,
in order to provide the President with better communications
and related facilities for managing crises. The Situation
Room contained regular and secure telephones ("scrambled" to
prevent interception) , teletype and voice radio equipment,
183
and a collection of maps and charts. During the crisis
the location and status of U.S. forces and all available
intelligence on Soviet and Cuban forces was assembled there
for twice-daily Presidential briefings. The President had
complete and timely information on all Navy units partici-
pating in the quarantine and all related operations in the
Atlantic and Caribbean. Soviet bloc merchant ships en route
to Cuba and Soviet submarines discovered by the Navy were
18 4
tracked in the Situation Room. Because it was
established in a rush on limited iunds, the Situation Room
did not have the extensive command and control capabilities
of NMCC or Flag Plot, but it was far superior to the
facilities any previous President had in the White House.
183Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., John F. Kennedy: Man of
the Sea (New York: William Morrow, 1965)
, p. 96; Commander
Gerry M. McCabe, Assistant Naval Aide to the President and
Director of the White House Situation Room during the
crisis, interview by author, February 22, 1988. Responsibil-
ity for the Situation Room was later transferred to the
National Security Council Staff.
Shepard, John F. Kennedy , pp. 104-4; Shepard,
interview by author, February 10, 1988; McCabe, interview by
author, February 22, 1988; Anderson, interview by author,




Flag Plot, on the fourth floor of the "D" ring in Navy
section of the Pentagon, had been established by Admiral
Arleigh Burke during his tenure as CNO. It contained
extensive communications equipment, large wall charts of the
world's oceans, and separate conference and briefing rooms.
When the CNO was designated the JCS executive agent on
October 19, the Flag Plot staff was placed on alert and
augmented with specialists from other sections of OPNAV.
All of Flag Plot was declared a Top Secret area and
additional Marine guards were posted. Captain Carmichael,
Director of Flag Plot during the crisis, has described the
information available there:
Since the CNO was running the show, Flag Plot kept
track of all forces—Army, Navy and Air Force
—
assigned to the operation. . . . Flag Plot maintained
a ship locator for all U.S. Navy ships or any special
interest ship. Pertinent ones were plotted on the
world charts mounted on the walls. Records were kept
of all ship movements and other information necessary
for keeping the Navy picture world-wide. ... As
complete a picture of forces location as possible was
kept and displayed
g
so that Admiral Anderson could
exercise command.
Every evening during the crisis McNamara was briefed at
10:00 p.m. in Flag Plot on the status of the quarantine and
186CINCLANT forces alerted for Cuban contingencies. He was
thus exposed daily to all of the information available to
the CNO on the status of CINCLANT operations and Soviet
185
• Carmichael, letter to author, March 8, 1988.





forces in Cuba, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic. The
detailed knowledge of the movements of U.S. and Soviet ships
that McNamara showed in EXCOMM meetings and his quizzing of
Admiral Anderson on the positions of Navy ships show that
187McNamara paid close attention to the Flag Plot briefings.
The next level in the Chain of Command was CINCLANT,
Admiral Dennison, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. In
mid-1961 CINCLANT was tacked by JCS to prepare contingency
plans for military operations against Cuba. CINCLANT
created Joint Task Force 122 (JTF-122) , a contingency task
force with forces designated but not actually assigned, for
Cuban contingency operations. Commander Second Fleet was
designated Commander JTF-122; Army, Air Force, and Navy
component commanders were also designated. On October 18
JCS designated CINCLANT overall commander for operations
against Cuba, including blockade and contingency opera-
tions. In response, CINCLANT on October 20 disestablished
JTF-122 and assumed command of all Cuban contingency
operations. Army Lieutenant General Louis W. Truman was
designated CINCLANT Chief of Staff for Cuban Contingency
Operations, in charge of a separate CINCLANT Contingency
188Staff responsible for air strike and invasion planning.
187Anderson, "Reminiscences , " p. 558; Chew,
"Reminiscences," pp. 332-33; Carmichael, letter to author,
March 8, 1988; Abel, pp. 154-55.
188
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 17, 22, 39-40;
"DOD Operations," p. 1; Ward, "Diary," p. 2.
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CINCLANT had three component commanders during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. The Navy component commander, Comman-
der in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Atlantic (CINCWAVLANT) ,was
Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) . Admiral
Dennison was CINCLANTFLT as well aa CINCLANT, and the
CINCLANTFLT staff was integrated into the CINCLANT unified
command staff. Vice Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, Deputy
Commander in Chief Atlantic, was in charge of CINCLANTFLT
functions in the CINCLANT staff. Additionally, to
facilitate CINCLANTFLT control of quarantine operations a
separate Quarantine Plot headed by Rear Admiral Reynold D.
Hogle was established in the CINCLANT OPCON Center. The
CINCLANT Quarantine Plot maintained the tactical picture at
sea for Admiral Dennison and Vice Admiral Beakley. The Air
Force component commander, Commander in Chief Air Force
Atlantic (CINCAFLANT) , was Commander Tactical Air Command
(TAC) , General Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., headquartered at
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The Army component
commander. Commander in Chief Army Atlantic (CINCARLANT)
,
was Commanding General Continental Army Command (USCONARC)
,
General Herbert B. Powell, headquartered at Fort Monroe,
Virginia. CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT set up a Forward
Command Post at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. Prior to
the crisis, the only forces assigned to CINCLANT were Navy
and Marine Corps forces under CINCLANTFLT. Army (USCONARC)
and Air Force (TAC) units designated for CINCLANT
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contingency operations were under the command of Commander
in Chief Strike Command (C INC STRIKE) . On October 22
CINCSTRIKE transferred command of Army and Air Force units
designated for Cuban operations to CINCLANT. On that date
CINCLANT gained command of all component forces that would
189participate in Cuban contingency operations.
Under the CINCLANT component commanders were severa.1
Task Forces. The Navy and Marine Corps Task Forces under
CINCLANTFLT are listed in Table 2. Two of these (TF 81 and
TF 83) were standing Task Forces operational prior to the
crisis, while the others were contingency Task Forces
activated for the crisis. In addition to these Task Forces,
the Subordinate Unified Commander for the Caribbean,
Commander Antilles Defense Command (COMANTDEFCOM) , reported
directly to CINCLANT. COMANTDEFCOM was important primarily
because Commander Naval Base Guantanamo reported to him via
Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARSEAFRON, the Navy
176
component commander for COMANTDEFCOM) . Under the Task
Forces listed in Table 2 were a large number of Task Groups,
the number and composition of which changed frequently
189
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 22-24, 49-50;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 415, 425. The Army and Air
Force component commanders were designated on October 20.
Prior to that date, lower-ranking Army and Air Force comman-
ders had been component commanders for JTF-122.
190COMANTDEFCOM forces also included Navy and Marine





Navy Task Force Organization
Task Force Task Force Title and Commander
TF 135 Carrier Strike Force
Rear Admiral Robert J. Stroh, Commander
Carrier Division Six, relieved by Rear
Admiral John T. Hayward, Commander Carrier
Division Two
TF 136 Blockade Force
Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, Commander
Second Fleet, relieved by Rear Admiral John
W. Ailes, III, Commander Cruiser Destroyer
Flotilla Six
TF 137 Combined Quarantine Force (Latin American/U.S.
)
Rear Admiral John A. Tyree, Commander South
Atlantic Force
TF 128 Amphibious Force
Rear Admiral Horacio Rivero, Jr., Commander
Amphibious Force Atlantic
TF 129 Landing Force
Lieutenant General Robert B. Luckey, USMC,
Commanding General Fleet Marine Force
Atlantic and Commanding General Second
Marine Expeditionary Force
TF 81/83 Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Atlantic
Vice Admiral Edmund B. Taylor
Source: "CINCLANT Historical Account," passim.
during the crisis. The command structure for the Navy
forces assigned to Cuban contingencies was thus highly
complex due to the size and scope of the forces involved.
The Army and Air Force had two primary Task Forces for
Cuban contingency operations. Under the Army component
commander, CINCARLANT, was the Army Task Force (TF 125) for
the invasion of Cuba, commanded by Commanding General
Eighteenth Airborne Corps. Under the Air Force component
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commander, CINCAFLANT, was the Air Task Force for air
strikes against Cuba, commanded by Commander Nineteenth Air
rorce. CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT had additional Task Forces
for other operations related to Cuba. The final Task Force
under CINCLANT was the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task
Force Atlantic (JUWTFA) , consisting of Army Special Forces,
191Navy SEALs, and Air Force Air Commando units. This
brief review of the basic command organization of the forces
committed to Cuban contingencies suggests the magnitude of
the task faced by the White House in attempting to exercise
close control over U.S. military operations.
United States communications capabilities had made
significant advances since 1958, allowing a greater degree
of direct control over naval operations than had ever been
possible before. CINCLANT, Flag Plot, NMCC, and the White
House Situation Room all had the ability to communicate
directly with ships at sea over voice radio, if they so
desired. Three advances in communications technology were
particularly important: First, secure (voice encryption,
commonly called "scrambled'*) telephone lines connected the
White House, Flag Plot, NMCC, and CINCLANT. This allowed
discussion of classified information without risk of Soviet
interception. Second, high frequency (HF) , single sideband
(SSB) clear (unencrypted) and secure (encrypted) voice radio
191x
"CINCLANT Historical Account,- pp. 22-23.
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equipment was just coming into widespread use. Prior to
this, lor/j -range radio communication had been limited to
radioteletype and radiotelegraph (manual Morse) . HF/SSB
radio allowed commanders ashore to speak directly with
forces afloat, a crucial capability for exercising direct
control of naval operations. The CWO had established a
Composite Fleet SSB Command Net and CINCLANT had two SSB
nets of his own. Third, the Navy had long-range HF Fleet
Radioteletype Broad-casts with on-line encryption for
message communications between shore stations and ships at
sea. This system greatly expedited the flow of information
by eliminating slow manual encryption and transmission of
192
messages.
In addition to these communications systems, telephone
and telegraph lines were also used extensively for
communications among shore commands . Three types of lines
were available: military-owned lines, leased commercial
lines, and engineered military circuits (commercial lines
with a preplanned standby military capability) . The Defense
Communications Agency, created only the year before, managed
this overall system. The number of commercial lines leased
by CINCLANT and its component commands increased from 106
192
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 24-26, 28, 32.
Only a few ships
—
primarily carriers and other large ships
commonly used as flagships—had the secure voice capability




193prior to the crisis to 511 at the height of the crisis.
Microwave communications were not yet in widespread use.
The first U.S. radio-relay communications satellite, Samos
II, had been launched in January 1961, but satellite
communications were still essentially experimental.
Modern communications equipment, especially HF/SSB
voice communications with ships at sea, were perceived by
civilian leaders as providing the capabilities they needed
to exercise close control of naval operations during the
crisis. Vice Admiral Houser, who worked closely with
McNamara and Gilpatric, noted this: "Modern communications
also affected the civilians. There was a fascination with
this. They had an attitude of 'I'm in charge,' and that
194they had the tools to be in charge." ' This attitude was a
natural corollary to their desire to maintain control of
events in the crisis. In describing the quarantine,
CINCLANT noted that centralized control of the operation
determined the manner in which communications capabilities
were utilized:
. . . this operation was directed in great part from
the seat of government in Washington.. In this
connection, there was a steady flow of instructions
from Washington to CINCLANT which required rapid
dissemination to the operating forces. Also, there
was a pressing requirement for a prompt, accurate and
complete flow of the current status and results of
193 Ibid, pp. 25-27. Also see Carter, pp. 233-57;
Blair, pp. 51-65.
194Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988.
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operations. Although the CW [radioteletype and
radiotelegraph] communications were generally fast and
good, the requirement for expediting matters required
extensive use of the single sideband voice radio.
Thus, the President's determination to maintain control of
events in the crisis led to highly centralized control of
naval operations, which in turn generated the demands placed
on the communications system.
On the other hand, although the President had HF/SSB
voice radio available in the White House Situation Room,
there is no evidence that he ever spoke with any Navy ships
196
or commanders at sea. It is certain, however, that he
195
-CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 108.
196Admiral Dennison states in his oral history that
officials in Washington, apparently including officials in
the White House, occasionally tried to contact commanders at
sea, but that he told them to "get off my circuits." He
makes no suggestion, however, that the President was ever on
the radio or that any of the Presidents advisors ever issued
orders to ships at sea over voice radio. Dennison,
"Reminiscences," p. 421. Admiral Anderson, Admiral Griffin,
Admiral Rivero, Vice Admiral Hayward, Vice Admiral Stroh,
Rear Admiral Wylie, and Captain Robert J. Wissman
(Operations Officer on the staff of Commander Carrier
Division 18, commander of the USS Essex HUK Group, which was
part of the quarantine force) all state that there were no
such communications. Anderson, interview by author, January
25, 1988; Griffin, letter to author, April 6, 1988; Rivero,
letter to author, March 10, 1988; Vice Admiral John T.
Hayward, letter to author, February 17, 1988; Stroh, letter
to author, February 18, 1988; Wylie, letter to author, April
13, 1988; Captain Robert J. Wissman, letter to author, March
4, 1988. Admiral Chew, Admiral Sharp, and Admiral Ward make
no mention of such communications in their oral histories.
Chew, "Reminiscences," pp. 315-41; Sharp, "Reminiscences,"
pp. 164-69; Ward, "Reminiscences," p. 199. Additionally,
some three dozen Commanding Officers of ships that partici-
pated in the Cuban Missile Crisis all stated in letters to
the author or in interviews by the author that they had not
heard the President or McNamara on the HF/SSB net.

567
listened to reports coming in from thu quarantine line over
HF/SSB voice radio nets. Admiral Ward states that Flag Plot
and the White House were monitoring his HF/SSB
197
communications with CINCLANT. It is possible, even
likely, that during high interest operations at sea the
President's advisors got on the HF/SSB net to request
further details (perhaps identifying their station as the
White House). This would account for Admiral Dennison's
remarks about telling Washington stations to get off his net
as well as the recollection of many Navy officers that the
President never talked on the HF/SSB net. If this
interpretation is accurate, it means that the President
voluntarily denied himself a powerful communications tool
that was literally at his fingertips
—
perhaps because he
realized the disruption and animosity it would cause in the
chain of command.
Direct HF/SSB communications from ships at sea to
Washington—NMCC, Flag Plot, and the White House Situation
Room monitoring the net—appear to have been used only in
two situations. The first situation was during intercepts
of Soviet merchant ships. Admiral Ward states that U.S.
Navy ships were directed to report the name, description and
visible deck cargo of ships they intercepted to CINCLANTFLT
197Ward, "Reminiscences," p. 199; Ward, "Sea Power in
the Cuban Crisis," Address by Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward,
February 5, 1963 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
Office of Public Affairs, News Release No. 151-63), p. 6.
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(Quarantine Plot) and to the CNO (Flag Plot) . Captain James
W. Foust, Commanding Officer of USS John R. Pierce (DD 753)
during the crisis, states that a "running account" of the
boarding of the Lebanese freighter Marucla was provided to
Commander Second Fleet and CINCLANTFLT on the HF/SSB
198
net. This net was also monitored in the CNO's Flag Plot
and the White House Situation Room) . The second situation
was during the trailing of known Soviet submarines. Captain
George L. Dickey, Jr., Commanding Officer of USS Lawe (DD
763) during the crisis, states that while trailing a Soviet
submarine he was directed to come up on the voice net for
direct communications with Flag Plot. Captain Robert J.
Vissman, Operations Officer for Commander Carrier Division
Eighteen, states that USS Essex (CVS 9) did the same thing,
but carried it one step further. When ASW helicopters or
aircraft from Essex were trailing a Soviet submarine, their
reports would be relayed "real time" to Norfolk (CINCLANT
199Quarantine Plot) and Washington (Flag Plot) . Although
all of these ASW reports could have been monitored in the
White House Situation Room—at least by the Situation Room
staff, which could immediately notify the President and his
advisors of urgent developments—there is no conclusive
198Ward, "Diary," p. 11; Captain James W. Foust,
letter to author, March 10, 1988.
199Captain George L. Dickey, Jr., letter to author,
April 20, 1988; Wissman, letter to author, March 4, 1988.
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evidence that the President or his advisors ever monitored
the progress of ASW operations "real time." Given that
President Kennedy did not attempt to control other opera-
tions while they were actually in progress, it is unlikely
that he would have monitored ASW operations, which can (and
did) drag on for days. On the other hand, the Situation
Room staff had the capability of using reports coming over
HF/SSB voice radio to keep their charts updated with the
latest information on Soviet submarines.
Opinions as to how well the Defense Communications
System and Navy communications system performed during the
crisis vary widely. The CINCLANT history of the crisis
concludes that overall the Defense system performed well,
demonstrating tremendous flexibility and rapid expansion of
capability, but that it did experience problems. Problems
included lack of telephone and telegraph lines in the
Southeastern United States to accommodate the build-up of
forces there, insufficient portable communications
equipment, lack of compatibility between the communications
equipment of the three services, insufficient secure voice
and on-line encryption equipment, lack of frequency
coordination, and heavily overloaded circuits with attendant
200Participants could not recall specifically if this
was done, but did recall that information on Soviet
submarines was kept as up to date as possible. It appears
that message situation reports, rather than voice radio
reports, were the principle source of information.
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201backlogs of messages. All of these problems would have
degraded the President's ability to exercise close control
of military operations.
CINCLANT provides a similarly mixed view of how well
the Navy communications system performed. The CINCLANT
conclusion would appear to be favorable: "Ship/shore
communications with the commands afloat and tactical
communications between the task force units were excellent
throughout most of the period of the crisis. Radio
propagation phenomena and other factors affecting
reliability caused less than 10% outage on radio
202
circuits." However, this statement only addresses the
technical ability to complete radio circuits, which is just
one aspect of communications performance.
The CINCLANT report also contains a long list of
problems. The Fleet Radioteletype Broadcast system was in
the midst of converting to faster teletypes, which created
traffic backlogs as messages had to be transmitted on.
separate broadcasts for old and new teleypes. There was an
overwhelming number of messages—the number of messages per
month during the crisis was more than three times, greater
than the pre-crisis average—and a large number of
excessively long messages, which were difficult to transmit
201*v





and often had to be sent repeatedly. The total volume of
traffic exceeded the capacity of the Fleet Radioteletype
Broadcast, requiring that an additional broadcast be
initiated for broadcasting to major afloat commands. An
inordinate proportion of messages were given high
transmission precedence—an attempt to expedite time-
critical orders that backfired, creating a backlog of high
precedence messages. An unusually high proportion of
messages were classified Secret or Top Secret, which created
backlogs due the requirement for on-line encryption of such
traffic. The incredible volume of message traffic created a
shortage of radiomen that could only be partially alleviated
203by borrowing personnel from other commands. All of these
problems are generated by centralized control of large-scale
naval operations.
Participants in the crisis recount instances of
operational problems caused by difficulties with message
communications, confirming that the problems reported by
CINCLANT had an impact on the crisis. On at least one
occasion a commander afloat did not receive a crucial
message. At the start of the crisis Rear Admiral Ernest E.
Christiansen, Commander Carrier Division 18, was embarked in
the ASW carrier USS Essex (CVS 9) , which was conducting air
operations training at sea off Guantanamo. On October 23
203Ibid, pp. 32-35. These problems persisted until
late November, when U.S. forces began standing down.
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Rear Admiral Christiansen did not receive a CINCLANTFLT
message directing Essex to join the Blockade Force east of
the Bahamas—important because Essex was designated to
204intercept a Soviet ship the next morning. Captain Donald
L. Lassell, Commander Destroyer Division 601 and Commander
of the Florida Strait Protection of Shipping Patrol during
the crisis, has also described severe problems with message
communications. When the quarantine was announced, Captain
Lassell, who was headquartered ashore at Key West, had to
recall his ships from a contingency holding area northeast
of Key West in order to send them to patrol sectors in the
Florida Strait:
...all I had to do is call my ships back. Simple: I
wrote an OPIMMEDIATE [Operational Immediate trans-
mission precedence, second only to Flash] message to
my Flagship, telling them to come back. You never
heard of the Air Force, though. Every one of their
messages is OPIMMEDIATE.. The backlog was impossible.
. . . It took 38 hours for my first OPIMMEDIATE
message to get through to Sauf ley [the Flagship] , no
more than 150 miles away . 205
Had Captain Lassell not been able to get a message to
Saufley via helicopter, there would have been no ships on
patrol between Cuba and the United States for the first day
204Rear Admiral Ernest E. Christiansen, interview by
author, February 3, 1988; Wissman, letter to author, March
4, 1988. Essex was able to make the commitment because Rear
Admiral Christiansen on his own authority had moved the
carrier toward the Windward Passage in anticipation of some
sort of tasking.
205Captain Donald L. Lassell, letter to author, May
11, 1988. Emphasis is his.
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and a half of the crisis. Captain Carmichael described the
scene in Washington: "Communications were chaotic. . . .
extremely wordy messages, including operations orders, hit
the air in numbers you would not believe. The highest
priority traffic was taking up to 48 hours to go from
206
originator to addressees." These are the type of
communications problems that give rise to decoupling and
degrade crisis management.
The HF/SSB voice radio net also experienced problems.
Not all of the ships had received the new HF/SSB equipment
when the crisis erupted. CINCLANT reported a shortfall of
45 HF/SSB units that could not be alleviated during the
crisis. Flag Plot and the Situation Room could not monitor
•very merchant ship intercept and submarine prosecution
"real-time" because not every Navy ship had HF/SSB equipment
and a few ships suffered casualties to their HF/SSB
equipment. Participants in the crisis recall great
difficulties with the HF/SSB voice circuits. The three
HF/SSB nets in use during the crisis were often overloaded
due to too many stations attempting to use a circuit,
excessively long and detailed reporting requirements, and
excessively long transmissions by higher authorities. Voice
HF communications (even HF/SSB) are much more vulnerable to
radio propagation problems than are radioteletype or
206Carmichael, letter to author, March 8, 1988.
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radiotelegraph HF communications. At times USS Essex had to
relay HF/SSB voice transmissions between CINCLANT and
Admiral Ward due to HF propagation problems. Admiral Ward
noted that "Communications within the [quarantine] line and
on other circuits were not good due to poor radio frequency
207propagation in the atmosphere." Thus, the key
technological innovation that made direct control possible
—
HF/SSB voice radio—was degraded by a number of factors,
among them excessive use of the capability.
There is an irony in the communications problems
experienced during the Cuban Missile Crisis: the more
communications circuits are used, the less they support the
needs of their users. Military men understand this irony
through their operational experience. Military communica-
tions procedures emphasize brevity of transmissions and
military command procedures emphasize delegation of
control. Sending a brief message executing a plan already
held by recipients or simply stating the objective to be
achieved is much more efficient than sending detailed plans
specifying every aspect of an operation. The need for
direct control must be balanced against the harmful effects
of overloading communications channels.
207Ward, "Diary," p. 12; Christiansen, interview by
author, February 3, 1988; , Wissman, letter to author, March
4, 1988; Captain Charles H. Morrison, Commander Destroyer
Squadron 24, interview by author, February 3, 1988;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 421.
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Soon after the quarantine of Cuba was announced on
October 22 the President and his advisors became aware that
they did not have sufficient communications capabilities to
manage the crisis in the manner they desired. During the
first EXCOMM meeting on October 23, the "problem of
effective communications" was discussed and the President's
Science Advisor, Jerome B. Weisner, was appointed to head an
inter-departmental review of the problem. Dr. Weisner
presented an initial briefing on the communications
situation at the October 24 morning EXCOMM meeting and the.
President "directed that most urgent action be taken by
State, Defense and CIA to improve communications worldwide,
208but particularly in the Caribbean area." Thus, rather
than adapt its crisis management approach to existing
communications capabilities, the Kennedy Administration
sought to expand those capabilities to support its
approach. As the previous discussion of communications
problems revealed, that effort was unsuccessful—the
problems did not abate until after the crisis peaked and
U.S. forces began to stand down.
In summary, although significant advances had been
made in communications capabilities, U.S. leaders and the
208
-October 23 EXCOMM Minutes," p. 3; McGeorge Bundy,
"Executive Committee Record of Action, October 24, 1962,
10:00 A.M., Meeting No. 3," pp. 1-2 (declassified 1978.
National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban Missile
Crisis file. Cited hereafter as "October 24 Morning EXCOMM
Meeting Record of Action.").
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military chain of command experienced serious communications
problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In some instances it
took longer to transmit messages to commanders off the coast
of the United States in 1962 than it took to transmit
messages to commanders in the Taiwan Strait in 1958. This
demonstrates conclusively that command and control capabili-
ties are not directly, or even primarily, a function of
technology. Variance in crisis outcomes—in terms of the
degree to which national leaders maintain control of events
and prevent inadvertent escalation—is not accounted for by
variation in command and control technology. In other
words, better radios do not guarantee better crisis
management. There are additional variables that affect how
effectively military operations are controlled in a crisis.
In the Cuban Missile Crisis the primary determinant
was the emphasis on exercising close, detailed, direct
control of military operations. Emphasis on direct control
was not accompanied by consideration of the implications
this might have for the effective conduct of military
operations. There was a lack of appreciation for the
organizational, procedural, and operational requirements for
effectively exercising direct control. As has been shown,
impulsive efforts to exercise direct control generated
communications problems that degraded the effectiveness of
direct control. The President's civilian advisors appear
not to have appreciated that communications capabilities
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need to be jealously guarded rather than ruthlessly
exploited.
President Kennedy's desire to maintain control of
events was implemented impulsively during the crisis,
reflecting the novelty and complexity of the situation and
the need for improvisation to meet the President's crisis
management objectives. No attempt was made to formulate a
comprehensive command and control doctrine that designated
methods of control for specific operations, what decision-
making authority would be delegated and what would be.
reserved for the President, and procedures for shifting
control of operations up and down the chain of command.
These issues were addressed on an ad hoc basis in response
to concerns over the implications of particular operations.
The implicit objective was to exercise direct control
over all military and naval operations. This, of course,
was not feasible. The President and his top advisors were
forced by the immense scale of operations being conducted to
focus their attention on particular operations. Seven areas
appear to have been singled out for close attention. Navy
quarantine operations, particularly the intercept and
boarding of Soviet bloc ships, received first priority for
White House attention and control. Vice Admiral Houser has
pointed out additional areas of attention: "The big
concerns were reconnaissance flights over Cuba, the [SAC]




strikes." The Marines, he clarified, meant invasion
plans and preparations. Records from EXCOMM meetings reveal
that all of these topics except civil defense were discussed
st length. The records of the EXCOMM meetings held October
23 and 26 indicate that civil defense, particularly measures
for the southeastern United States, was a concern, but was
210generally discussed in separate meetings. The final area
that received close attention was operations by Navy ships
close to Cuban waters. Whenever Navy ships trailing Soviet
vessels or conducting other surveillance approached the
coast of Cuba, their movements were closely monitored. To
summarize, the areas that received close attention were
quarantine operations, reconnaissance flights over Cuba, the
SAC DEFCON 2 alert, civil defense, invasion and air strike
preparations, and operations near Cuba.
What is striking is that this focusing of attention
appears to have occurred without a deliberate decision as to
which military operations warranted the President's direct
attention. None of the available records show this topic
being discussed with the President or among his advisors
during the many meetings held in the week prior to the
209Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988.
210McGeorge Bundy, "Executive Committee Record of
Action, October 23, 1962, 6 PM, Meeting No. 2," p. 1
(Declassified 1978. National Security Archive, Washington,
DC, Cuban Missile Crisis file. Cited Hereafter as "October
23 Evening EXCOMM Meeting Record of Action."); "Ocotber 26
EXCOMM Meeting Summary Record," pp. 1-2.
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crisis or during the crisis. The President apparently
desired to control the operations with greatest likelihood
of involving U.S. forces in an incident with Soviet or Cuban
forces. Several observers have noted that the President was
concerned that an incident might occur, particularly between
Navy ships on the quarantine line and Soviet merchant
211
ships. This accounts for attention to quarantine opera-
tions, reconnaissance flights over Cuba, and surveillance
operations near Cuba. Concern for incidents also should
have led to close control of Navy ASW operations, which
generated the most intense interactions with Soviet forces
during the crisis. However, although the President was
aware of the danger of a confrontation with Soviet
submarines and had the ability to monitor ASW operations
"real time," he made no effort to exercise direct control
212
while submarines were being trailed. Thus, selection of
particular operations for close attention and control to
appears to have been spontaneous and intuitive, rather than
planned and carefully considered.
211Shepard, interview by author, February 10, 1988;
Chew, "Reminiscences," p. 318; Hilsman, p. 213; Sorenson, p.
708. Also see Abel, p. 153; Pachter, pp. 42-43.
212On the President's concern over an incident with
Soviet submarines, see Robert Kennedy, p. 70; Sorenson, pp.
705, 710; Schlesinqer, Robert Kennedy
, p. 514. Despite this
concern, ASW was not a focus of attention. Vice Admiral
Houser told the author, referring to McNamara, Gilpatric and
the EXCOMM, that "ASW was viewed as part of support
operations, it wasn't one of the major concerns." Houser,
interview by author, February 11, 1988.
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There was little consistency in the manner that
operations were controlled. The White House would pay
little attention to a particular operation, tacitly
delegating control of it, then suddenly intervene and
attempt to exercise close control over it. Just as
suddenly, the White House would move on to other problems,
leaving the chain of command in the dark as to the extent of
their authority. This inconsistency—impulsively seizing
control of tactical operations—appears to have been what
annoyed military commanders the most.
A fundamental principle of military command, often
called "unity of command," is that a commander must always
know from whom he is receiving orders. The U.S. armed
forces use formal procedures to designate commanders and
transfer control or operations among them in order to avoid
ambiguity and conflicts over who is authorized to give
orders. For example, the Navy uses formal "CHOP" (Change of
Operational Commander) procedures to designate the precise
time at which control over a unit shifts from one commander
to another. Although these procedures for transferring
control are formal, they are also flexible and rapid.
Transferring control of a unit or operation can be done by
written message or instantaneously over voice radio. There
are also standard procedures for automatically transferring
control, intended for emergency situations in which a
commander has to issue urgent orders without formally
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assuming control. But even in this situation, military
standing orders specify procedures to avoid ambiguity of
control. Thus, the military had concepts and procedures for
shifting operational control that could have been adapted to
meet the needs of the President.
The White House did not implement formal procedures
for for designating which operations the President wished to
control or for transferring control of specific operations
up and down the chain of command. Navy commanders never
knew when the White House might suddenly intervene in their
operations or countermand orders they had given. Simple,
rapid procedures for designating when the White House was
exercising direct control would have enhanced the
President's ability to control military operations while
avoiding ambiguity of command. There is no evidence that
the need for such procedures was even considered.
This was a failure not only cf the President's
civilian advisors, who had the excuse of having virtually no
experience with military operations, but also of the Joint
Chiefs
—
particularly the Chairman. During the crisis
General Taylor was the only JCS member who routinely met
with the President, attended EXCOMM meetings, and received
orders from the Secretary of Defense. He was in the perfect
position to address the command and control implications of
the President's approach to managing the crisis, but
apparently never made an effort to do so.
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Senior Navy leaders, particularly Admiral Anderson and
Admiral Dennison, also could have devised procedures for
facilitating White House control, but instead made a
concerted effort to protect the chain of command from what
they viewed as White House interference. Admiral Anderson
discusses this frankly in his oral history: "I was
determined, as far as the Navy was concerned, that we had
two principle considerations. . . . Second, that there was
to be a firm impediment by the higher authorities of the
Navy for any direct control or interference by our civilian
authorities to our operating forces, [sic] We did not want,
and I had it pretty well set up, to prevent any intrusion by
McNamara or anybody else in the direct operations of any
213
ship or squadron or anything of the sort." Admirals
Anderson and Dennison reacted as they did not only because
direct White House control of operations affronted their
professional sensibilities, but also because of the manner
in which the White House sought to exercise direct control.
Rather than work with the military to devise command
procedures appropriate for the President's desire to control
events, McNamara implemented on an ad hoc basis what was in
effect a major change in U.S. command and control doctrine.
213Anderson, "Reminiscences, " p. 550. He made the
same point to the author: "I particularly took the position
that control of the ships at sea had to go by the chain of
command." Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988.




To place this discussion in the analytical framework
introduced in Chapter IV, the Kennedy Administration sought
to employ methods of control at the tight end of the
"tightness of control" spectrum. The objective was to
exercise positive direct control, in which communications
links with operational forces are used to control their
movements and actions on a real-time basis. The White House
was not able to effectively exercise positive direct control
over all military operations due to limitations in
communications systems and the vast scale of the operations
being conducted. The President and his advisors focused
their attention on specific operations and made de facto
delegations of authority in other operational areas, tacitly
re?ying on methods of delegated control. Employing a
combination of direct and delegated control is not unusual,
the Eisenhower Administration did the same thing in the 1958
Taiwan Strait Crisis. What was unusual was the Kennedy
Administration's reluctance to admit that it could not
possibly exercise positive direct control over all the
military operations in progress and its reliance on de facto
rather than formal delegation of authority.
As part of their effort to maintain control over
military operations, the President and his advisors paid
close attention to the mechanisms of indirect control. The
manner in which the quarantine was conducted illustrates
this. Rather than allow the Navy to carry out the
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quarantine in accordance with its standing orders, McNamara
and the President had the CNO prepare mission orders
specifying how the operation was to be conducted, then
carefully reviewed and approved them. The procedures
contained in the mission orders were changed very little
from those contained in Navy standing orders, but the
President had ascertained that the quarantine would be
conducted in a manner that supported his political
214
objectives.
The manner in which contingency plans were used during
the crisis is particularly interesting. In mid-1961, not
long after the Bay of Pigs affair, the President directed
the Joint Chiefs to commence contingency planning for
214The original plans for a limited blockade were
drawn up by Admiral Dennison and Vice Admiral Ward on
October 20. The CNO briefed the President on Navy
quarantine plans the afternoon of October 21 and McNamara
approved the quarantine orders that evening. See "DOD
Operations, " p. 2; Ward, "Diary," pp. 4-6; Abel, p. 107.
Admiral Anderson and Admiral Griffin state the procedures
were basically the same as those in Navy tactical
publications. Anderson, interview by author, January 25,
1988; Griffin, letter to author, April 6, 1988. Vice
Admiral Caldwell, who drafted the instructions for the
quarantine, states that the only change made to them was to
delete POL from the initial list of prohibited items.
Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1988. One of the most
important innovations, to put Russian-speaking officers on
the quarantine line ships, originated with CINCLANT.
Dennison, "Reminiscences," pp. 428. Captain Nicholas S.
Mikhalevsky, Commanding Officer of USS Joseph P. Kennedy (DD
850) , one of two ships that boarded the Marucla , states that
he followed the procedure for intercept and boarding "as
described in the pertinent NWP [Naval Warfare Publica-




military action against Cuba. JCS assigned responsibility
for these plans to CINCLANT because Cuba was in his area of
responsibility. Initially two contingency plans were
produced: Operation Plan [OPLAN] 312-61 (later renumbered
312-62) for air strikes against Cuba and OPLAN 314-61 for
invasion of Cuba. These plans were tentatively approved by
JCS in the fall of 1961. Later in the year JCS directed
CINCLANT to prepare an alternative invasion contingency
plan, which was ready by early 1962 and designated OPLAN 316-
62. All three CINCLANT OPLANs were reviewed and updated
215
continuously through October 1962.
OPLAN 312-61 was a contingency plan for quick reaction
air strikes against Cuban air defenses in preparation for
the Army airborne assault contained in OPLAN 314-61. Prior
to September 1962 Cuba had only rudimentary air defenses, so
OPLAN 312-61 contained relatively small-scale air strikes
covering a four-hour period. As the Soviets modernized and
expanded Cuba's air defenses it became apparent that this
plan would not be adequate. On September 7 , 1962, the
Tactical Air Command began working on an entirely new plan.
This plan, code named -Rockpile," was approved by the Chief
of Staff of the Air Force, General Curtis E. Lemay, on
215
"CINCLANT Historical Account,- pp. 17-22; Vice
Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, -Presentation to the Naval War
College,- December 11, 1962 (Operational Archives, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, DC, Personal Papers of Vice
Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, Box 6, Book 4), p. 15; Ward,
"Diary,- pp. 2-3; Dennison, -Reminiscences," pp. 415-17.
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September 27. The next day it was approved by CINCLANT and
adopted as OPLAN 312-62. When he approved the plan, General
Lemay set October 20 as the target date for readiness to
execute OPLAN 312-62. Throughout October the Air Force
carried out preparations to launch air strikes against Cuba,
including relocating aircraft, prepositioning fuel and
ammunition, setting up communications channels, and flying
training combat missions against simulated Cuban targets
216(such as mock Soviet SAM sites) .
OPLAN 312-62 contained three air strike options. The
first, code named "Fire Hose," provided for "the selective
destruction of a surface-to-air missile site or sites as
directed by CINCLANT." It provided the option of small-
scale air strikes for retaliatory or demonstrative
purposes. Fire Hose could be launched on two hours notice.
The second option, code named "Shoe Black," provided for
larger air strikes against a wider range of targets, but
limited as prescribed by CINCLANT. Targets included
airfields, SAM sites, and missile complexes. Shoe Black
also could be launched on two hours notice. The third
option, code named "Scabbards 312," provided for destruction
of all Cuban defenses (air, naval and ground) in preparation
for invasion. Scabbards 312 could be launched on twelve
hours notice. During the crisis, two additional options
216
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 27, 162-63.
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were added to OPLAN 312-63: "Full House," for destruction of
all surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba, and "Royal Flush,"
for destruction of the entire Cuban air defense system.
These two options could be launched on two hours notice. As
the CINCLANT report notes, discovery of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba
shifted the purpose of OPLAN 312-62: "The newly discovered
ballistic missile sites had altered the purpose of the plan
from the original objective of defeating Cuban air to one of
defeating Cuban air and preventing destructive missile
attacks on the United States." Thus, after October 16
Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba were added to OPLAN
312-62217
Most OPLAN 312-62 air strikes were to be carried out
by the Air Force. The Navy role was limited to defense of
Guantanamo and pre-landing air strikes in amphibious.
objective areas. Additionally, however, a large number of
Navy and Marine shore-based fighter and attack aircraft were
placed under Air Force command to augment the Tactical Air
217*x
-CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 17-20, 163;
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum JSCM-821-62,
"Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: Timing Factors,"
October 25, 1962 (Declassified 1984. Reproduced in Johns,
"Naval Quarantine," p. 90. Cited hereafter as "JSCM-821-
62) . The code name "Scabbards" originally designated the
operations that were to be carried out under OPLAN 316-62,
which included the third option in OPLAN 312-62. On October
23 JCS directed that the code name "Scabbards" be used to
cover all operations related to Soviet deployment of
offensive weapons in Cuba, thus covering the quarantine as
well. However, the quarantine was not designated or
referred to as "Operation Scabbards."
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Command for execution of the Air Force portion of OPLAN
312-62. 218
OPLAN 314-61 was for invasion of Cuba and overthrow of
the Castro government. CINCLANT states that **The plan
called for a simultaneous amphibious and airborne assault in
the Havana area by a Joint Task Force within eighteen days
after the receipt of the order to execute.** The Joint Task
Force, JTF-122, consisted of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps,
Nineteenth Air Force, Second Marine Expeditionary Force,
Amphibious Force Atlantic, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task
Force Atlantic, and other units. The plan contained an
option, designated **314 Golf, H for execution of the invasion
on four days notice. This was to be achieved by executing
OPLAN 314-61, then halting it at D-4, four days before
invasion. On October 26 JCS cancelled OPLAN 314-61 and
directed that OPLAN 316-62 be used, allowing commanders to
219focus on a single contingency invasion plan.
218
"CINCLANT Historical Account,** pp. 17-20. The Navy
had two attack carrier air groups afloat (about fourteen
fighter and attack squadrons) , one attack carrier air group
ashore (six squadrons) , and about six Navy and Marine
squadrons ashore in Guantanamo and Puerto Rico designated
for air strikes against Cuba. The Tactical Air Command was
assigned two attack carrier air groups ashore (about twelve
squadrons) and a Marine air group (three squadrons) for air
strikes against Cuba. Additionally, the Continental Air
Defense Command was assigned one Marine and two Navy fighter
squadrons and several Navy shore-based airborne early
warning aircraft to augment air defenses in Florida.
219* A:,Ibid, pp. 20-21. •*D-4" is the military
abbreviation designating four days prior to MD-Day," which
in turn is the designated day for launching an assault.
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OPLAN 316-62 was originally drafted as a quick
reaction joint airborne and amphibious assault against
Cuba. It differed from OPLAN 314-61 primarily in that it
used much smaller forces for the initial assault, allowing
an invasion to be launched on shorter notice. OPLAN 316-62
originally called for the initial assault to be launched
five days after the President ordered an invasion. The
remainder of the invasion force was to be landed no later
than eighteen days after the order was given. On October 17
the interval from decision to initial assault was increased
to seven days, which allowed more forces to be landed in the
initial assault and reduced the time between initial assault
and landing of reinforcements. OPLAN 312-62 air strikes
were to commence twelve hours after the invasion order was
220given and continue throughout the week prior to D-Day.
As the full extent of the Cuban military build-up
became known, the forces committed to OPLAN 316-62 the
invasion were significantly increased. The Fifth Marine
Expeditionary Brigade from Camp Pendleton was added to the
initial assault and the Army's First Armored Division was
added to the forces to be landed later. Total Marine Corps
forces included a total of nine battalion landing teams,
roughly 28,000 troops. Army forces to be landed in the
initial assault included the 82nd and 101st Airborne
220** Ibid, pp. 21-23? JSCM-821-62, p.l.
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Divisions, the First Infantry Division, two artillery
battalions, a light tank company, and Special Forces units.
Follow-on Army forces included the Second Infantry Division,
the First Armored Division, three artillery battalions and
two artillery groups, two tank battalions, and an array of
support forces. Army tactical nuclear weapon units
—
•quipped with Honest John, Long John, and Davy Crockett
rockets—were alerted, but placed in an "on-call" status in
the United States rather than included in the invasion
force. Total Army forces committed to the invasion of Cuba
221
exceeded 100,000 troops.
In addition to these three contingency plans, the Navy
had two additional contingency plans. CINCLANTFLT Operation
Order (OPORD) 36-61 was for the evacuation and defense of
Guantanamo. The evacuation and reinforcement portions of
this OPORD were carried out during the crisis, but no Cuban
threat to the base developed, so the combat operations
contained in the OPORD were not executed. CINCLANTFLT OPORD
41-62, issued October 3, 196 2, was for a total blockade of
Cuba in support of OPLANs 314-61 or 316-62. When the
President decided to impose a limited "search and seizure"
blockade of offensive weapons to Cuba, OPORD 41-62 was
superseded by CINCLANTFLT OPORD 43-62, issued October 20.
From this point onward the President had decided to conduct
221** X
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 58-85, 153-161.
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a limited blockade and the OPORDs took on the character of
mission orders rather than contingency plans. OPORD 43-62
was substantially revised to reflect additional Presidential
guidance and re-issued as CINCLANTFLT OPORD 45-62 on October
21, 1962. This OPORO was used to conduct the quarantine,
with minor revisions (primarily renaming the blockade a
quarantine) issued on October 22 and 23. It was
supplemented by Commander Second Fleet (COMSECONDFLT) OPORD
2221-62, issued by Admiral Ward on October 22.
Recollections vary as to how much the President and
McNamara knew about the CINCLANT contingency plans prior to
October. Admiral Dennison states in his oral history that
"My plans were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, of
223
course, were known to the President. " Most senior Navy
officers involved in the crisis state McNamara undoubtedly
was briefed on the contingency plans given his attention to
detail. Vice Admiral Houser states that while Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gilpatric probably was aware of the
plans, he probably was not briefed on them "until it was
needed," which would have been in early October. The same
may also be true for McNamara and President Kennedy: they
probably were aware of the contingency plans but not briefed
on them in detail until early October. The civilian
222
* Ibid, pp. 39, 103, 153.
223Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 416.
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official who appears to have known the most about the plans
was Robert Kennedy due to his being Chairman of the Cuba
Coordinating Committee, which reviewed all plans and
preparations for action against Cuba. Vice Admiral Blouin,
Secretary to the Joint Chiefs immediately prior to the
crisis, suggested that Robert Kennedy probably reviewed the
224
contingency plans.
What is clear, however, is that McNamara and the
President paid close attention to the Cuban contingency
plans after October 1, when McNamara directed the Chiefs to
commence general preparations to execute them. On October 4
McNamara sent the President a memorandum primarily assessing
the Soviet SAM sites in Cuba, but also responding to a
Presidential inquiry as to the impact of the SAMs on the
Cuban contingency plans. McNamara reassured the President
that "I have taken steps to insure that our contingency
225plans for Cuba are kept up to date.** The Cuban
contingency plans were discussed at length during the
October 16 meetings with the President on the Soviet MRBMs
discovered in Cuba. In those meetings McNamara demonstrates
thorough knowledge of the plans and defends the Air Force
224Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988;
Blouin, letter to author, March 1, 1988.
225Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President,
"Presidential Interest in SA-2 Missile System and
Contingency Planning for Cuba," October 4, 1962
(Declassified 1978. John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA,




view that air strikes would have to cover a wide range of
air defense targets rather than just the MRBM sites. By the
October 27 EXCOMM meeting, when it appeared that air strikes
and invasion might have to ordered in the next few days,
even the President was able to discuss the contingency plans
in great detail, including the number of sorties that would
226be required to execute OPLAN 312-62.
A striking feature of President Kennedy's management
of the crisis is his ordering imlementation of specific
actions contained in the Cuban contingency plans without
authorizing execution of the overall plans. The President
was aware of the need to commence preparations for an
invasion of Cuba, and during the first meeting of the crisis
227
on October 16 directed that such preparations proceed.
However, he appears to have refused to actually execute the
Cuban contingency plans—even the preparatory phases.
Instead, the President approved specific invasion and air
strike preparations individually, which required that
operational commanders write separate orders for those
actions, rather than simply implementing the guidance
contained in the contingency plans. By October 16 the
President should have known, given his attention to the
226See "October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript," pp. 11-
17, 21-26; "October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. ; 9-
10, 17-23; "October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 52, 63-65,
74, 86-88.
227
"October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript," p. 27.
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contingency planning, that just the preparatory phases of
the two invasion plans could be executed so as to be
228prepared for invasion later. Nevertheless, he refused to
be bound by the timetables and courses of action in the two
plans. He was not alone. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Paul Nitze has stated that he and Secretary of State Rusk
agreed when they first heard about the Soviet missiles that
"the United States must move with deliberation, not merely
229proceed with existing contingency plans."
The President recalled the lessons from Barbara
Tuchman's The Guns of August . He appears to have been
deeply concerned that he would become trapped by execution
of the contingency plans, just as Europe's leaders had been
trapped by execution of their war plans in 1914. President
Kennedy seemed to fear that execution of the preparatory
phase of OPLAN 316-62 would build momentum and pressure to
carry out the rest of the plan.
Rather than executing OPLAN 316-62, the President
incrementally authorized specific preparatory actions
228OPLAN 314-61 contained an option, designated. "314
Golf,** for execution of the invasion on four days notice
—
achieved by executing the plan, then halting it at D-4.
OPLAN 316-62 consisted of four phases—alert, prepositioning
and initial deployment, final deployment and pre-assault,
and assault—and could be executed in phases. See "CINCLANT
Historical Account," pp. 20-21, 87-89.
229Quoted in Abel, p. 33. Nitze's comments on his
October 15 conversation with Rusk also shows that they knew




contained in the plan. This is revealed by a comment in the
CINCLANT report on the October 22 JCS order sending the
Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Camp Pendleton to
the Caribbean: "This step appeared to be another
incremental execution of actions outlined in the Contingency
230
Plan without execution of the plan itself. H The
President would eventually authorize a wider range of
preparations than were originally included in OPLAN 316-62,
indicating that it was not his intent to constrain the
ability of the military to carry out the plan if he so
ordered. His objective was maintaining control of events.
Incremental authorization of the preparatory actions
called for in OPLAN 316-62 does not appear to have seriously
hindered the ability of the military to carry out those
preparations. Serious logistical problems were encountered
during the invasion preparations, particularly by the Army,
but they were primarily the result of inadequate transpor-
tation resources. There were not sufficient numbers of
transport planes, amphibious ships, or railroad cars to move
all the men and equipment called for in the plan in the
• allotted time. The decks of one ship designated to carry
the First Armored Division to Cuba were not far enough apart
to carry tanks. Port, airfield, and rail capacity in the
southeastern United States was saturated by the movement of
230
"CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 144.
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231forces into the area. None of these problems were caused
by the manner in which the President managed the crisis.
On the other hand, incremental authorization of the
preparatory actions called for in OPLAN 316-62 and the
decision to impose a quarantine on offensive arms rather
than execute the existing contingency plan for a total
blockade of Cuba were the causes of the overloading
experienced by U.S. communications systems. As was
discussed above, rather being able to send a short message
stating "Execute OPLAN 312-62, OPLAN 316-62, and OPORD 41-
62, H JCS was forced to transmit detailed instructions for ad
hoc actions authorized by the President. The most severe
crisis management problem encountered during the crisis
—
overloading of communications channels—was thus generated
by the manner in which the President elected to manage the
crisis. The President's objective of maintaining control of
events was sound, but the means he employed to pursue that
objective degraded his ability to control events. This is
an example of a tension between political and military
considerations in crisis management, one that was not
anticipated by the President or his civilian advisors.
Rules of engagement were used to exercise indirect
control over certain military operations during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, particularly quarantine force operations.
231Ibid, pp. 58-85, 153-67
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For the most part, however, naval operations were governed
by standing peacetime rules of engagement issued by JCS,
CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, and Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare
Force Atlantic (COMASWFORLANT) . When special rules of
engagement were issued, they generally reiterated the
232guidance contained in standing peacetime rules.
The rules of engagement for the quarantine of Cuba
were drafted by Captain Turner F. Caldwell of OPNAV (the
CNO's staff). Captain Caldwell commenced working on
detailed blockade procedures, including rules of engagement,
on Friday, October 19, after McNamara directed the CNO to
prepare plans for a limited blockade on offensive arms to
Cuba. Captain Caldwell completed them the next day and the
CNO presented them to McNamara that afternoon. The CNO
briefed the President and his advisors on Navy plans for the
quarantine on Sunday, October 21, and McNamara approved the
final plans—including the rules of engagement—that
evening. The JCS directive for the quarantine was issued on
Monday, October 22. It included the rules of engagement
233drafted by Captain Caldwell, with virtually no changes.
232The one exception to this was protection of
reconnaissance flights over Cuba. The right to use force in
self defense was specifically denied to U.S. forces and the
decision to use force was reserved for the President.
233
"DOD Operations," pp. 2, 9; Caldwell, letters to
author, March 14, 1988, and April 27, 1988. According to
Vice Admiral Caldwell, the only change made to his rules for
the quarantine was deletion of POL (petroleum, oil and
lubricants) from the list of prohibited items.
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Although not a part of the quarantine rules of
engagement per se , use of force against merchant vessels was
addressed in the intercept and boarding procedures issued by
CINCLANTFLT:
In stopping ships to be visited, use all/any available
communications to signify intent, including such means
as international code signals, flashing light, radio,
or loud speakers. If these means fail, warning shots
shall be fired across the bow, or, in the case of
submarines, equivalent warning action. These means
failing, minimum force may be used. Attempt, if
possible, to damage only non-vital parts, such as the
rudder, and attempt to avoid injuries or loss of life.
... If destruction of ship is necessary, ample
warning and intentions should be given to permit suf-
ficient time for debarkation by passengers and crew.
Assistance to maximum extent permitted by operational
conditions should be furnished. 233
This was essentially the same as guidance contained in Navy
tactical publications. According to Vice Admiral Caldwell,
"The chief difference was stress on caution. It was desired
234
to accomplish the purpose with minimum use of force."
Thus, other than emphasizing caution, the quarantine
guidance served only to reiterate standard Navy procedures
The rules of engagement for the quarantine issued by
CINCLANTFLT, based on JCS guidance, were as follows:
233Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet, CINCLANTFLT
231710Z OCT 62, Revised OPORD 45-62, naval message, October
23, 1962 (Declassified 1986. Operational Archives, Naval
Historical Center, Washington DC. Cited hereafter as
CINCLANTFLT 231710Z OCT 62.). Also see Robert Kennedy pp.
60-61,* Sorenson, p. 698; "Ships Must Stop," New York Times ,
October 23, 1962, p. 1; "Blockade Begins at 10 A.M. Today,"
New York Times , October 24, 1962, p. 1.
234Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1988.
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Any ships, including surface warships, armed merchant
ships or submarines, or any aircraft, which interfere
with or threaten to interfere with a U.S. ship engaged
in visit and search will be treated as hostile and may
be engaged to the extent required to terminate the
interference. Any ships, including surface warships,
armed merchant ships or submarines, or any aircraft,
which take actions which can reasonably be considered
as threatening a U.S. ship engaged in visit and search
may be subjected to attack to the extent required to
terminate the threat. 235
These rules are not a change from standing peacetime naval
rules of engagement, which always allow a ship to use force
in self defense. The rules invoke the principle of anticipa-
tory self defense upon detection of "actions which can
reasonably be considered as threatening." This also is not
different from peacetime rules of engagement: the Navy had
adopted the principle of anticipatory self defense in 1958.
The quarantine rules of engagement thus served to reiterate
236the guidance contained in standing peacetime rules.
The basic guidance contained in the quarantine rules
of engagement was revealed publicly by the Kennedy
235CINCLANTFLT 231710Z OCT 62.
236Senior naval officers that participated in the
crisis emphasized this point to the author. The CNO, the
CNO's deputy for fleet operations, both of the attack
carrier group commanders, and two ASW HUK group commanders
all stated that the rules of engagement were basically
similar to standing peacetime rules. Anderson, interview by
author, January 25, 1988; Griffin, letter to author, April
6, 1988; Hayward, letter to author, February 17, 1988;
Stroh, letter to author, February 18, 1988; Christiansen,
interview by author, February 3, 1988; Admiral Noel A.M.
Gayler, Commander Carrier Division Twenty (an ASW HUK group)
during the crisis, letter to author, March 22, 1988.
Several ship commanding officers made similar comments, and
no one offered comments to the contrary.
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Administration. The New York Times stated on October 24
that MThe blockading ships can also use force if
237
attacked." The Quarantine Proclamation signed by the
President on October 23 addressed the conditions under which
force would be used against merchant ships: "In carrying
out this order, force shall not be used except in case of
failure or refusal to comply with directions, or with
regulations or directives the Secretary of Defense issued
hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to
communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of self-
defense. In any case force shall be used only to the extent
238
necessary. " If the Soviets and Cubans paid attention to
these statements, they were forewarned of the actions that
would provoke use of force by the United States.
The interesting point about the quarantine rules of
engagement is that they specifically authorized use of force
against submarines in self-defense or anticipatory self-
defense. Secretary of Defense McNamara and President
Kennedy reviewed and approved the proposed rules of engage-
ment drafted by Captain Caldwell before they were issued by
the JCS on Monday, October 22, and therefore should have
known that U.S. Navy ships had specifically been given such
237
"Blockade Begins at 10 A.M. Today," N*w York Times ,
October 24, 1962, p. 21.
238
"The Soviet Threat to the Americas," Department of




authority. It cannot be demonstrated conclusively that the
President fully understood the implications of the
quarantine rules of engagement. However, the fact that
McNamara and the President authorized these rules strongly
suggests that they appreciated the Navy's concern for the
Soviet submarine threat and did not want to unnecessarily
endanger Navy ships. This could well explain the Presi-
dent's concern that a clash with a Soviet submarine might be
239imminent on October 24. He may have been concerned not
only because he did not know what a Soviet submarine captain
or a U.S. destroyer captain might do, but also because he
knew that U.S. ships were authorized to use force against
Soviet submarines in self-defense.
Rules of engagement were also issued for encounters
with Cuban air and naval forces. The guidance promulgated
by Commander Key West Force (COMKWESTFOR) to the forces
operating near Cuba was that "Any ship or aircraft which
attacks, or reasonably threatens to attack, a US flag ship
will be treated as hostile and may be engaged to the extent
240
required to terminate the threat." Although these rules
authorized use of force in anticipatory self-defense, Navy
operational commanders emphasized caution and restraint in
239Robert Kennedy, p. 70. Also see Sorenson, p. 705
240CTG 81.6 261524Z OCT 62, OPORD 31-62 Change One,
naval message, October 26, 1962 (Declassified 1986. Opera-




applying the rules. Captain Donald L. Lassell, Deputy
Commander of the Key West Force and Commander of the Florida
Strait Protection of Shipping Patrol, states that "my ships
had orders to return fire if fired upon, but not to initiate
an action without clearing it first with me. We had no
intention of initiating hostilities." This illustrates a
tactical-level operational commander issuing guidance that
is more restrictive than the guidance contained in rules of
engagement issued by higher authority. Captain Lassell
could do this effectively because he was near the scene of
action and in direct communications with his ships.
Anticipatory self defense was authorized because Cuba
had recently received Soviet-built Komar-class fast attack
craft armed with SS-N-2 anti-ship cruise missiles. The
Cuban Missile Crisis marked the first crisis in which U.S.
naval forces had to cope with the threat of anti-ship cruise
missiles. The rules of engagement issued by Commander Key
West Force for the Komar missile boat threat stated
"Permission is granted to immediately engage and destroy any
Komar-class PGMG [guided missile fast patrol boat] which
makes a hostile approach on U.S. naval forces or U.S.
242
merchant ships." Captain Robert E. Brady, Commanding
241Lassell, letter to author, May 11, 1988.
242CTG 81.6 011603Z NOV 62, OPORD 33-62, naval
message, November 1, 1962 (Declassified 1986. Operational
Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC).
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Officer of USS John R. Perry (DE 1034) , one of the ships on
patrol in the Florida Strait during the crisis, states:
The rules of engagement were basically those of self-
preservation— fire if fired upon. The exception was
that we were to fire if it became obvious that we were
about to be fired upon. This was apparently a
concession to the missile threat, but it was not
really carte blanche , because we were in constant
communication with COMKWESTFOR, and CINCLANT or
CINCLANTFLT would jump in quickly if there was any
hint of trouble. 243
Thus, although U.S. Navy ships were authorized to use force
in anticipatory self-defense due to the Cuban Komar threat,
operational commanders closely monitored the tactical
situation in order to maintain control over engagments.
It is not known if President Kennedy personally
approved anticipatory self-defense against Cuban Komar
missile boats. The principle of anticipatory self-defense
had been approved by the JCS and the President in 1953 and
adopted by the the Navy in 1958 „ so Navy commanders could
authorize anticipatory self-defense on their own authority.
The President would have had to specifically deny this
option to the Navy. The President may have been briefed on
the threat from Cuban Komars and the proposed rules of
engagement for dealing with them—this would be consistent
with the detailed briefings he received on other military
operations—but it is also possible that the issue was never
raised at his level.




U.S. Navy forces other than those under Commander Key
West Force would have been governed by standing peacetime
rules of engagement in an encounter with Cuban forces. Vice
Admiral John T. Hayward, commander of the USS Enterprise
(CVAN 65) attack carrier group during the crisis, provided
comments illustrating how the peacetime rules functioned:
They [the rules of engagement] were not significantly
different [from peacetime rules] , but I was prepared
to engage any threat as I perceived it to the Task
Force and instructed all hands to that effect. In
that respect I guess they were different from the
normal rules in existence at that time. My
instructions from CINCLANTFLT, particularly Admiral
Beakley, Chief of Staff, was to make sure no one had a
chance to attack us. . . .1 would have fired on any
Cuban planes approaching the Task force and so
instructed my people. For some reason people feel we
did not have this authority. I can assure you we
would have fired [on] and intercepted any plane in-
bound for the Task Force. One cannot afford to take
any chances in such a situation. One must realize the
speed of an engagement of that type and [that] one
doesn't have a chance to do much but to make sure
everyone in the Force knew not to hesitate or ask for
any instructions on the matter. . . . The Komar patrol
boats were the biggest danger at night and I couldn't
let anyone get into missile range because of this. If
a Komar had a Styx [SS-N-2] missile aboard, I certain-
ly wasn't going to delay destoying it. 244
Vice Admiral Hayward had ample authority under Navy
peacetime rules of engagement to take all of the actions he
describes. The primary difference from peacetime rules that
he identifies is the emphasis on anticipatory self defense
—
firing before being fired on. Although this had been a part
of Navy doctrine for four years, few Navy officers were
244Hayward, letter to author, February 17, 1988.
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familiar or experienced with the concept in 1962. Prior to
that they had never been opposed by anti-ship cruise
missiles. Vice Admiral Hayward's concern over the threat
from Cuban Komar missile boats was typical of the concerns
felt by Navy officers—concerns which generated the emphasis
on anticipatory self defense.
As it had done with other aspects of the rules of
engagement, the United States revealed the essence of its
rules of engagement for Cuban forces. When asked during the
background briefing he gave on October 22 if a Cuban attack
on a U.S. ship would be considered an act of war, McNamara
responded: "We will consider an attack by Cuban aircraft
and/or ship against our aircraft or vessels warrants attack
by us of the Cuban ship or aircraft. . . . The attack by a
Cuban aircraft on one of our aircraft or on one of our ships
warrants, I think, fire in return, directed to destroying
245that particular aircraft or ship." Cuba was thus fore-
warned against attacking U.S. vessels.
In addition to reviewing and authorizing the rules of
engagement for the quarantine, the Kennedy Administration
also launched a study of the rules of engagement that would
be appropriate should fighting erupt at sea. On October 23
230Robert S. McNamara, background Briefing on Cuban
Situation," October 22, 1962, transcript prepared by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 39-40 (National





a Planning Subcommittee was formed to closely examine
particular issues for the EXCOMM. One of the subjects of
planning from October 24 onward was "rules of engagement for
a protracted war at sea." The Department of Defense and JCS
were tasked to study the issue, they in turn delegated the
246
study to the Navy. It is not clear what prompted this
study other than apprehension that the Soviets might try to
break the blockade, provoking fighting at sea. The key
point is that the EXCOMM was trying to anticipate the rules
of engagement that would be needed for expanded hostilities.
The rules of engagement over which the White House
exercised the closest control were those for engaging Cuban
air defenses. The basic question was in what manner U.S.
forces would respond to Soviet SA-2 SAMs firing on high
altitude photographic reconnaissance flights, or Cuban anti-
aircraft guns or Mig fighters firing on low altitude
photographic reconnaissance flights. The U-2s that flew the
high altitude flights and the Navy F8U-1P Corsairs and Air
Force RF-101 Voodoos that flew the low altitude flights were
all unarmed. Their only defense was evasive maneuvering
and, for the Corsairs and Voodoos, speed. The initial ."
246 See W.W. Rostow, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy,
"Report Number One of Planning Subcommittee," October 24,
1962 (Declassified 1975. National Security Archive,
Washington, DC, Cuban Missile Crisis file.); W.W. Rostow,
Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, "Report Number Two of the
Planning Subcommittee," October 25, 1962 (Declassified





policy decision was that military commanders would not be
delegated authority to strike SAM or gun sites in Cuba that
had fired on U.S. planes. On October 23 the President
approved the following policy for retaliation against
attacks on U-2 flights:
The President will be informed through SAC/DOD
channels, and it is expected that if there is clear
indication that the incident is the result of hostile
action, the recommendation will be for immediate
retaliation upon the most likely surface-to-air site
involved in the action. The President delegated
authority for decision on this point to the Secretary
of Defense under the following conditions:
(1) that the President himself should be unavailable
(2) that evidence of hostile Cuban action should be
very clear
The impact of this policy was to define strikes on Cuban air
defenses as retaliation rather than self defense, and
therefore beyond the scope of rules of engagement. It was,
in effect, an order not to return fire when fired upon until
the President, or at least the Secretary of Defense, ordered
return fire. This policy was the most restrictive rules of
engagement issued during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The issue of defending high and low level photographic
reconnaissance flights became critical on October 27, when a
Soviet SAM downed a U-2 and Cuban guns fired on Navy
Corsairs (none were hit) . Although both incidents clearly
met the criteria for retaliation, the President decided not
247
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to authorize retaliation against Cuban air defenses. He and
McNamara were clearly aware of the danger that this could
result in more U.S. planes being shot down and more U.S.
pilots being killed. The President's rationale in not
ordering retaliation was to give Khrushchev an opportunity
to respond to the letter the U.S. sent that day proposing a
248
solution to the crisis. If Khrushchev's response was not
satisfactory and if there were further attacks on U.S.
reconnaissance planes, the President probably would have
249
ordered limited air strikes on Cuban air defenses. In
retrospect, the President's decision was a wise one
—
probably one of the most important of the entire crisis.
Khrushchev did accept the offer in the President's letter
and there were no further attacks on U.S. planes.
248
"October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 63-71. Also
see Sorenson, p. 713.
249These retaliatory air strikes, rather than full-
scale strikes against Soviet offensive missile sites, were
probably the military action that Robert Kennedy had in mind
when he told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on October 27 that
"We had only a few more hours" and that the United States
must have an answer by the next day. Robert Kennedy, pp.
108-9. The deadline is usually associated with his remark
earlier in their conversation that "if they did not remove
the bases we would remove them." However, if his account of
the conversation is correct, he did not necessarily mean to
imply that the United States would attack the offensive
missile sites on Monday. Robert Kennedy had attended the
EXCOMM meeting at which the President and McNamara had
discussed retaliation against Cuban air defenses, so knew
that this was imminent if there were further attacks on U.S.
planes. Robert Kennedy also would have known that the
President had not yet decided whether the next U.S. move
would be a blockade of POL shipments to Cuba or full-scale
air strikes against Soviet offensive missiles.
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The manner in which rules of engagement were used in
the crisis illustrates the command and control problems that
arose from the Kennedy Administration's approach to
maintaining close control over military operations. Rules
of engagement are intended to serve as a mechanism of
indirect control, providing on-scene commanders with
decisionmaking guidance for situations in which direct
control is not feasible. Issuing rules of engagement
presupposes that military commanders have been delegated
authority to make tactical decisions based on those rules.
If the President or other high-level commanders do not wish
to delegate certain operational decisions, that should be
spelled out in the guidance issued to on-scene commanders.
This was only done formally in the case of retaliatory
strikes on Cuban air defenses. In every other area of
operations, mechanisms of indirect control were used in
parallel with direct control over telephone lines and HF/SSB
voice radio.
Using mechanisms of indirect control in parallel with
methods direct control was not novel. The military chain of
command does this routinely when it delegates certain
operational decisions to subordinates while retaining other
decisions for superiors. When the military chain of command
does this, however, it is careful to specify exactly what
authority has been delegated and what has not. Senior
commanders refrain from intervening in areas of operational
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decisionmaking delegated to subordinates except in emer-
gencies. These principles avoid confusion over delegation
of authority, but were not applied in the Cuban crisis.
On-scene commanders may have believed that they had
authority that the President and McNamara did not intend to
delegate to them. On the other hand, the President and
McNamara may have believed that they had control over
decisions that would not have been referred up the chain of
command to them. Although the President and McNamara
attempted to exercise direct control over certain naval
operations, they still had to rely heavily on the prudence
and judgement of on-scene commanders.
Naval Operations
The quarantine on shipments of offensive missiles to
Cuba was the most important and visible naval operation
conducted during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but it was far
from being the only, or even the largest, naval operation of
the crisis. Other operations conducted by the navy included
anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic and Caribbean,
defense of Guantanamo Naval Base, low altitude photographic
reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol around Cuba,
preparations for air strikes against Cuba, preparations for
amphibious invasion of Cuba, combined Latin America-United
States quarantine force operations, air defense of the
continental United States, and certain (still classified)
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special operations against Cuba. Of these various
operations, only those that generated tactical-level
interactions with Soviet vessels or submarines— the
quarantine and anti-submarine warfare—will be discussed in
detail. 250
The option of blockading Cuba had been discussed
within the Navy, JCS and Kennedy Administration for some
time prior to the discovery of Soviet offensive missiles on
October 14, 1962. After the Berlin Crisis in the fall of
1961, the President had directed the JCS to prepare
contingency plans to blockade Cuba in retaliation for a
Soviet blockade of Berlin—plans ranging from harassment
250For details on the operations not discussed in this
study, see the following: On preparations for air strikes
against Cuba, Attack Carrier Force operations, and Air Force
operations, see "CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 110-19,
162-67; Robert S, McNamara, "Notes on October 21, 1962
Meeting with the President," (Declassified 1985. National
Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban Missile Crisis
file) ; "Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile
Bases and Bombers in Cuba," National Security Council,
informal Cuba working group, final draft of internal
memorandum, October 20, 1962 (Declassified 1985. National
Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban Missile Crisis
file). On preparations for invasion of Cuba, Amphibious
Force operations, and Army operations, see "CINCLANT
Historical Account," pp. 58-83, 141-52, 153-61; Admiral
Horacio Rivero, Jr., "The Reminiscences of Admiral Horacio
Rivero, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis, MD: U.S.
Naval Institute, Oral History Program, 1975), pp. 411-447.
On the reinforcement and defense of Guantanamo Naval Base,
see "CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 90-102, 153-61; "DOD
Operations," pp. 9-11. On Combined Latin America-United
States Quarantine Force (TF 137) operations, see "CINCLANT
Historical Account," pp. 126-31; Commander Forrest R. Johns,




of shipping and flights to total blockade— a form of what is
now called the "lateral escalation" strategy. As the
military build-up on Cuba gained momentum in the summer of
1962, Navy planners on the CNO's staff and at CIHCLANTFLT
began preparing plans for a total blockade of Cuba that were
not contingent on prior Soviet action against Berlin. A
blockade was called for in OPLANs 314-61 and 316-62, but
contingeny plans for it had not been prepared prior to the
Cuban arms build-up. In late August Justice Department
Counsel Norbert A. Schlei submitted a memorandum to the
Attorney General suggesting that either a total blockade or
a "visit and search" blockade, similar to that imposed by
the United States on the eve of World War II, would be an
appropriate response to Soviet introduction of offensive
missiles in Cuba. On October 3 CINCLANTFLT issued a
contingency plan (OPORD 41-62) for a total blockade of
251Cuba. Thus, by early October the idea of a total or
limited blockade of Cuba had been considered by civilian
officials as well as by the military, and contingency plans
existed for a total blockade of Cuba.
Given this prior consideration, of plans to blockade
Cuba, it is not surprising that blockading Cuba was
discussed in the first meetings President Kennedy held with
251Beakley, Naval War College Presentation, pp. 11-13;
Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1988; Ward, "Diary,"




his advisors on October 16 to discuss the the Soviet
missiles in Cuba. Blockading Cuba was first mentioned by
General Taylor that morning as an action to be taken in
conjunction with air strikes against the Soviet missile
252
sites. In the afternoon meeting, McNamara proposed a
"search and seizure'1 blcckade as a separate option: "A
second course of action we haven't discussed but lies in
between the military course we began discussing a moment ago
and the political course of action . . . would involve
declaration of open surveillance; a statement that we would
immediately impose ... a blockade against offensive
753
weapons entering Cuba in the future; ..."
Initially, there was little support for a limited
blockade: most EXCOMM members and the JCS preferred the air
strike option and believed that a limited blockade would not
be sufficient to force Khrushchev to remove the missiles
already in Cuba. On Thursday, October 18, opinion in the
EXCOMM bagan shifting in favor of a limited blockade. On
the morning of October 20, the EXCOMM slightly favored the
blockade option over the air strike option, but the Joint
Chiefs still advocated large-scale air strikes. The
President made an initial decision in favor of the limited
blockade option Saturday afternoon (October 20) and, after
252
"October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript," p. 12.
253
"October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," pp. 9,
46. Also see Robert Kennedy, pp. 33-34.
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on* last review of the air strike option with Air Force
leaders Sunday morning, made a final decision to impose a
254
search and seizure blockade on offensive arms to Cuba.
Navy planning for a limited blockade of Cuba began
Thursday evening, October 18, in response to a memorandum
from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to the JCS
requesting information on the blockade option. Friday
afternoon, 19 October, the JCS met with Gilpatric with the
answers to his questions and designated Admiral Anderson its
executive agent for CINCLANT operations against Cuba. That
evening Secretary of Defense McNamara directed the CNO to
prepare plans for a limited blockade on offensive arms to
Cuba. The operational planning was delegated to Admiral
Dennison and his staff in Norfolk, but certain policy
issues, such as detailed intercept and boarding procedures
and the rules of engagement, were handled by the CNO's
staff. Saturday morning, October 20, McNamara directed the
CNO to prepare "position and policy papers, scenario, and
implementing instructions" for a limited blockade. Saturday
254On the advantages and disadvantages of the blockade
option and the considerations that led to its adoption, see
"October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript," pp. 13-14; "October
16 Evening Meeting Transcript," p. 48; SNIE 11-19-62, pp. 4-
6, Annex A; SNIE 11-20-62, pp. 6-7; Robert S. McNamara,
"Notes on October 21, 1962 Meeting with the President,"
(Declassified 1985. National Security Archive, Washington,
DC, Cuban Missile Crisis file); Robert Kennedy, pp. 33-39,
43-49; Hilsman, pp. 203, 206; Sorenson, pp. 682-92;
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days
, pp. 803-8. Also see George,
"Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 95-100; Abel, pp. 60-73, 79-82,
86-101; Pachter, pp. 15, 27.
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afternoon Admiral Dennison and Vice Admiral Ward prepared a
plan for blockade operations. The Clio, assisted by Admiral
Dennison and Vice Admiral Ward, presented the detailed Navy
plans for the blockade to McNamara and the JCS. McNamara
and General Taylor took the plans to the White House for the
Saturday afternoon meeting in which the President initially
approved the limited blockade option. The CNO briefed the
President and his advisors on Navy plans for the limited
blockade on Sunday, October 21, and McNamara approved the
final plans that evening. The only major change made in the
Navy's plan for the limited blockade was to delete POL
(petroleum, oil and lubricants) from the list of prohibited
Items. The JCS directive for the limited blockade was
255issued on Monday morning, October 22.
The Blockade Force, Task Force 136 (TF 136) , was
commanded by Vice Admiral Ward, embarked in USS Newport News
(CA 148). TF 136 was divided into three Task Groups. The
Surface Group (TG 136.1) was commanded by Rear Admiral John
W. Ailes, III, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla Six,
embarked in the guided missile cruiser USS Canberra (CAG
2). TG 136.1 consisted of two cruisers escorted by four
destroyers, and twelve destroyers on the quarantine .line.
The ASW Group (TG 136.2) was commanded by Rear Admiral
255
"DOD Operations," pp. 2, 9; Caldwell, letter to
author, April 27, 1988; Ward, "Diary," pp. 4-5; Ward,
"Reminiscences," pp. 189-91; Dennison, "Reminiscences," p.
422; Sorenson, pp. 692, 698; Abel, pp. 81-82, 107, 141-43.
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Ernest C. Christiansen, Commander Carrier Division Eighteen,
embarked in USS Essex (CVS 9). TG 136.2 originally
consisted of USS Essex and six escorting destroyers. The
Underway Replenishment Group (TG 136.3) was commanded by
Captain W.O. Spears, Commanding Officer of USS Elokomin (AO
55), and consisted of three oilers and an ammunition ship,
with four destroyers as escorts. As the quarantine
progressed, other units relieved these ships so that they
could be rotated into port for repairs and crew rest. As a
256
result, a total of 62 ships eventually served in TF 136.
In addition TF 136, Task Force 81 and Task Force 83,
both under the command of Vice Admiral Edmund B. Taylor,
Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Atlantic,
participated in the search for Soviet bloc ships en route to
Cuba. The portion of Task Force 81 that participated in the
quarantine consisted of twelve land-based patrol plane
squadrons, about 140 aircraft (primarily P2Vs and P5Ms, but
with some brand new P3Vs) . Task Force 83 consisted of three
ASW HUK Groups (three ASW carriers, about 120 planes and
helicopters, and 20 destroyers) and approximately 24
destroyers and destroyer escorts in Atlantic and Caribbean
257picket stations. Although the primary function of TF 81
256wCINCLANT Historical Account," p. 103; Ward,
"Diary, " pp. 9-10.
257
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 120-25. Air
Force RB-47 and RB-50 reconnaissance planes flying out of
the Bahamas also participated in ocean surveillance.
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and TF 83 was ASW, they played vital role in locating and
tracking Soviet bloc shipping.
Some of the ships that would comprise TF 136 began
leaving port over the weekend of October 20-21, some having
to depart with only part of their crews on board due to the
secrecy of the operation. This provided enough ships on
station as of Monday, October 22, to guard the shipping
lanes to Cuba. Most of the quarantine force ships left port







1 19-00 65-10 USS
2 20-00 65r00 USS
3 21-00 65-10 USS
4 22-00 65-20 USS
5 23-00 65-40 USS
6 23-50 66-00 USS
7 24-50 67-20 USS
8 25-40 67-20 USS
9 26-30 68-10 USS
10 27-10 69-06 USS
11 27-40 70-06 USS
12 28-00 70-50 USS









W.C. Lawe (DD 763)
Witek (EDD 842)
Gearing (DD 710)
Source: "CNO Historical Narrative," pp. 44-46.
24) when the quarantine went into effect. The initial
quarantine line was designated "Walnut" and was established
on an arc 500 nautical miles from Cape Maisi, at the eastern
tip of Cuba. Table 3 lists the initial twelve stations in
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quarantine line Walnut. The two cruisers operated
independently of the quarantine line: USS Newport News
,
escorted by USS Keith (DD 775) and USS Lawrence (DDG 4) ,
near the south end of the line (northeast of Puerto Rico)
,
and USS Canberra , escorted by USS Borie (DD 704) and USS
Solev (DD 707) , near the north end of the line (northeast of
Nassau) . The USS Essex HUK group operated west of the
258
center of the quarantine line.
A controversy has persisted over exactly where the
quarantine line was established and whether or not it was
moved closer to Cuba on October 23-24. The evidence now
available establishes conclusively that the quarantine line
was established on October 24 on an arc 500 nautical miles
from Cape Maisi and was not moved closer to Cuba until
259October 30. Robert Kennedy and others who recall the
quarantine line as initially having been established at 800
260
nautical miles are mistaken.
*aoWard, "Diary," p. 10; "CINCLANT Historical
Account,** p. 103; "DOD Operations," p. 3. Also see
Anderson, "Reminiscences," pp. 546-47.
*J
*JCS message, JCS 250833Z OCT 62, no. 6968,
"Situation Report 3-62 as of 250400Z October 1962, Opertion
Scabbards," p. 3 (Declassified 1988. Provided to author by
Scott Sagan) ; "CNO Historical Narrative," pp. 44-46;
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 103-4; Ward, "Diary," pp.
10, 15.
• 260Robert Kennedy, p. 67; Dan Caldwell, "A Research
Note on the Quarantine of Cuba, October 1962," International
Studies Quarterly 22 (December 1978): 625-33. Caldwell made
three errors in his analysis. First, only five of the




The 500 nautical mile distance from Cuba was decided
upon by October 20 and implemented October 24. The ration-
ale for placing the blockade line that far out was to keen
261
Navy ships outside the range of Cuban aircraft. McNamara
probably accepted a CNO or JCS recommendation to set the
blockade line at 500 nautical miles the evening of October
19 or the morning of October 20. Admiral Ward states that
the 500 nautical mile distance had already been decided upon
by 11:00 A.M. on October 20, when he was first briefed on
the blockade by CINCLANT. Admiral Ward and Admiral Dennison
drew up their blockade plan based on the 500 nautical mile
distance and presented it to the JCS. The blockade line
distance was discussed at length during the evening October
20 JCS meeting. According to Admiral Ward, Admiral Anderson
agreed that Cuban forces were not a serious threat outside
of about 180 nautical miles and that the blockade line could
262be moved closer to Cuba. Admiral Ward states that the
quarantine line. The others were operating independently of
the quarantine line and one (USS Randolph ) wa3 not even in
TF 136. Second, ship's locations prior to about 9:00 A.M.
on October 24 are irrelevant because the ships were still en
route to their stations from U.S. ports. Third, the posi-
tions from October 24 onward are suspect because quarantine
line ships were routinely out of station for refueling,
trailing Soviet ships, and other tasking. Quarantine line
ships were not prohibited from going beyond 500 miles for
these purposes. For a more detailed analysis, see Johns,
"Naval Quarantine," pp. 107-115.
261Ward, "Diary," pp. 4-6; Anderson, "Reminiscences,"
p. 546; Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 424.
262
Ward, "Diary," pp. 4-6. Also see Abel, p. 123.
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October 22 JCS directive for the blockade did not contain
the 500 nautical miles requirement, but that CINCLAMTFLT
OPORD 45-62 for the quarantine of Cuba, promulgated October
21, retained the requirement that the blockade line be set
at 500 nautical miles. Therefore, he decided on October 23,
with CINCLANTFLT concurrence, to set the blockade line at
263500 nautical miles.
Robert Kennedy recounts in his memoir of the crisis
that on the evening of October 23 President Kennedy directed
McNamara to move the quarantine line closer to Cuba in order
to give the Soviets more time to react before the first
ships were intercepted. Robert Kennedy's account is
erroneous in that he states the quarantine line was ordered
264
moved in from 800 nautical miles to 500 nautical miles.
Graham T. Allison, establishing correctly that the
quarantine line was set at 500 nautical miles from Cuba at
least through October 25, contends that "the blockade was
265
not moved as the President ordered." Allison goes on to
conclude, incorrectly, that "It seems probable, then, that
the Navy's resistance to the President's order that the
blockade be drawn in closer to Cuba forced the President to
263Ward, "Diary," pp. 6, 9.
264Robert Kennedy, p. 67. Also see Schlesmger, A
Thousand Days , p. 818.
265Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining





allow one or several Soviet ships to pass through the
266blockade after it was officially operative." Allison
portrays this incident as an example of the organizational
process model constraining the President's ability to
267
affectively control crisis military operations.
Attention must focus on exactly what the President
said to McNamara concerning the quarantine line on the
evening of October 23. The first possibility is that the
President gave McNamara a clear and specific order to
immediately move the quarantine line closer to Cuba, as -
recounted by Robert Kennedy, but the CNO refused to carry
out the order. It is inconceivable, however, that McNamara
or the President would have tolerated such insubordination.
266
Ibid. Allison incorrectly contends that the Soviet
.
tanker Vinnitsa and other Soviet ships were allowed through
the quarantine line. However, the daily CIA report for
October 25 states "Thus far no Soviet ships have entered the
zone since it was established. Only two Soviet ships—one a
tanker—have arrived in Cuba since 23 October and both of
these were well within the zone prior to its establish-
ment.'' Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, "The Crisis
USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600," October 25, 1962, p.
II-l (Declassified. National Security Archive, Washington,
DC, Cuban Missile Crisis file. Cited hereafter as CIA,
-Crisis USSR/Cuba," October 25, 1962).
267Allison does not claim the President was unaware of
the quarantine line not having been moved. The positions of
the Navy ships were plotted on the charts in the White House
Situation Room and closely monitored by the President. See
Sorenson, p. 710. Additionally, McNamara visited Flag Plot
at least once a day, sometimes morning and evening, for
briefings on Navy operations and Soviet shipping. Charts in
Flag Plot showed the locations of all Navy ships involved in
Cuban operations. There is thus no possibility that the
Navy could have covertly left the quarantine line at 500
nautical miles after having been ordered to move it in.
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Admiral Anderson denies that there was any insubordination:
"Certainly there was no disregard of the President's
268directives. After all, he is the commander in chief."
According to Admiral Ward the CNO was willing to consider
moving the quarantine line closer to Cuba on October 20,
making it unlikely that Admiral Anderson would have defied
269
the President three days later. It is thus highly
unlikely that the CNO simply refused to carry out a clear
and specific Presidential order to immediately move the
quarantine line closer to Cuba
The second possibility is that the President erroneous
ly thought that the quarantine line was set at 800 nautical
miles, called the Secretary of Defense to move it in, and
was reminded by McNamara that it was set at 500 nautical
270
miles. The strength of this explanation is that it
accounts for Robert Kennedy's recollection that the quaran-
271tine line was originally set at 800 nautical miles.
268Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., "The Cuban
Blockade: An Admiral's Memoir," The Washington Quarterly ,
Autumn 1982, p. 86. Vice Admiral Houser, Naval Assistant to
Roswell Gilpatric during the crisis, states "I know of no
instances of the Navy deliberately disobeying an order."
Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988.
269Ward, "Diary," p. 6.
270Johns, "Naval Quarantine," p. 113.
271Other participants in the crisis, notably General
Taylor and Arthur Schlesinger, also recall the quarantine
line as originally having been set at 800 nautical miles.
See Dan Caldwell, "Research Note," pp. 628-29.
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Admiral Anderson recalls discussing the quarantine line
272distance with McNamara the evening of October 23. Thus,
McNamara may have checked with' the CNO to verify his facts
before reminding the President of where the quarantine line
was actually located.
The weakness in this scenario is trying to establish
how the President came to think that the quarantine line was
set at 800 nautical miles. The most likely source would
have been a briefing prior to October 19 on the original
contingency plan for a total blockade of Cuba, CINCLANTFLT
OPORD 41-62, which had been issued October 3. Although
unlikely, this OPORD may have specified a blockade line
273distance of 800 nautical miles. However, the plan that
was actually used, CINCLANTFLT OPORD 45-62, issued October
21, specified a 500 nautical mile distance, and the
President was briefed on this plan by the CNO Sunday
afternoon. The President is thus unlikely to have thought
that the quarantine line was set at 800 nautical miles.
272Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988.
273* ^The author was unable to locate CINCLANTFLT OPORD
41-62 in Navy archives. However, OPORD 41-62 probably would
not have specified a distance as great as 800 nautical miles
from Cuba, which would have put the blockade ships in the
mid-Atlantic. That would have greatly complicated Navy
logistics, particularly refueling the ships, and required a
greater number of ships to cover a larger ocean area.
Furthermore, the OPORD actually used for the quarantine
(OPORD 45-62) was derived from OPORD 41-62 and specified
only a 500 nautical mile distance, which suggests that OPORD
41-62 originally specified the same distance.
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The third possibility is that the President talked to
McNamara about moving the quarantine line in from 500
nautical miles to 300 nautical miles, but then was persuaded
to leave it at 500 nautical miles. However, there are
grounds for suspecting that Robert Kennedy was wrong when he
stated that the President gave an order to move the quaran-
tine line in. Given that he erred on the distance of the
quarantine line, Robert Kennedy also may not have understood
exactly what the President wanted done with the quarantine
line. Robert Kennedy made similar errors concerning other
274
orders the President allegedly gave. The President may
not have given McNamara an order, but rather a suggestion
that the quarantine line be moved in or a request that
275McNamara investigate the feasibility of moving it in.
274Robert Kennedy erroneously claims elsewhere in his
memoir of the crisis that the President gave an order when
he had not. Robert Kennedy states that the President gave
an order for the Jupiter missiles in Turkey to be removed.
See Robert Kennedy, pp. 94-95. In fact, however, the
President had only directed that the issue be studied. See
The White House, Office of the Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, National Security Action
Memorandum No. 181, August 23, 1962 (Declassified 1978.
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA, National Security
Files, Box 338, "Cuba (4). 8/23/64" folder). Also see
Donald L. Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics and 'Those Frigging
Missiles': JFK, Cuba and U.S. Missiles in Turkey," Orbis 21
(Summer 1977) : 307-33; Barton J. Bernstein,. "The Cuban
Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" Political
Science Quarterly 95 (Spring 1980): 102-104. There are thus
grounds for suspecting that Robert Kennedy misinterpreted a
Presidential request or suggestion as an order.
275Vice Admiral Houser suggested this to the author.
Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988.
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Furthermore, Admiral Anderson states that he did not attempt
to persuade McNamara or the President to leave the quaran-
276
tine line at 500 nautical miles. Thus, whatever the
President passed to McNamara probably was not an order to
move the quarantine line closer to Cuba. The President
probably requested that McNamara find some way of delaying
the initial boardings of Soviet ships
—
perhaps suggesting
that moving the quarantine line as a way of doing it.
This raises the fourth possible explanation:
President Kennedy did not specifically order the quarantine
line moved in, but directed McNamara to delay the initial
boardings of Soviet ships and suggested that moving the
quarantine line closer to Cuba would be a means of achieving
that objective. McNamara consulted with the CNO, who
recommended that the quarantine line be left at 500 nautical
miles until the extent of the threat from cuban aircraft
277
could be determined. McNamara concurred with this
recommendation, specifying that no Soviet bloc ships were to
be boarded until they reached the 500 nautical mile arc, and
the Pesident approved this plan. This is the most likely
explanation for what transpired the evening of October 23.
276Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988.
277Admiral Dennison states that the quarantine line
was moved closer to Cuba after it was determined that there
was little threat from cuban planes. See Dennison,
"Reminiscences," pp. 424-26. Also see "CINCLANT Historical
Account," p. 104; anerson, "Reminiscences," p. 546.
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The key to this explanation is that the ships on the
quarantine line were authorized to intercept Soviet ships
outside the 500 mile arc on which their stations were
established. Initially, that was the only significance of
the 500 nautical mile arc: it imposed no restriciton
278
whatsoever on the movements of the quarantine ships.
Scott D. Sagan suggests that the President was aware that
Admiral Ward had authority to intercept ships outside the
500 nautical mile arc. Sagan concludes that "The result of
Kennedy's order thus appears to have been only to ensure
that the quarantine line was set at the point where it had
279
originally been planned. " Sagan is correct that Admiral
Ward originally was not restricted to intercepting ships
when they reached the 500 nautical mile arc. CINCLANTFLT
OPORD 45-62 and COMSECONDFLT OPORD 1-62 did not specify the
range at which ships were to be intercepted. Admiral
Dennison states that "the line wasn't necessarily static.
We didn't just sit there. We knew where these ships were
277Dennison, "Reminiscences," pp. 424-25. Also see
"CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 104; Anderson,
"Reminiscences," p. 546.
278 In his October 22 background briefing, McNamara
stated that there was not a boundary line drawn where the
Navy would start patrolling in the Atlantic, which suggests
that intercepts could occur outside the quarantine line.
McNamara, "Background Briefing on the Cuban Situation," p.
19.
279Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis




and went out to intercept them." Thus, President Kennedy
had reason to belive that Soviet ships might be boarded well
beyond the 500 nautical mile arc. This probably would have
happended if he had not directed McNamara to delay the first
boardings.
The one modification that must be made to Sagan's
interpretation is to draw a distinction intercept and
boarding. To the Navy, intercepting the Soviet ships meant
coming close enough to positively identify them visually
(depending on weather conditions, that could be anywhere
from one to five miles) , then trailing them visually or on
radar (radar trailing kept the U.S. ship discretely out of
sight over the horizon) . When so specified by COMSECONDFLT,
intercept also included hailing the Soviet ship and asking
its cargo and destination. The key point is that intercept
did not mean boarding. This was probably unclear to the
President when he called McNamara the evening of October
23. McNamara appeara_not_tQjiav^ issued, an order not to
281intercept Soviet ships outside the 500 nautical mile arc.
The orders that probably were given allowed Soviet
ships to be intercepted and trailed outside quarantine line,
280Dennison, "Reminiscences,** p. 426. Sorenson notes
that **The Navy was eager to go far out into the ocean to
intercept the key Soviet ships." Sorenson, p. 710.
281Admiral Anderson states no such order was given.
Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988. None of




but specified that Soviet ships were not to be stopped and
boarded until they reached the 500 nautical mile arc. If
this had been Admiral Ward's intention to begin with, no
further orders would have been required. This explanation
supports Sagan's interpretation of the overall effect of the
President's October 23 order. It also complements the
previous explanation— that the President approved a CNO
recommendation not to move the quarantine line in until the
Cuban air threat could be assessed. Given the President's
concern with avoiding incidents with Soviet and Cuban
forces, he was probably responsive to arguments for keeping
the quarantine ships away from Cuba. Thus, the President
may well have suggested to McNamara that the quarantine line
be moved closer to Cuba, but then agreed that it would be
better simply to not stop and board ships outside the 500
nautical mile arc. This met the President's objective of
providing Khrushchev more time to react and the CNO's
objective of keeping the quarantine ships beyond the range
of Cuban planes.
The Navy had mounted intensive surveillance of Soviet
bloc shipping to Cuba since early August. When the
•President announced the quarantine on October 22, the Navy
already had a complete list of the Soviet bloc ships en
route to Cuba, including those suspected of carrying
offensive missiles. The Soviet bloc ships were being
tracked by the Navy's Univac Sea Surveillance Computer
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System, which projected their positions based on their last
known course and speed. On October 23 there were t enty-f ive
Soviet and two other Soviet bloc ships en route to Cuba,
including nineteen Soviet freighters (dry cargo ships) and
six Soviet tankers. Of the nineteen Soviet freighters,
three ( Okhotsk , Orenburg , and Poltava ) were large hatch
ships suspected of carrying offensive missiles, two were
carrying suspected missiles or missile-related equipment on
deck, and eleven others were suspected of carrying other
military equipment (for a total of sixteen freighters
suspected of carrying military cargoes) . Additionally,
there were eighteen Soviet bloc ships^ in CubajL-por-ts,, when
*
'
^" 282the quarantine was announced.
282Of the nineteen Soviet freighters en route to Cuba
when the quarantine was announced, all sixteen suspected of
carrying military cargoes turned back, and the other three
proceeded on to Cuba. The Soviet freighter Leninsky
Komsomol , carrying IL-28 bombers, arrived in Cuba October
24. It was one of the two Soviet ships, along with the
tanker Vinnitsa , that was well inside the quarantine line
when it went into effect. The Soviet freighter Belovodsk
stopped, transferred probable military cargo at night to a
ship returning to the Soviet Union, then proceeded on to
Cuba. The Soviet freighter Emelyan Puqachev , in the Pacific
when the quarantine was announced, was boarded and searched
by a U.S. Navy officer as it transited the Panama Canal on
November 3 and allowed to proceeded to Cuba. This was not a
quarantine inspection per se , but the standard inspection of
all Soviet ships that transit the canal. CIA, Memorandum,
"Soviet Bloc Shipping To Cuba," October 23, 1962, p. 1
(Declassified. National Security Archive, Washington, DC,
Cuban Missile Crisis file) ; CIA, Memorandum, "The Crisis
USSR/Cuba," October 24, 1962, pp. II-l, II-2 (Declassified.
National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban Missile
Crisis file); CIA, "Crisis USSR/Cuba," October 25, 1962, p.




U.S. Navy ships on the quarantine line were at the
highest condition of readiness they could sustain for an
extended period, with at least half of their crews at battle
stations and weapons manned and ready. Navy patrol planes
searching for Soviet ships were armed with five-inch rockets
and ASW torpedoes. Although CINCLANT had made an effort to
provide Russian language interpreters for all the ships on
283
the quarantine line, not every ship had one. As dawn
broke on Wednesday morning, October 24, the Navy ships moved
into position to halt the flow of offensive arms to Cuba.
The basic operational procedures for the quarantine
were specified in CINCLANTFLT OPORD 45-62. The following
excerpts from OPORD 45-62 were the central guidance for
intercept and boarding of ships:
of 0600," October 26, 1962, pp. 1-1 , II-l (Declassified.
National Security Archive, Washington, DC, Cuban Missile
Crisis file); "CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 12; Ward,
"Diary," p. 9.
283On the readiness of the ships, see Ward,
"Reminiscences," p. 198. On patrol plane weapons, see
Captain Sidney Edelman, Commanding Officer of VP-24, letter
to author, March 25, 1988. Two Commanding Officers of ships
on the quarantine line stated they did not have interpreters-
embarked. Dickey, letter to author, April 20, 1988; Foust, .
letter to author, March 10, 1988. The Commanding Officer of
USS Canberra (CAG 2) stated that seven Russian interpreters
reported aboard his ship on October 22 for distribution to
the rest of the quarantine force. Captain Robert K. Irvine,
letter to author, April 6, 1988. Since Canberra was the
only ship in the quarantine force with helicopters for
transferring personnel (other than USS Essex , at sea off
Guantanamo) , there is reason to believe that these seven
interpreters were the only ones available for the nineteen
ships that could have been tasked to board a Soviet ship the




All ships, including combatant, surface and sub-
surface, Soviet and non-Soviet, designated by
CINCLANTFLT on [the] basis of available information
will be intercepted. Ships not so designated are not
to be interfered with. If CINCLANTFLT believes the
intercepted ship may be carrying prohibited material
to Cuba, CINCLANTFLT will order a visit and search to
be made to verify the belief. . • .
Ships which after being intercepted signal their
intention to proceed to non-Cuban ports may be
released without visit or search. The Commander of
the intercepting ship may prescribe courses for the
intercepted ship to follow. Surveillance will be
maintained over such intercepted ships. Any^sliTp
which fails to proceed as elected or directed, or
which attempts to proceed to a Cuban port, j*ill be
stopped and boarded. If a satisfactory explanation is
fioT forthcoming , the ship will be diverted to Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, or to a port designated by
CINCLANTFLT.
Any ship which is determined by the Commander of
the intercepting ship to be carrying no prohibited
material shall be permitted to proceed to Cuba.
Visit and search of a stopped ship shall consist
of examining the manifest and inspecting the cargo.
In the event visit is refused, the ship may be taken
into custody. A boarding party shall be placed on
board. Forceful boarding and control of the ship's
operation may be necessary. If boarding meets with
organized resistance, the ship will be destroyed.
Ships believed to be carrying prohibited mater-
ial shall be directed to proceed to such non-Cuban
port as her owners or master may elect. The commander
of the intercepting ship may designate courses to be
followed. Surveillance shall be maintained over the
intercepted ships. Any ship which fails to proceed to
•a non-Cuban port will be handled IAW para 2 above.
If a ship is visited but search is refused, the
Commander of the intercepting ship will take the
intercepted ship into custody if he has reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it is carrying prohibited
material. It
g
will be diverted to a U.S. port for
disposition.
284CINCLANTFLT 231710Z OCT 62.
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The first Soviet ships were to be stopped and boarded
as soon as the quarantine went into effect at 10:00 a.m.
Wednesday, October 24. USS Essex was assigned to stop and
board Gagarin , a suspected arms carrier. USS Newport Mews
and her escorts were assigned to intercept Poltava , a large
hatch ship suspected of carrying missiles. Kimovsk , another
suspected arms carrier, was also targeted for intercept and
boarding. CINCLANT had recommended, and the White House had
approved, that these ships be boarded because they would be
the first suspected arms carriers to reach the quarantine
line. But the three Soviet ships did not reach the
quarantine line at their estimated arrival times and as of
285
early afternoon none of them had been intercepted.
As of Tuesday, October 23, nine Soviet merchant ships
had been close enough to the quarantine line that they might
*
"-CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 105; Ward,
"Diary," pp. 10-11; Christiansen, interview by author,
February 3, 1988. Robert Kennedy's account of the situation
at sea that Wednesday morning is erroneous. See Robert
Kennedy, p. 69. There was no Soviet ship named Komiles , he
is probably referring to Kimovsk . Rear Admiral Christiansen
has stated USS Essex was not informed of or tasked to
prosecute any Soviet submarines in the vicinity of Gagarin .
Interest-ingly, the quarantine ships were told when to stop
and board the Soviet ships (at 10:00 A.M.), not where to
stop and board them (at the 500 nautical mile arc) . The
President apparently knew that the first Soviet ships were
to be boarded as soon as the quarantine went into effect
Wednesday morning—he had, in fact, personally authorized
the initial boardings. Presumably, Navy calculations showed
that Kimovsk and Gagarin would reach the 500 nautical mile
arc by 10:00 A.M. Wednesday. However, this cannot be proven




have been stopped and boarded the first day of the quaran-
tine. By Wednesday morning, however, all of the Soviet
hips en route to Cuba, including tankers and freighters
carrying non-military cargoes, had already either stopped or
turned back. Moscow had HF radio links with its merchant
fleet and used them to control the ships en route to Cuba.
There appears to have been a pattern to the movements of the
Soviet ships. All of the freighters that the U.S. suspected
of carrying weapons or equipment on the prohibited list were
ordered to immediately reverse course and return to the
Soviet Union. According to the October 25 daily CIA report,
"The course changes of those ships which have turned back
were executed around noon EDT [Eastern Daylight Time] on 23
October. . . . The ships turned around well before President
Kennedy signed the proclamation establishing a quarantine
286
zone around Cuba." The Soviets had thus made a decision
not to challenge the quarantine even while publicly
declaring their refusal to recognize it. Soviet ships
286CIA, "Crisis USSR/Cuba, " October 25, 1962, p.
II-l. The Welch and Blight interpretation of the Soviet
decision not to challenge the quarantine is misleading in
this regard. They claim that it was U.N. Secretary General
U Thant's October 25 public request that Khrushchev keep his
ships clear of the quarantine area that provided the Soviet
leader with "a face-saving way of ordering his ships to stop
short of the quarantine line." Welch and Blight, p. 9. It
is clear, however, that by October 23— two days before U
Thant's request—Khrushchev had already ordered his ships
not to enter the quarantine zone. Thus, what U Thant's
request provided was a face-saving way for Khrushchev to
publicly acknowledge that he would not challenge the
quarantine—not an insignificant contribution.
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suspected of carrying military cargo other than offensive
weapons initially halted, apparently awaiting further
instructions, then turned back as Moscow decided not to let
any military cargo be inspected by the Americans. Soviet
ships carrying non-military cargo, including tankers,
initially halted—some of them sitting motionless for two
287days— then proceeded on to Cuba. This delay resulted in
no Soviet ships passing through the quarantine line until
October 25.
Late Tuesday and early Wednesday the United States
began receiving indications that Soviet shipping to Cuba had
been ordered to halt. By mid-morning Wednesday the informa-
tion was solid enough to pass on to the President. He
received the report at about 10:00 a.m. during an EXCOMM
meeting. Initial estimates of how many Soviet ships had
halted or turned back varied widely. During the day Navy
and Air Force reconnaissance planes were able to verify that
the Soviet ships had halted or turned back. By midafternoon
the President could clearly see that Khrushchev was not
288going to challenge the quarantine.
287Admiral Dennison observed that w this demonstrates
pretty good control by the Soviets, that they could get
through to these merchant ships and with not very much time
elapsed either." Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 427.
288
-October 24 Morning EXCOMM Meeting Record of
Action," p. 1; CIA, "Crisis USSR/Cuba," October 25, 1962, p.




When the President received the initial report that
the Soviet ships appeared to have halted, he ordered that no
Soviet ships were to be boarded for at least an hour while
289further information on their movements was collected.
Later, when it was confirmed that the Soviet ships had
halted or turned back, the order went out to the quarantine
force: "Do not stop and board. Keep under surveillance.
290
Make continuous reports." This marked a significant
change in the manner the White House controlled the
quarantine. Prior to midday Wednesday, the President had
approved a list of ships to be boarded, specified when the
boardings would commence (10:00 a.m. Wednesday), and waited
for the boardings to take place. From midday Wednesday
onward, the White House closely controlled which ships were
to be stopped and boarded. Lengthy discussions were held on
the merits and dangers of boarding every Soviet bloc ship
that approached the quarantine line. Navy commanders were
not permitted to order a ship of any nationality boarded on
291their own authority.
289
"October 24 Morning EXCOMM Meeting Record of
Action," p. 1.
290Ward, "Diary," p. 11. Also see Anderson, "Cuban
Crisis," p. 84; Robert Kennedy, pp. 71-72.
291Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 426; Ward,
"Reminiscences," p. 200; Christiansen, interview by author,
February 3, 1988; Wissman, letter to author, March 4, 1988;
Irvine, letter to author, April 6, 1988; Foust, letter to




A misconception has arisen in the literature on the
Cuban Missile Crisis concerning the manner in which the
quarantine was controlled. Allison, for example, claims
that the White House circumvented the chain of command and
that "local commanders received repeated orders about the
details of their military operations directly from political
292leaders." This greatly exaggerates the degree of control
exercised by the White House.
Neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense
ever gave orders directly to Navy commanders at sea.
Presidential orders were relayed via McNamara to General
Taylor or Admiral Anderson, then from the CNO to CINCLANT,
and finally from CINCLANT (in his guise as CINCLANTFLT) to
293Admiral Ward. The White House closely monitored
quarantine operations on the HF/SSB radios in the Situation
Room, but never used those radios to give orders directly to
ships at sea. None of the quarantine force participants
contacted by the author, including the Commanding Officers
of the two destroyers that boarded Marucla , could recall
hearing the President, Secretary of Defense, or CNO on the
HF/SSB radio circuit. The only transmissions from the White
292Allison, p. 128. Also see Sorenson, p. 708.
293Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988;
Anderson, "Reminiscences, " p. 550; General Taylor, Oral
History Transcript, p. 8; Chew, "Reminiscences," pp. 316-17;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 421.
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House to ships at sea appear to have been requests for
294
amplifying information.
The only aspect of quarantine operations controlled
directly by the President was the decision as to which ships
were to be stopped and boarded. Admiral Dennison and Vice
Admiral Ward controlled the intercept and trailing of Soviet
bloc ships and all routine movements of the quarantine
force. Commanding Officers of quarantine force ships report
that their operations were not closely controlled and that
they had adequate authority to operate their ships as they
felt best. Captain Irvine, Commanding Officer of USS
Canberra , states that detailed control by Washington was
only exercised when "contact occurred (or would be likely to
occur) between U.S. and Soviet units (military or
295
merchant). " Thus, contrary to Allison's assertion, the
294Dennison, "Reminiscences, " p. 421; Captain William
R. Kunnicutt, Jr., Commander Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Six
(embarked in USS Dewey on the quarantine line) , letter to
author, June 1, 1988; Christiansen, interview by author,
February 3, 1988; Wissraan, letter to author, March 4, 1988;
Irvine, letter to author, April 6, 1988; Foust, letter to
author, March 10, 1988; Dickey, letter to author, April 20,
1988; Mikhalevsky, letter to author, March 23, 1988.
295Irvine, letter to author, April 6, 1988. Also,
Ward, "Diary," pp. 11-12; Foust, letter to author, March 10,
1988; Dickey, letter to author, April 20, 1988; Mikhalevsky,
letter to author, March 23, 1988. Captain Edelman,
Commanding Officer of VP-24, a Navy patrol plane squadron,
states that he had adequate authority to conduct ocean
surveillance operations as he saw fit. Edelman, letter to
author, March 25, 1988.
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White House only controlled specific aspects of the
quarantine operation and exercised that control through the
chain of command.
Although the President personally controlled which
ships would be boarded, neither he nor his advisors con-
trolled how the boardings were to be conducted. CINCLANTFLT
specified that the boarding procedures contained in the Navy
publication Law of Naval Warfare (NWIP 10-2) would be
296
used. " OPORD 45-62 stated the following: "Procedures to
be followed in the case of visit and search will be similar
to those prescribed in Section 502(B) of NWIP 10-2 except
that unless specifically authorized, Subsection 8 of Section
502(B) will not be applicable and log entries will not state
that prize procedures have been invoked or are being
296Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval
Warfare Information Publication 10-2 (NWIP 10-2) , Law of
Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, 1959). This would have been the publication
that Admiral Anderson was trying to show McNamara during
their infamous encounter in Flag Plot the evening of October
24. See Anderson, "Reminiscences," p. 559. Accounts that
have the CNO waving the "Manual of Naval Regulations" are
nonsensical. See Allison, p. 134; Abel, p. 156. United
States Navy Regulations, 1948 contained no guidance at all
on blockades, and mentions quarantines only in the sense
U.S. navy ships complying with routine customs or medical
quarantine. The interesting point about the October 23
McNamara-Anderson argument is that it was not over sub-
stantial policy issues. The two men were at odds primarily
because each felt he was being treated contemptuously by the
other. Their argument reveals very little about how
organizations carry out Presidential orders, but much about




followed.** The subsection deleted by CINCPACFLT concerns
procedures applicable only in wartime, which is when a
blockade—an act of war under international law—normally
would have been imposed. The Quarantine Force thus used
standard Navy boarding procedures, modified for peacetime
application, rather than special procedures drafted in the
White House.
The boarding of the Soviet-chartered Lebanese
freighter Marucla on October 26 shows how boarding
operations were conducted. The decision to board Marucla
was made by the President and passed down the chain of
command to Admiral Ward, who ordered USS John R. Pierce and
USS Joseph P. Kennedy to "Stop and board [at] first light
298tomorrow." Captain Mikhalevsky confirmed that the the
visit and search procedure used was that contained in NWIP
10-2. USS John R. Pierce provided real-time reports on the
progress of the boarding to Admiral Ward and CINCLANT on the
HF/SSB voice radio net, which was also being monitored in
Flag Plot and the White House Situation Room. Captain Foust
states he received no guidance from higher authority on how
to conduct the boarding while it was in progress. Admiral
297CINCLANTFLT 231710Z OCT 62.
CTF 136 260212Z OCT 62, naval message, October 26,





Ward and CINCLANT occasionally asked questions over the
HF/SSB voice radio net, but Flag Plot and the Situation Room
299
were silent. Thus, although the boarding of Marucla was
closely monitored by the chain of command, the on-scene
commanders were allowed to conduct it at their discretion in
accordance with Navy standing orders (NWIP 10-2) and the
mission orders for the quarantine (CINCLANTFLT OPORD 45-62)
.
The remainder of the operations conducted during the
quarantine were uneventful. Several ships were intercepted
and trailed, but no other ships were stopped and boarded at
sea. When Khrushchev on October 28 agreed to remove Soviet
offensive missiles from Cuba, the President suspended the
boarding of Soviet ships. Accordingly, CINCLANTFLT sent the
following order that day:
Direct no rpt [repeat] no forceful action against any
shipping including boarding until further orders. All
challenges will be made by visual means (blinking
light, etc.). If any difficulties encountered report
to me immediately info [notify for information pur-
poses] JCS/CNO prior [to] taking any further action.
Acknowledge . 300
On October 30, after it was determined that there was
little threat of Cuban air attack, the quarantine line was
moved closer to Cuba. The new line, code named "Chestnut,"
299
Mikhalevsky, letter to author, March 23, 1988;
Foust, letter to author, March 10, 1988.
300CINCLANTFLT 281702Z OCT 62, naval message, October
26, 1962 (Declassified 1986, Operational Archives, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, DC).
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was located just outside the Bahamas Island Chain, about 280
nautical miles from Cuba at its closest point. The Chestnut
line contained eight stations clustered at the sealanes
through and around the Bahamas. It required ten destroyers,
one cruiser, and a HUK Group (compared with 16 destroyers,
two cruisers, and a HUK Group for the Walnut line). Ships
were frequently detached from the Chestnut line to trail
Soviet ships removing missiles from Cuba, but the line
remained in effect until the quarantine was lifted on
November 21.
Although the boarding of Soviet bloc ships en route to
Cuba had been suspended, intercept and trailing continued in
November. CINCLANTFLT used the code name "Scotch Tape" to
designate high-interest Soviet bloc shipping. The most
important operation was the inspection of Soviet ships
removing MRBMs from Cuba. The United States had insisted
upon inspections to verify removal of the missiles, but
Castro refused to allow inspections on Cuban soil. A
compromise was reached on November 7 when the United States
agreed to inspect the missiles on the decks of Soviet
ships. The Soviet Government provided a list of the ships
that would be carrying the missiles, the number of missiles
301Ward, "Diary,- p. 15; "CINCLANT Historical
Account," p. 104; "CNO Historical Narrative," pp. 83-84;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," pp. 424-25. Also see Johns,
"Naval Quarantine," pp. 116-18.
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each would carry, and the course that they would all take
from Cuba out into the Atlantic. However, the Soviet ships
did not adhere to this plan— taking different courses and
not carrying the designated number of missiles—requiring an
intensive Navy search effort to locate them and count the
missiles. The nine Soviet ships carrying the missiles from
Cuba were inspected between November 8 and 11, and all 42
missiles known to be in Cuba were counted. Finally, in
early December Navy ships and planes verified the removal of
Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba, counting all 42 bombers on
302the decks of three Soviet ships.
There were no incidents between Quarantine Force ships
or planes and Soviet merchant ships. Relations at sea
between the superpowers were proper—Soviet and American
ship captains behaved as professional seamen—and usually
amicable. Gifts were exchanged at least once. Some Soviet
ship captains were reluctant to comply with the procedures
for the MRBM inspections, but they all complied eventually.
The Soviets twice filed protests against Navy actions: a
Navy patrol plane's search light alarmed a Soviet captain
302
* *"CN0 Historical Narrative," pp. 100-103, 107-13,
137-40; "DOD Operations," pp. 5-6; "CINCLANT Historical
Account," pp. 105-108; Dennison, "Reminiscences," pp. 427-
430; Ward "Diary," pp. 18-19; National Indications Center,
pp. 96-99; USS Vesole (DDR 878), Ship's History for 1962
(Ship's History Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC); "Navy Intercepts 5 Soviet Vessels in Missile Check,"
New York Times . November 10, 1962, p. 1.
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who thought he was he under attack, and the USS BXandy (DD
943) was accused of threatening the Soviet ship Dvinoqorsk
while inspecting the MRBMs on its deck. Thus, despite
the intense level of interaction between U.S. Navy and
Soviet ships, there were no incidents that had an impact on
the President's ability to manage the crisis.
The second area of operations in which tactical-level
interactions occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis was
U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare operations against Soviet
submarines. Senior Navy officers would later stress the
scope and intensity of the ASW operations conducted during
the crisis. Admiral Anderson stated that "The presence of
Russian submarines in Caribbean and Atlantic waters provided
perhaps the first opportunity since World War II for our
anti-submarine warfare forces to exercise at their trade, to
perfect their skills, and to manifest their capability to
304detect and follow submarines of another nation. " This
303nCINCLANT Historical Narrative," pp. 108-9;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," pp. 428-30; Ward, "Sea Power in
the Cuban Crisis," pp. 3-4; Ward, "Reminiscences," pp. 197-
98. The' Navy investigated the charges against USS Blandy
and concluded that the ship had not made any threats. It is
possible, however, that if USS Blandy had its weapons
manned, it could have upset the Soviet captain.
304
"Admiral Confirms U.S. Navy Detected and Trailed
Soviet Submarines," New York Times , November 10, 1962, p. 1;
Abel, p. 155. Also see Admiral Anderson's testimony in
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964 , pp. 256-57;




suggests the enthusiasm with which the Navy approached its
ASW mission during the crisis.
The Navy began detecting signs of increased Soviet
submarine activity in the Atlantic as early as October 13
and began increasing the readiness of its ASW forces
accordingly. On October 17 the Soviet submarine replenish-
ment ship Terek was spotted in the North Atlantic headed
southwest. Terek was placed under daily surveillance by
Navy patrol planes. On October 22 a Soviet Zulu-class
diesel-electric attack submarine (armed with only with
torpedoes, no missiles), designated contact B-28 in the Navy
ASW tracking system, was photographed on the surface
refueling from Terek near the Azores. This Zulu submarine
was at the end of its patrol and returned to the Soviet
Union after refueling, thus playing no role in the crisis.
On October 24 CINCLANTFLT advised Admiral Ward that at least
three known Soviet submarines were operating in the Atlantic
305
and could reach the quarantine zone in a few days. Thus,
at the time the quarantine went into effect, there were no
positive Soviet submarine contacts and no Soviet submarines
were actively being prosecuted, but there were indications
that three Soviet submarines were approaching the quarantine
line.
305hCINCLANT Historical Account, n pp. 10, 120-22;
Ward, "Diary," p. 11; Dennison, p. 434.
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The Navy conducted intensive ASW operations during the
crisis. The principle ASW forces were Task Force 81 and
Task Force 83 , both under the command of Vice Admiral Edmund
B. Ttylor, Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Atlantic
(COMASWFORLANT) . Task Force 81 consisted of twelve land-
based patrol plane squadrons, about 140 aircraft (P2Vs,
P5Ms, and P3Vs) . Task Force 83 consisted of four ASW HUK
Groups (one of which was assigned to TF 136 at all times)
and approximately 24 destroyers and destroyer escorts in
Atlantic and Caribbean picket stations. On October 24
seventeen ASW patrol planes and ten submarines were tasked
to establish the "Argentia Sub-Air Barrier'* in the North
Altantic. This ASW barrier, which went into effect October
27 on a southeasterly bearing from Argentia, Newfoundland,
remained in operation through November 13. No Soviet sub-
marines were detected attempting to penetrate the barrier.
Ships and aircraft of TF 136 (the Quarantine Force) and TF
135 (the Attack Carrier Force) , Royal Canadian Navy ships
and aircraft, and Air Force reconnaissance aircraft also
participated in ASW operations during the crisis.
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 120-25, 134?
Anderson, "Cuban Crisis," p. 85; "DOD Operations," p. 12.
For a description of HUK Group ASW operations in 1962, see
Barrett Gallagher, "Searching for Subs in the Atlantic,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 88 (July 1962): 98-113.
The Navy also considered activating the Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom (GIUK Gap) ASW Barrier, but did not do so.
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 121-22, 132.

646
The Navy located and trailed five confirmed Soviet
submarines, all identified as Foxtrot-class diesel-electric
attack submarines, during the crisis. Information on these
five contacts is summarized in Table 4. This number
Table 4
Confirmed Soviet Submarines
Contact Submarine Time of First General
Number Class Postive Contact Location
C-18 Foxtrot 3:29 p.m. 24 Oct Atlantic
C-19 Foxtrot 6:11 p.m. 25 Oct Atlantic
C-20/26 Foxtrot 6:48 a.m. 26 Oct Atlantic
C-21 Foxtrot 5:05 p.m. 26 Oct Caribbean
C-23 Foxtrot 3:08 p.m. 26 Oct Caribbean
Source: Johns, "Naval Quarantine, H p. 147; "CINCLANT
Historical Account," pp. 120-25.
excludes the Zulu-class submarine sighted in the Atlantic on
October 22, which did not play a role in the crisis. For a
contact to be evaluated as confirmed, it either had to. be
photographed or sighted by several observers well-trained in
submarine recognition. About 13 to 20 additional contacts,
depending on who is making the judgement, were considered to
be "probable" Soviet submarines, but could not meet the
strict visual identification criteria to be confirmed {even
307though several of them were "sighted"). For the Soviets
307Christiansen, interview by author, February 3,
1988; Admiral Anderson's testimony in Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1964 , p. 256.
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to have had a total of 18 to 24 submarines in the Caribbean
and Western Atlantic would have been an incredible and
extremely unlikely feat. All but one or two of the probable
contacts can be dismissed as additional detections of the
confirmed submarines or very realistic false contacts. Only
308
the five confirmed contacts will be discussed further.
President Kennedy and his advisors were concerned
about Soviet submarines from their first meetings after
Soviet offensive missiles were discovered in Cuba. They
appear to have had three concerns. First, they were
concerned that submarines would be used to bring nuclear
warheads into Cuba for the Soviet missiles. President
Kennedy raised this issue during the October 16 morning
meeting with his advisors. That afternoon Robert Kennedy
308 Past confusion over the number of confirmed .Soviet
submarine contacts detected during the crisis can now be
cleared up. As can be seen in Table 4, one of the Soviet
•submarines originally had two contact designations, C-20 and
C-26, and during the crisis was believed to be two different
submarines. This gives a total of six confirmed contacts.
Por sources that state there were six Soviet submarines, see
"CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 11; Abel, p. 155; Robert
Kennedy, p. 77; Anderson, "Cuban Crisis," p. 85; and
Dennison, "Reminiscences, " p. 435. After almost a year of
careful analysis, the Navy's ASW experts determined that
C-20 and C-26 were the same submarine. During the crisis
not all of these contacts were accepted as confirmed. One
of them, C-21, was never photographed, and originally was
classified as only being a "possible" Soviet submarine. For
sources that state there were five Soviet submarines, see
"DOD Operations," pp. 4-5; Ward, "Diary," p. 12. After the
crisis contact C-21 was upgraded to confirmed. The best




cautioned that the United States might be forced to sink
Soviet submarines to maintain a blockade of Cuba. The CIA
estimate prepared October 20 also warned that submarines
309
could bring nuclear warheads into Cuba. The second
concern was that the Soviets would establish a submarine
base in Cuba. There had been concerns about this well
before the crisis, particularly that a fishing port being
built by the Soviets at Mariel would be used as a submarine
base. This was a major concern for the CNO. Admiral
Anderson states in his oral history that "I had taken a
particular determination that we were not going to let any
Soviet submarines get in and start operating out of bases in
Cuba." The third concern was that Soviet submarines
would attack Quarantine Force ships or ships standing by for
air strikes and invasion of Cuba. Khrushchev exacerbated
these concerns on October 24 when he warned American
businessman William Knox that Soviet submarines would sink
any American ship that forced a Soviet ship to stop. This
was not just a Navy concern, the President and McNamara were
309
"October 16 Morning Meeting Transcript, pp. 13-14;
"October 16 Evening Meeting Transcript," p. 25; SNIE 11-19-
62, p. 2.
Anderson, "Reminiscences, H p. 557. Admiral Anderson
reiterated this point to the author. Anderson, interview by
author, January 25, 1988. Also see "CINCLANT Historical
Account," p. 11; Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 434; Hilsroan,
p. 166; Carthoff, Reflections , pp. 75-77.
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also concerned about the Soviet submarine threat. Thus,
the President and his advisors had several concerns related
to Soviet submarines, concerns which were raised from
October 16 onward.
In response to concerns that Soviet submarines would
bring nuclear warheads into Cuba and that they would start
operating out of Cuban bases, the Kennedy Administration
included Soviet submarines in the quarantine. Although the
President did not state this explicitly in his October 22
speech, he did state that the quarantine covered "all ships
of any kind" and would be extended, if needed, to other
types of carriers—implying aircraft and submarines.
Similarly, the Quarantine Proclamation signed by the
President October 23 stated that "any vessel or craft" could
be stopped and searched. 312 CINCLANTFLT OPORD 45-62, which
was based on JCS guidance reviewed by the President and
approved by McNamara, explicitly included submarines in the
quarantine. CINCLANTFLT directed that "All ships, including
On Khrushchev's threat, see William E. Knox, "Close-
up of Khrushchev During a Crisis," New York Times Magazine ,
November 18, 1962, p. 3; Hilsman, p. 214; Sorenson, p. 710;
Abel p. 151. Concerns of Task Force commanders were
expressed to the author in Rivero, letter to" author, March
10, 1988; Stroh, letter to author, February 18, 1988;
Hayward, letter to author, February 17, 1988. On the
President's concern, see Hilsman, p. 705; Robert Kennedy,
pp. 61-62, 70.
312
"The Soviet Threat to the Americas," Department of
State Bulletin 47 (November 12, 1962): 715-20.
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combatant, surface and sub-surface , Soviet and non-Soviet,
designated by CINCLANTFLT on [thel basis of available
information will be intercepted." Thus, Soviet
submarines were an explicit target of the quarantine, and
could be stopped and searched if proceeding to Cuba.
The greatest difficulty in enforcing a quarantine
against submarines is signalling them to surface for
identification and search. The CINCLANTFLT operation order
did not include specific signals for use with submarines,
but did include procedures if a ship or submarine failed to
stop after being signalled: "If these means fail, warning
shots shall be fired across the bow, or, in case of
314
submarines, equivalent warning action ." CINCLANTFLT did
not, however, state what constituted an equivalent warning
action for submarines.
The JCS, Secretary of Defense, and President had been
briefed on Navy ASW operations and procedures prior to the
315quarantine going into effect. During the evening EXCOMM
meeting on October 23, President Kennedy was briefed on
intelligence that Soviet submarines were moving toward the
Caribbean. In response, according to Robert Kennedy, "The
President ordered the Navy to give highest priority to
313CINCLANTFLT 231710Z OCT 62, emphasis added.
314
Ibid, emphasis added.
315Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988;
Griffin, letter to author, April 6, 1988.
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tracking the submarines and to put into effect the greatest
possible safety measures to protect out own aircraft
316
carriers and other vessels." An encounter between U.S.
Navy ASW forces and Soviet submarines was now almost
inevitable.
McNamara, knowing that the quarantine covered sub-
marines and that the President had just directed a maximum
ASW effort, was concerned that the lack of a standard means
of signalling Soviet submarines to surface could lead to
weapons unnecessarily being used against a Soviet sub-
marine. After the evening EXCOMM meeting on October 23, he
went to the CNO's office to discuss the problem. Admiral
Anderson was in a JCS meeting, but his Deputy for fleet
operations, Vice Admiral Griffin (one of three Admirals
deputized by the CNO to act in his absence during the
crisis), was available. McNamara asked Vice Admiral Griffin
how Navy ships could signal a Soviet submarine to surface.
McNamara knew from previous ASW briefings that this was not
a normal peacetime procedure for the Navy. Vice Admiral
Griffin consulted with the CINCLANTFLT staff on the problem
and together they devised a unique set of signals that could
317be used to signal Soviet submarines to surface. McNamara
immediately approved the special signals.
Robert Kennedy, pp. 61-62.
317
-CNO Historical Narrative," pp. 93-94; Griffin,
letter to author, April 6, 1988.
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The special "Submarine Surfacing and Identification
Procedures" were transmitted to the fleet over the Fleet
Radioteletype Broadcast five hours before the quarantine
318
went into effect on October 24. The next day they were
broadcast to the world, including the Soviet u>lon, in a
Notice to Mariners, the standard message used by all nations
to send warnings of navigation hazards:
Pursuant to Proclamation of the President of Oct 23rd,
1962 on the "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive
Weapons to Cuba" the Secretary of Defense has today
issued the following submarine surfacing and identifi-
cation procedures when in contact with U.S. quarantine
forces in the general vicinity of Cuba. U.S. forces
coming in contact with unidentified submerged
submarines will make the following signals to inform
the submarine that he may surface in order to identify
himself: Signals follow
—
quarantine forces will drop
4 or 5 harmless explosive sound signals which may be
accompanied by the international code signal "IDKCA"
meaning "rise to surface." This sonar signal is
normally made on underwater communications equipment
in the 8 kc frequency range. Procedure on receipt of
signal: Submerged submarines, on hearing this signal,
should surface on easterly course^-gSignals and
procedures employed are harmless.
318
COMCRUDESLANT 2409002 OCT 62, naval message,
October 24, 1962 (Unclassified. Operational Archives, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, DC)
.
319Naval Oceanographic Office, "Notice to Mariners No.
45-62, Special Warnings Nos. 30-33," Paragraphs 5980-5983,
October 24-25, 1962 (Naval Oceanographic Office, Washington,
DC) ; NAVOCEANO WASHDC 252124Z OCT 62, "Special Warning Nr
.
32, " naval message, October 25, 1962 (Unclassified. Opera-
tional Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC).
These special signals may have been provided to Moscow on
October 24, the day before the Notice to Mariners was
broadcast. See "DOD Operations," p. 5. These are the
signals described by Robert Kennedy, although he miscon-
strued how they were used. The sonar and explosive charge
signals could be used interchangeably, rather than sequen-
tially as described by Kennedy. See Robert Kennedy, p. 69.
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This signal is interesting for two reasons. First, these
procedures were not a normal part of peacetime Navy ASW
procedures, they were created specifically for the quaran-
tine of Cuba. The Navy had procedures for signaling
unidentified submerged submarines, but their only purpose
was to determine if a contact was a U.S. submarine.
McNamara thus tailored Navy ASW procedures to meet the
President's political objectives. Second, the signal
"IDKCA" did not come out of the International Code of
Signals used by sea-going vessels, which does not contain a
320
signal for submarines to surface. Soviet submarines
would have no idea what it meant unless their Government
informed them of it. The Soviet Union thus had to make a
deliberate decision whether or not to inform its submarines
of the signals.
To ensure that the Soviets understood the intent of
this Notice, a "Defense Department spokesman" told the press
that "should a submarine refuse to cooperate, it would be
subject to the same orders applied to other vessels, calling
for the 'minimum amount of force necessary* —sinking if
necessary—to require the vessel to permit itself to be
320See International Code of Signals , For Visual,
Sound and Radio Communications, Adopted by the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, United
States Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Hydrographic
Office, Publication No. 102, 1954). The code mentioned in
the Notice to Mariners is the international Morse code, vice




searched." This statement gives the essence of the
guidance provided by CINCLANTFLT to the Quarantine Force,
and is similar to other statements used to warn the Soviets
about key provisions in U.S. rules_of_eii£agement. The
statement was not a bluff: the President had in hand
contingency orders for the Navy to destroy Soviet submarines
322if they attempted to interfere with the quarantine.
Thus, by October 25 the Kennedy Administration had publicly
warned the Soviets that the quarantine applied to their
submarines as well as their merchant ships, and had tailored
U.S. Navy ASW procedures to support that policy.
There are indications—far from conclusive—that
President Kennedy may have used Navy ASW operations as an
additional means of demonstrating American resolve and
applying coercive pressure on the Soviets. Robert Kennedy
alludes to this, suggesting that the President "increased
the pressure" on Khrushchev by ordering the Navy to harass
323Soviet submarines. Admiral Anderson has made statements
that support Robert Kennedy. In 1973 he stated that ASW
operations were "of immense psychological significance to
emphasize to the USSR that any confrontation with the U.S.
321
"U.S. Sets Up a Warning System to Halt Submarines
off Cuba," New York Times , October 26, 1962, p. 18.
322Sorenson, p. 709; Weintal and Bartlett, p. 66.
323Robert Kennedy, p. 77. Also see George, "Cuban
Missile Crisis," pp. 112-13.
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was in an area where the U.S. had undoubted naval
324
supremacy. " In 1987 Admiral Anderson made a more
explicit reference to the issue: "It did not particularly
create any problems for the Navy that McNamara wanted to
send political signals with antisubmarine warfare
operations, carefully measured, with limitations on action
325
and diplomatic intentions." However, none of the other
participants in the crisis have reported deliberate use of
ASW as a political signal and there are no discussions of
326
this topic in available records of EXCOMM meetings.
Robert Kennedy's recollection must therefore be tempered
with the qualifications that political signalling was not
the primary purpose of the ASW operations and that ASW
operations were not among the primary means of signalling
the Soviets. Rather, ASW operations were used to reinforce
political signals being sent primarily by the quarantine,
Strategic Air Command alert, and invasion preparations.
ASW was not one of President Kennedy's top priorities
during the crisis. Available EXCOMM records do not reveal
Navy ASW operations to be a frequent topic of conversation
and Vice Admiral Houser indicates that ASW was primarily
324Anderson, "Cuban Crisis," p. 85.
325* A Anderson, "As I Recall," p. 45.
326Vice Admiral Houser and Rear Admiral Shepard state
that ASW was not used as a political signal. Houser, letter





regarded as a support operation for the quarantine. The
President and McNamara did not attempt to modify Navy ASW
procedures other than with the special surfacing signals.
Navy Officers that participated in ASW operations during the
crisis report that, other than the special signals, they
328
used normal peacetime ASW procedures. This was not a
327Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988.
328Twelve Navy Officers who trailed confirmed Soviet
submarines during the crisis stated that they used normal
peacetime ASW procedures {the contacts they prosecuted are
given in parentheses) : Christiansen (C-18 and C-19)
,
Commander of the Essex HUK Group, interview by author,
February 3, 1988; Wissman (C-18 and C-19), Operations
Officer for the Essex HUK Group, letter to author, March 4,
1988; Morrison (C-18 and C-19) , Commander of the destroyers
in the Essex HUK Group, interview by author, February 3,
1988; Captain William H. Morgan (C-19) , Commanding Officer
of USS Cony (DD 508), letter to author, April 7, 1988;
Captain Richard D. Faubion (C-19) , Commanding Officer of USS
Bache (DDR 470), letter to author, February 29, 1988;
Commander Stephen F. Durbin (C-19) , Commanding Officer of
USS Eaton (DD 510), letter to author, March 15, 1988;
Captain Charles P. Rozier (C-20/26) , Commanding Officer of
USS Charles P. Cecil (DDR 835) , interview by author, January
30, 1988; Dickey (C-20/26), Commanding Officer of USS Lawe
(DD 763), letter to author, April 20, 1988; Commander John
R. Riediger (C-21) , Commanding Officer of USS Basilone (DD
824), letter to author, April 11, 1988; Commander John M.
Dinwiddie (C-21) , Commanding Officer of USS Hank (DD 702)
,
letter to author, April 28, 1988; Edelman (C-21), Commanding
Officer of VP-24, letter to author, March 25, 1988;
Commander Charles H. Hayden (C-21) , Commanding Officer of
USS Charles H. Roan (DD 853), letter to author, May 10,
1988. Five other Navy Officers who participated in ASW
operations stated that they used normal peacetime ASW
procedures: Gayler, letter to author, March 22, 1988: Foust,
letter to author, March 10, 1988; Captain John L. Kent,
Commanding Officer of VS-24, letter to author, March 25,
1988; Captain William K. Doty, Commanding Officer of USS
Hawkins (DDR 973), letter to author, March 17, 1988; Captain
Robert H. Small, Commanding Officer of USS Abbot (DD 629),
letter to author, June 20, 1988.
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lapse on McNamara's part: the Navy's peacetime ASW proce-
dures were relatively safe. In fact, the special surfacing
signal was a more aggressive measure than Navy ships were
normally allowed to take in peacetime. The one other
difference from normal peacetime operations was that during
the crisis shore-based and carrier-based ASW aircraft
329
carried live MK-43 ASW homing torpedoes. This action was
consistent with the level of DEFCON in effect during the
crisis (DEFCON 3) and prevailing concerns over the Soviet
submarine threat. It is not known if the President ordered
ASW aircraft to carry live ASW ordnance, or even knew that
they were ioing so. Navy commanders had the authority to
take this action on their own initiative, so there was no
need for the President to have ordered it.
The White House did not attempt to exercise direct
control over ASW operations. Navy Officers that
participated in ASW operations during the crisis report that
they did not experience close high-level control of their
operations. On the other hand, because operational
329Christiansen, interview by author, February 3,
1988; Edelaan, letter to author, March 25, 1988.
330Christiansen, interview by author, February 3,
1988; Wissman, letter to author, March 4, 1988; Morgan,
letter to author, April 7, 1988; Faubion, letter to author,
February 29, 1988; Durbin, letter to author, March 15, 1988;
Rozier, interview by author, January 30, 1988; Dickey,
letter to author, April 20, 1988; Dinwiddie, April 28, 1988;
Hayden, letter to author, May 10, 1988; Gayler, letter to




reports were being made to CINCLANTFLT on the HF/SSB voice
net, the White House could monitor the progress of ASW
operations. In his oral history Admiral Ward describes a
reporting a submarine contact to the White House, and being
331
told not to take offensive action against it. Thus, the
CNO, Secretary of Defense, or President could have inter-
vened if prosecution of a Soviet submarine started getting
out of hand.
The special "Submarine Surfacing and Identification
Procedures** were used several times during the crisis.
Available information is incomplete, but the special signals
apparently were used on at least two of the five confirmed
Soviet submarines (C-19 and C-21) , and may have been used on
two others (C-18 and C-20/26). 332 Both the Morse code
signal ("IDKCA") and the explosive charge signal (four or
five charges) were used. Every time that the explosive
charge signal was sent by ASW aircraft, they dropped
practice depth charges (PDCs) . PDCs were small explosive
charges routinely used by the Navy in peacetime for an echo
Ward, "Reminiscences," p. 194. Captain Dickey
described an ASW prosecution being monitored by Flag Plot on
the HF/SSB net. Dickey, letter to author, April 20, 1988.
Captain Wissman recalled the Navy chain of command paying
close attention to ASW prosecution. Wissman, letter to
author, March 4, 1988.
332Edelman, letter to author, March 25, 1988; Wissman,
letter to author, March 4, 1988; Dinwiddie, letter to
author, April 28, 1988; Dickey, letter to author, April 20,
1988. These are the signals referred to by Robert Kennedy.
See Robert Kennedy, p. 69.
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ranging technique known as "Julie" and for sending signals
to U.S. submarines in ASW exercises. Navy patrol planes and
HUK groups had been tracking Soviet submarines for years in
the Atlantic, so the Soviet captains knew what PDCs sounded
333like. Every time that the explosive charge signal was
334
sent by surface ships, they dropped hand grenades. Thus,
contrary to what the organizational process model would
predict, the Navy readily adapted to a civilian-inspired
335
modification to its ASW procedures.
The results achieved with the "Submarine Surfacing and
Identification Procedures" were mixed. Submerged Soviet
333
Edelman, letter to author, March 25, 1988; Kent,
letter to author, March 25, 1988; Wissman, letter to author,
March 4, 1988. The Navy had different types of PDCs,, but
ASW aircraft were restricted to using a particular type (MK
64) and requests to use other, larger charges were denied.
The type of PDCs used by ASW aircraft are shown in a
photograph in Gallagher, p. 103. The fact that MK 64 PDCs
were routinely used in exercises with U.S. submarines
indicates that the Navy believed they were a safe signaling
method (MK 64 charges were phased out in about 1980 and
replaced by MK 84 electronic signalling devices)
.
334Dinwiddie, letter to author, April 28, 1988;
Rozier, interview by author, January 30, 1988. Ships
normally did not carry PDCs: they had sonar and underwater
telephone, so did not did not need PDCs. Hand grenades had
about the same explosive charge as MK 64 PDCs.
335Although this observation illustrates a weakness in
the organizational process model, it does not disprove the
model. The Navy readily adopted the special signals because
they provided an additional tactic to use against Soviet
submarines—a means that otherwise would not have been
available (such signals were not permitted in normal peace-
time operations). Thus, in this case the organizational
process model, properly applied, predicts that the Navy




submarines essentially ignored the sonar and explosive
charge signals. There were no reported instances of a
Soviet submarine immediately surfacing upon hearing the
signals—the Navy did not literally "force** any Soviet
submarines to surface. Soviet submarines surfaced because
they needed to replenish air and batteries, or because they
had some kind of mechanical problem that had to be repaired
on the surface. The Navy can claim, however, that it forced
Soviet submarines to surface in the presence of U.S. ships
—
a humiliation for a submarine captain. On the other hand,
the Soviet submarines did not react to the signals with
other than their normal efforts at evasion. The Soviet
submarines attempted to evade being tracked, sometimes
successfully, but their efforts were sporadic. Captain
Rozier faced one of the more determined opponents, but was
able to maintain contact for over 35 hours despite the
submarine's efforts to evade him.
There are indications that the Soviet Government may
have directed its submarines to comply with the U.S.
"Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedures.** At
least three of the contacts surfaced on an easterly heading,
as specified in the U.S. Notice to Mariners. Although this
suggests that the Soviet submarines were directed to comply
3
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 122-24; Rozier,
interview by author, January 30, 1988; Anderson, interview
by author, January 25, 1988; Christiansen, interview by
author, February 3, 1988.
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with the U.S. instructions, it is not conclusive: the three
submarines had been on an easterly heading before surfacing
anyway. There are ho clear cases of Soviet submarines
making a large course change specifically to surface on an
easterly heading. What is more revealing is the fact that
they surfaced at all. Normally, a submarine need only
expose its snorkel to recharge its batteries and replenish
it air. It was unusual, and striking to experienced ASW
operators, that all five of the Soviet submarines fully
surfaced, sometimes repeatedly, rather than just
snorkeling. This led some Navy Officers to conclude that
submarines were ordered to surface and identify themselves
337if challenged by the U.S. Navy. Thus, although the
evidence is not conclusive, the Soviet Government does
appear to have directed its submarines to comply with the
U.S. instructions.
Soviet submarine operations during the Cuban Missile
Crisis had a discernible pattern, but not the pattern
commonly described in accounts of the crisis. It was
unusual for there to be five Soviet submarines in or near
338the Caribbean—the normal number was two or three.
During the crisis, two confirmed Soviet submarines (C-21 and
337
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 122-24; HDOD
Operations," p. 5; Edelman, letter to author, March 25,
1988; Gayler, letter to author, March 22, 1988; Rozier,
interview by author, January 30, 1988.
338
Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1988.
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C-23) operated in the Caribbean. These two Soviet subma-
rines appear to have been on routine Caribbean patrols. One
of them (C-21) was operating near Guantanamo in the Windward
Passage— a strategic location for monitoring U.S. Navy
movements—when first detected.
The other three confirmed Soviet submarines (C-18,
C-19, and C-20/26) operated in the Atlantic east and
northeast of the Bahamas. They were detected moving toward
the quarantine zone shortly before the quarantine went into
effect. Some accounts have described these three submarines
as escorting the Soviet merchant ships carrying offensive
arms to Cuba. In fact, their locations and movements were
unrelated to those of the merchant ships. The Soviet
freighters were scattered across the Atlantic, rather than
being in a convoy or following a common track toward Cuba.
Additionally, the Soviet submarines were scattered over a
large area, rather than concentrated around a particular
339
ship or group of ships.
The interesting aspect of these three contacts was
pointed out in the CINCLANT report: "Shortly after their
discovery the submarines began a return to the Russian
340Northern Fleet bases." Navy Officers that prosecuted
339
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 120-25; Johns,
"Naval Quarantine," p. 147.
340
"CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 11. The detailed
description of ASW operations during the crisis makes it
clear that this statement applies only to the three Soviet
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these three contacts confirm that the Soviet submarines were
all headed away from the Caribbean, eastward or northeast-
341
ward into the Atlantic. Given that these submarines were
all confirmed between October 24 and 26, it appears that the
Soviet government ordered them to reverse course and return
home on October 24 or 25. If this is correct, the Soviets
could well have decided to recall their submarines as early
•s October 23—the same day they ordered their merchant
ships to halt or return home. Greater time delays would
have been experienced in getting the recall order out to
submerged submarines, which had to expose a radio mast above
342the surface in order to receive messages. The most
likely scenario is that Soviets decided to recall their
submarines on October 25, after the United States revealed
its "Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedures" and
warned that force would be used against submarines that
failed to comply. However, the possibility cannot be
dismissed that the Soviets may have decided to recall their
submarines in the Atlantic. The two Soviet submarines in
the Caribbean attempted, with little success, to maintain
surveillance of the two U.S. attack carriers operating south
of Cuba.
341Christiansen, interview by author, February 3,
1988; Dickey letter to author, April 20, 1988.
342Ironically, aggressive Navy ASW operations may have
inadvertently delayed receipt of the recall order by one or
two of the Soviet submarines. However, there was probably
no way that the United States could have known that Moscow




submarines on October 23 or 24, perhaps in response to a
private warning from the United States, but before the
special signals were published and the public warning was
given.
There were no significant incidents between U.S. Navy
ASH forces and Soviet submarines during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. There were no near collisions with submerged or
surfaced Soviet submarines. In accordance with peacetime
Navy ASW procedures, when Soviet submarines surfaced they
were politely asked in the international maritime code, "Do
you require assistance?" Some of the submarines were also
asked to identify themselves (two responded) , but none were
343
ordered to stop for boarding. Navy ships and planes
practiced ASW tactics while tracking submerged Soviet
344
submarines. This is routine in peacetime ASW operations,
so the Soviet captains would have experienced it before
while being hunted and tracked in the Atlantic. This posed
little danger to the Soviet submarines (The greater danger
was that Navy ships or aircraft might collide with each
other during ASW maneuvers) . Significantly, the Soviets,
343J *JwCINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 120-25;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 435; Lassell, letter to
author, May 11, 1988; Wissman, letter to author, March 4,
1988; Christiansen, interview by author, February 3, 1988;
Morrison, interview by author, February 3, 1988; Riediger,
letter to author, April 11, 1988; Durbin, letter to author,
March 15, 1988.
344Morrison, interview by author, February 3, 1988;
Dinwiddie, letter to author, April 28, 1988.
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who were quick to protest U.S. actions that appeared to
threaten their merchant ships, did not file any protests
against U.S. ASW operations. It is extremely unlikely that
the Soviets would have ignored and not protested a serious
incident involving one of their submarines.
A search of available Navy records and questioning of
Navy Officers involved in the ASW operations indicates that
no torpedoes or full-size (lethal) depth charges were
345dropped on Soviet submarines. This confirms that Elie
Abel was correct when he stated that "At no time were
345 . .The two major Navy reports on the crisis do not
mention any weapons incidents. See "CNO Historical
Narrative;" CINCLANT Historical Account." The CNO contends
were were no weapons incidents. Anderson, interview by
author, January 25, 1988. Five of the Officers who
prosecuted Soviet submarines stated there were no weapons
incidents (the contacts they prosecuted are given in
parentheses) : Christiansen (C-18 and C-19) , interview by
author, February 3, 1988; Morrison (C-18 and C-19),
interview by author, February 3, 1988; Morgan (C-19), letter
to author, April 7, 1988; Rozier (C-20/26) , interview by
author, January 30, 1988; Edelman (C-21) , letter to author,
March 25, 1988. Three other Officers who prosecuted Soviet
submarines stated that they did not know of any weapons
incidents: Dickey (C-20/26), letter to author, April 20,
1988; Dinwiddie (C-21), letter to author, April 28, 1988;
Hayden (C-21), letter to author. May 10, 1988 (Commander
Hayden was in charge of prosecuting contact C-21 while it
trailed the Enterprise carrier task group) . These responses
cover four of the five confirmed Soviet submarines (C-18,
C-19, C-20/26, and C-21). The fifth confirmed contact
(C-23) was prosecuted by ASW aircraft from VP-56 and VS-26.
The commanders of those two squadrons could not be located,
but Navy records indicate that no weapons were used in the
prosecution of contact C-23. Five other Navy Officers who
participated in ASW escort and patrol also stated that there
were no weapons incidents: Gayler, letter to author, March
22, 1988; Foust, letter to author, March 10, 1988; Kent,
March 25, 1988; Doty, letter to author, March 17, 1988;




weapons fired." Thus, there do not appear to have been
any instances of Navy ships or ASW aircraft using live
ordnance against Soviet submarines.
A possible source of confusion was that not all of the
Navy commanders at sea received the message containing the
347
"Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedures. H
Because destroyers were frequently shifted among the various
Task Groups, it would have been possible for a destroyer
Commanding Officer to know about the special signals while
his Task Group Commander did not. On one occasion during
the prosecution of a confirmed contact (C-19) , the Destroyer
Division Commander in charge of the prosecution, apparently
frustrated by the Soviet submarine's refusal to surface in
response to the special signals, requested permission to
346Abel, p. 155.
347Rear Admiral Christiansen and Captain Morrison, who
prosecuted contacts C-18 and C-19, and Captain Rozier, who
prosecuted contact C-20/26, did not know about the special
signals. Christiansen, interview by author, February 3,
1988; Morrison, interview by author, February 3, 1988;
Rozier, interview by author, January 30, 1988.
This probably explains the incident related to
Sagan by a senior Navy Officer, in which a zealous commander
dropped depth charges on a contact. Sagan, p. 117. As
Sagan suggests, the charges undoubtedly were hand grenades
or PDCs, which were authorized, and were dropped in order to
send the special signals approved by McNamara. Commanding
Officers were authorized to use the special signals at their
own discretion, there was no requirement to get permission
from higher authority (Some HUK Group Commanders may have
controlled use of the explosive signals themselves for
coordination purposes—the explosive signals could interfere




drop full-size (lethal) depth charges (rather than PDCs) at
a distance from the submarine as an even stronger signal to
surface. This request was denied by the Task Group
Commander (the Destroyer Division Commander's immediate
349
superior). Thus, although available records do not
establish conclusively that there were no deliberate or
accidental weapons incidents, the preponderance of evidence--
including the absence of Soviet protests— is that none
occurred.
Although weapons were never employed against Soviet
submarines, there was a remote possibility that the
explosive charge signals could damage a submarine. Captain
Lassell, the Destroyer Division Commander at Key West,
Florida (then home of the Navy's leading ASW training and
tactics development center) , maintains that the explosive
signals were safe: "A PDC could not damage a submarine even
350if it were in contact with the hull." " This is a reason-
able assessment, given that the Navy routinely used PDCs
against its own submarines. Nevertheless, it is conceiv-
able, even if unlikely, that a PDC detonating against an
already weak point in a submarine's hull could exacerbate
existing damage, causing a minor leak, or could damage the
submarines' s rudder or diving planes.
349
Faubion, letter to author, February 29, 1988.
Lassell, letter to author, May 11, 1988.
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Two of the Soviet submarines that surfaced during the
crisis (C-18 and C-20/26) remained on surface for an
extended period. In both cases, crewmen were observed on
351deck apparently making repairs to hatches or the hull.
The explosive charge signal was never used in the prosecu-
tion of contact C-20/26, so that submarine's problem
probably was not due to PDCs. Captain Rozier suggests that
the submarine may have had a hatch that would not seal
properly and that the crew apparently was able to repair
352the hatch. " The other Soviet submarine (C-18) suffered
more serious damage: it was unable to submerge after it
surfaced and eventually was taken in tow. Captain Wissman,
one of the officers who prosecuted C-18, speculated that the
submarine may have been damaged by a PDC. However, the
Soviets never filed a protest and Admiral Dennison
attributed the casualty to some sort of machinery failure (a
353PDC could not damage internal machinery) . The problems
experienced by C-18 probably were not caused by PDCs.
In summary, the Kennedy Administration included Soviet
submarines in the quarantine of Cuba. The Navy was directed
"CINCLANT Historical Account, " pp. 122-24;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 435; Christiansen, interview
by author, February 3, 1988; Rozier, interview by author,
January 30, 1988.
352Rozier, interview by author, January 30, 1988.
353
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to surface, board, and inspect Soviet submarines that were
discovered en route to Cuba. Standard Navy peacetime ASW
procedures were modified specifically to support the
President's political objectives. Secretary of Defense
McNamara approved special signals devised by the Navy for
signalling submarines to surface for identification. The
rules of engagement issued for the quarantine specifically
addressed when force could be used against submarines. When
informed that Soviet submarines were moving into the
quarantine area, the President directed the Navy to launch a
maximum ASW effort. The Soviet Union was informed of the
••Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedures" and was
warned that force would be used against submarines that
failed to comply.
By themselves, these observations suggest an overly
optimistic view of how the Kennedy Administration handled
Navy ASW operations during the crisis. ASW was viewed in
the EXCOMM as a supporting operation, rather than as one of
the central operations in the crisis. ASW operations thus
do not appear to have received as much attention as other
areas, despite the fact that ASW operations genereate the
most intense interactions with Soviet forces. The President
may not have fully understood the operational implications
of Navy ASW operations—such as the fact that Navy ASW
planes and helicopters were carrying live ordnance while
they trailed Soviet submarines. Nevertheless, McNamara
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attempted to ensure that Navy ASW operations supported the
President's political objectives.
The President and McNamara chose not to exercise
direct control over ASW operations, but were kept abreast of
the operations. The Situation Room displayed all but the
most sensitive information on the tactical situation at sea
and McNamara was briefed in detail at least once daily in
Flag Plot. The President had the capability to monitor the
trailing of Soviet submarines real-time over HF/SSB voice
radio—except when circuit overload or propagation problems
interrupted voice communications (see the earlier discussion
of these problems) . Although the President apparently chose
not to monitor ASW operations over voice radio, he or
McNamara could have intervened if they felt that things were
getting out of hand.
U.S. Navy ASW forces complied with their rules of
engagement and the ASW procedures specified for the
quarantine. They used the special signals and did not fire
any weapons against Soviet submarines. The only potential
incidents were the possibility that U.S. ASW operations may
have delayed Soviet submarines from receiving a recall
order, and the remote possibility that contact C-18 might
have been damaged by a PDC. Other than this, there were no
incidents between U.S. ASW forces and Soviet submarines




These findings challenge the prevailing view of Navy
ASW operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Commenting
on Robert Kennedy's description of the Wednesday morning
EXCOMM meeting in which the President was informed of a
submarine near the quarantine line, Allison made the
following assertion: "What neither the President nor his
colleagues knew however, was that prior to the experience
through which they were living, American destroyers had
encountered Soviet submarines—according to the Navy's
standard operating procedures. McNamara discovered this
during the course of his Wednesday evening visit to the Flag
354Plot." This assertion contains several serious errors.
First, the President had been informed the previous day
(October 23) that Soviet submarines were moving into the
area and had directed the Navy to launch a maximum ASW
effort. Second, the President was told during the Wednesday
morning EXCOMM meeting that USS Essex had been tasked to
prosecute the Soviet submarine. Third, the first positive
contact between Navy ASW units and a Soviet submarine did
not occur until 3:29 p.m. Wednesday, well after the morning
354Allison, p. 138. Similarly, Nathan, citing Robert
Kennedy's account of the October 24 morning EXCOMM meeting,
contends that "the Navy began to force Soviet subs to the
surface in order to defend its blockade—well before Kennedy
had authorized contact with surface vessels." Nathan
asserts, with no apparent evidence, that the President was
"horrified" when he found out that the Navy intended to
surface Soviet submarines. Nathan, pp. 261-2. Nathan's
interpretation seriously distorts Robert Kennedy's account,
and is proven false by the evidence in this study.
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EXCOMM meeting. Fourth, the Navy was not just following
standard operating procedures— Soviet submarines had
explicitly been included in the quarantine by guidance
reviewed by the President and approved by McNamara.
Finally, McNamara knew about Navy ASW operations before he
visited Flag Plot Wednesday evening (October 24). What he
learned during that visit was that a specific destroyer from
the Essex HUK Group was trailing a Soviet submarine (contact
C-18)—an action that McNamara authorized . Allison's
interpretation of ASW operations during the crisis thus has
no validity.
John Steinbruner alleges that Navy ASW operations
threatened to upset the strategic balance and disrupt the
President's political strategy for the crisis:
Until well into the crisis, however, it escaped
their attention that the US Navy would pursue Soviet
submarines in the North Atlantic as a normal
operational measure in support of the large US naval
deployment establishing the blockade. In fact, the
naval commanders, with ample operational authority to
do so (unless it was specifically denied) , chose to
pursue this mission very aggressively from the
outset. Since Soviet submarines carrying cruise
missiles with nuclear warheads were inevitably one of
the targets of American anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
operations, and since these submarines were one of the
prime force elements the Soviet government would have
to rely upon should they have to undertake retaliation
for strategic attack, the actions of the US Navy
constituted extremely strong coercion and.yiolated the
spirit of the Executive Committee policy.
355John Steinbruner, "An Assessment of Nuclear
Crises," in Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Polanyi, eds.,
The Dangers of Nuclear War (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1979), p. 38. Also see Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at
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The only accurate statement in this analysis is that Navy
commanders had ample operational authority (unless it was
specifically denied) to conduct ASW in the North Atlantic.
The rest is erroneous. First, the President and McNamara
knew by at least October 21 that the Navy would be pursuing
Soviet submarines in support of the quarantine. McNamara
had explicitly included submarines among the vessels that
the Navy was permitted to stop and board. The President and
McNamara appear to have shared Navy concern that Soviet
submarines might attack Navy quarantine ships and were
generally supportive of Navy ASW objectives.
Second, McNamara undoubtedly and the President
probably knew about Navy ASW operations in the Atlantic
outside the quarantine area. The Argentia ASW barrier,
ordered on October 24 and established on October 27, was
displayed on the charts in Flag Plot and thus would have
been seen by McNamara during his daily briefings. The CNO
would have had to make an extraordinary effort to prevent
356McNamara from learning about the barrier. However, the
CNO had no motive for hiding the barrier from McNamara.
Sea," International Security 10 (Winter 1985-86): 19-20;
Barry R. Posen "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and
NATO's Northern flank," International Security 7 (Fall
1982): 31.
356The Canadian Government would have had to join the
CNO's conspiracy: Royal Canadian Navy planes participated
in the barrier and U.S. Navy planes operated out of bases in
Canada. "CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 124.

674
Third, no Soviet missile submarines were trailed in
the North Atlantic. McNamara stated during the October 27
EXCOMM meeting that there were three Soviet submarines off
the U.S. coast, but that "as far as we know they don't carry
357
missiles." Further, the CINCLANT report states that no
Soviet submarines were detected by the Argentia ASW
358Barrier. The only submarines trailed by the Navy in the
Atlantic during the crisis were the three Foxtrot-class
torpedo-armed attack submarines that entered the quarantine
area. The only Soviet submarine-launched cruise missile
credited with a land attack capability in 1962 (the SS-N-3)
was the size of a jet fighter and had to be carried in very
large tubes outside the hull. The Soviets had no cruise
missiles that could be launched from torpedo tubes,
excluding the Foxtrots from the strategic nuclear deterrence
role. Thus, Navy ASW operations did not constitute
"extremely strong coercion," at least not for the reason
given by Steinbruner.
Fourth, the Navy conducted its ASW operations
essentially in the manner that the President desired. The
special surfacing signals were used as specified by
McNamara. Force was not used against Soviet submarines
because they did not take actions that warranted use of
357
"October 27 Meetings Transcript," p. 53
"CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 124.

675
force under the rules of engagement approved by McNamara.
Soviet submarines were treated courteously when they
surfaced. Thus, contrary to Steinbruner * s assertion, Navy
ASW operations did not violate H the spirit of Executive
Committee policy."
The final step in this review of U.S. Navy operations
during the Cuban Missile Crisis is to examine the
interactions with Soviet and cuban forces that could have
occurred and the interactions with those forces that did
occur. The following interactions conceivably could have
occurred during the crisis: Soviet submarine, perhaps
mistaking U.S. efforts to make it surface as indications of
attack, fires a torpedo at a U.S. warship, prompting the
U.S. ship to return fire; Soviet submarine ignores U.S.
signals to surface and attempts to proceed to a Cuban port,
prompting the President to order it destroyed; Soviet
merchant ship does not receive recall order, attempts to
pass through blockade line, refuses order to halt, and is
fired on by a U.S. warship; Soviet merchant ship uses force
against a U.S. Navy boarding party, prompting U.S. warships
to destroy it; Soviet merchant ship resists being taken into
custody, prompting the President to order it destroyed;
Cuban aircraft attack a U.S. civilian merchant ship, Navy
warship, or military aircraft in international waters or
airspace, prompting U.S. ships or aircraft to return fire;
Cuban naval vessels attack a U.S. merchant ship or warship
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in international waters, prompting U.S. ships or aircraft to
return fire; Cuban coastal defense anti-ship cruise missiles
fire on a U.S. merchant ship or warship in international
waters, prompting the President to order retaliatory strikes
against Cuban coastal defense missile sites; Cuban fighters
attack U.S. low-level photographic reconnaissance aircraft,
causing an air battle with U.S. fighters waiting outside
Cuban airspace; Cuban anti-aircraft guns shoot down a U.S.
low-level photographic reconnaissance aircraft, prompting
the President to order retaliatory strikes against Cuban air
defenses. This list is not comprehensive, but does provide
an indication of the many ways in which violent incidents
could have occurred during the crisis.
Additionally, a wide range of accidents could have
occurred, including U.S. Navy ships or planes accidently
firing a weapon near a Soviet submarine or merchant ship, a
Soviet submarine accidently firing a torpedo near a U.S.
warship, collisions between U.S. warships and Soviet
submarines or merchant ships, aircraft crashing over or near
Cuba (causing speculation that the Cubans shot them down)
,
and Cuban Komar missile boats or coastal defense missile
sites accidently firing an anti-ship cruise missile during
testing or training. This list is representative, rather
than comprehensive, and some of these accidents were more
likely to occur than others (collisions were the greatest
danger). The high tempo of U.S. Navy operations during the
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crisis, particularly the intense quarantine and ASW
operations, suggests that there was ample opportunity for
inadvertent military incidents to occur. Given the high
level of tensions between the United States and Soviet
Union, any of these incidents could have triggered a clash
between U.S. forces and Soviet or Cuban forces.
There were, in fact, significant tactical-level
interactions during the crisis. Most important were the
interactions between the U.S. Quarantine Force and Soviet
merchant ships, and between U.S. ASW forces and Soviet
submarines. There were also low-intensity interactions
between U.S. low altitude reconnaissance planes and Cuban
air defenses, in the form of Cuban anti-aircraft guns firing
on the U.S. planes, and interactions between Cuban naval
units and U.S. Navy ships and patrol planes in the Florida
Strait. Cuban Koroar missile boats were active in Cuban
waters during the crisis and occasionally ventured out into
the Florida Strait at night. They did not, however, take
any threatening actions toward U.S. vessels and retreated to
359Cuban waters when illuminated by Navy patrol planes.
359The CIA reported that Cuban naval units were
deployed to defend Cuban harbors. CIA, "Crisis USSR/Cuba,"
October 24, 1962, p. 1-1. Navy ships and patrol planes
frequently spotted Cuban naval vessels and planes, but there
were no close encounters even though U.S. Navy ships
operated as close as three nautical miles from the Cuban
coast on several occasions. Lassell, letter to author. May
11, 1988; Wissman, letter to author, March 4, 1988; Edelman,
letter to author, March 25, 1988; Foust, letter to author,
March 10, 1988; Dickey, letter to author, April 20, 1988;
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None of these interactions were as intense as they
could have been. Interactions with Soviet merchant ships
and submarines were limited by Khrushchev's decision to
recall the freighters carrying arms and the three submarines
operating in the Atlantic. The only Soviet ships that
entered the quarantine zone were those that the United
States would have no reason to take into custody. The three
Soviet submarines that were of greatest concern had all
reversed course and were headed home by the time U.S. Navy
ASW forces were able to locate and prosecute them. Had
Khrushchev directed the freighters and submarines to
continue toward Cuba, the intensity of tactical-level
interactions at sea would have been much more severe.
Interactions with Cuban forces were constrained by an
apparent decision by Castro not to provoke a confrontation
with the United States. The CIA daily intelligence report
for October 26 noted that "The armed forces remain under
strict orders not to fire unless fired upon." The Cuban
Captain William C. Magee, Commanding Officer of USS Claud
Jones (DE 1033), letter to author, May 12, 1988. Navy low-
level photographic reconnaissance planes were fired on by
Cuban anti-aircraft guns on October 27, but were not hit.
On one occasion Navy reconnaissance jets, which had no
armament, spotted two Cuban Migs while on a mission over
Cuba. . The U.S. pilots reacted with "Burner now!": they
activated their afterburners for high speed evasion. The
Cuban Migs did not attempt to pursue the fast Corsairs.
Captain William B. Ecker, Commanding Officer of VFP-62,
letter to author, March 19, 1988.
360CIA, "Crisis USSR/Cuba," October 26, 1962, p. 1-2,
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air force was relatively inactive throughout the crisis and
the Cuban navy avoided confrontations with the U.S. Navy.
The anti-aircraft fire on October 27 was the only exception
to this pattern of caution, but appears to have been an
isolated incident— there was no further anti-aircraft fire
against U.S. planes. If Castro had decided to demonstrate
defiance of the United States— to back up his inflammatory
rhetoric with military actions— there probably would have
been a Caribbean version of the Tonkin Gulf Incident. Once
an initial Cuban attack had taken place, U.S. forces would
have been at hair trigger readiness for further attacks.
Repeated Cuban provocations, particularly a successful Cuban
attack on a U.S. ship, probably would have led the President
to order destruction of the Cuban navy and air force.
Khrushchev's early decision not to challenge the U.S.
quarantine meant that President Kennedy and the Navy
commanders at sea were never confronted with a situation in
which they had to decide whether or not to use force against
Soviet ships or submarines. At the time, however, this was
not clear to the President or the chain of command.
Khrushchev did not announce his actions, the United States
had to infer them from the movements of Soviet ships and
submarines. As late as Saturday, October 27, it still was
not clear to U.S. leaders that Khrushchev would refrain from
challenging the quarantine, even though several Soviet ships
suspected of carrying arms had turned back. Additionally,
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U.S. leaders had to assess the meaning and implications of
the downing of an Air Force U-2 over Cuba by a Soviet SA-2
missile on Saturday, October 27. The President and his
advisors i particularly McNamara, fully expected that there
would be further attacks on U.S. reconnaissance planes,
which would have prompted air strikes against Cuban air
361defenses within a couple days. The danger of an armed
confrontation with Soviet or Cuban forces thus appeared to
be much greater at the time than it does in retrospect.
U.S. Navy forces experienced a number of accidents
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but none of them cause a
confrontation with soviet forces or otherwise interfered
with the President's ability to manage the crisis. The USS
Holder (DD 819) collided with USS Wasp (CVS 18) while
refueling at sea on November 14, but damage to the ships was
slight. The USS William C. Lawe (DD 763) was forced aground
by heavy seas in the mouth of San Juan harbor, Puerto Rico,
on November 17, suffering damage sufficient to keep it out
of further quarantine operations. The Navy lost an F8U that
crashed during a catapult launch and an A4D that caught fire
in flight. USS Essex (CVS 9) lost two new SH-3 ASW -helicop-
ters due to an electrical malfunction, which prompted the
Navy to ground all of its SH-3s until the problem was cor-
rected. Rear Admiral Christiansen states that not having
78.




the SH-3s caused some difficulties in tracking Soviet
submarines. An ASW torpedo was dropped on the flight deck
of USS Essex while being loaded onto an aircraft, but did
not explode. One of the Navy F8U-1P photographic recon-
naissance planes was damaged when it struck an Albatross in
flight. Navy F4H Phantoms intercepted (but did not fire on)
an Air Force U-2 as it approached the USS Enterprise (CVAN
65) carrier group after flying over Cuba. Two Air Force
planes supporting the Navy crashed during the crisis: on
October 23 a C-135 loaded with ammunition crashed while
landing at Guantanamo (causing a spectacular explosion and
fire) , and on October 27 an RB-47 crashed on takeoff from
the Bahamas. Four Marines at Guantanamo were injured, two
when they accidently entered a U.S. minefield and two who
were wounded when they failed to respond properly to a
sentry's challenge. The accident that created the greatest
danger of a confrontation with Cuban forces occurred on
November 6, when two Marines accidently crashed a pickup
truck through the Guantanamo security fence and twenty feet
into Cuban territory. The incident was witnessed by a Cuban
military officer, but the Cubans did not interfere with
362
recovery of the truck and did not file a protest. These
J * WCINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 99-100, 108,
118; Christiansen, interview by author, February 3, 1988;
Dickey, letter to author, April 20, 1988; Hayward, letter to
author, February 17, 1988; Ecker, letter to author, March
19, 1988; Vice Admiral Kent L. Lee, Commander Carrier Air
Group Six aboard USS Enterprise (CVAN 65) , interview by
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incidents are not unusual and most are typical peacetime
accidents. None of them complicated the crisis.
In summary, the U.S. Navy conducted extensive
operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The operations
that had the most immediate impact on resolution of the
crisis were the quarantine and ASW operations. Both of
these operations were conducted largely in accordance with
standard Navy procedures, but with certain key modifications
to ensure that the supported the President's political
objectives. The White House and the chain of command
closely monitored quarantine and ASW operations when they
involved encounters with Soviet ships or submarines, but did
not attempt to exercise direct real-time control over
operations at sea. The Navy conducted these operations in
the manner prescribed by the President and there were no
incidents with Soviet ships or submarines.
Findings
This section will review the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
to answer the eight reseach questions. The first question
is to what degree were interactions between the forces of
the two sides at the scene of the crisis the result of
actions taken in accordance with mechanisms of indirect
author, February 5, 1988; Rear Admiral Edward J. O'Donnell,




control, rather than direct control by national leaders?
The Kennedy Administration was clearly concerned about the
danger of an incident with Soviet ships or submarines. The
President and McNamara exercised a greater degree of control
over U.S. Navy operations than had ever been attempted in
the past. However, they primarily controlled naval
operations through mechanisms of indirect control,
particularly mission orders and rules of engagement, rather
than through direct control. The President and McNamara
retained authority certain crucial decisions, particularly
retaliation against Cuban air defenses and the boarding of
ships. Other than this, however, they exercised control by
negation, rather than positive control, over Navy operations
they felt were particularly sensitive. The President
could monitor operations at sea on HF/SSB radio in the White
House Situation Room, therefore could intervene if he felt
an encounter was getting out of hand. Less sensitive
Researchers have in the past been misled about the
manner in which the President exercised control over naval
operations because they focused only on top-level delibera-
tions and decisionmaking without examining the rest of the
chain of command. The EXCOMM was an only an advisory body
for the President— it was not in the chain of command. The
EXCOMM and its study groups discussed military and naval
operations in numbing detail, but the President and McNamara
did not attempt to control all of those details in the
actual conduct of operations. For example, the boarding
party that searched Marucla was guided by the Navy tactical
publication NWIP 10-2, not by procedures worked out in the
EXCOMM. Similarly, the mission orders and rules of
engagement for the quarantine were drafted by CINCLANT and
the CNO's staff, and the President and McNamara made only a
few key changes to those orders and rules.
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operations were not closely controlled, with methods of
delegated control being used. Presidential orders were
passed via the chain of command and neither the President
nor McNamara ever gave orders directly to ships at sea.
The second question is were the forces of the two
sides at the scene of the crisis tightly coupled with each
other? The overall answer is yes, but the coupling was not
as tight as might be expected given the seriousness of the
crisis. The tightest coupling was between U.S. Navy ASW
forces and Soviet submarines, followed closely by coupling
between the Quarantine force and Soviet merchant ships. In
both cases, however, Khrushchev's decision not to challenge
the quarantine dampened the interactions between the two
sides. The Soviet submarines were not attempting to force
their way through U.S. naval forces to get to Cuba, they
were attempting to return home unmolested. The only Soviet
ships that approached the quarantine line were those that
the U.S. would have no reason to take into custody. As
Admiral Dennison relates in his oral history, the quarantine
was a success without ever having been tested. Inter-
actions between U.S. and Cuban forces were also dampened by
the efforts that leaders on both sides made to avoid provoca-
tions. In this regard the Cuban Missile Crisis was similar
to the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis: although significant U.S.
\tkA
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 427.
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forces were operating in close proximity to the adversary's
forces, tactical-level interactions were dampened by the
caution and restraint shown by both sides.
The third question is were the forces of the two sides
being used by their national leaders as a political
instrument in the crisis? President Kennedy clearly was
using the U.S. armed forces to convey political signals to
Khrushchev during the crisis. The President and McNamara
actively sought out ways to reinforce the signals being sent
to the Soviets, such as by modifying Navy ASW procedures to
support the political objectives of the quarantine.
Khrushchev, on the other hand, may have used military forces
for political signalling, but did not do so as clearly as
President Kennedy. Khrushchev was probably avoiding signals
of hostile intent by not placing Soviet forces at full
alert, recalling freighters carrying arms, and recalling the
three submarines in the Atlantic. However, there is insuf-
ficient evidence to establish this conclusively. Shooting
down an American U-2 over Cuba on October 27 certainly sent
the wrong signal to the United States, but this action may
not have been authorized in the Kremlin. Cuba placed its
armed forces on alert, but avoided provocatory actions
during the crisis. This was probably intended to avoid
giving the United States a pretext for invading the island.
Thus, all three of the participants in the crisis used their
military forces for political signalling.
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The answers to these first three questions suggest
that conditions necessary for stratified interaction were
present in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although the President
•ought to maintain close control of military operations he
relied heavily on methods of delegated control and
communications problems constrained his ability to
effectively exercise direct control. In certain operations
there was tight coupling between the forces of the two
sides. Both sides used their forces as a political
instrument under conditions of acute crisis. Interactions
occurred at the tactical level that were not directly
controlled by American leaders. The President did not
directly control any of the ASW prosecutions or the boarding
of the Marucla (other than to order it to occur) . Navy
forces encountered Cuban air and naval forces on several
occasions without the President or McNamara controlling the
interactions. The President's attention was focused on a
very small portion of the overall operations that were in
progress. The stratified interaction model of international
crises, in which interactions evolve in separate, semi-
independent sequences at the political, strategic and
tactical levels, offers a good description of Soviet-
American interactions in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The fourth question is did crisis interactions at the
tactical level become decoupled from the strategy being
pursued by national leaders? Despite the vast scale of
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operations that were conducted and the intensity of the
interactions that took place, decoupling was relatively rare
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. There were no serious
365instances of decoupling involving naval forces. A review
of the seven potential causes of decoupling reveals that
there were relatively few opportunities for decoupling to
occur. The potential cause of decoupling that was most
prominent in the crisis was communications problems.
Despite the advances that had been made in communications
technology, the effort to exercise close control over large-
scale operations seriously overloaded and degraded U.S.
communications systems. These communications problems did
not cause serious decoupling because only a very small
portion of U.S. forces were in contact with adversary forces
and because attention had been paid to the guidance
contained mechanisms of indirect control, so that U.S.
forces would act as the President desired when he could not
control their actions.
The second potential cause of decoupling, a fast-paced
tactical environment, was not a major problem during the
365There was at least one instance of decoupling
involving the Air Force. An Air Force U-2 strayed over the
Soviet Union on October 27, prompting the Soviets and
Americans to scramble fighters—an incident decoupled from
Presidential control. If, as has been alleged, the
Strategic Air Command transmitted its readiness reports for
the DEFCON 2 alert in the clear without the President and
McNamara knowing what they were doing, that would have been
another instance of decoupling. See Sagan, p. 108.
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crisis. There were no fast-paced engagements. ASW
operations— the most dangerous Soviet-American tactical
interactions during the crisis—are particularly slow and
tedious, providing ample opportunity for disengagement.
Similarly, the intercept and boarding of merchant ships
takes place at a leisurely pace and is relatively easy to
control. Fast-paced engagements, such as air combat and sea
battles fought with tactical aircraft and cruise missiles,
never arose. In retrospect this appears to have been a key
factor in the success of the President's crisis management
efforts—opening with operations that were inherently slow-
paced. The President probably knew intuitively that this
was an advantage of a blockade, but it was not an explicit
consideration in the decision.
President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara
also sought to avoid three of the other potential causes of
decoupling: ambiguous or ambivalent orders, tactically
inappropriate orders, and inappropriate guidance in mechan-
isms of indirect control. This is a striking contrast with
the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when the Navy did not have
clear guidance on whether or not it could defend the off-
shore islands when the crisis erupted. By tailoring certain
key guidance contained in mission orders (OPORDs) and rules
of engagement to support the President's political objec-
tives, the President and McNamara avoided the problem of
inappropriate guidance in mechanisms of indirect control.
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McNamara did not attempt to rewrite Navy tactical doctrine,
but did impose certain requirements and limitations on the
Navy. The most important innovation, the special submarine
surfacing signals, were devised in conjunction with the
Navy. By not attempting to exercise positive direct control
of operations while they were in progress, the President and
McNamara largely avoided the problem of tactically inappro-
priate orders. The method of control they used—control by
negation—only required that orders be given if a Navy
commander embarked on a course of action that they opposed.
The final potential cause of decoupling, unauthorized
actions by military commanders, did not occur during the
crisis. Contrary to the prevailing myth, Navy ASW
operations were not conducted without the President's
knowledge and authority, and did not violate the spirit of
EXCOMM policy. No Soviet submarines were depth charged.
The fact that no unauthorized actions occurred is even
somewhat surprising. As will be discussed below, there was
resentment among many Navy (and Air Force) Officers to the
close attention that the President and McNamara paid to
military operations. Thus, in summary, the various
potential causes of decoupling either were not present
during the crisis or did not have a serious adverse effect
on the President's ability to manage the crisis.
The fifth question is did national leaders and on-
scene commanders hold different perceptions of the
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vulnerability of on-scene forces to pre-emption and the need
to itrike first in the event of an armed clash? Although
the JCS remained committed to the air strike option as its
preferred course of action until Khrushchev agreed on
October 28 to remove Soviet offensive missiles from Cuba,
this does not reflect differences in threat perceptions.
Rather, it reflects differences of opinion over whether or
not the quarantine would be sufficient to compel Khrushchev
to remove the missiles that were already in Cuba. Even
President Kennedy was skeptical that it would work, but
decided to give it a try before resorting to force. The
primary area in which there appear to have been stratified
threat perceptions, that is, on-scene commanders at the
tactical level holding threat perceptions different from
those held by decisionmakers at the political level, was in
the area of ASW. Navy commanders at sea were more concerned
about the Soviet submarine threat than were senior military
and civilian leaders in Washington. However, the
differences were not extreme and the President and McNamara
were also concerned about the Soviet submarine threat.
366Admiral Griffin, Vice Admiral Houser, Vice Admiral
Caldwell, and Rear Admiral Shepard stated that there was not
great concern for the Soviet submarine threat in Washington.
However, Admiral Anderson, Admiral Sharp, and rear Admiral
Wylie state that there were such concerns. Griffin, letter
to author, April 6, 1988; Houser, interview by author,
February 11, 1988; Shepard, interview by author, February
10, 1988; Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988;
Sharp, letter to author, February 24, 1988; Wylie, letter to
author, April 13, 1988. President Kennedy and McNamara were
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There was recognition at all levels that for several
reasons, including that fact that submarines were to be
stopped and boarded under the quarantine, the Navy would
have to conduct intense ASW operations.
The one other area in which threat perceptions were
stratified was the Cuban air and naval threat to U.S. Navy
ships. Navy commanders were particularly concerned about
367
the threat from Cuban Romar missile boats. There is
little mention of this threat in available EXCOMM records.
Perceptions of the threat from Cuban aircraft were mixed,
not following any pattern. Admiral Anderson and Admiral
Dennison appear to have been most concerned about the Cuban
air threat, Admiral Ward was not overly concerned about it.
According to Admiral Ward, however, the CNO was flexible on
368this point during the October 20 JCS meeting. Among
concerned about the Soviet submarine threat. See Robert
Kennedy, 61-62, 69-70; Sorenson, pp. 705, 710. Admiral
Rivero, Vice Admiral Houser, Vice Admiral Caldwell, Vice
Admiral Hayward, Vice Admiral Stroh and the CINCLANT report
on the crisis state that Task Force and Task Group Comman-
ders at sea were concerned about the Soviet submarine
threat. Rivero, letter to author, March 10, 1988; Houser,
interview by author, February 11, 1988; Caldwell, letter to
author, March 14, 1988; Hayward, letter to author, February
17, 1988; Stroh, letter to author, February 18, 1988;
"CINCLANT Historical Account," pp. 116, 121-22, 146.
367
Lassell, letter to author, May 11, 1988; Brady,
letter to author, April 21, 1988; Magee, letter to author,
May 12, 1988; Wissman, letter to author, March 4, 1988;
-CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 112.
368Anderson, interview by author, January 25, 1988;
Dennison, "Reminiscences," p. 424; Ward, "Diary," pp. 4-6.
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commanders at sea, only those patrolling near Cuba in the
Florida Strait were particularly concerned about the Cuban
•ir threat. Thus, while perceptions of the Cuban air and
naval threat were mixed, they were not stratified.
The sixth question is, when tactical-level inter-
actions become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation
dynamics from occurring at the tactical level and being
transmitted upward to the strategic and political levels of
interaction? The Cuban Missile Crisis does not help to
answer this question because there were no instances of
decoupled interaction sequences. The decoupling that did
occur was minor and did not generate sustained interaction
sequences beyond Presidential control. President Kennedy's
decision to open with relatively slow-paced naval opera-
tions, Khrushchev's early decision not to challenge the
quarantine, and Castro's decision not to provoke the United
States were the factors that determined the nature of the
tactical-level interactions. There was immediate disengage-
ment in the one instance that weapons were fired at a U.S.
Navy unit: When Cuban anti-aircraft guns fired at Navy
reconnaissance jets on October 27, the unarmed Navy planes
simply left the area. Navy ASW forces trailed Soviet
submarines for days without escalation by either side. In
effect, then, escalation was avoided by the tactical
environment having been structured in such a manner as to




this was what President Kennedy had in mind when he selected
the quarantine over other military options, the outcome was
due to decisions made in Moscow and Havana as well as in
Washington.
The seventh question is did actions taken with mili-
tary forces send inadvertent signals to either adversaries
or friends, and did inadvertent military incidents occur
that affected efforts to manage the crisis? There were two
instances of U.S. naval forces sending inadvertent signals
of hostility: the first was when a Soviet merchant ship
captain mistook a Navy patrol plane's high-powered search
light (flashed for photographs) for an attack on his ship,
and the second was a Soviet merchant ship captain's
complaint that he had been threatened by a Navy destroyer
inspecting MRBMs on his deck. Although the Soviet
Government filed protests over these incidents, it did not
interpret them as deliberate indications of hostile
intentions on the part of the United States.
There was only one inadvertent military incident
serious enough to have affected the President's efforts to
"manage the crisis: the Air Force U-2 that strayed over the
Soviet Union on October 27. This apparently annoyed
Khrushchev, who complained about the incident to President
Kennedy, but otherwise did not have a major impact on the
crisis. There were no serious inadvertent military
incidents involving naval forces. The most serious incident
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was the Marine pickup truck that crashed through the fence
at Guantanamo into Cuban territory. A Cuban officer watched
patiently, and probably in amusement, as the wayward truck
was dragged back into the American base. There is a remote
possibility that a Navy PDC might have contributed to the
problems that kept two of the Soviet submarines on the
surface, but the Soviets never filed a protest claiming that
such an incident had occurred. The lack of incidents is
somewhat surprising, given the tremendous scope of United
States military operations during the crisis, and may not be
a reliable indicator of what to expect in future crises.
The U-2 incident and Soviet protests of incidents
involving their merchant ships illustrate another feature of
the Cuban Missile Crisis: communications between the two
sides were used to prevent incidents from giving rise to
misperceptions. Military moves were not the only means of
signalling intentions available to President Kennedy, he had
several other channels for delivering formal and informal
369
messages to Khrushchev. Because Kennedy and Khrushchev
were exchanging communications frequently during the crisis,
they could wait, send a protest, and assess the implications
of an isolated incident, rather than immediately reacting to
it. But these communications were not perfect: The United
States appears not to have asked for or received an
"
369
Hilsman, pp. 216-17; Holsti, pp. 187-92.
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•xplanation for the shooting down of a U-2 on October 27.
This was an important incident that caused apprehensions
concerning Khrushchev's motives and willingness to resolve
the crisis peacefully. Yet its implications remained
ambiguous. The incident probably would have had a greater
impact on U.S. policy than it did were it not for
Khrushchev's October 28 letter accepting President Kennedy's
terms for ending the crisis. Nevertheless, the availability
of formal and informal communications channels between the
two superpowers appears to have moderated the use of
military forces for political signaling by allowing
diplomatic rather than military responses to military
incidents.
The eighth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the crisis? All three of the tensions arose, but only one
was severe. Tensions between political considerations and
military considerations primarily arose from the fundamental
decision to impose a quarantine on offensive arms rather
than immediately launch an air strike against the Soviet
missiles sites or invade Cuba. The JCS never wavered from
its advocacy of the air strike option. There was also
concern that the President's strategy of applying military
force in graduated increments would increase the difficulty
of carrying out the air strike or invasion options by




advantage of surprise. Further, tensions arose between
the military consideration of protecting U.S. forces against
a sudden attack by Cuban or Soviet forces, and the political
consideration of avoiding military moves that appeared to
threaten an immediate effort to achieve a military solution
to the crisis. Captain Carmichael, who observed the crisis
intimately from his post in Flag Plot, states that "friction
was generated when the military considered it prudent to
take precautionary measures, assuming that the Soviets would
371
shoot if the point of no return was reached." The
tension that this generated has been explained by Eliot A.
Cohen:
The events of October 1962 created considerable
tension between military men seeking to protect those
under their command, in the event of an outbreak of
war, and politicians seeking to give the other side
time to think and give in. Had men in fact died as a
result, had ships sunk or airplanes fallen by the
score, the crisis in civil-military relations would
have taken a more dramatic turn, one in which, I
suspect, civilian leaders would have accommodated
commanders far more than they actually jlid.
This captures the essence of the problem, but must be
qualified by three observations. First, the military was
concerned with protecting their men in the event of any
outbreak of fighting, no matter how small, not just in the
event of war.
370Sharp, letter to author, February 24, 1988.
371




Second, as this case study has shown, civilian leaders
accommodated military commanders to a much greater degree
than past accounts have acknowledged. The rules of engage-
ment issued for the quarantine were not significantly
different from normal peacetime rules and did not infringe
upon a commander's right of self-defense. The only opera-
tional area in which the President deliberately denied the
military any authority to take action in self defense was in
the case of Cuban air defenses firing on U.S. reconnaissance
aircraft. This was not a policy innovation created for the
Cuban Missile Crisis. The distinction between self defense
and retaliation was well-established in U.S. rules of
engagement. President Kennedy simply defined attacks on
Cuban air defenses to be an act of retaliation that he would
control, rather than an act of self defense that the
military could take on its own authority. President
Eisenhower had done the same thing in the 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis, allowing hot pursuit of Communist Chinese aircraft
but not attacks on their mainland bases.
Third, records of EXCOMM meetings reveal that Presi-
dent Kennedy and Secretary McNamara were sympathetic to the
military's concern with protecting its men. After a U-2 was
shot down on October 27, the danger of further attacks and
the loss of additional pilots was discussed. McNamara
argued the military perspective forcefully, contending that
further attacks on U.S. planes were likely and that it would
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be necessary to destroy the Cuban air defense system if this
373happened. This is why tensions between political con-
siderations and military considerations were not severe
during the Cuban Missile Crisis: The President and McNamara
tried to understand the implications of their interventions
in military operations and attempted to weigh potential
military costs against the political objectives they sought.
Tensions arose between performance of crisis missions
and readiness to perform wartime missions. In mid-October,
only days before Soviet offensive missiles were discovered
in Cuba, a JCS study concluded that execution of CINCLANT
contingency plans for the invasion of Cuba would have the
following consequences:
a. Preclude simultaneous, (D-5 to D+2) , reinforcement
of either CINCEUR [Commander in Chief U.S. Forces
Europe] or CINCPAC using troop carrier or MATS
[Military Air Transport Service] aircraft.
b. Inhibit for 5 to 7 days capability for conduct of
Berlin airlift contingency plans by withdrawing all
C-130 aircraft from EUCOM [U.S. European Command].
c. Make inadequate for reinforcement of CINCEUR the
available logistic support units for filling the port
package [equipment and supplies delivered by ship]
.
d. Deplete critical logistic support units of-Army
forces remaining in CONUS [Continental U.S.].
During the crisis all the forces called for in the CINCLANT




"October 27 Meetings Transcript," pp. 66-71, 74,
CINCLANT Historical Account," p. 45.
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force added to the plans at the last moment, were mobilized
and began logistic and training preparations for invasion.
The problems described by JCS thus became a consideration
during the crisis: Preparations for invasion of Cuba
degraded the ability of the United States to respond to
Soviet moves in Europe, particularly against Berlin. The
only reason that this did not generate severe tensions was
that the political-military situation in other theaters,
including Europe was relatively quiet. Military men were
not overly concerned about the negative consequences of the
preparations for invasion of Cuba because there was no
375immediate need for the forces elsewhere. This situation
would have changed drastically if the Soviets had moved
against Berlin or Turkey in response to a U.S. move against
Cuba, which justifies the President's concern for such a
376Soviet move.
Tension arose between the need for top-level control
of military operations and the need for on-scene flexibility
and initiative. This was the most severe political-military
375Sharp, letter to author, February 24, 1988;
Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1988.
376Rear Admiral Shepard related to the author a
statement the President made to the Joint Chiefs after the
crisis: "We had the upper hand in Cuba, but we did not have
the upper hand in other theaters. The Russians might have
taken action against Berlin or Turkey." Shepard, interview
by author, February 10, 1988. Also see CIA, SNIE 11-19-62,
p. 9; Robert Kennedy, pp. 58, 60, 98; "October 27 Meetings
Transcript," pp. 54-55; Sagan, p. 111.
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tension during the crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis marked
• turning point in American civil-military relations and in
the evolution of U.S. command and control doctrine. Vice
Admiral Houser described the significance of the crisis: "It
was the major turning point from the World War II type of
operations to modern operations. It was a watershed.
During World War II and the Korean War there was military
command only, no control. But after Cuba civilians would
377
exercise both command and control." Vice Admiral
Caldwell made the same point when asked the most important
lesson of the crisis: "That in the nuclear age the civilian
leadership will quickly and actively intervene in a military
operation of any seriousness. We did not understand this
prior to the crisis, but afterward began to structure the
378Command/Control system to accommodate this process."
This was the fundamental origins of the tension: a sudden
attempt to impose radically new methods of direct control on
a command system set up for delegated methods of control,
without prior planning, consideration of the implications,
or even consultation with the military.
The Navy, with its tradition of granting autonomy to
commanders at sea, reacted most strongly to the Kennedy
Administration's efforts at closely controlling military
377
Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988
378Caldwell, letter to author, March 14, 1988.
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operations. Admiral Griffin has described the crux of the
problem: "What we [the Navy] wanted was to get clear orders
as to what was wanted [by. civilian authorities]. Then we
could carry out those orders. McNamara wanted to know in
detail how each function was to be accomplished. It was not
379
a very good situation." Admiral Anderson, at the
interface between between civilian authorities and the Navy
chain of command, took the lead in preventing what he
perceived to be unreasonable civilian interference in naval
operations. On October 23, the CNO, after learning that the
White House rather than the Quarantine Force Commander would
decide which ships were to be boarded, sent McNamara a
memorandum stating that "from now on I do not intend to
interfere with Dennison or either of the Admirals on the
380
scene." This reflects Admiral Anderson's determination
to "prevent any intrusion by McNamara or anybody else in the
direct operations of any ship or squadron or anything of the
381
sort." This was the heart of the problem: a clash
between the President's desire to maintain control over
events and the Navy's desire to operate on the basis of its
traditional philosophy of command, in which commanders at
sea are delegated substantial authority.
379Griffin, letter to author, April 6, 1988. Also see
Chew, "Reminiscences," pp. 317-18.
"CNO Historical Narrative," pp. 39-40.
381Anderson, "Reminiscences," p. 550.
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Most senior Navy Officers deeply resented the new
civilian attention to the details of naval operations, which
they viewed as "micromanagement . " McNamara would bear the
brunt of their resentment. Admiral Anderson, whose relation-
ship with McNamara was notoriously poor, stated "I just
resent the involvement of these lower-level—well, some of
them are high-level, the Secretary of Defense--civilian
38 2
staff officers getting involved in military affairs."
When asked his most prominent memory of the crisis, Admiral
Sharp replied, "Robert McNamara dashing into Flag Plot and
demanding instant action that was often not possible. For
example, wanting ships to be at certain places at a time
when their max speed would not permit. He was unreason-
383
able." Vice Admiral Riley, like many senior Navy
Officers, questioned McNamara' s competence for controlling
military operations: "How could any civilian, no matter how
successful he might have been in his line of business before
he got appointed Secretary of Defense, have the competence
to do this? The answer is that he didn't. He didn't have
that competence." Only Vice Admiral Houser offered a
comment on McNamara that was even faintly positive: "My own
view of McNamara, which a lot of my friends didn't share,
Anderson, "Reminiscences,** p. 553.
383Sharp, letter to author, February 24, 1988.
384Riley, "Reminiscences," p. 754.
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was that McNamara was the best Secretary of Defense we ever
38 5had, but the worst Secretary of War we ever had." The
second half of this assessment reflects a widespread
attitude toward McNamara, that he was incompetent at
controlling military operations. McNamara, the admirals
felt, was trying to run naval operations the way he would
manage a Ford assembly line, but without the experience
necessary to do so and with no respect for those who did
have the requisite experience.
If McNamara was resented, his civilian aides were
despised. Navy admirals commonly referred to them as
"Junior Field Marshals" and a variety of less polite
expressions. Even General Taylor was suspect because he had
been brought out of retirement to serve as JCS Chairman.
One admiral who worked closely with General Taylor described
him as a "boot licking sycophant" and a "yes man" for the
Kennedy Administration. The records of the EXCOMM meetings
reveal that this is not a fair assessment, but it was their
perceptions that mattered.
Although there was widespread resentment toward
McNamara, the admirals who ran the quarantine did not feel
unreasonably burdened by civilian authorities and understood
the need for close control. Admiral Dennison, referring to
President Kennedy, stated that "he was perfectly marvelous
385Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988.
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and I never got a call from the White House during the
386
entire operation. He let me alone." The Admiral's only
complaint was about officials in Washington attempting to
use his already overloaded radio circuits. Admiral Ward
describes well the reasons for close civilian control of the
quarantine:
We were not there to sink ships or shoot anyone. Our
mission was to accomplish a political objective. . . .
Everything we did had political impact. If we had
sunk a Soviet ship, we would have started World War
III. We could have. Everything that we did we
reported directly by voice telephone [HF/SSB radio]
,
sometimes through a scrambler, to the Pentagon, which
was monitored also in the White House war room. For
the first time we asked instructions on whether or not
we should stop a Soviet ship known to be headed our
way and the decision was made at the political level
because it was a political decision rather than a
military one.
Similarly, Admiral Rivero, Amphibious Force Commander during
the crisis, supported the close civilian control: "Very
tight control of the Quarantine Force was probably
appropriate since only the people in the White House and the
ExComm knew the meaning of the signals being exchanged
between Kennedy and Khrushchev. But this was an exceptional
388
situation, more political than military in nature." The
fact that Navy commanders who did not have to work directly
with McNamara felt less resentment and better understood the
386Dennison, "Reminiscences, " p. 421.
387Ward, "Reminiscences," p. 199.
388




President's political objectives strongly suggests that much
of the friction and anger visible in Washington was
generated by the McNamara* s personality, management style,
and personal attitudes, rather than by the underlying policy
conflicts. This largely explains the infamous argument
between McNamara and Admiral Anderson the evening of October
24. Their clash arose over a policy issue: the question of
how closely operations at sea were to be controlled.
Admiral Anderson had thrown down the gauntlet the previous
day with his memorandum to McNamara stating there would be
no more interference with the commanders at sea. McNamara
had spent the day in a tense EXCOMM meeting, and had been
tasked by the President to closely monitor the quarantine
operations. Under such circumstances, a clash between these
two strong-willed men was to be expected. However, their
argument reveals much more about personalities clashing
under the stress of a crisis than it does about organization-
al processes. Admiral Anderson did not disobey or attempt
to circumvent any orders from the President or McNamara
during the crisis. The CNO objected strongly to some of
their decisions and to what he viewed as unwarranted
intrusion into naval matters, but did not defy their
authority.
Because of the emphasis on direct civilian control of
military operations, civilian authorities did not keep
military leaders adequately informed of the overall U.S.

706
political-diplomatic strategy Cor resolving the crisis.
Admiral Anderson makes this point in his oral history:
Admittedly, from the Joint Chief's point of view, some
of the sensitive negotiations, exchanges of
information between President Kennedy and the White
House and the Soviet Union, were not filtering down to
the Chiefs. That was so tightly held—maybe they gave
it to Taylor and he didn't pass it on down. Maybe he
was told not to pass it on down. But there was a
inadequacy, in^gY opinion, in that flow of information
to the chiefs.
Other admirals share his opinion. Admiral Griffin, who
attended JCS meetings with the CNO, states that "One of the
difficulties in going into a great amount of detail about
some of these things is the secrecy with which the White
House held them. Even the Chiefs would be uninformed about
certain things. I don't think that the Chiefs were being
really kept up to date on the negotiations that were going
390
on in New York, and from the White House to Moscow." The
President could have had several reasons for not informing
the Joint Chiefs about political efforts to resolve the
crisis
—
particularly a desire to not compromise sensitive
negotiations.
The important point is that by not informing the JCS
of political-diplomatic efforts at resolving the crisis, the
President risked defeating his efforts to ensure that mili-
tary operations supported his political objectives. The
389Anderson, "Reminiscences," p. 549
390Griffin, "Reminiscences," p. 555.
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Chiefs did not need to know the details of sensitive communi-
cations with the Soviets to understand the President's
diplomatic objectives. Vice Admiral Houser and Captain
Carmichael both stated that the Chiefs did not appear to
understand the President's political strategy or the
391
escalation concerns of civilian leaders. Such an
understanding might have helped them to anticipate
operational problems that could have interfered with the
President's crisis management strategy.
In summary, the stratified interaction model
accurately describes Soviet-American interaction during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the scale of U.S. military
and naval operations and the intensity of tactical-level
interactions at sea, there were no serious instances of
decoupled interactions involving naval forces. The pattern
was one of parallel stratified interactions: tactical level
nteractions not directly controlled by political leaders,
but generally supporting their strategy for resolving the
crisis. Positive direct control was exercised only over the
decision to board merchant ships and the decision to
retaliate against Cuban air defenses. There were no serious
incidents between U.S. naval forces and Soviet or Cuban
forces. The most serious political-military tension was
over centralized control of naval operations.
391Houser, interview by author, February 11, 1988;
Carmichael, letter to author, March 8, 1988.
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The 1967 Arab-Israeli War
The Third Arab-Israeli War erupted in June 1967 when
Israel, after weeks of increasing tensions and provocative
Arab military moves, launched pre-emptive attacks on Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria. The United States sought to remain
officially neutral in the conflict and to avert Soviet
intervention on behalf of the Arab nations. The war was
over in only six days after a string of successful Israeli
offensives. The United States Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean Sea was used to deter Soviet intervention in
the conflict. The one major incident involving the U.S.
Navy during the crisis—the Israeli attack on the USS
Liberty (AGTR 5)—will be discussed in a separate case study
in Chapter VIII.
Background
Tensions between Israel and neighboring Arab countries
had been rising for years due to the Syrian-Jordanian effort
to divert Jordan river water away from Israel, Palestinian
terrorist attacks on Israel, Israeli reprisal raids into
Jordan and Syria, and artillery duels along the Israeli-
Syrian border. Three events in May 1967 escalated these
tensions to the brink of war: The United Nations Secretary
General, caving in to Egyptian demands, ordered withdrawal
of the U.N. peacekeeping force on the Israeli-Egyptian
border and Egyptian troops began pouring into the Sinai;
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Egypt announced its intention to blockade the Strait of
Tiran controlling access to the Israeli port of Eilat, an
act of war under international law; and an Egyptian-
Jordanian mutual defense pact was signed bringing Jordan
into the Egyptian-Syrian joint military command. These
moves appeared to confirm Israeli fears of imminent attack
392
and Israel decided to pre-empt.
Israel struck early on 5 June with devastating air
strikes on Egyptian air fields, followed later in the day by
attacks on Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi air fields. Israeli
army units invaded the Sinai the morning of 5 June, reaching
the Suez canal three days later. Israel attacked Jordan on
5 June, occupying all of Jerusalem and the West Bank in two
days. Although action on the Syrian front was limited to
artillery duels and three small Syrian probes, Israel
decided late on 7 June to attack the Golan Heights but then
delayed the assault due to Arab acceptance of the U.N.
ceasefire. By the morning of 8 June Egyptian defenses in
the Sinai had collapsed and Jordan had been knocked out of
the war. There had been only sporadic fighting on the
Syrian front during the first four days of the war,
primarily two Syrian probes that were easily repulsed by the
Israelis. On June 9 Israel attacked Syria in the Golan
392 See, for example, Theodore Draper, Israel and World
Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli War (New York:
Viking Press, 1967), pp. 85-115; Nadav Safran, Israel: The
Embattled Ally (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1978), pp.
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Heights despite Syrian acceptance of the U.N. ceasefire
resolution. The next day, the sixth day of the war, Israel
achieved the last of its military objectives against Syria
393
and the fighting stopped.
Political-Strategic Context
Preoccupied with the war in Vietnam, the Johnson
Administration was slow to react to the rapidly increasing
tensions in the Middle East. In late May and early June the
United States had attempted to organize an international
naval force to contest the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of
Aqaba, as part of its political efforts to avert an Israeli
394decision for war. A primary Johnson Administration
381-413; Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967
and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980),
pp. 51-76.
393On the 1967 War, see Edgar O'Ballance, The Third
Arab-Israeli War (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972); Randolf
S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); Peter Young, The Israeli
Campaign, 1967 (London: William Kimber, 1967); Safran, pp.
240-56; Brecher, pp. 91-170.
394On U.S. policy immediately prior to the crisis, see
"The Situation in the Middle East: Statement by President
Johnson,** May 23, 1967, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology and Background
Documents Relating to the Middle East , First Revised Edition
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
Cited hereafter as Foreign Relations Committee, Select
Chronology ) , pp. 211-13; Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage
Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-69 (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 290-96. On efforts
to break the Aqaba blockade, see "U.S. Seeks Backing on an
Aqaba Test," New York Times , June 1, 1967, p. 1; "U.S
Drafts Plan to Assert Rights of Aqaba Passage," New York
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concern was that the Soviet Union would exploit the crisis
to increase its influence in the middle east at the expense
of the United States. United States objectives in the
crisis were to limit the scope the fighting in the Middle
East and quickly bring it to a halt, prevent the Soviet
Union from intervening militarily on behalf of the Arab
395
nations, and avoid alienating the Arab world.
The U.S. strategy during the Six Day War was to act
through the U.N. Security Council to achieve an early cease-
fire, pressure Israel to accept the ceasefire and limit its .
military objectives, and prevent Soviet military interven-
tion through deterrent military moves and diplomacy. The
United States attempted to portray a neutral stance without
officially declaring itself to be neutral. This failed to
placate the Arab nations, which declared an embargo on oil
shipments to the United States. United States diplomatic
efforts favored Israel, but were not a grant of unlimited
support. The United States supported the U.N. ceasefire
Times, June 1, 1967, p. 1. Also see William B. Quandt,
Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1977), pp. 37-59; Steven L. Spiegel, "The U.S.
Approach to Conflict Resolution in the Middle East," in
Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds
.
, Conflict
Management in the Middle East (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1987), pp. 166-67.
395Johnson, pp. 288-300; "U.S. Seeks to Hold a Neutral
Stance," New York Times , June 6, 1967, p. 1; "U.N. Impasse
Ends," New York Times , June 7, 1967, p. 1. Also see Quandt,
pp. 60-63; Howe, pp. 90-94.
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resolution and called on Israel to adhere to it. The United
States specifically tried to prevent the Israeli attack on
396
Syria. President Johnson used the Soviet-American "hot
line" to communicate with Soviet leaders during the crisis,
397
the first use of the system for its intended purpose.
American efforts were thus primarily political and diplo-
matic, and military forces had only a small active role.
Soviet objectives in the crisis were to prevent its
clients in the Middle East from suffering catastrophic
defeats and to expand its influence among Arab nations at
the expense of the United States. As it became apparent
that Israel was scoring a major triumph, the Soviet
objective shifted to limiting the extent of Arab defeats and
the reducing the potential erosion of Soviet prestige and
398influence in the Middle East.
The Soviet strategy prior to the war was to support a
rapid military build-up in Syria and Egypt and to encourage
396 Ibid; Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "News Briefing
at the White House," Department of State Bulletin 56 (June
26, 1967): 950.
397
"Johnson Pleased by Gains on Truce," New York
Times , June 9, 1967, p. 1; Hugh Sidey, "Over the hot line
—
the Middle East," Life , June 16, 1967, p. 24B; Johnson, pp.
298-302; Howe, pp. 91-92, 103.
398
Ulam, pp. 732-34; S. Niel MacFarlane, "The Soviet
Union and Conflict Management in the Middle East," in
Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds
.
, Conflict
Management in the Middle East (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1987), pp. 187-207. For a critique of Soviet policy
in 1967, see Khrushchev, Last Testament , pp. 344-46.
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Egypt and Syria to adopt a belligerent stance toward
Israel. There are indications that the Soviets may even
have helped provoke the war by spreading rumors of imminent
Israeli attacks. The Soviet strategy during the war was to
provide strong diplomatic support for the Arab nations.
When war broke out the Soviet Government immediately
condemned Israeli "aggression" and demanded that Israeli
forces withdraw from Arab territory as a condition for a
ceasefire. As the extent of the Arab losses became
apparent, however, the Soviets dropped the withdrawal demand
and supported an unconditional immediate ceasefire in order
to forestall further Arab defeats. Soviet public pronounce-
399
ments remained solidly pro-Arab throughout the crisis.
Anthony R. Wells concludes the Soviets took four military
actions in support of their crisis diplomacy: reinforcing
their Mediterranean squadron; shadowing Western aircraft
carriers; mounting a airlift and sealift to resupply the
Arabs; and threatening direct military intervention in the
Middle East, probably with airborne troops. On June 10,
the day after Israel invaded Syria, the Soviets sent a
threat over the hot line to take "necessary actions,
399
"Moscow Demands Israel Quit Egypt," New York Times
,
June 6, 1967, p. 1; "U.N. Impasse Ends," New York Times ,
June 7, 1967, p. 1; Howe, pp. 114-116.
400Anthony R. Wells, "The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,"
in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds
.
, Soviet Naval
Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 166.
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including military" unless Israel unconditionally halted
military action in the next few hours. The Soviets also
sent a blunt warning to Israel, which they revealed in the
U.N. Security Council. However, the threat was not backed
by overt military moves signalling an intent to carry it out
401in the near future. The Soviet role in the war thus
consisted primarily of diplomatic activity, backed by low-
level signalling with military forces.
In summary, the United States and the Soviet Union had
limited objectives in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and both
superpowers limited their roles primarily to political and
diplomatic activities. However, both superpowers used their
naval forces in the Mediterranean for political signalling,
as will be discussed below. Unlike the Cuban Missile
Crisis, which was a direct superpower crisis, the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War was an indirect superpower crisis. In a direct
superpower crisis the primary confrontation is between the
United States and the Soviet Union. In an indirect
superpower crisis the primary confrontation is between
allies or clients of the United States and the Soviet
Union. An indirect superpower crisis can be more difficult
for the superpowers to manage because the outcome is heavily
influenced by the decisions and actions of their clients.
401Johnson, p. 302; Howe, pp. 104-6, 122. Also see
Francis Fukuyama, "Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention
Threats in the Middle East," Orbis 25 (Fall 1981): 583-84.
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The superpowers can be put in the role of restraining, as
well as supporting, their clients.
Command and Control
By 1967 the defense reorganization of 1958 had taken
firm hold and the military chain of command ran from the
President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the unified and
specified commanders. The JCS no longer used the executive
agent system. The unified commander responsible for Europe
and the Mediterranean was United States Commander in Chief
Europe (USCINCEUR) , General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army,
commander of all U.S. forces in the European Command
(EUCOM) . USCINCEUR was also Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) , commanding all NATO forces in and immediately
around Europe.
The Navy component commander under USCINCEUR was
Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR)
,
Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., headquartered in London.
Because CINCUSNAVEUR was a Navy command as well as a
component of the unified command, Admiral McCain reported
administratively direct to the CNO, Admiral David L.
402
McDonald, as well as operationally to General Lemnitzer.
402This was not unique to CINCUSNAVEUR: component
commands invariably are "dual-hatted" as administrative or
geographic area commanders within their own services, as
well as being operational commanders under a unified
command. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example,
CICNCAFLANT—CINCLANT' s' Air Force component commander—could
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There were three naval commands under CINCUSNAVEUR concerned
with operations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
The most important was the Sixth Fleet, commanded by Vice
Admiral William I. Martin (COMSIXTHFLT) , embarked in USS
Little Rock (CLG 4). The Sixth Fleet was also the NATO
Striking Force Mediterranean. The other two commands were
Commander Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH)
,
headquartered in Naples, Italy, responsible for ASW
operations in the Mediterranean, and Commander Middle East
Force, responsible for U.S. naval forces in the Persian
Gulf. Of these commands, the Sixth Fleet played the most
important role in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
The United States had maintained a continuous naval
presence in the Mediterranean since the end of World War
II. Initially, this force was small, consisting only of two
destroyer squadrons and some amphibious and support ships.
In August 1946 the force was expanded and included the
nearly constant presence of at least one attack carrier
group. On February 12, 1950, U.S. Navy forces in the
Mediterranean were designated the Sixth Fleet in recognition
of the Mediterranean's strategic importance to NATO's
southern flank.
report directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff as well as
to CINCLANT. There is an important reason for this: the
service chain of command provides essential support
services, such as spare parts and replacement personnel, and





The Sixth Fleet consisted of several Task Forces, the
most important of which was the Carrier Strike Force (Task
Force 60) . In the spring of 1967 TF 60 was commanded by
Rear Admiral Laurence R. Geis, embarked in USS America (CVA
66), and consisted of two Task Groups. Task Group 60.1
consisted of the USS America (CVA 66) and six escorting
destroyers. Task Group 60.2 consisted of the USS Saratoga
(CVA 60), the cruiser USS Galveston (CLG 3), and four
destroyers. The other Sixth Fleet Task Force that had a
role in the crisis was the Amphibious Force (Task Force 61)
,
consisting of an amphibious ready group with an embarked
Marine battalion landing team (BLT) , some 1,300 troops.
United States communications capabilities in 1967 had
improved over 1962, but still did not enable the President
to directly control ships at sea. The primary communica-
tions links to the Sixth Fleet were the fleet HF radiotele-
type broadcast and other HF channels from communications
stations around the Mediterranean. Satellite communications
had been introduced into the fleet on an experimental basis
in 1963 and various prototype systems were being tested
9including limited operational use in the Vietnam war) , but
the Sixth Fleet was still relying on HF communications. The
Sixth Fleet had HF/SSB voice radio communications with local
communications stations and shore-based headquarters in
southern Europe, but had no capability to speak directly
with the Pentagon or the White House. Verbal orders from
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the White House could be sent to USCINCEUR via phone lines,
but were then relayed to the Sixth Fleet via
403
radioteletype.
Although the White House sought to control the
movements of the Sixth Fleet for political signalling, the
chain of command was used for transmitting orders to the
Sixth Fleet. President Johnson and McNamara did not attempt
404
to gxve orders directly to ships at sea. The White House
Situation Room was unable to monitor Sixth Fleet operations
real-time. The President and McNanara had to await verbal
reports from USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR, or receipt of
message operational reports (OPREPs) , situation reports
(SITREPs) , and operational summaries (OPSUMs)
.
The only aspect of Sixth Fleet operations that was
controlled by the White House was the general location of
405the Task Forces in the Mediterranean. In addition to the
403On U.S. comunications capabilities in 1973, see
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Review of
Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase I ,
Hearings, 92nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1971). Also see Blair, pp. 51-65;
Carter, pp. 233-57; Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short and
Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presidential
Decision Making in the Mayaquez and Korean Confrontations
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 85-99.
404Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, Deputy Commander in Chief
U.S. Naval Forces Europe during the crisis, letter to
author, March 28, 1988.
405Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Commander in Chief
Atlantic during the crisis, interview by author, February 9,
1988. Admiral Horacio Rivero, Vice CNO during the crisis,
states there was close control "to the extent of the JCS
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overall effort to signal the U.S. intention to stay out of
the conflict, Sixth Fleet movements were used on at least
three occasions (described below) to send specific political
signals to the Soviet Union. However, Sixth Fleet movements
generally were not under positive direct control. Rather,
general geographic limits were placed on on the fleet's
movements and control by negation was exercised—Vice
Admiral Martin reported his actions up the chain of command,
allowing the White House to alter politically inappropriate
fleet movements. There appear to have been no instances
in which the President countermanded an order given by Vice
Admiral Martin.
The President and Secretary of Defense did not use the
mechanisms of indirect control to issue detailed operational
guidance to the Sixth Fleet. USCINCEUR had contingency
plans for a wide range of emergencies and hostilities, but
directing COMSIXTHFLT to proceed to a certain latitude and
longitude, or to operate not less than X miles from the
coast. H Rivero, letter to author, March 10, 1988.
According to Vice Admiral Donald D. Engen, Commanding
Officer of USS America (CVA 66) during the crisis, the
movements and operations of the carriers were not closely
controlled from Washington, other than a requirement that
the carriers operate in the vicinity of specific points
rather than being allowed to roam at will. Vice Admiral
Donald D. Engen, letter to author, March 21, 1988. This
restriction appears to have been imposed by the Navy chain
of command in order to facilitate control of the carriers'
movements in response to White House signalling efforts. It
was a compromise between telling the carriers precisely what
to do on a real-time basis and allowing them complete
autonomy
.
Wylie, letter to author, March 28, 1988
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no special contingency plans appear to have been issued
407
specifically for the 1967 war. The U.S. Government had
been preparing plans for an international naval force to
challenge the Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran, but
the outbreak of war halted efforts to organize the force.
No special mission orders were issued for the crisis.
Likewise, no special rules of engagement were issued for the
crisis. The only special guidance was restrictions on how
closely U.S. ships and aircraft could approach the coasts of
Israel, Egypt, and Syria. Other than this, the Sixth
Fleet was governed by standing CINCUSNAVEUR peacetime rules
409
of engagement. The lack of attention to mechanisms of
indirect control is not surprising given the short duration
of the crisis and the relatively limited scope and intensity
of the naval operations that were conducted during the
crisis.
407 •See the suggestive comments by Vice Admiral Martin
and Rear Admiral Geis in "Admirals Cite Options," New York
Times , June 1, 1967, p. 18.
408Admiral Moorer, interview by author, February 9,
1988; Wylie, letter to author, March 28, 1988; Engen, letter
to author, March 21, 1988; "2nd Russian Ship Watches
Carrier," New York Times , June 8, 1967, p. 14.
409This is evident in the orders given by COMSIXTHFLT
in response to the attack on the Liberty. The rules of
engagement guidance refers to the standing CINCUSNAVEUR
rules issued prior to the crisis. See COMSIXTHFLT 081320Z
JUN 67, naval message, June 6, 1967 (Unclassified.
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC); COMSIXTHFLT 081339Z JUN 67, naval message, June 6, 1967






Soviet naval operations during the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War attracted a great deal of attention among Western naval
analysts because it marked the first significant employment
of the Soviet navy in a crisis. As Anthony Wells observed,
"The 1967 June War was a watershed in the evolution of
Soviet naval diplomacy. It was the first occasion on which
the Soviets utilized significant naval power in Third World
410
coercive diplomacy." Similarly, Bradford Dismukes
suggests, based on the composition and number of Soviet
ships deployed to the Mediterranean during the crisis, that
"for the first time Soviet decision makers regarded the Navy
as an important tool of their diplomacy and a quasi-credible
411deterrent threat to the employment of U.S. naval power."
The Soviet Union had embarked on a program of naval
expansion after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and had
greatly increased its naval operations on the high seas.
From mid-1964 onward the Soviet navy maintained a continuous
presence in the Mediterranean. The average daily force
level rose from five ships in 1964 to fifteen ships in
1966. In the first part of 1967 the Soviets normally had
410Wells, p. 168.
411Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet Employment of Naval
Power for Political Purposes, 1967-75," in Michael MccGwire
and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic




five or six warships, a like number of submarines, and
several support vessels in the Mediterranean. The Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron (the Fifth Eskadra ) was not unusually
active, spending much time at anchor or in small-scale train-
ing exercises. However, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
conducted close surveillance and aggressive intelligence
collection against the Sixth Fleet, particularly its attack
carriers, and conducted ASW exercises in which simulated
U.S. Polaris submarines were hunted down. The Soviets also
began using their navy more frequently for political
purposes, making port visits to friendly countries and
412
moving ships to the vicinity of hot spots.
In early May 1967 the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
was conducting routine operations and was at a normal
412
F.M. Murphy, "The Soviet Navy in the
Mediterranean," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 93 (March
1967): 38-44; Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy:
Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1968), pp. 93, 110, 154-55; Melvin D.
Blixt, "Soviet Objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean,"
Naval War College Review 21 (March 1969): 16-21; Walter
Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union
in the Mediterranean, 1958-1968 (New York: Macmillan, 1969),
pp. 145-57; Gary G. Sick, "Russia and the West in the
Mediterranean: Perspectives for the 1970' s," Naval War
College Review 22 (June 1970):. 49-69; C.B. Joynt and O.M.
Smolansky, Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean ,
Research Monograph No. 3 (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University,
Department of International Relations, July 1972), pp. 6-7,
15-16, 25-27; Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Challenge
for the 1970s (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974), pp. 65-66;
Jesse W. Lewis, The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), pp.
59-72; Bruce W. Watson, Red Navy at Sea (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1982), pp. 85-87.
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peacetime strength of some seven warships: a Kotlin-class
destroyer (DDG) armed with SAM missiles, two Riga-class
frigates, a Mirka-class corvette (or light frigate), a Petya-
class corvette, and two minesweepers. On May 12 two Soviet
ships entered the Mediterranean from the Black Sea: the
Slava , an old Kirov-class cruiser whose main armament was
nine 7.1-inch guns, and a Kashin-class DDG. This was prob-
ably a routine deployment, perhaps a training cruise for
cadets or recruits. By May 22, however, Turkey had received
notification from the Soviet Union that an additional ten
ships would be passing through the Turkish Straits into the
Mediterranean. Four Soviet warships passed through the
Turkish Straits on June 3 and 4: a Krupnyy-class destroyer
armed with two SS-N-1 anti-ship cruise missile launchers, a
Kildin-class destroyer armed with one SS-N-1 anti-ship
cruise missile launcher, a Kashin-class DDG, and a Kotlin-
class destroyer. As of June 5, the Soviets had a total of
thirteen surface combatants in the Mediterranean: one
cruiser, two cruise missile-armed destroyers, two SAM-armed
destroyers, two destroyers, four frigates and corvettes, and
two minesweepers. No further surface combatants were added
during the war. Two or three Soviet attack submarines were
413
also thought to be in the Mediterranean.
413
"Soviet is Sending 10 More Warships to Middle
East," New York Times , May 31, 1967, p. 1; "Soviet Ships
Transit Straits," New York Times , June 1, 1967, p. 18;
"Soviet Ships in Bosporous," New York Times , June 4, 1967,
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If the Soviets intended the deployment of these ships
to serve as a political signal, they succeeded. The Mew
York Times on May 31 quoted "Washington officials" as saying
the Soviet ship movements were a "calculated show of force"
and reported concern in Washington that the presence of the
Soviet ships might encourage the Arab states to harden their
414Anti-Israeli stance.
As tensions mounted in the Middle East during May and
early June of 1967, the Sixth Fleet was discretely readied
for action and maneuvered in support of the President's
diplomatic efforts to get Egypt to open the Strait of Tiran
415
and thereby avert war. On May 20 Saratoga was moved to
the eastern Mediterranean. On May 25 America and the Sixth
Fleet flagship. Little Rock , were ordered to join Saratoga
in the eastern Mediterranean. The two carriers
p. 4; "A Larger Soviet Vessel Follows U.S. Carrier in the
Mediterranean," New York Times , June 4, 1967, p. 4. Also
see Wells, pp. 160-62; Disraukes, p. 497. There is no
information available on Soviet submarine deployments during
the crisis. Dismukes argues that it is reasonable to assume
that the number of Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean
would have increased proportional to the increase in surface




"Soviet is Sending 10 More Warships to Middle
East," New York Times , May 31, 1967, p. 1
415Sick p. 57.
• 416The western Mediterranean extends from the Strait
of Gibralter to the Strait of Sicily, including the Alboran,
Tyrrhenian, and Ligurian Seas. The central Mediterranean
extends from the Strait of Sicily to the southern tip of
Greece, including the Ionian and Adriatic Seas. The eastern

725
rendezvoused north of Crete on May 29. The Sixth Fleet was
directed to remain west of a line drawn from eastern Libya
to the eastern end of Crete—over two hundred miles from
western Egypt, over four hundred miles from the Suez Canal,
and over six hundred miles from Syria. On May 25 the Sixth
Fleet amphibious group (TF 61) was sailed from Naples to
Malta for a port visit. The amphibious group was standing
by primarily to evacuate U.S. citizens from the Middle East
if the need arose, but was also capable of landing the
Marines it carried. On May 27 the JCS directed the Sixth
Fleet readied for a non-combat deterrence role in the event
417
of war in the Middle East.
The Navy's Middle East Force normally consisted of two
destroyers and the flagship, a seaplane tender. In mid-May
the Navy had used the normal rotation of ships to reinforce
the Middle East Force by delaying the departure of the
destroyer being replaced. On May 23 Commander Middle East
Force was directed to move his four ships into the Red Sea.
Mediterranean extends from the southern tip of Greece
eastward, including the Sea of Crete and the Aegean Sea.
This reflects common U.S. Navy and Government usage.
417
"Johnson Calls on Cairo to Abandon Blockade Moves,
New York Times, May 24, 1967, p. 1? "Soviet Watching U.S.
Fleet," New York Times , May 31, 1967, p. 16; "Soviet
Destroyer off Malta," New York Times , June 3, 1967, p. 31;
"Two U.S. Carriers Staying in Place," New York Times , June
6, 1967, p. 18; J.C. Wylie, "The Sixth Fleet and American
Diplomacy," in J.C. Hurewitz, ed. , Soviet-American Rivalry
in the Middle East (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1969), p.
58; Wylie, letter to author, March 28, 1988. Also see
Dismukes, p. 497; Howe p. 69; Sick, p. 56; Wells, p. 164.
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On June 1 Middle East Force established two patrols in the
Red Sea. On June 3 the destroyer USS Dyess (DD 880)
transited the Suez canal into the Red Sea. This was a
routine rotation of ships, but resulted in further
418
reinforcement of the Middle East Force. There were no
interactions between U.S. and Soviet naval units in the Red
Sea during the Six Day war.
The Soviet navy closely monitored Sixth Fleet move-
ments on the eve of the crisis. On about May 23 a Soviet
intelligence collection ship (AGI) began shadowing
Saratoga . On May 28 a Riga-class frigate began trailing
America as she moved into the eastern Mediterranean. On
June 4 a Kashin-class DDG took over trailing America and
remained with the carrier through the start of the war. Two
Soviet minesweepers were monitoring the British carrier HMS
Victorious at Malta. They were joined by a Kotlin-class
destroyer on June 2. The Soviet ships shadowing American
carriers were "tattletales, " assigned to monitor the
carriers' operations and provide targeting data for Soviet
419
anti-carrier forces, particularly strike aircraft.
418
"Canal Reprisal Hinted by Egypt," New York Times ,
June 3, 1967, p. 8; Wylie, "Sixth Fleet," p. 60; Wylie,
letter to author, March 28, 1988.
419^
'"Soviet Watching U.S. Fleet," New York Times , May
31, 1967, p. 16; "Soviet Destroyer off Malta," New York
Times . June 3, 1967, p. 31; "A Larger Soviet Vessel Follows
U.S. Carrier in Mediterranean," New York Times , June 4,
1967, p. 4. Also see Wells 162-4; Dismukes, p. 497.
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Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, Deputy Commander in Chief of
U.S. Naval Forces Europe during the Six Day War, pointed out
that Navy commanders, recognizing that Sixth Fleet movements
would send important political signals, placed limitations
on the fleet's actions during May and early June: "Thus the
move to readiness in the. Arab-Israeli mobilization period
had three careful signals built into it: no premature
departures from scheduled port visits; the deliberate and
visible retention of the amphibious forces in the central
Mediterranean; and the purposeful retention of American
forces south of Crete and well clear of the prospective
420 . . •
scene of action." Additionally, in order to avoid giving
the impression that the Sixth Fleet was being reinforced,
the attack carrier USS Intrepid (CVA 11) , en route from the
U.S. east coast to Vietnam, was not placed under the command
of COMSIXTHFLT and was kept away from the rest of the Sixth
Fleet. Intrepid was ordered on May 29 to transit the Suez
421Canal and made the transit on May 31.
420
Wylie, "Sixth Fleet." p. 59. Rear Admiral Wylie,
who participated in the crisis at CINCUSNAVEUR, emphasizes
that these restrictions were originally imposed by the Navy
chain of command, rather than the White House: "The naval
command estimated, correctly as it turned out, that the
United States policy would be to stand aloof from military
involvement if possible, to play the United States military
role in as low a key as possible in order to give the
greatest scope for diplomatic maneuver, but to be ready and
on hand." Ibid.
421
Wylie, "Sixth Fleet," p. 59; Wells, p. 164. The
actions taken to avoid the appearance that Intrepid was
reinforcing the Sixth Fleet may have been too subtle to be
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On May 31 the carriers of TF 60, which had been
operating together since May 25, were split into two task
groups operating independently. That night America , accom-
panied by Little Rock , moved to a position south of Crete,
leaving Saratoga north of the island. The two carriers
422
remained in these areas through June 6. On June 4, the
day before war broke out, most of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron (eleven ships, including Slava ) was anchored at the
423Kithira anchorage south of Greece and west of Crete.
These were the dispositions of U.S. and Soviet naval forces
in the Mediterranean when war erupted on June 5.
When war broke out on June 5 the two U.S. carriers
were operating (in their separate groups) in the vicinity of
Crete. The Sixth Fleet remained in the Eastern
»
Mediterranean to deter Soviet intervention, but was kept
readily discerned. The U.S. press reported on May 31 that
Intrepid had been ordered to remain in the Mediterranean to
reinforce the Sixth Fleet. See "Soviet Watching U.S.
Fleet," New York Times , May 31, 1967, p. 16; "Admiral Says
Soviet Shadowing Often Imperils Ships in 6th Fleet," New
York Times , June 1, 1967, p. 18. The fact that Intrepid
loitered in the central Mediterranean for six days before
transiting the Suez Canal appears to have been the origin of
such erroneous reports (the delay was caused by Egyptian
reluctance to let the carrier make the transit)
.
422
"2 U.S. Carriers Continue Air Exercises Near
Crete, " New York Times , June 3, 1967, p. 12; "Two U.S.
Carriers Staying in Place," New York Times , June 6, 1967, p.
18.
423
"Two U.S. Carriers Staying in Place," New York
Times , June 6, 1967, p. 18. Also see Wells, p. 162;




well clear of the fighting. The U.S. Navy unit closest to
the fighting on June 5 was a lone Navy carrier-based
reconnaissance plane on a routine flight one hundred
nautical miles off the coast of Egypt. The Sixth Fleet
initially was ordered to remain at least one hundred
nautical miles from the Syrian coast, but in fact did not
approach closer than about four hundred nautical miles.
Carrier aircraft were ordered to remain at least two hundred
nautical miles from the Egyptian and Israeli coasts. The
U.S. carriers were placed at an increased condition of
readiness, which included doubling the number of aircraft
ready for immediate launch and arming strike aircraft with
424
conventional bombs and missiles.
The political caution that had marked Sixth fleet
operations prior to the crisis continued after the war broke
425
out. Ship movements were announced and routine port
424
"Navy Says One Plane Flew Near War Zone," New York
Times , June 10, 1967, p. 22; "6th Fleet Ships in State of
Alert," New York Times , June 7, 1967, p. 17; "2nd Russian
Ship Watches Carrier," New York Times , June 8, 1967, p. 14;
Howe, p. 93. The ships of the Sixth Fleet were ordered to
readiness condition three, an internal Navy readiness
designation unrelated to the JCS worldwide DEFCON system.
Navy ships were normally at "Condition IV," defined as
normal peacetime steaming. At "Condition III" the ships
would put additional crewmen on watch and man certain
weapons and combat systems normally left unmanned.
425Wells observes that "The U.S. and U.K. went to
considerable pains to show that they did not intend to use
their naval forces offensively." Wells, p. 164. Similarly,
Howe noted that "The posture of the Sixth Fleet reflected




visits and shore liberty continued. Significantly,
seventeen civilian reporters embarked America beginning on
May 29. Vice Admiral Engen, Commanding Officer of America
during the crisis, stated that "We used the embarked press
corps to provide safety from misrepresentation. That was a
427U.S. tactic." Thus, the emphasis in Sixth Fleet opera-
tions was on demonstrating the U.S. intention to avoid
involvement in the fighting.
On June 5 and 6 the two U.S. carrier groups steamed to
the southeast. Although the press would correctly report
this movement as a deliberate signal to the Soviets, it was,
as Howe reports, ordered by the Task Force Commander without
prior knowledge of the White House:
As it happened, the Sixth Fleet carrier task forces
had begun speeding at twenty knots in a southeasterly
direction in order to vary their "position while still
maintaining a neutral posture with respect to the Arab-
Israeli war." The ships were under orders to remain
at least 200 miles from the area of conflict, and
proceeded to a position 100 miles southeast of Crete.
Although this change of position was ordered on the
initiative of local commanders, the movement
426
Wylie, "Sixth Fleet," p. 58-59; Engen, letter to
author, March 21, 1988; Wells, p. 164. The only exception
to the policy of continuing routine ports visits was that
the JCS on May 27 cancelled all port visits for the two U.S.
aircraft carriers. As a result of this action, America
remained at sea from May 22 to June 21—the longest the
carrier had been at sea continuously since commissioning.
USS America (CVA 67), Ship's History, 1967 (Ships History
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC)
.
427
Engen, letter to author, March 21, 1988. Also see
USS America (CVA 67), Ship's History, 1967 (Ships History
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC); Wylie,
-Sixth Fleet," p. 59; Wells, p. 164.
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represented a timely underlining of American
determination. The White House took advantage of the
repositioning as a means of showing the Russians, who
were tailing the task forces, that the United States
would not be intimidated although it earnestly sought
a U.N. solution.
This episode illustrates that the White House was not
•xercising positive direct control over the movements of the
carriers. Had the President felt that the movement of the
carrier force would send too threatening a signal, he could
have ordered it to reverse course and move away from the
fighting (thus exercising control by negation) . Instead,
because the movement supported the President's political
objectives, it was publicized and allowed to continue.
On June 6 Egypt claimed that U.S. and British carrier
aircraft had assisted Israel in its initial air strikes on
Egyptian airfields. The Soviets, whose ships were closely
monitoring the Sixth Fleet carriers, knew that U.S. carrier
429planes could not have participated in the attacks. In
response to the Arab charge, the two U.S. carriers, then
428Howe, p. 95. He quotes Rear Admiral Guise,
commander of the carrier task force. For how the press
reported the movement, see "6th Fleet Ships in State of
Alert," New York Times , June 7, 1967, p. 17.
429
"U.S. Denies Charges By Cairo It Helps Foe," New
York Times . June 7, 1967, p. 1; "2nd Russian Ship Watches
Carrier," New York Times , June 8, 1967, p. 14; Johnson, p.
302; Wylie, "Sixth Fleet," p. 59. Also see Trevor N. Dupuy,
Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1978), p. 269; Howe, pp. 99-102; Sick p. 56;
Wells, p. 165; Laqueur, p. 155. Egyptian President Nasser
would later admit that no U.S. planes had attacked Egypt.
"Envoys Say Nasser Now Concedes U.S. Didn't Help Israel,"
New York Times , September 16, 1967, p. 3; Howe, p. 119.
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southeast of Crete, were ordered on June 6 to move west-
ward. The U.S. carriers continued moving westward through
June 8, reaching a position southwest of Crete.
On June 7 a suspected Soviet submarine was detected in
the vicinity of the America task group and was tracked by
430U.S. destroyers, ASW helicopters, and patrol planes.
This appears to have sparked the most severe Soviet
harassment of the Sixth Fleet during the crisis. On June 7
a Soviet Kashin-class DDG trailing the America task group
threatened to collide with the destroyer USS Lawe (DD 763)
in a nautical version of the game "chicken." This incident
could well have been sparked by the U.S. prosecution of a
suspected Soviet submarine near the America task group. In
response to the incident, Vice Admiral Martin sent a message
to the Soviet destroyer, warning it to clear the U.S.
formation. The Soviet ship withdrew, but returned the next
morning. On June 8 the America task group experienced the
most severe Soviet harassment of the crisis. The Kashin-
class DDG and a Mirka-class corvette maneuvered dangerously
close to America , attempting to force the carrier to change
course while it was conducting flight operations. The
harassment on June 8 appears to have been a defiant reponse
430The Navy objective was to "trail to exhaustion,"
that is, to track the submarine until it had to surface or
snorkel in the presence of U.S. ASW forces in order to
recharge its batteries—a symbolic victory in peacetime ASW
operations (with the subtle message that the submarine could
have been hunted to destruction in wartime) .
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to Vice Admiral Martin's warning to the Soviet destroyer the
431previous day.
The Sixth Fleet had previously experienced serious
problems with Soviet surveillance vessels and had sent them
warnings to keep clear of U.S. formations. There was great
concern among Navy commanders in the Mediterranean that
there would be further incidents because the Soviet ships
had adopted aggressive shadowing tactics, maneuvering
432dangerously close to U.S. ships. Vice Admiral Engen,
then the Commanding Officer of America , has described the
U.S. Navy attitude toward Soviet harassment:
We telegraphed intentions to maneuver and then held
firm to [the] Rules of the Road. . . . COMSIXTHFLT and
CTF 60 [Rear Admiral Geis] were strongly supportive of
U.S. C.O.'s in order to keep [the] Soviets from
achieving [success with] what were then harassing
tactics. ... [I experienced] frequent Soviet
attempts to embarrass USS America by maneuvering to
431
"Russians Continue to Harass 6th Fleet," New York
Times , June 9, 1967, p. 1. Also see Howe, p. 177n; Wells,
p. 215n. The Soviets have been known to harass U.S. ships
prosecuting their submarines on other occasions as well.
For a description of a similar incident in 1972, see Rear
Admiral Robert P. Hilton, "The US-Soviet Incidents at Sea
treaty," Naval Forces 6 (1/1985): 30-31.
432
Engen, letter to author, March 21, 1988; "Admiral
Says Soviet Shadowing Often Imperils Ships in 6th Fleet,"
New York Times , June 1, 1967, p. 18. There had also been
two serious incidents in the Sea of Japan on May 10 and 11,
when two Soviet destroyers collided with the destroyer USS
Walker (DD 517) while maneuvering in the midst of an ASW
carrier formation. This incident received front page
headlines in the United States and was on the minds of Navy
commanders in the Mediterranean. On the Walker , see "A U.S.
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use [the] Rules of the Road to interfere with flight
operations. I held firm, and-would have run down a
Soviet ship if I was right.
Soviet harassment thus was more than an annoyance, it could
well have led to a serious collision with an American war-
434
ship. A serious collision would have increased tensions
in the Mediterranean and might also have interfered with
Washington's and Moscow's efforts to manage the crisis.
On June 8 the U.S. amphibious group with its embarked
Marines departed Malta and steamed eastward toward the war
zone. Also on June 8, America and Little Rock moved
eastward to provide assistance to USS Liberty , under attack
off the Sinai coast. On June 9, when America rendezvoused
with Liberty , the carriers made their closest approach to
the fighting, reaching a position about one hundred nautical
miles north of Alexandria, Egypt. After taking aboard the
dead and wounded from Liberty the carriers moved westward,
435
reaching a position north of Darnah, Libya, by June 10.
On June 10, in response to the Soviet threat to take
military action against Israel, President Johnson ordered
433
Engen, letter to author-, March 21, 1988.
434 . .There was a serious collision between the British
aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and a Soviet destroyer in the
Mediterranean on November 9, 1970. "Soviet and British
Warships Collide," New York Times , November 11, 1970, p. 2.
Soviet maneuvering in this incident was very similar to that
conducted near America in 1967.
435




the Sixth Fleet moved closer to Syria. The U.S. carriers
teamed to the northeast at full speed. The President also
reduced the fleet's minimum distance to the Syrian coast
436from one hundred to fifty nautical miles. In his memoir
President Johnson makes it clear that this was done as a
political signal:
We knew that Soviet intelligence ships were
electronically monitoring the fleet's every movement.
Any change in course or speed would be signalled
instantly to Moscow. . . .We all knew the Russians
would get the message as soon as their monitors
observed the change in the fleet's pattern. That
message, which no translator would need to interpret
to the Kremlin leadership, was that the United States
was prepared.to resist Soviet intrusion into the
Middle East.
This was the most important instance of the Sixth Fleet
being used to send a specific political signal. It is not
clear, however, that the signal had a major impact on the
crisis: Israel apparently had no intention of seizing
Damascus and soon stopped its advance into Syria, and the
Soviets made no military overt moves to carry out the
threat. 438
The most important Soviet naval activity during the
crisis was trailing the U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean.
America was shadowed by one or more Soviet warships
continuously from May 28 to June 14, but neither of the
436Johnson, p. 302; Howe, pp. 106-8; Wells, p. 165-6.
437Johnson, p. 302.
4 "' 8Howe, pp. 106-8; Wells, p. 165-6.
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Soviet cruise missile-armed destroyers participated in this
shadowing. Saratoga was not shadowed by Soviet warships
other than during the May 29-31 period, when she was
operating with America . Saratoga was probably trailed by a
Soviet intelligence ship (AGI) from May 23 to June 13. The
*
Soviet navy also kept a Kotlin-class destroyer and two type
439
T-43 minesweepers off Malta throughout the war. Although
this close surveillance of the Sixth Fleet was conducted
primarily for military purposes, it helped to avert
misperceptions of the fleet's role in the crisis (such as
the claim that U.S. carrier planes had attacked Egypt) and
greatly increased the value of the U.S. fleet as a political
instrument by ensuring that Soviet leaders would quickly
detect changes in its operations.
Armed surface warships were frequently used as
tattletales during the crisis because they had a higher top
speed than the intelligence ships (AGIs) and therefore were
better able to keep up with U.S. carriers. The Soviet
destroyers and frigates that were used as tattletales were
not heavily armed, so they did not present a serious
immediate threat to the carriers. In fact, the Soviet
combatants that served a tattletales appear to have been
selected precisely because they were expendable (the only
439 M 6th Fleet Ships in State of Alert," New York
Times , June 7, 1967, p. 17; "2nd Russian Ship Watches
Carrier," New York Times , June 8, 1967, p. 14. Also see
Wells, p. 164; Dismukes, p. 497.
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exception*! were the fast new Kashin-class destroyers,
selected because of their speed) . On the other hand, as
Anthony Wells points out, use of. combatants rather than AGIs
as tattletales "expresses increased Soviet interest, both
440
military and political, in the force being shadowed."
The Soviet tattletales thus served as political signal to
the United States, as well as being means of conveying U.S.
political signals to the Soviet Union.
Anthony Wells has suggested that the Soviet ships in
441the Mediterranean comprised two anti-carrier groups. If
this were the case, the Soviet ships would have been
organized into two distinct groups, one group within missile
range of each carrier, with a cruise missile-armed ship in
each group. This pattern was never observed during the
crisis. Although the two Soviet cruise missile-armed ships
occasionally moved to within missile range of the U.S.
carriers, it is clear that they did not make a concerted
effort to keep the carriers in their sights. The Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron carried out operations at a very low
442tempo.
As tensions subsided after the ceasefire took effect
on June 11, the U.S. and Soviet navies gradually reduced. the
440Wells, p. 164.
441Ibid, p. 160.
442 .Dismukes, p. 498.
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tempo of their operations and reduced their forces in the
•astern Mediterranean. From June 12 to June 16 six of the
Soviet warships were located near Cyprus, apparently to
443protect Soviet shipping to Syria. This was the last
significant Soviet naval operation of the crisis. U.S.
naval forces left the eastern Mediterranean after the
ceasefire: Saratoga departed on June 13, America departed on
June 14, and the amphibious group departed on June 15.
In summary, tactical-level interactions between U.S.
and Soviet naval forces were intense during the crisis.
Soviet tattletales closely monitored the Sixth Fleet and
U.S. aircraft closely monitored the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron. Tensions at sea were acute on June 7 and 8 during
U.S. prosecution of a Soviet submarine and Soviet harassment
of the America carrier group. Because U.S. and Soviet naval
forces were in close proximity throughout the crisis, there
were ample opportunities for inadvertent military incidents
to occur between them.
The final step in this review of U.S. naval operations
during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War is to examine the tactical-
level interactions that could have occurred with Soviet or
Arab forces and the interactions that did occur with those
forces. The following interactions conceivably could have
occurred during the the crisis: collisions at sea between
443
Wells, p. 165. The Soviets also conducted an air-
lift of supplies to Syria and Egypt from June 8 tc July 2.
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U.S. and Soviet vessels, U.S. ships or aircraft firing on
Soviet or Arab planes approaching the fleet in a potentially
hostile manner, U.S. ships or aircraft firing on Arab naval
vessels approaching the fleet in a potentially hostile
wanner, Soviet naval vessels firing on U.S. planes
approaching them in a potentially hostile manner, Arab or
Israeli aircraft firing on U.S. planes flying reconnaissance
missions off their coasts, and Arab or Israeli aircraft or
ships firing on U.S. ships patrolling off their coasts.
Despite the intense tactical-level interaction between
U.S. and Soviet Naval forces, there were no incidents like
those described above. There were no collisions despite
Soviet harassment of the Sixth Fleet. No Soviet aircraft
were encountered during the crisis, which is unusual for the
Mediterranean. No Egyptian or Syrian vessels or aircraft
were encountered during the crisis because the sixth Fleet
423
was kept well clear of their coasts. There were very few
accidents involving U.S. naval forces, and none serious
enough to have an impact on Washington's ability to manage
the crisis. The only incident of the crisis was the Israeli
attack on the Liberty . Thus, ironically, the only mishap of
the crisis was perpetrated by the nation that the U.S.
supported in the war.
444
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This section will review the 1967 Arab-Israeli War to
answer the eight research questions. The first question is
to what degree were interactions between the forces of the
two sides at the scene of the crisis the result of actions
taken in accordance with mechanisms of indirect control,
rather than direct control by national leaders? The Johnson
Administration did not attempt to exercise direct control
over the operations of the Sixth Fleet other than its
movements in the Mediterranean. Nor did the President or
McNamara make an effort to provide specialized guidance in
mechanisms of indirect control, other than limitations on
how close the fleet and its aircraft could approach the
coasts of the belligerents. When the America carrier group
experienced severe Soviet harassment on June 8 the on-scene
commanders were guided by standing Navy policies for
handling such situations, rather than by special
instructions from the White House. There was thus
significant delegation of authority to on-scene commanders
and the guidance contained in Navy standing orders and
standing rules of engagement played a crucial role in
determining the nature of the tactical-level interactions
that occurred.
The second question is were the forces of the two
sides at the scene of the crisis tightly coupled with each




Fleet, U.S. aircraft closely monitored the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron, and U.S. ships and planes hunted
445Soviet submarines. As Anthony Wells points out, "Each
navy devoted considerable effort to tracking the other
through radar, sonar, electronic intercept, and visual
446
observation." Each side reacted to actions taken by the
other side. Thus, Soviet and American naval forces were
tightly coupled during the crisis.
The third question is were the forces of the two sides
being used by their national leaders as a political
instrument in the crisis? The answer clearly is yes. The
Johnson Administration used the Sixth Fleet to signal the
U.S. intention not to intervene in the crisis, but also used
the fleet to warn the Soviets against direct military
intervention in the conflict. The Soviet Union also
conveyed political signals by rapidly building up its
Mediterranean squadron, shadowing the Sixth Fleet, and
keeping the bulk of the squadron well clear of the fighting
and the Sixth Fleet. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was the
first crisis in which both superpowers actively used their
navies for political signalling.
The answers to these first three questions suggest
that conditions necessary for stratified interaction existed
445
"6th Fleet Ships in State of Alert," New York




in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War: the United States relied on
methods of delegated control, U.S. and Soviet naval forces
in the Mediterranean were tightly coupled, and both sides
used their forces as a political instrument under conditions
of conditions of acute crisis. Interactions occurred at the
tactical level that were not directly controlled by American
leaders. For example, President Johnson had no control over
whether or not the Soviet harassment of America on June 8
would produce a clash between the U.S. and Soviet navies.
The stratified interaction model of international crises, in
which interactions evolve in separate, serai-independent
sequences at the political, strategic, and tactical levels,
offers a good description of Soviet-American interactions in
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
The fourth question is did crisis interactions at the
tactical level become decoupled from the strategy being
pursued by national leaders? One of the potential causes of
decoupling was prominent in the crisis: the U.S.
communications system did not permit the President to
exercise real-time direct control over the Sixth Fleet.
President Johnson's ability to control the Sixth Fleet in
1967 was less than President Kennedy's ability to control
the Second Fleet during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
President Johnson had to rely more on command by negation
and delegated command than did President Kennedy. Another
potential cause of decoupling—a fast-paced tactical
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environment—was also present during some periods of the
crisis. The Sixth Fleet reacted to the attack on Liberty
hours before it received instructions from the Washington.
Similarly, the President could not tell Rear Admiral Geis or
Captain Engen how to handle the Soviet ships harassing
America and her escorts. The other potential causes of
decoupling—impairment of political decisionmaking,
ambiguous or ambivalent orders, tactically inappropriate
orders, inappropriate guidance in mechanisms of indirect
control, and deliberate unauthorized actions by military
commanders—did not have an observable impact on the crisis.
The second requirement for establishing that inter-
actions became decoupled during a crisis is that the
operational decisions made by tactical-level decisionmakers
differed from the decisions that political-level decision-
makers would have made in order to coordinate military
operations with their political-diplomatic strategy for
resolving the crisis. Divergence between tactical-level
military operations and political-level objectives was not a
serious problem during the crisis. Although on-scene
commanders were often making operational decisions on their
own authority, their decisions generally supported the Presi-
dent's political objectives. For example, Sixth Fleet
movements on June 6, taken on the initiative of Rear Admiral
Geis, sent the political signal the President wanted to send
at that moment even though he had not ordered the movement.
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Thus, the overall pattern was that of parallel stratified
interactions: interactions the President did not control,
but which supported his political objectives.
There way have been one instance of tactical-level
military operations diverging from political-level objec-
tives: the response of Navy on-scene commanders to Soviet
harassment on June 8. Navy commanders were determined not
to be intimidated by the dangerous maneuvering of the Soviet
ships, even at the risk of a collision. The stern warning
Vice Admiral Martin sent to the Soviet destroyer and the
ensuing game of chicken may not have been the types of
actions President Johnson desired for managing tensions with
the Soviet Union. However, there is no evidence that he
disapproved of how the the Navy commanders handled the
situation—there were no collisions or shots fired—so even
this incident is not a clear case of decoupling.
The fifth question is did national leaders and on-
scene commanders hold different perceptions of the
vulnerability of on-scene forces to pre-emption and the need
to strike first in the event of an armed clash? Threat
perceptions were not acute at any level of the chain of
command and there is evidence that officials in Washington
were more concerned about the Soviet Navy than were the on-
scene commanders. For example, when Liberty was attacked
McNamara and others in Washington thought that the Soviets
might have been responsible, while Navy commanders in the
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Mediterranean, who were closely monitoring Soviet movements,
knew that Soviet forces could not have conducted the
447
attack. If anything, Navy on-scene commanders perceived
the Soviet threat to the Sixth Fleet to be less dangerous
than did civilian officials in Washington. Threat percep-
tions and the security dilemma thus were not stratified
during the crisis.
The sixth question is, when tactical-level interac-
tions become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation
dynamics from occurring at the tactical level and being
transmitted upward to the strategic and political levels of
interaction? Although there were intense tactical-level
interactions during the crisis, there were no cases of such
interactions generating an escalation sequence the President
could not control. The most dangerous interactions took
place on June 7 and 8 during Soviet harassment of America
and her escorts. This interaction sequence did escalate, in
•
the sense that a second Soviet ship joined the harassment on
the second day, but did not escalate to violence. There
447
McNaraara has stated that he initially thought the
Soviets had attacked Liberty . "Secretary Rusk and Secretary
o£ Defense McNamara Discuss Viet-Nam and Korea on 'Meet the
Press * , ** Department of State Bulletin 58 (February 26,
1968): 271. Also see Howe, p. 102. Navy commanders knew
that there were no Soviet tactical aircraft or torpedo boats
in the Mediterranean and therefore did not suspect the
Soviets of the attack. Rivero, letter to author, March 10,
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were no collisions and no shots were fired. Although naval
commanders on both sides were determined not to be intimi-
dated, they were cautious to avoid collisions. Their
caution arose not so much from concern over the political
repercussions of an incident, but from the prudence any good
seaman would show under the circumstances. Collisions at
sea are extremely dangerous, so that even deliberate
collisions for signaling purposes are performed with great
caution. Thus, the first factor inhibiting escalation was
caution on the part of U.S. leaders in the restrictions they
placed on Sixth Fleet movements and caution on the part of
U.S. naval commanders in the Mediterranean when potentially
serious incidents did occur.
The June 7-8 harassment incident stands out because it
was entirely different from the behavior of the Soviet navy
during the rest of the crisis. On one other occasion a Riga-
class frigate trailing America approached the carrier as
close as 700 to 1,000 yards. Both this frigate and a Soviet
AGI following Saratoga frequently maneuvered inside the U.S.
formations, a dangerous practice when the carrier groups
maneuver to conduct flight operations. When a larger Kashin-
class destroyer was trailing America , the Soviet vessel
maneuvered with greater caution, generally remaining three
448to four miles behind the carrier. But none of these
448
"Soviet Watching U.S. Fleet," New York Times , May
31, 1967, p. 16; "Admiral Says Soviet Shadowing Often
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trailing operations constituted deliberate harassment of the
U.S. carriers. Overall, as Anthony Wells points out, "The
style of Soviet tattletale operations in this situation was
conservative. . . . Soviet units in the Mediterranean
generally avoided any action that could be construed as
449
systematic harassment."
The second factor inhibiting escalation was that the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron generally behaved in a cau-
450tious and circumspect manner. It did not practice anti-
carrier strikes on the U.S. carriers. In fact, the two
Soviet destroyers armed with anti-ship cruise missiles
rarely were in the vicinity of the U.S. carriers. Soviet
submarines also appear to have maintained a low profile,
rather than aggressively pursuing the U.S. carriers, and no
Soviet long-range strike aircraft were detected during the
crisis. This Soviet caution was an important factor in the
lack of escalation during particularly intense interactions
at sea. U.S. Navy commanders could tolerate a certain
amount of indiscretion by individual Soviet ships because it
clearly was not part of a pattern of harassment and did not
appear to presage a Soviet pre-emptive attack. Thus, while
Imperils Ships of 6th Fleet," New York Times , June 1, 1967,
p. 18; "A Larger Soviet Vessel Follows U.S. Carrier in
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Soviet efforts to show caution around the Sixth Fleet were
not entirely successful in preventing tensions from arising,
they did help to prevent serious incidents from occurring.
The third factor inhibiting escalation was the tight
coupling between U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the
Mediterranean. Sixth Fleet carrier aircraft and patrol
planes kept Vice Admiral Martin and the chain of command up
to the President informed of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron's operations and movements. Soviet tat tie tales
probably kept Moscow informed of Sixth Fleet operations and
movements on a near real-time basis. Overall, this was
beneficial for crisis management because the signal the
United States and Soviets were sending with their fleets was
one of non-involvement in the hostilities. When Soviet
ships harassed America , Vice Admiral Martin knew it was an
isolated act and that the rest of the Soviet squadron was
operating normally. When Israel attacked Liberty , Vice
Admiral Martin knew that the Soviets probably were not
responsible because he knew where their ships were and that
they did not have any tactical aircraft over the Mediterran-
ean. Thus, although tight coupling is generally perceived
as increasing the danger of escalation in crises, it can
also reduce the likelihood of escalation when both sides are
attempting to avoid involvement in a local conflict.
The fourth factor inhibiting escalation was use of the
Soviet-American hot line. Both sides used the hot line to
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express concerns, give warnings, and avoid misperceptions
.
Of particular importance was President Johnson's use of the
hot line to warn the Soviets of the U.S. response to the
attack on Liberty , which ensured that Soviet leaders would
not misperceive the purpose of the sudden launch of carrier
aircraft and America 's sprint toward the Sinai. The hot
line was thus used to dampen the potential negative effects
of tight coupling between U.S. and Soviet naval forces in
the Mediterranean. Ironically, while tight coupling of the
naval forces in the Mediterranean increased the need for the
hot line, it also increased the effectiveness of the hot
line as a means for conveying political messages. Soviet
and American leaders could verify the veracity of statements
made by the other side by comparing them with reports on the
other side's naval operations. The essential requirement
for this synergistic relationship to exist was careful
coordination of naval operations with political objectives
and diplomatic initiatives. The United States and the
Soviet Union were largely successful in achieving such
coordination.
The seventh question is did actions taken with
military forces send inadvertent signals to either
adversaries or friends, and did inadvertent military
incidents occur that affected efforts to manage the crisis?
There do not appear to have been any instances of the
Soviets seriously misperceiving the intent of Sixth Fleet
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operations, largely due to close Soviet monitoring of the
fleet and United States use of the hot line. However,
Lieutenant Commander Gary L. Sick, a naval intelligence
officer stationed at the American embassy in Cairo in 1967,
has suggested that Sixth Fleet movements in May
—
before the
war broke out—were misperceived by Arab leaders:
American policy was designed to use a military show of
force to convince Nasser that he should reopen the
Strait of Tiran and defuse the mounting tension in the
area. This was to be accomplished by a series of
careful moves and "signals" to the Egyptian
Government. The moves were indeed observed by the
Arab governments, but the signals were misinterpreted
in the atmosphere of tension and distrust. As shown
by the Syrian statement early in the crisis [May 15]
and by President Nasser's reference to the 6th Fleet
[May 29] , the Arabs strongly suspected an attack by
U.S. forces and tended to disregard relatively subtle
evidence to the contrary. Thus, the American policy
did not succeed and, in fact, provided the grounds for
making the United States the scapegoat., for a situation
it had tried desperately to prevent.
To review, in May the Sixth Fleet was concentrated in the
eastern Mediterranean: Saratoga on May 20, and America and
Little Rock on May 25. Although the carriers were directed
to remain over 400 miles from the Suez Canal, they easily
could have moved to within air strike range in less than a
day. Also in May, the U.S. Middle East Force was reinforced
and concentrated near Egypt: In mid-May a third destroyer
was added to the force, on May 23 the force was ordered into
the Red Sea, and on June 3 a fourth destroyer was added to
the force in the Red Sea. By June 3, then, the United
451 Sick p. 57.

751
States had four destroyers available to challenge the
Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran, and two carriers
in the Mediterranean ready to retaliate against Egypt if the
U.S. destoyers were attacked. The credibility of these U.S.
naval moves can be questioned, given President Johnson's
reluctance to act unilaterally in the Strait of Tiran, but
it is certainly plausible that Egyptian President Nasser and
other Arab leaders would view the moves as threatening.
Given such Egyptian and Syrian suspicions of U.S.
intentions on the eve of the war, it is not surprising that
Egypt would later claim—either thinking it was true or
knowing it was false—that U.S. carrier aircraft had
attacked Egypt. Sixth Fleet and Middle East Force movements
in May, intended to support the President's efforts to
pressure Nasser into reopening the Strait of Tiran, thus
sent an inadvertent signal of hostility to the Arab
nations. The inadvertent hostile signal would lead Arab
leaders to assume U.S. hostility after war broke out. It
thus complicated U.S. efforts to manage the crisis by
lending credibility to Arab claims of American complicity in
the Israeli attacks—claims that contributed to serious
deterioration in U.S. relations with the Arab nations.
There were no inadvertent military incidents that
seriously affected United States efforts to manage the
crisis. The most serious incident of the crisis was the
attack on the Liberty , but Israel quickly notified the
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United States that it had conducted the attack, thus
defusing tensions over the incident. The second most
serious incident of the crisis was the harassment of America
by two Soviet ships on June 7 and 8. But there were no
collisions and no shots were fired. The absence of serious
inadvertent incidents was largely due to the cautious manner
in which the two superpowers conducted naval operations in
the Mediterranean. Although there were relatively intense
interactions between the two sides, the interactions could
have been much more intense and dangerous than they actually
were. The most important factor in avoiding incidents that
could complicate crisis management, then, was decisions made
by national leaders on the two sides that structured the
tactical environment in such a manner as to moderate the
intensity of tactical-level interactions and limit the
tensions that would arise from those interactions.
The eighth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the crisis? None of the three tensions was serious during
the crisis. There was moderate tension between political
considerations and the needs of diplomatic bargaining, on
the one hand, and military considerations and the needs of
military operations, on the other. This arose primarily
from the restrictions placed on movements of the Sixth Fleet
carriers and the efforts -to use their movements for
political signalling. The carrier force commanders objected
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to restrictions on their mobility, which denied them one of
the greatest advantages of carrier air power, and the
publicity surrounding their movements, which made it easier
452for the Soviets to target the carriers. On the other
hand, the restrictions on the carriers did not impose
unreasonable limitations on their ability to carry out their
immediate mission. Further, the restrictions were
disregarded by the on-scene commander when it was necessary
to respond to the attack oh the Liberty . Vice Admiral
Martin, on his own authority, launched aircraft to defend
the ship and ordered America to close the scene at best
speed. Both actions required violation of the geographic
restrictions placed on the Sixth Fleet. However, the
President soon authorized the actions Vice Admiral Martin
had already initiated. Thus, the tension between political
and military considerations was not serious.
There was also only moderate tension between the need
for top-level control of military operations and the need
for tactical flexibility and initiative at the scene of the
Crisis. The Johnson Administration handled the military
chain of command much better than the Kennedy Administration
had handled it in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Which is inter-
esting given that McNamara was still Secretary of Defense)
.
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Orders to the Sixth Fleet were passed via the chain of
command and only essential aspects of Sixth Fleet operations-
-the general movements of the fleet in the Mediterranean
—
were closely controlled. The carrier force commanders were
not happy about this control of their operations, but it did
not seriously interfere with their ability to carry out
their mission. The intense resentment against civilian
interference that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis was
absent in 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
There was very little tension between performance of
crisis political missions and readiness to perform wartime
combat missions. Sixth Fleet operations during the crisis
did not seriously detract from the fleet's readiness for
453
wartime contingencies. The only feature of the crisis
operations that the on-scene commanders did not like, even
though they understood its purpose and importance, was the
publicizing of the fleet's movements. The carrier force
commanders would have preferred to make Soviet efforts to
track and target the carriers as difficult as possible.
This is a crucial consideration in wartime operations, but
one that directly conflicts with political crisis management
considerations. Other than this, however, there was little





In summary, the stratified interaction model
accurately describes Soviet-American interaction during the
1967 Arab-Israeli War. Although there were intense
interactions between U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the
Mediterranean, there were few instances of decoupled
interactions. The overall pattern was one of parallel
stratified interactions with occasional momentary
decoupling. The only aspect of naval operations that was
closely controlled was the movement of the Sixth fleet in
the Mediterranean. Control by negation was exercised over
other aspects of Sixth Fleet operations, but there were no
instances of orders issued by the on-scene commander being
countermanded by the White House. U.S. and Soviet naval
forces were tightly coupled during the crisis, but there
were no serious incidents between them. There were no
serious political-military tensions during the crisis.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
The Fourth Arab-Israeli War erupted in October 1973
when Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israeli positions
on the east bank of the Suez Canal and Syria attacked
Israeli positions on the Golan Heights. After initial
setbacks, Israel launched devastating counterattacks,
ultimately crossing the Suez Canal and trapping the Egyptian
Third Army. This precipitated a Soviet threat to intervene
in the war, backed by mobilization of airborne forces. The
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United States strongly backed Israel during the war,
initiating (after a delay) a massive airlift of supplies and
replacement aircraft. In response to the Soviet
intervention threat, the United States declared worldwide
Defense Condition three (DEFCON 3) . The Sixth Fleet played
an important role in U.S. foreign policy, supporting the
airlift and countering Soviet military threats. The Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron also played an active role in the
crisis, demonstrating Soviet concerns and politically
countering the Sixth Fleet.
Background
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was the first major crisis
in the era of Soviet-American detente. Detente had been
inaugurated ceremonially at the May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev
summit in Moscow. During that summit the two leaders signed
the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement on Limitation of
Strategic Arms (the SALT I agreement) , and the Basic
Principles Agreement. The Basic Principles Agreement sought
to codify the principles of detente and, among other things,
called for restraint in seeking unilateral gain at the
454
expense of the other party. Arms control and regulation
of superpower competition were thus the cornerstones of
454 See Alexander L. George, MThe Basic Principles
Agreement of 1972: Origins and Expectations,** in Alexander
L. George, Managing U.S. -Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis
Prevention (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 107-117.
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detent* • Round one of the SALT II negotiations opened in
November 1972. American involvement in the Indochina War,
long a source of tension in Soviet-American relations, began
winding down early the next year. On January 27, 1973 the
U.S. -North Vietnamese peace treaty was signed and in
February 1973 the last U.S. troops left South Vietnam. The
second Nixon-Brezhnev summit was held in Washington and San
Clemente in June 1973. During that summit the two leaders
signed the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, which,
among other provisions, called for consultations between the
superpowers in the event of nuclear accidents or third party
nuclear threats. Soviet-American relations in 1973 were
thus much better than they had been in the three previous
crises examined in this study.
Another significant development in Soviet-American
relations was the Incidents at Sea Agreement, signed May 25,
1972, during the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit. This agree-
sent committed both sides to respect the international rules
of the road for preventing collisions at sea and provided
guidance for situations unique to naval forces (such as
formations of ships) that were not adequately covered by the
international rules. Beginning in 1960, there had been a
long series of incidents between U.S. and Soviet naval
vessels, including several collisions. The Incidents at Sea
Agreement was intended to prevent such incidents in the
future. In addition to specifying behavior for naval
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vessels at sea, the agreement set up a standard channel for
reporting violations to the other side and called for annual
review of the agreement. At the first annual review, held
May 1973, a protocol to the agreement was signed that
expanded its provisions. As of October 1973, there had been
no high-intensity superpower naval operations that seriously
455tested the Incidents at Sea Agreement.
Immediately after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War the Soviet
Union began supplying large quantities of modern arms to
Egypt and Syria in order to rebuild their shattered forces
and restore Soviet influence among the Arab nations. From
1969 to late 1970, Egypt engaged Israel in a war of attri-
tion along the Suez Canal. Both sides suffered heavy losses
with no gains. In early 1970 the Soviets took over the air
455
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defense of Egypt. Egyptian President Nasser's death in
September 1970 did not lessen tensions with Israel. His
successor* Anwar Sadat, committed himself to war with Israel
if there was no progress toward a political solution. Sadat
expelled almost all Soviet military advisors from Egypt in
July 1972, a move apparently prompted by Soviet efforts to
restrain Egypt from resorting to force against Israel and
increasing Soviet domination of the Egyptian military. In
October 1972 Sadat replaced the top military leadership and
ordered the army to begin planning an offensive to seize the
east bank of the Suez Canal. In early 1973, frustrated over
lack of progress in the diplomatic arena, Sadat asked the
Soviet Union to resume arms shipments to Egypt. The Soviets
agreed, and the final Egyptian military build-up for war
commenced
.
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The United States had offered a series of Middle East
peace proposals, all of which were rejected. United States
policy in 1972 and 1973 was designed to maintain a prolonged
stalemate between Israel and her Arab neighbors, which Henry
Kissinger believed would erode Soviet influence and perhaps
move the Arab nations to seek improved relations with the
United States. U.S. policy during this period assumed that
Is: aeli military supremacy was the key to avoiding war in
the Middle East, but this U.S. policy served only to
exacerbate Arab-Israeli tensions. Tentative U.S. -Egyptian
talks in early 1973 on an interim Israeli-Egyptian agreement
made no progress, and Egypt decided to attempt a military
457
solution to the stalemate.
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The Egyptian-Syrian strategy in the war was to inflict
a decisive defeat on the Israeli standing army before Israel
could mobilize its reserves, quickly seize strategic
positions on the east bank of the Suez Canal and the Golan
Heights, and prepare defensive positions for the Inevitable
Israeli counterattacks. Initial heavy attrition of Israeli
forces and a quick U.K. ceasefire backed by the superpowers
Were expected to nove the conflict to the bargaining table
before Israel would be able to dislodge Egyptian and Syrian
forces. Success in achieving these limited objectives would
destroy Israel's image of military invulnerability, restore
Arab confidence and pride, and increase Arab credibility and
influence with the superpowers. These psychological and
political victories, and possession of strategic positions
in the Sinai and Golan Heights, would allow Egypt and Syria
to negotiate from strength and force Israel, to withdraw from
458the occupied territories on Arab terms.
At 2:00 P.M. on October 6, 1973, Egypt attacked across
the Suez Canal and Syria attacked the Golan Heights. They
succeeded in achieving surprise and gaining ground on both
fronts, inflicting heavy losses on Israeli ground and air
forces. Beginning October 8 Israel counterattacked on both
fronts, driving Syrian forces from the Golan Heights by
October 10, but suffering a defeat in the Sinai. On
458 Safran, pp. 279-282; Dupuy, pp. 387-405; Insight
Team, pp. 46-62; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 460, 482.
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October 11 Israel launched a counterof f ensive against Syria
and advanced into Syrian territory. Israeli forces net
stiff resistance from Syrian forces (reinforced with Iraqi
and Jordanian units) , and on October 13 halted the offensive
and consolidated defensive positions. There was only
sporadic fighting on the Syrian front thereafter and on
October 23 Syria agreed to the U.N. ceasefire.
On October 14, Egypt launched a major offensive in the
Sinai in order to relieve Israeli pressure on Syria. Israel
quickly halted the Egyptian offensive and launched a counter-
offensive on October 15. Israeli armored units crossed the
Suez Canal in small numbers on October 15 and 16, and in
strength on October 17, threatening to cutoff Egyptian
forces on the east bank of the canal. A U.N. -sponsored
ceasefire was supposed to go into effect at 6:50 P.M. on
.
October 22, but the fighting did not stop and Israeli forces
continued advancing in Egypt. A second UN-sponsored
ceasefire was set for 7:00 A.M. on October 24, but again the
fighting failed to stop and Israel continued its offensive,
surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. Each side blamed the
other for the initial failure of these two ceasefires to
take hold. On October 25 Israeli-Egyptian fighting tapered
459
off and a fragile cease-fire held.
459
* Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (New York: William
Morrow, 1976), pp. 459-539; Herzog, pp. 68-250. Also see




Using the categories of crises presented in Chapter
II, which distinguished between direct and indirect crises,
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was an indirect superpower
crisis. The United States was brought into the confronta-
tion through its support of Israel and the Soviet Union was
brought into the confrontation through its support of Egypt
and Syria. This meant that, in addition to controlling the
actions of their own forces, the superpowers had to be
concerned about the behavior of their clients. The period
of greatest superpower tension in the crisis (October 24-
25) , resulted from actions taken by the local participants
(primarily Israel) that contradicted arrangements made by
the superpowers to resolve the crisis.
The United States had several objectives in the
crisis: (a) to ensure the survival of Israel; (b) to
preserve and strengthen U.S. credibility as a reliable ally
in Israeli eyes, which was perceived to be important for
gaining Israeli participation in post-war diplomacy; (c) to
increase U.S. influence among the Arab nations
—
particularly
Egypt—or at least reduce to a minimum the erosion of U.S.
influence among moderate Arab nations that would result from
University Publishing Project, 1974); Heikal, pp. 207-43;
Safran, pp. 282-311; Dupuy, pp. 411-546; Brecher, pp. 171-
229; Insight Team, pp. 133-246, 289-346, 383-98; Kissinger,




U.S. support for Israel (and, if possible, avert an Arab oil
embargo); (d) to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East,
or at least prevent an expansion of Soviet influence; (e) to
terminate the war under circumstances conducive to negotia-
tions leading toward at least a partial Middle East peace
settlement, rather than just a ceasefire; (f) to avoid a
direct confrontation with the Soviet Union that might esca-
late to a military clash; (g) to avoid unilateral actions
that would unnecessarily erode detente while achieving only
marginal advantages over the Soviets; and (h) to reduce to a
minimum divisions between the U.S. and its allies (Western
Europe and Japan) arising from the Middle East war. The
priorities of these objectives shifted during the crisis as
circumstances in the Middle East changed. Additionally,
several of the goals tended to be contradictory, requiring
extreme fine tuning of U.S. diplomatic initiatives and use
of subtle signals that were easily missed or misinterpreted
a (\ n
in the heat of the crisis.
Henry Kissinger, "Secretary Kissinger's News
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Th« basic United States strategy was to achieve a
ceasefire after Israel had repulsed the Egyptian and Syrian
assaults, but before Israel could inflict a decisive,
humiliating defeat on her neighbors (particularly Egypt)
.
President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger believed this would
create the most conducive circumstances for post-war
diplomacy. The other major aspect of the U.S. strategy was
to avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union and to work
in conjunction with the Soviets to resolve the crisis—at
least to appear to be working with the Soviets while
attempting to limit their role in the Middle East. This
strategy remained consistent throughout the crisis, although
the tactics used to pursue it changed significantly as U.S.
461perceptions of Israel's military situation changed.
The primary Soviet objective in the crisis were (a)
to increase Soviet prestige and influence among Arab
nations, particularly Egypt, and to reduce U.S. influence in
the region; (b) to avert a catastrophic defeat of Syria and
32-33, 53*55. Some observers also claim that U.S. leaders
were concerned that Israel would use its nuclear weapons
capability it threatened with a catastrophic defeat, and
that the U.S. therefore had the objective of averting this
possibility. See Dowty, pp. 244-45; Safran, p. 483;
Aronson, pp. 178-79; Insight Team, pp. 282-84.
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ence of October 12, H 535; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp.
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254; Edward N. Luttwak and Walter Laqueur, "Kissinger and
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Egypt by Israel ; (c) to avoid a direct confrontation with
the United States that might escalate to a military clash;
and (d) to avoid serious erosion of detente with the United
States. Additional Soviet objectives, derived from those
listed above, were to be able to take credit for Arab
victories or for averting catastrophic defeat of Syria and
Egypt, and to terminate the war under circumstances that
would give the Soviet Union a central (or at lest a more
important) role in post-war negotiations. The Soviet Union,
like the United States, had complex and contradictory
objectives. Attempting to maintain detente will* the United
States while increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East
at the expense of the United States was a particularly
difficult combination of objectives. It does not appear
that the Soviet leaders believed, prior to the outbreak of
the war, that another Arab-Israeli war would necessarily
serve their interests in the Middle East. Rather, the
Soviets appear to have sought what gains they could accrue
from a conflict they could not avert without serious erosion
of their influence among Arab nations.
The Soviet strategy in the crisis had three basic
elements. The first was to press for an early ceasefire
462William B. Quandt, Soviet Policy in the October
1973 War . R-1864 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1976), pp. 7-12;
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 469; Safran, p. 479; Galia
Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking," pp. 198-99, 202; Galia
Golan, Yom Kippur and After , p. 74; Aronson, p. 183.
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before the tide of battle turned against Egypt and Syria.
At this point the Arab nations would have their greatest
bargaining leverage against Israel. To curry favor with the
Arab nations, the initial Soviet ceasefire proposal called
for Israel to return to pre-1967 boundaries. The second
element was to work in conjunction with the United States,
rather than unilaterally, to gain a UN ceasefire resolution,
to maintain at least an image of upholding the principles of
detente, and to avoid excessive friction with the United
States by not waging an intense anti-American propaganda
campaign in the Middle East (as it had in past conflicts)
.
The third element was to resupply Egypt and Syria with
sufficient military equipment to maintain an image of
solidarity with the Arab cause and to forestall a decisive
Israeli victory. An additional, minor element in the Soviet
strategy was to encourage other Arab nations to assist Egypt
and Syria in the war against Israel. Jordan and Iraq sent
troops to the Syrian front during the war, demonstrating at
463least some Arab solidarity. The Soviet strategy was
precarious and somewhat risky in that its three major
elements could easily become mutually incompatible if events
in the Middle East took an unexpected turn, which is exactly
what happened.
Safran, p. 479; Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After ,
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Israel notified Washington that it had received
warning of the impending attack about two hours before the
Egyptians and Syrians struck. Kissinger warned the Israelis
not to pre-empt and attempted to forestall the Arab attack.
Israel did not preempt, but Egypt and Syria carried out
their attacks. Initially, the United States was slow in
pursuing a ceasefire in the UN Security Council, believing
that Israel would soon turn the tide of battle. The United
States maintained a low profile, evenhanded approach so as
not to alienate the Arab nations. The United States also
sought to act in conjunction with the Soviet Union, rather
than unilaterally, in the UN Security Council. The initial
U.S. proposal was to be for a ceasefire based on the status
quo ante, timed to go into effect after Israel had repulsed
the invading armies. The Soviets reportedly sought Egyptian
agreement for a ceasefire in place as early as October 6, a
proposal the Egyptians rejected. On October 7 the United
•
States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to a cease-
fire and the Soviets reassured the United States that they
would not unilaterally introduce a ceasefire resolution in
the Security Council. Israel initially requested resupply
of military equipment and munitions on October 7, a request
464
approved by the United States later in the day. Israel
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Upheaval . pp. 471-91; Dayan, p. 511; Quandt, Decade of

769
was to pick up the American supplies in the United States
using unmarked El Al planes. Through October 8 U.S.
leaders believed, based on Israeli reports, that Israel
would soon prevail over Egypt and Syria and that low-profile
resupply of Israel and evenhanded diplomacy were all the
actions the U.S. needed to take.
Soviet-American tensions started rising during the
October 9-12 period. Israel's resupply requests became more
urgent on October 9 and Israel revealed that it had suffered
massive losses of tanks and aircraft in the first three days
of battle. On October 9 President Nixon approved Israel's
requests for increased immediate resupply and post-war
replacement of all Israeli battlefield losses, but for the
next three days U.S. supplies were carried only in Israeli
planes. The Soviet Union, which had been delivering
military supplies to Syria by sealift from the start of the
war, commenced an airlift to Syria on October 10 and
commenced an airlift to Egypt the next day. Additionally,
the Soviets made it clear that they would only support a
Decisions . pp. 173-75. Also see Safran, pp. 479-80; Dowty,
pp. 224-30; Heikal, p. 244; Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and
After , pp. 74-86; Galia Golan, "Soviet Decision-making," pp.
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Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 459-66; Matti Golan, The Secret
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the Middle East (New York: Bantam, 1976), pp. 33-48, 63-64;
Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East
Since 1970 . Revised Edition (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp.
141-42; Rubinstein, pp. 262-67; Glassman, pp. 142-44.
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ceasefire based on the Arab position, that is, a ceasefire
in place linked with Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 lines.
The United States rejected this proposal and sought to delay
UN action on a ceasefire until Israel gained the upper hand
on the battlefield. On October 10 or 11, in response to
Israeli advances into Syrian territory, the Soviet Union
placed three airborne divisions on alert. The United States
learned of this Soviet move on October 12. That same day
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin warned Kissinger that the Soviet
Union might intervene if Israel continued advancing on
Damascus. Kissinger, in turn, warned Dobrynin that the
United States would resist Soviet intervention with force.
Israel informed the United States on October 12 that it
would accept a ceasefire in place, but preferred that the UN
resolution not be voted on for another day. Israel also
made an urgent plea for immediate resupply. In response,
President Nixon ordered an airlift using U.S. military
465transport aircraft flying all the way to Israel. October
12 thus marked the last day of the low key, evenhanded U.S.
approach to the crisis.
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Upheaval . pp. 491-515; Quandt, Decade of Decisions , pp. 176-
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The U.S. airlift to Israel commenced October 13 and
the President directed that it be operated at maximum
capacity. The United States also proposed to the Soviet
Union a ceasefire in place linked to reaffirmation of UN
Security Council Resolution 242, rather to Israeli with-
drawal from all occupied territories. On October 14 Egypt
launched a major offensive in the Sinai in order to relieve
pressure on Syria. Israel quickly halted the offensive,
launched a counter-offensive on October 15, and sent troops
across the Suez Canal in small numbers on October 16.
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Egypt October 16 and
urged Sadat to agree to a ceasefire in place. The next day
the Soviet Union expressed to the United States its support
for a ceasefire in place. The Arab oil exporting nations
announced on October 17 a production cutback and price
increase, to be followed by additional cutbacks until Israel
withdrew from the occupied territories. Israeli armored
units crossed the Suez Canal in strength on October 17. In
response, the Soviet Union on October 18 began pressing for
a ceasefire in place. Thus, as of October 18 the conditions
that the United States had originally thought appropriate
for a ceasefire were emerging.
466Nixon, p. 930; James Schlesinger, "Secretary of
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On October 19 Brezhnev sent a message to Nixon
inviting Kissinger to Moscow to discuss a Middle East
ceasefire. Kissinger flew to Moscow early the next morning
and held initial discussions with Brezhnev late on October
20. Meanwhile , the Nixon Administration on October 19
submitted a $2.2 billion dollar aid package for Israel to
Congress. In response, Saudi Arabia announced on October 20
that it was joining the embargo on oil shipments to the
United States—a serious setback for U.S. foreign policy.
On October 21 Kissinger reached a ceasefire agreement with
the Soviets, which was to presented to the UN Security
Council that evening. The Soviet-American ceasefire
proposal. Resolution 338, was passed by the Security Council
•t 12:50 A.M. on October 22. Kissinger left Moscow that
morning for Israel to explain the Soviet-American agreement
to Israeli leaders. The ceasefire was supposed to go into
effect at 6:50 P.M. on October 22, but Israeli forces in
Egypt continued advancing, allegedly after Egyptian
violations of the ceasefire. On October 23 Israeli forces
cut the final supply line to the Egyptian Third Army,
totally surrounding it. In response, the Soviet Union
placed four more airborne divisions on alert (a total of
"Soviet Decisionmaking," pp. 203-206; Heikal, pp. 245-46;
Safran, pp. 483-85; Insight Team, pp. 281-85, 367-72; Kalb
and Kalb, pp. 479-83; Sheehan, pp. 34-35; Matti Golan,
Secret Conversations , pp. 61-62, 67-73; Dowty, pp. 242-53,




seven alerted) . A second UN-sponsored ceasefire was set for
7x00 A.M. on October 24, but Israel again continued its
offensive, seizing key positions in Suez City and setting
467the stage for a superpower confrontation.
Egypt requested U.S. and Soviet troops to enforce the
ceasefire on October 24 after Israel surrounded the Egyptian
Third Army. In response, Brezhnev sent a letter to Nixon
threatening unilateral intervention if the U.S. refused to
participate and the Soviet Union began assembling its seven
alerted airborne divisions at airfields for immediate
deployment. The United States rejected the Egyptian
proposal and warned the Soviets against unilateral
intervention. At 12:25 A.M. on October 25, the United
States set DEFCON 3 worldwide and readied the 82nd Airborne
Division for immediate deployment to the Middle East.
Within hours the U.S. alert had been detected by the
American press, which speculated on whether the move was
warranted or motivated by domestic politics. On October 25
Israeli-Egyptian fighting tapered off and a fragile
467Nixon, Memoirs , pp. 931-36; Kissinger, **News
Conference of October 25, " pp. 586-87; "U.N. Calls for
Middle East Cease-Fire, w Department of State Bulletin 69
(November 12, 1973): 599-602; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval ,
pp. 542-75; Quandt, Decade of Decisions , pp. 190-95. Also
see Safron, pp. 310, 485-93; Heikal, pp. 247-54; Galia
Golan, Yom Kippur and After , pp. 112-20; Galia Golan,
•Soviet Decisionmaking,'* pp. 207-209; Insight Team, pp. 362-
63, 372-74, 377-88; Kalb and Kalb, pp. 484-89; Sheehan, pp.
69-70; Matti Golan, Secret Conversations , pp. 74-89;
Aronson, pp. 187-91; Freedman, pp. 144-45; Rubinstein, pp.
274-75; Glassman, pp. 153-59.
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ceasefire held despite Israeli efforts to force surrender of
the Egyptian Third Army by delaying passage of relief
convoys. The Soviet Union dropped its threat of military
intervention and proposed that Soviet and American
representatives observe implementation of the ceasefire (a
proposal that quietly died when Egypt decided it did not
want superpower observers, even though the Soviets had sent
a team of observers on October 24). U.S. forces quickly
began standing down from DEFCON 3 and returning to normal
peacetime DEFCON: the Southern Command and Alaskan Command
at midnight on October 25, the Strategic Air Command and
North American Air Defense Command on October 26, the
Pacific Command and Readiness Command on October 27, and the
Atlantic Command and U.S. European Command on October 30.
Meanwhile, as of October 31 it appeared that the Soviet
airborne divisions had also returned to normal peacetime
readiness, thus greatly reducing the possibility of a
superpower confrontation. The Sixth Fleet—the last U.S.
command to stand down—returned to peacetime readiness on
November 18. 468
468Richard M. Nixon, "President Nixon's News
Conference of October 26, H Department of State Bulletin 69
(November 12, 1973): 581, 583-84; Nixon, Memoirs , pp. 937-
42; Kissinger, "News Conference of October 25," pp. 587-88,
592-93; Schlesinger, "News Conference of October 26," pp.
617-22; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp. 575-99; "U.N.
Calls for Middle East Cease-Fire, " Department of State
Bulletin 69 (November 12, 1973): 602-605; Quandt, Decade of
Decisions , pp. 195-200; "Trapped Egyptian Force Held Key




The military and naval chain of command in 1973 was
the same as it had been in 1967: from the President, to the
Secretary of Defense (James Schlesinger) , to the unified
commander (USCINCEUR) , to the component commander
(CINCUSNAVEUR) , to the fleet commander (Commander Sixth
Fleet) , to the appropriate Task Force Commander (TF 60 for
the attack carriers) , to the appropriate Task Group
Commander, and finally to individual ships. Admiral Thomas
R. Moorer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Blno R. Zumwalt, Jr., was Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Worth H. Bagley was CINCUSNAVEUR, and Vice Admiral Daniel J.
Murphy was Commander Sixth Fleet.
The principle advisory body during the crisis was the
Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) , a panel created by
Kissinger within the National Security Council framework.
The WSAG, formed in April 1969, was the Nixon Administra-
tion's principle crisis management body, serving a role
"U.S. Forces Put on Worldwide Alert Lest Soviet Send Troops
to Mideast," New York Times , October 26, 1973, p. 1; HU.S.
Is Basing the Alert, But Links Step to Soviet, " New York
Times , October 27, 1973, p. 10? "Most Units Off Alert, Which
May End Today," New York Times , October 28, 1973, p. 27;
"Pentagon Declares Its Worldwide Alert of Military Is Over,"
New York Times , November 1, 1973, p. 19. Also see Safran,
pp. 493-95; Keikal, pp. 254-61; Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and
After , pp. 120-26; Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking," pp.
210-11; Kalb and Kalb, pp. 490-99; Insight Team, pp. 399-
420; Matti Golan, Secret Conversations
, pp. 90-107; Aronson,
pp. 193-98; Dowty, pp. 255-60, 273-77; Rubinstein, pp. 275-
77; Glassman, pp. 159-67.
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similar to that of the EXCOMM in October 1962. 469 Kissinger
was the principle link to the President, directly and
through White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig.
United States communications capabilities had improved
significantly since 1967. The two major developments were
automated message processing at communications centers
ashore and satellite communications. Manual message
processing, rather than radio propagation problems,
typically caused the bulk of message transmission delays.
Automated message processing and routing was being achieved
through integration of Navy communications stations into the
Naval Communications Processing and Routing System
(NAVCOMPARS) and installation of the Common User Digital
Information Exchange System (CUDIXS) at NAVCOMPARS master
stations, which provided an automatic on-line interface with
the Department of Defense's Automatic Digital Network
(AUTODIN) message communications system.
The Navy satellite communications system was operation-
al in 1973, but satellite communication terminals had been
469WSAG membership varied, but generally included
Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, James Schlesinger,
Secretary of Defense, William Colby, CAI Director, Admiral
Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, William Clements, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of
State, and, for meetings on the Middle East, Joseph Sisco,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South




installed in only a small number of key ships. In October
1973 the Sixth Fleet flagship, USS Little Rock (CLG 4), the
aircraft carriers VSS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42) , USS
Independence (CVA 62) , and USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67) , and
the amphibious command ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20) had
satellite communications terminals. Satellite communica-
tions provided rapid, reliable encrypted teletype and secure
(covered) voice channels to Navy NAVCOMPARS stations ashore
and to the Department of Defense AUTODIN message system and
Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) system.
If he shose to do so, the President in the White House had
the capability to speak directly with Navy commanders
embarked in ships equipped with satellite communications
terminals. The remainder of the ships in the Sixth Fleet
still relied on high frequency (HF) communications for long-
470
range voice and radioteletype communications.
President Nixon and his advisors used a combination of
direct and delegated control over the Sixth Fleet during the
Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973," pp.
V-l, V-5 (Declassified 1982. Command history files,
Operational Archives, Naval Historical center, Washington,
DC. Cited hereafter as Sixth Fleet, "Command History
1973. "). Also see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
Services , Review of Department of Defense Worldwide
Communications, Phase II , Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd
Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972),
pp. 16490-95, 16499-502. Also see Blair, pp. 51-65; Carter,
pp. 233-57; Head, Short and McFarlane, pp. 85-99; Lieutenant
D.J. Marshall, "Communications and Command Prerogative,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 100 (January 1974): 31;
Peter A. Mitchell, "The Navy's Mission in Space," Oceanus 28
(Summer 1985) : 25.

778
1973 Arab-Israeli War. The only aspect of Sixth Fleet
operations that was were under positive direct control by
the White House was the location of the fleet in the
Mediterranean. According to Admiral Moorer, JCS Chairman,
"We only gave the Fleet general instructions as to the area
471to stay in." However, most participants in the crisis
recall White House control as being much closer than that.
Admiral Zumwalt, CNO, states that there was extremely tight
White House control of the fleet's location and movements in
the Mediterranean: "The JCS felt they had to closely
control the fleet because the Nixon-Kissinger political-
military strategy closely controlled military operations.
They used the fleet for their 'shadow boxing' with the
Soviet Union. And there was close control of the Sixth
472Fleet by the JCS." Vice Admiral Donald D. Engen, Deputy
Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, states that
Washington's control of Sixth Fleet movements was "very
restrictive" and that the Commander of the Sixth Fleet had
to get JCS permission prior to ordering changes in the
473fleet's operations. In addition to the overall effort to
471Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, interview by author,
February 9, 1988.
472Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, interview by author,
February 16, 1988. Also see Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.,
On Watch; A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 436.
473Vice Admiral Donald D. Engen, letter to author,
April 25, 1988. Also see Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 436.
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signal the U.S. intention to stay out of the conflict, Sixth
Fleet movements were used on October 25 to send a specific
political signal to the Soviet Union—warning the Soviets
not to intervene militarily on behalf of Egypt (This signal
is discussed in greater detail below)
.
Other than movements of the fleet in the
Mediterranean, control of Sixth Fleet operations was
delegated to the chain of command. Admiral Moorer states
that Washington did not try to micromanage Sixth Fleet
operations and that he personally "tried to avoid nitpicking
474
the commanders." Admiral Zumwalt concurs: "In that
aspect Nixon and Kissinger were quite rational. They let
475the chain of command handle operations . " Rear Admiral
James B. Morin, Commanding Officer of USS Franklin D.
Roosevelt (CVA 42) , and Rear Admiral John C. Dixon,
Commanding Officer of USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67) , both
state that they did not feel the movements and operations of
their carriers were micromanaged from Washington. The
overall pattern, then, was one of close control of Sixth
Fleet movements in the Mediterranean and delegated control
of all other aspects of Sixth Fleet operations.
474
T.H. Moorer, interview by author, February 9, 1988.
475Zumwalt, interview by author, February 16, 1988.
476Rear Admiral Jamej B. Morin, letter to author,
April 14, 1988; Rear Admiral John C. Dixon, letter to
author, April 18, 1988.
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Although the White House sought to control the move-
ments of the Sixth Fleet for political signalling, the chain
of command was used for transmitting orders to the Sixth
Fleet. Nixon and Schlesinger did not attempt to give orders
477
directly to CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, or ships at sea. '
The White House Situation Room was unable to monitor Sixth
Fleet operations real-time. As in 1967 , the President and
Secretary of Defense had to await verbal reports from
USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR, or receipt of message opera-
tional reports (OPREPs), situation reports (SITREPs) , and
operational summaries (OPSUMs). The primary difference from
1967 was that these reports generally could reach the White
House much faster than in 1973 (though still not fast enough
for effective real-time control of fleet operations)
.
Nixon, Schlesinger, and Kissinger paid little atten-
tion to the guidance contained in mechanisms of delegated
control, and did not use those mechanisms to issue detailed
operational guidance to the Sixth Fleet. No special rules
of engagement were issued during the crisis: the Sixth Fleet
used standing CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT rules. 478
477Zumwalt, interview by author, February 16, 1988;
Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988.
478
T.H. Moorer, interview by author, February 9, 1988;
Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988; Vice Admiral Joe P.
Moorer, Commander Carrier Group Six and commander of the
Kennedy carrier task group, letter to author, April 18,
1988; Morin, letter to author, April 14, 1988; Dixon, letter
to author, April 18, 1988.
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Admiral Zumwalt states, "Nixon and Kissinger did not get
into that level of detail with military operations. General
rules of engagement Here spelled out in the JC5, with
overall approval coming from Kissinger. From time-to-time
479
we received injunctions on things we couldn't do."
Similarly, it does not appear that any special mis-sion
orders (OPLANs or OPOROs) were issued for the crisis, other
than for support of the U.S. airlift to Israel.
Contingency plans did not play a major role in the
execution of U.S. naval operations during the crisis.
Kissinger states that on May 15, 1973, he requested a
contingency plan covering "the kinds of things the Egyptians
might do, the various ways in which the Israelis might react
and the diplomatic issues that might ensue," but that this
contingency study was not completed before the war broke
A Of)
out. The United States did not have contingency plans
for emergency resupply of Israel while a war. was in
progress: American planners expected any future Arab-
Israeli war to be short and end in a decisive Israeli
victory, thus limiting the U.S. role to replacement of
Israeli battlefield losses after the war. 481 William
479Zumwalt, interview by author, February 16, 1988.
The injunctions were restrictions on the Sixth Fleet's
movements, described in greater detail below.
480Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 462; Quandt,
Decade of Decisions , p. 167.
481Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp. 492-97.
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B. Quandt states that on October 25, "The president ordered
Kissinger to develop a plan for sending United States troops
482
to the Middle Cast in case the Soviets did intervene."
This plan was never executed because the Soviets backed down
from a confrontation later that day. The United States also
had contingency plans for various types of military opera-
tions in the Middle East* such as evacuation of American
citizens, but none were executed.
The most important mechanism of delegated control
during the crisis was the U.S. alert system. In response to
the Soviet threat to intervene militarily on behalf of
Egypt, the United States set DEFCON 3 worldwide early on
483October 25. Admiral Moorer promptly informed the unified
482Quandt, Decade of Decisions , pp. 198-99.
483There is disagreement as to the exact time of the
alert. Schlesinger states that the decision on "enhanced
readiness status" was made at 11:30 P.M. on October 24
during a WSAG meeting. The London Sunday Times Insight Team
states that Admiral Moorer issued the DEFCON 3 order at
11:35 P.M. Kissinger states that DEFCON 3 was set at 11:41
P.M. on October 24. Admiral Moorer states that he arrived
at the White House at about midnight and DEFCON 3 was set
shortly thereafter. Admiral Zumwalt states that DEFCON 3
was set worldwide at 12:25 A.M. on October 25. Nixon stated
in his October 26 press conference that the alert was
ordered "shortly after midnight Thursday morning [October
251". Quandt states that the first orders for the alert*
were issued at about midnight and that the scope of the
alert was widened at 1:30 A.M. on October 25. See
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp. 587-91; Moorer, interview
by author, February 9, 1988; Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 443;
Quandt, Decade of Decisions
, pp. 196-98; Insight Team, p.
413. The most likely sequence of events was that the
decision to set DEFCON 3 was made at about 11:30 P.M. on
October 24 during the WSAG meeting. Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger issued an initial order for the alert at 11:41
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and specified commanders of the limited (primarily
political) purpose of the alert. Setting DEFCON 3 had
little effect on the Sixth Fleet, which was already at a
high condition of readiness. The threat of Soviet military
intervention soon subsided and U.S. forces quickly returned
to normal peacetime readiness.
Naval Operations
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron had steadily
increased in size since the 1967 Middle East War, and in
1972 and 1973 usually numbered between 43 and 61 ships. The
P.M. He may have issued verbal alert orders to specific
commands. More likely, however, is that he gave NMCC a
warning that DEFCON 3 orders would soon be issued (which
would have placed NMCC and WWMCCS at increased readiness for
the impending alert) . Schlesinger then waited until he
could consult with Admiral Moorer before issuing alert
orders. The message order setting DEFCON 3 worldwide was
sent at 12:25 a.m. on October 25. At 1:25 A.M., specific
orders were issued to the Sixth Fleet (described below) and
the 82nd airborne division was alerted for immediate
deployment to the Middle East.
484Moorer, interview by author, February 9, 1988;
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp. 587-91; Quandt, Decade of
Decisions , pp. 196-98; "U.S. Forces Put on Worldwide Alert
Lest Soviet Send Troops to Mideast," New York Times , October
26, 1973, p. 1; "Kissinger Says Action is Expression of
Policy," New York Times , October 26, 1973, p. 20; "Nixon's
Motives in alert Questioned and Defended," New York Times ,
October 26, 1973, p. 20. Also see Scott D. Sagan, "Lessons
of the Yora Kippur Alert," Foreign Policy No. 36 (Fall 1979):
160-77; Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts," pp. 122-28; Bruce Hurwitz,
"Threat Perception, Linkage Politics and Decision Making:
The October 1973 Worldwide Alert of US Military Forces,"
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 7 (1985) : 135-
44; Dowty, pp. 256-58, 274-77; Steinbruner, "An Assessment
of Nuclear Crises," p. 43.
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Soviet squadron typically consisted of 8-10 torpedo-armed
attack submarines (some nuclear-powered) ; 2-3 anti-ship
cruise missile-armed submarines (some nuclear-powered); 2-4
cruisers, some armed with anti-ship cruise missiles; 9-12
destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, some armed with AAW
guided missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles; 2-3 mine-
sweepers (used for patrol and surveillance) ; 1-3 amphibious
ships, normally carrying naval infantry; 18-20 auxiliary
ships, including oilers, supply ships, and tenders; and 5-6
research vessels and intelligence collection ships (AGIs)
.
The Soviets routinely deployed their most modern vessels to
the Mediterranean Squadron, making it the most capable
485Soviet naval force outside Soviet home waters.
Between 1967 and 1973 the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron increased the scope and tempo of its operations,
conducting larger and more sophisticated naval exercises,
but Soviet ships still spent well over half their time at
anchor. Most of the Soviet squadron was kept in the eastern
Mediterranean, with surveillance patrols monitoring the
Strait of Gibralter (including the U.S. naval base at Rota,
Spain) and the Strait of Sicily. The Soviets relied heavily
485Commander Sixth Fleet, ^Command History 1973,** pp.
VI-1 to VI-7; Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., "View From the
Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 98 (February 1972): 18-29; Milan Vego, "Moscow's
Quest for Naval Facilities in the Mediterranean," Defense
and Foreign Affairs Digest , December 1979, pp. 10-15;
Weinland, p. 76; Watson, pp. 90-99.
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on ports in Egypt and Syria for logistic support of the
Mediterranean Squadron. Soviet ships began using the
Egyptian port of Alexandria as a base in October 1967 and
Soviet naval aircraft began using Egyptian airfields in May
1968. In 1969 the Soviet navy began developing a naval base
at Mersa Matruh, Egypt, and by 1970 was using a total of six
Egyptian airfields for its naval aircraft. The Soviet navy
began routinely using the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus
in March 1968, and in May 1972 the Syrians agreed to Soviet
construction of naval facilities in those ports. Beginning
in March 1970 Soviet naval aircraft flying out of Egypt were
allowed to refuel in Algeria, extending their range to the
western Mediterranean. Egyptian expulsion of Soviet
military advisors in July 1972 had no effect on Soviet use
of Egyptian ports, but caused Soviet naval aircraft to be
transferred from Egypt to Syria. The Soviets also used
several anchorages in international waters. Most important
were the Kithira anchorage off the southern tip of Greece,
an anchorage off the eastern tip of Crete, and the Solium
anchorage off the coast of Egypt. Also frequently used were
an anchorage northeast of Cyprus, the Rammamet anchorage off
the coast of Algeria (for the Strait of Sicily patrol) , and
the Alboran Island anchorage just east of the Strait of
Gibralter (for the Gibralter patrol). 486
486
Ibid; A.J. Baker, The Yom Kippur War (New York:
Random Rouse, 1974), pp. 23-25.
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Soviet-American naval interactions became much less
tense and dangerous in the Mediterranean between 1967 and
1973. Dangerous Soviet maneuvers near U.S. warships and
formations had been a growing problem since 1960, reaching
severe intensity in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan
in 1967. The Soviet navy policy of harassing U.S. naval
formations continued to be a serious problem through 1969.
Proa 1970 onward, reflecting the improvement in Soviet-
American relations under the Nixon Administration, the
frequency and severity of naval incidents at sea declined
somewhat. During the Jordanian crisis in September 1970,
the Soviet navy slightly reinforced its Mediterranean
Squadron (which rose from 52 to 72 ships) and closely
monitored U.S. naval operations, but did not provoke any
incidents with U.S. ships. In the words of Admiral Isaac C.
Kidd, Commander Sixth Fleet during the crisis: "The two
fleets gave no evidence of undue stress. Both sides
operated in a normal and restrained manner. There was none
of the nonsense of their ships running in and around our men-
of-war at close range. M Nevertheless, incidents at sea
continued to occur and remained a cause for concern in the
U.S. Navy. The Incidents at Sea Agreement, signed in 1972,
487
Kidd, p. 27. On U.S. and Soviet naval operations
in the Jordanian crisis, see Zumwalt, On Watch , pp. 292-301;
Kidd, pp. 25-28; Watson, pp. 97-99; Thomas A. Bryson, "The
Projection of U.S. Naval Power in the 1970 Jordan Crisis,"
in Craig L. Symonds, ed., New Aspects of Naval History
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 313-21.
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further lessened tensions at sea. Although incidents were
not entirely eliminated, both navies largely complied with
the agreement and there was a significant drop in the most
488dangerous Soviet maneuvering practices. By 1973,
according to Vice Admiral Engen, the U.S. and Soviet navies
489had grown accustomed to operating close to one another.
Admiral Worth Bagley, CINCUSNAVEUR, provided this assessment
after the crisis: "In fact the Soviets weren't overtly
aggressive. It looked as though they were taking some care
not to cause an incident. On the whole , their overt posture
490
was restrained and considerate.** This improvement in
Soviet-American relations at sea was an important reason for
the lack of naval incidents in October 1973.
Soviet naval involvement in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
began with sealifts of Moroccan, troops to Syria in April and
July. Two Soviet tank landing ships (LSTs) and a freighter
arrived in Or an, Morocco, on April 13. The LSTs departed on
April 15 escorted by a Kashin-class guided missile destroy-
er, and the freighter departed April 18. In the eastern
Mediterranean the three ships were escorted by a Kynda-ciass
* Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, "As I Recall . . .
Sailing with the Soviets in the Med, H U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 111 (January 1985): 60-61; Morin, letter to
author, April 14, 1988; Hilton, pp. 30-31.
489Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988.
490Quoted in Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After , p.
109. Also see Glassman, p. 162.
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cruiser and a Riga-class destroyer. The three ships arrived
in the Syrian port of Tartus on April 25. Two more LSTs
arrived in Oran on July 7 , loaded Moroccan troops and tanks,
491departed on July 9, and arrived in Tartus on July 15.
These two sealifts were symbolic Soviet support for pan-Arab
unity against Israel.
The Soviets took several naval actions on October 5.
A Polnocny-class medium landing ship (LSM) and Riga-class
frigate evacuated civilians from Port Said, Egypt (The
Soviets had begun evacuating civilians from Egypt and Syria
by air on October 3) . Two intelligence collection ships
(AGIs) and two minesweepers were moved into the eastern
Mediterranean to augment the single AGI on patrol there.
Five Foxtrot-class conventional attack submarines arrived in
the Mediterranean for routine rotation of the submarines on
patrol, but the five submarines that were supposed to return
home were kept on station to augment the submarine force. A
new Kara-class ASW cruiser, carrying the Commander of the
Black Sea Fleet on a port visit to Split, Yugoslavia, de-
492parted the Mediterranean for the Black Sea on October 5.
491Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973," pp.
VI-4, VT-6; Dismukes, pp. 491-93; Robert G. Weinland, "Super-
power Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War:
K Case Study," The Washington Papers , Vol. VI (Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1979), p. 61.
492Commander Sixth Fleet, ."Command History 1973," pp.
VI-7, VI-8; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval
, p. 469, 475; "U.S.
Aides See Eventual Israeli Victory," New York Times , October
10, 1973, p. 1; Quandt, p. 173; Weinland, pp. 63-64, 78-79;
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When war broke out on October 6, the Soviet "Fifth
Eskadra " (Mediterranean Squadron) consisted of about 57
ships, including eleven submarines (two armed with anti-ship
cruise missiles) , one Kynda-class cruiser (armed with SS-N-3
anti-ship cruise missiles) , one Sverdlov-class cruiser (guns
only) , three Kashin-class and two Kotlin-class guided mis-
sile destroyers (armed with AAW missiles) , two Kotlin-class
destroyers (guns only) , nine frigates and corvettes (Petya,
Mirka, and Riga classes, armed only with guns), two Polnocny-
class medium landing ships (LSMs), two minesweepers, and
several auxiliary vessels. The ships and submarines armed
with anti-ship cruise missiles could launch a total of about
twenty missiles in their first salvo (a rough measure of the
threat to the U.S. carriers). Most of the Soviet ships were
conducting routine peacetime operations, with the majority
of them anchored at normal Soviet anchorages in the vicinity
493
of Crete or in Egyptian ports.
On October 6 there was a total of 48 U.S. Navy ships
in the Mediterranean. Task Force 60, the carrier strike
force, consisted of two attack carrier Task Groups: Task
Group 60.1, the USS Independence (CVA 62) attack carrier
Watson, p. 103; Stephen S. Roberts, "The October 1973 Arab-
Israeli War," in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell,
eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press,
1979), p. 198.
493Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973," p.
VI-7; Weinland, 79; Watson, p. 103; Roberts, pp. 193-94.
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group, was at anchor at Athens, Greece. Task Group 60.2,
the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42) attack carrier group,
was in various Spanish ports. Most of Task Force 61, an
amphibious task force consisting of the helicopter carrier
USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7) and nine other amphibious ships, was
in various Greek ports. A Marine battalion landing team,
augmented with additional troops for an exercise (a total of
about 3,000 Marines), was embarked in the amphibious group.
The Sixth Fleet flagship, USS Little Rock (CLG 4) , was at
sea south of Crete. Four nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) were on patrol in the Mediterranean. In the
Atlantic, the attack carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67)
and her escorts were visiting Edinburgh, Scotland, after
494participating in a NATO exercise in the Norwegian Sea.
Egypt and Syria declared substantial areas of the
eastern Mediterranean off their coasts to be war zones on
October 6. The United States kept the Sixth Fleet well
clear of these war zones throughout the war. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, conducted significant naval
operations in these war zones. During the war the Soviets
concentrated amphibious ships and combatants off the coasts
of Syria and Egypt despite the battles the Egyptian and
494Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973, M p.
III-5, 111-10; Zumwalt, On Watch , pp. 436-37; J. P. Moorer,
letter to author, April 18, 1988; Weinland, pp. 69-70;
Roberts, p. 197; F.C. Miller, "Those Storm-beaten Ships,
Upon Which the Arab Armies Never Looked," U.S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings 101 (March 1975): 22-23; Glassman, p. 162.
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Syrian navies were fighting with the Israeli Navy, which
created a danger of Soviet naval vessels being attacked
inadvertently in the heat of battle (Almost all of the
495
engagements were fought at night)
.
The only significant Soviet naval activity during the
first two days of the war was the evacuation of Soviet
personnel from Egypt and Syria. A Soviet Polnocny-class LSM
evacuated civilians from Port Said on October 6, proceeded
to Alexandria, and left there with more Soviet citizens on
October 7. Meanwhile, the Soviet LSM and frigate that
departed Port Said on October 5 visited the Syrian port of
Latakia on October 6, probably to pick up Soviets evacuating
Syria. Interestingly, Soviet Navy auxiliary vessels
(tenders and supply ships) remained in Alexandria throughout
the war. Additionally, Soviet minesweepers and AGIs in the
eastern Mediterranean commenced surveillance patrols on
October 6: an AGI escorted by a minesweeper off the coast of
Israel, and an AGI escorted by a minesweeper off the coast
of Syria. Soviet Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance bombers
closely monitored the Sixth Fleet. The bulk of the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron continued routine peacetime
operations during the first two days of the war.
495Veinland, p. 81; Dupuy, p. 562.
496Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973, H pp.
VI-7, VI-8; Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 437; Weinland, pp. 80-81;
Roberts, p. 198; Glassman, p. 162.
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The first United States military response to the war
was to deploy an attack carrier task group at sea in the
•astern Mediterranean. At 9:00 A.M. on October 6, Kissinger
asked Scovfcroft to obtain a plan to move the U.S. Sixth
Pleet into the eastern Mediterranean and plans to reinforce
the Sixth Fleet if necessary. The decision to move a
carrier into the eastern Mediterranean was made during an
evening WSAG meeting and at 9:46 P.M. the JCS ordered
Independence and her escorts to get underway from Athens and
proceed to an operating area south of Crete. Independence
and her three escorts got underway from Athens on October 7
and proceeded to an area south of Crete. On October 8 Task
Force 61, the Sixth Fleet amphibious force, was ordered to
proceed to Souda Bay Crete and anchor there. The amphibious
force remained anchored at Souda Bay through October 25.
Independence arrived in the operating area south of Crete on
497October 8, joining Little Rock , the Sixth Fleet flagship.
These Sixth Fleet movements were made primarily for
purposes of political signaling. President Nixon reportedly
wanted the Sixth Fleet moved into the eastern Mediterranean
498
"as a visible sign of American power. " Kissinger
497Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973, " p.
III-9; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp. 455, 475; Quandt,
Decade of Decisions , p. 171; "Ships of Sixth Fleet Sail
Under Alert," New York Times , October 8, 1973, p. 16; "US
Warships Sail from Greece Unexpectedly," The Times (London),
October 8, 1973, p. 6; Roberts, p. 196; Weinland, p. 69.




describes the signals being sent with the Sixth Fleet as
more subtle and complex. The designated holding area south
of Crete was "a position that the Soviets would read as
indicating that the United States was preparing for any
contingency—close enough for us to act in an emergency, far
enough to bespeak no aggressive intent. The rest of our
fleet lay farther west; we would be able to indicate
499heightened concern by moving it off Cyprus." The low
key, evenhanded approach being pursued by the Nixon
Administration, was reflected in the operational guidance
provided to the Sixth Fleet. According to Vice Admiral
Daniel Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet: MTo project
this attitude, the Sixth Fleet was directed to continue
routine, scheduled operations and to avoid overt moves which
night be construed as indicating the United States was
preparing to take an active part in the conflict." The
Sixth Fleet was thus being used as a political instrument
from the first day of the crisis.
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron generally continued
normal peacetime operations during the October 6-13 period.
A Soviet AGI monitored the U.S. naval base at Rota, Spain, a
combatant patrolled just inside the Straits of Gibralter,
and two frigates patrolled the Straits of Sicily and
499Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 475. Also see
Weinland, p. 72; Quandt, Decade of Decisions , p. 171.
Quoted in Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 435.
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Messina. Most Soviet surface combatants were at anchorages
near Crete and most Soviet attack submarines remained in the
western Mediterranean. On October 7 a Kashin-class
destroyer began trailing Independence as it left Athens, a
501
routine form of Soviet peacetime surveillance. Vice
Admiral Murphy reported that there was little threat to the
Sixth Pleet during October 6-13:
Soviet units in the vicinity of the [U.S.] Task Group
holding area south of Crete during the period neither
represented a severe threat nor gave indications of an
increased state of readiness. One conventional attack
submarine and two cruise missile firing submarines
were in the general area but coordination with Soviet
surface units was infrequent and sporadic. Therefore,
COMSIXTHFLT did not perceive SOVMEDFLT [Soviet
Mediterranean Fleet] a threat to successful completion
of any of the perceived missions during Phase I
[October 6-13] . z
Soviet-American tactical-level naval interaction in
the Mediterranean began increasing on October 9. That day a
Soviet Kynda-class cruiser and an Ugra-class submarine
tender, serving as the flagship for the commander of the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, joined the Kashin trailing
the Independence and Little Rock , forming an anti-carrier
group. Also on October 9 a Soviet AGI began monitoring the
U.S. amphibious group at Souda Bay, remaining with it
through October 25. Soviet Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance
bombers continued to be active over the Mediterranean, but
501
Ibid, pp. 437, 447; Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command
History 1973," pp. VI-7, VI-8; Roberts, p. 196.




•till did not harass the Sixth Fleet. Stephen S. Roberts
has suggested that the increase in Soviet ships trailing
Independence may have been "a symbolic warning against
possible Sixth Fleet interference with the airlift and
504
sealift the Soviets were about to undertake to Syria. M
If so, it was the first political signal sent by the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron related to how the United States
might employ the Sixth Fleet in the crisis.
Soviet tattletales do more than just monitor the move-
ments and operations of the U.S. warships they trail, they
provide near real-time targeting data to Soviet ships,
aircraft, and submarines armed with anti-ship cruise
missiles. The presence of a Soviet tattletale warns a U.S.
Navy commander that his ships are constantly targeted for
preemptive attack should the Soviets elect to launch one.
Soviet tattletales are even more dangerous when they are
themselves armed with anti-ship missiles. This provides the
Soviets with the option of a preemptive strike that provides
virtually no warning time for the U.S. fleet to defend
itself. 505
503
Ibid; Watson, p. 106; Roberts, p. 196; Glassman, p.
162.
504Roberts, p. 196. Also see Galia Golan, "Soviet
Decisionmaking,** p. 202.
505For a discussion of the tattletale problem, see
William H. Gregory, "Their Tattletales (Our Problem)
,
H U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 110 (February 1984): 97-99.
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The Sixth Fleet had experienced Soviet tattletales in
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and anti-ship missile-armed Soviet
tattletales in the 1970 Jordanian Crisis. In the 1970
crisis Soviet ships armed with anti-ship missiles trailed
the three U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean around the
clock. To counter this threat, the Sixth Fleet assigned
ships armed with rapid fire guns to trail Soviet warships
armed with anti-ship missiles. Admiral Zumwalt has
explained why both sides ended up closely trailing each
other's warships:
All this trailing is an effort to compensate for
tactical asymmetries. A carrier outside the range of
the cruise missiles on Soviet ships can clearly sink
them easily with her aircraft. Therefore, the
Russians trail us closely in order to be able to
destroy most of a carrier's planes or disable the
carrier herself before aircraft can take off. We
adopted the retaliatory technique of trailing the
trailer so as to prevent them from preventing us from
launching our planes by knocking out most of fcbfir
cruise missiles before many of them took off.
This U.S. tactic was used again in 1973. Each of the
U.S. carriers would assign a destroyer or cruiser (what were
then called frigates) to each of the Soviet tattletales that
had weapons capable of threatening the carrier. The U.S.
ship would attempt to maintain a blocking position between
the Soviet warship and the U.S. carrier, keeping the Soviet
warship within range of its guns or missiles (the U.S. Navy
did not have anti-ship missiles in 1973, but certain AAW
506Zumwalt, On Watch , pp. 300-301.
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missiles could be used against surface ships) . To cover
Soviet ships armed with long range anti-ship missiles, which
usually trailed at greater ranges, the U.S. carriers used
the Hanti-surface combat air patrol" (SUCAP) tactic. The
U.S. carriers launched aircraft armed with conventional air-
to-surface bombs and missiles to monitor the Soviet
warships. The objective of the U.S. ships and planes
shadowing Soviet warships was to prevent them from launching
their anti-ship missiles against the U.S. carriers, which
obviously would have required taking the Soviet ships under
507fire before they had launched their weapons. Thus, the
ships of the Sixth Fleet and Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
were constantly maneuvering for tactical advantage against
each other, attempting to be in a favorable position to
instantly strike the first blow in the event of hostilities.
Th* Roosevelt carrier task group got underway from
Barcelona on October 10 and remained at sea in the western
508Mediterranean. The same day three Soviet ships—
a
Sverdlov-class cruiser, a Kotlin-class DDG, and a Kashin-
elass DDG—entered the Mediterranean for a port visit to
507Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973, H p.
III-4; Dixon, letter to author, April 18, 1988; Watson, p.
116; Miller, "Storm-beaten Ships," p. 24; Zumwalt, On Watch ,
pp. 300-301. Very little information is available on U.S.
and Soviet submarine operations during the 1973 crisis, but
it is safe to assume that tactical maneuvering similar to
that on the surface was also taking place under the seas.
508Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 197 3," p.
III-5; Weinland, p. 69; Roberts, p. 196.
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Taranto, Italy. Interestingly, these three Soviet ships
apparently did not participate in Soviet naval activities
directed against the Sixth Fleet until after their port
509
visit. On October 10 the Soviet Union commenced an
airlift to Syria and the next day commenced an airlift to
Egypt. Meanwhile, Soviet cargo ships had been carrying
supplies to Syria and Egypt from the beginning of the war.
Five Soviet cargo ships delivered supplies during the
October 7-12 period. Three Soviet cargo ships entered the
Mediterranean from the Black Sea on October 13, and during
October 14-19 up to two Soviet cargo ships a day passed
through the Turkish Straits en route to Egyptian and Syrian
ports. A total of nine Soviet ships proceeded to Egypt and
Syria during the October 20-22 period. The total tonnage
delivered by the Soviet sealift between October 7 and
October 23 is estimated to have been about 63,000 tons.
Although the Soviet sealift tapered off after October 23, it
510
continued through about November 1.
On October 11 the JCS ordered the Kennedy group to
depart Scotland on October 13 and proceed to a point in the
Atlantic west of Gibralter to support the U.S. airlift to
Israel. This diverted the Kennedy group from an expected
509Wemland, pp. 81, 83; Roberts, p. 193.
510Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973," pp.
VI-7, VI-8; Glassman, pp. 130-31; Roberts, p. 200. On the
Soviet airlift, see Quandt, Soviet Policy , pp. 23-26; Galia
Golan, Yom Kippur and After , pp. 85-89.
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return voyage to the United States. The same day, the JCS
ordered the helicopter carrier USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) , with
Battalion Landing Team 3/8. embarked (approximately 2,000
troops), deployed to the Mediterranean. On October 12
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin delivered a note from the Soviet
Government protesting the deployment of the Sixth Fleet to
the eastern Mediterranean. Later that day Kissinger told
the Israeli ambassador that the United States would move a
third carrier into the Mediterranean, probably referring to
the Kennedy . The Soviet protest note and Kissinger's
promise of a third U.S. carrier both illustrate the
511political role of naval forces in the crisis.
The night of October 10-11 Israeli missile boats
attacked several targets on the Syrian coast, including the
ports of Latakia and Tartus, and a battle was fought with
Syrian missile boats at Latakia. . Israeli Saar-class fast
patrol boats fired Gabriel anti-ship missiles at Syrian
missile boats maneuvering among civilian merchant ships,
sinking a Japanese freighter and a Greek freighter as well
as two Syrian missile boats. Israeli missile boats raided
the Syrian port of Tartus again the night of October 11-12.
Two more Syrian missile boats were sunk, but so was the
Soviet merchant ship Ilya Mechnikov . Israel expressed
Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973, H p.
III-5; Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 436; "Another U.S. Ship Sent,"
New York Times , October 12, 1973, p. 18; Kissinger, Years of
Upheaval , pp. 509-10; Weinland, p. 70.
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regret for sinking the Soviet ship and claimed its forces
512had orders not to attack civilian vessels. Bruce Watson
noted suspicions that the Israeli attacks on Soviet vessels
may not have been accidental:
Israel's survival depended on persuading the
United States to replace the Israeli losses of
equipment and consumables, perhaps even by independent
action against the Soviet supply line, which would
threaten to precipitate a major clash between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Whether this was
the Israeli intent on the night.of October 11-12 is
still shrouded in controversy.
In a message delivered to the U.S. on October 12, the Soviet
Union protested the Israeli sinking of its merchant ship and
warned that "The Soviet Union will of course take measures
512
"Israel Is Accused in U.N. of Sinking a Soviet
Ship,** New York Times , October 13, 1973, p. 1; "3 Freighters
Sunk," New York Times , October 13, 1973, p. 1; Galia Golan,
"Soviet Decisionmaking," p. 203; Schiff, p. 167; Dupuy, p.
559; Weinland, p. 81; Watson, p. 106; Roberts, p. 201.
Israel apparently was not alone in sinking civilian ships
during the war: Egyptian submarines allegedly sank two Greek
freighters in the Mediterranean. See Herzog, pp. 263-64.
On Arab-Israeli naval battles in the 1973 war, see Rear
Admiral Shlomo Erell, "Israeli Saar FPBs Pass Combat Test In
Yom Kippur War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 100
(September 1974): 115-18; Martin J. Miller, Jr., "The
Israeli Navy: 26 Years of Non-Peace," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 101 (February 1975): 49-54; Dupuy, pp. 557-65;
Herzog, pp. 261-69.
513Watson, p. 106. Israel also destroyed several
Soviet transport aircraft on Syrian airfields during raids
on October 10 and 11. Weinland, p. 81; Glassman, p. 130.
Although the destruction of the Soviet transport planes and
the sinking of the Soviet merchant ship could well have been
accidents, the attacks on the Syrian airfields and ports
being used for the Soviet airlift and sealift were certainly
deliberate. This does not necessarily indicate an Israeli
effort to disrupt the the Soviet airlift and sealift—the




which it will deem necessary to defend its ships and other
514
means of transportation."
The Soviets placed two LSMs off Syria on October 12,
probably on standby in the event it became necessary to
evacuate Soviet personnel and sensitive equipment. One of
the LSMs remained there through 17 October, the other
through 25 October. On October 13, probably in response to
Israeli attacks on Soviet merchant ships, the Soviets placed
a Kashin-class DDG off the Syrian coast. Two Soviet LSTs
entered the Mediterranean from the Black Sea on October 14
and proceeded to Syria on a resupply mission. A Soviet
Kotlin-class DDG joined the Kashin-class DDG off the Syrian
coast on October 15 to provide increased protection for
515Soviet ships and aircraft resupplying Syria.
On October 13 the Kennedy carrier group departed
Edinburgh, Scotland and proceeded to a position just west of
the Straits of Gibralter. The Kennedy group attempted to
avoid Soviet surveillance by transiting west of the British
Isles rather than through the English Channel and by turning
516
off radars and radios that would identify the carrier.
514Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 510.
515Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973," p.
VT-8; Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking," p. 203;
Weinland, pp. 81-82; Roberts, pp. 193, 201.
516
"Third US carrier is diverted suddenly," The Times
(London), October 17, 1973, p. 8; J. P. Moorer, letter to
author, April 18, 1988; Dixon, letter to author, April 18,
198*; Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 436; Weinland, p. 70.
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The U.S. airlift to Israel commenced on October 13.
On October 14 the Sixth Fleet was ordered to provide
assistance for the airlift. In response, ships that been
escorting the carriers were placed in a chain of picket
stations stretching across the Mediterranean. The S5:ith
Fleet provided two forms of support for the airlift. First,
the fleet provided navigation, surveillance, air defense,
and standby search and rescue support for the U.S. Air Force
C-5 and C-141 transports flying to Israel. Second, the
Sixth Fleet carriers provided refueling services for F-4 and
A-4 jets being ferried to Israel. The F-4s landed at the
Azores to refuel and were refueled again in flight over the
Mediterranean by Air Force KC-135 tankers. The A-4s landed
at the Azores to refuel, were refueled a second time in
flight by tankers from the Kennedy , then landed on Roosevelt
in the central Mediterranean and remained overnight for
refueling, servicing and pilot rest. The next day the A-4s
were refueled in flight by tankers from the Independence
during the final leg of their flight to Israel. Immediate
delivery of the F-4s and A-4s would not have been possible
without this Navy support because none of America's European
allies would allow the U.S. jets to land in their countries
(other than Portugal, which reluctantly allowed the U.S. to
517
use the Azores).
517Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973," p.




The requirement to support the U.S. airlift to Israel
created operational problems for the Sixth Fleet. The two
carriers in the Mediterranean were forced to operate without
some of their most valuable escorts at a time when they
needed them to counter the Soviet anti-ship missile threat.
Supporting the airlift left the Sixth fleet "widely
518dispersed and vulnerable." This vulnerability was
obvious to the Soviet navy. Robert Weinland contends that
"as long as it remained dispersed, the Sixth Fleet was
giving a clear—although unintentional—signal to all
concerned that it was not about to undertake any offensive
519
actions." Sixth Fleet support for the airlift thus may
have sent an inadvertent political signal to the Soviets.
On October 15 The Roosevelt began moving eastward to
the central Mediterranean to support the U.S. airlift. A
Soviet Petya-class corvette patrolling the Strait of Sicily
began shadowing Roosevelt as it passed through the strait on
October 16. It was replaced the next day by a Kashin-class
destroyer, which remained with Roosevelt through October
letter to author, April 18, 1988; Dixon, letter to author,
April 18, 1988; Miller, "Storm-beaten Ships," pp. 20-22;
Weinland, pp. 69-70. Defense of the U.S. transports was a
serious consideration. In addition to the threat of
Egyptian or Syrian attacks, there was a threat of Libyan
attacks: on March 21, 1973, Libyan jets had fired on a U.S
Air Force C-130 eighty-three miles off the coast.





22. Roosevelt arrived on station eaat of Malta on October
520
17 and remained there until October 25.
On October 16 a Sverdlov-class cruiser and Kotlin-
class destroyer joined the Kynda, Ugra, and Kashin trailing
521the Independence group and Little Rock south of Crete.
According to Vice Admiral Murphy, "The. object of this
presence nay simply be to let us know that they are aware of
our activities and to make us aware of theirs. They show no
522
sign of being more alert than normally.** Admiral
Zumwalt, on the other hand, felt the increased Soviet anti-
carrier activities were **a specific reaction to the shifting
of the fortunes of war in favor of Israel " made possible by
523the U.S. resupply airlift. As it turned out, the
Sverdlov and Kotlin replaced the Kynda and Kashin trailing
Independence . Although considered to be an anti-carrier
group, the replacement Soviet ships were much less of a
524threat to the U.S. carrier than the ships they replaced.
520a* Ibid, pp. 69, 83; Roberts, p. 198.
521Roberts, p. 196; Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 437.
522Quoted in Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 437.
523Ibid, pp. 437-38.
524Roberts speculates that this may have been
"reciprocity** for the detachment of two of Independence ' a
escorts to support the U.S. airlift to Israel. See Roberts,
p. 196. In all likelihood, however, the rotation of ships
on October 16 was not motivated by political or strategic
concerns, but by logistics. Soviet Navy underway replenish-
ment techniques were not well developed in 1973. The
Soviets would have had great difficulty refueling and

805
Several changes in U.S. and Soviet naval dispositions
in or related to the Mediterranean occurred from October 16
to October 21. USS Iwo Jlma with 2,000 Marines embarked
departed Moorehead, North Carolina, on October 16, for the
Mediterranean, arriving October 25. Soviet Tu-95 Bear
reconnaissance bombers periodically monitored Iwo Jima
during her transit of the Atlantic. A second Soviet
resupply convoy, consisting of one LST and three LSHs
,
entered the Mediterranean on October 17 and proceeded to
526
Syria. The Kennedy group arrived west of Gibralter on
October 18 and remained there through October 25. While
west of Gibralter Kennedy remained a part of the Second
Fleet, rather than joining the Sixth Fleet. A Soviet
destroyer took up trail of the Kennedy group when it arrived
west of Gibralter on October 18 and remained with the
carrier for the next two days.. It was not replaced it
departed, probably because Kennedy remained in the Atlantic
rather than entering the Mediterranean. From October 18 to
resupplying their ships while they trailed the fast U.S.
carrier groups. Instead, they had to periodically relieve
their ships so that they could be refueled at one of the
anchorages where the Soviets kept their replenishment ships
(the Kynda and Sverdlov rotated at precise seven-day
intervals, switching again on October 24).
525
"2,000 Marines to Go to Bolster Sixth Fleet," New
York Times . October 16, 1973, p. 16; Zumwalt, On Watch , p.
443; Roberts, p. 198.
526
Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After , p. 108;
Weinland, p. 82; Watson, p. 108; Roberts, p. 201.
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24, Kennedy provided support for the U.S. airlift, refueling
527jet fighters being ferried to Israel. A Mod Kildin-class
destroyer armed with SS-N-2 anti-ship cruise missiles and a
Kaahin-class DDG entered the Mediterranean from the Black
Sea on October 19, further reinforcing the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron. On October 20 a Soviet Kashin
joined the Kotlin and Kashin already off Syria (for a total
of 3 DDGs) , increasing the defenses for Soviet ships and
aircraft resupplying Syria. The three Soviet DOGs remained
on station until the ceasefire went into effect, departing
between October 24 and 26.
The Mediterranean was relatively quiet on October 22
and 23. After passage of the U.N. ceasefire resolution on
October 22, the Sixth Fleet was directed to begin planning
to return to normal peacetime operations. Through October
24 Vice Admiral Murphy expected that the Sixth Fleet would
529
return to normal operations in the near future. The only
noteworthy U.S. naval operation took place on October 22,
when fighters from Independence escorted Kissinger's plane
530into and out of Israel. The Soviet Mediterranean
527
J. P. Moorer, letter to author, April 18, 1988;
Dixon, letter to author, April 18, 1988; Zumwalt, On Watch ,
p. 436; Weinland, p. 70.
coo3<
*°Roberts
, pp. 194, 201.
529
Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 439.
530Ibid; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp. 559-60.
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Squadron's operations remained essentially unchanged.
Surveillance of Mediterranean chokepointa and trailing of
Independence and Roosevelt continued. The Kashin-class DDG
trailing Roosevelt was replaced by a Petya-class frigate on
October 22 in a routine rotation. Most of the Soviet
combatants were concentrated in the vicinity of Crete, with
a smaller concentration off Syria. Soviet ships armed with
anti-ship missiles remained within range of the Independence
task group south of Crete. Soviet Tu-16 Badgers continued
flying surveillance missions over the Mediterranean, but did
531
not harass the Sixth Fleet.
On October 22 a Soviet merchant ship passed through
the Bosporous emitting radiation, which was detected by
Western sensors. The White House received a report on this
•vent on October 25, well after the decision to set DEFCON
3. Detection of radiation created suspicions that the
Soviets had sent nuclear warheads to Egypt for the Soviet-
manned SCUD tactical rockets delivered to Egypt before the
war—perhaps as a political signal to the United States of
the Soviet commitment to enforce the ceasefire. However,
the evidence for this was sketchy and U.S. officials later
expressed doubts that the Soviets had deployed nuclear
532
warheads in Egypt. Some observers have speculated that
Glassman, p. 162; Weinland, p. 83.
532Quandt, Soviet Policy , pp. 30-31; Quandt, Decade of
Decisions , p. 198; Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking," p.
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the nuclear material was destined for the Soviet Mediter-
533
ranean Squadron. Although mysterious, this event did not
have a significant impact on the course of the crisis.
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron numbered 80 vessels
as of 24 October, including 31 surface combatants (two armed
with anti-ship cruise missiles) and 16 submarines (four or
five armed with anti-ship cruise missiles) . The surface
combatants included three cruisers, twelve destroyers, about
nine frigates and corvettes, three amphibious ships, and two
minesweepers. At least five of the Soviet conventional
attack submarines were in the eastern Mediterranean on
October 24. Additionally, five more Soviet submarines were
known to be en route to the Mediterranean. The ships and
209; Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After , p. 123; Insight
Team, p. 411; Kalb and Kalb, p. 557; Aronson, pp. 192-93;
weinland, p. 85; Dowty, pp. 258-59; Rubinstein, p. 276;
Glassman, p. 163; "Officials Suspect Russians Sent Atom Arms
to Egypt, " New York Times , November 22, 1973, p. 1.
533Weinland, p. 85; Galia Golan, ''Soviet Decision-
making, " p. 209. That the Soviet ship carried warheads for
the fleet is possible, but unlikely. At the time, the
Soviet nuclear-capable units in the Mediterranean consisted
of two Kynda-class cruisers and four or five guided missile
submarines. The submarines could not change the warheads on
their missiles, which were mounted outside the pressure
hull. The Kyndas had internal magazines, but probably could
not rebuild missiles with nuclear war.heads. The submarines
and Kyndas would have had to tie up alongside a pier or
tender to reload entire missiles. It is possible that
Soviet tenders in the Mediterranean had the capability to
reload the submarines and cruisers, and may even have been
able to rebuild missiles with nuclear warheads (a complex
task) . The Soviet ship that had emitted the radiation
proceeded to Alexandria, where several Soviet naval
auxiliaries were located, but there is no evidence that the
warheads were transferred to the tenders.
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submarines armed with anti-ship cruise missiles could launch
a total of forty missiles in their first salvo (up from
about 20 on October 6) . This was a formidable threat to the
534Sixth Fleet carriers. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
began moving into position on October 24 to support the
possibility of Soviet military intervention on behalf of
Egypt. According to Robert Weinland, "The Soviets
apparently anticipated strong U.S. opposition to what they
felt they might have to do—intervene directly in the
conflict to protect Egypt—and they moved quickly as
possible to be in an advantageous position to deal with that
535
opposition." The Soviets would take two naval actions
over the next two days: increasing its coverage of the U.S.
carrier and amphibious groups, and deploying an amphibious
and combatant force off Egypt.
The Sverdlov and Kotlin trailing Independence were
joined by an anti-carrier group composed of a Kynda-class
cruiser, Kashin-class DDG, and Kotlin-class destroyer on
536October 24. Although this rotation was probably due
534
Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 439 , 447; Watson, p. 106;
Roberts, p. 194; Glassman, pp. 161-62.
535Weinland, p. 83. Also see Glassman, pp. 162-63.
536Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 447; Roberts, p. 203. Galia
Golan states that a Moskva-class helicopter cruiser, rather
than a Kynda-class cruiser joined Independence on October
24. Rubinstein states that both of the Soviet Moskva-class
helicopter cruisers were in the Mediterranean during the
crisis. See Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking," p. 209;
Rubinstein, p. 272. Golan and Rubinstein are wrong: both of
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primarily to logistic factors, it would also have served to
protect the Soviet airlift if the Soviet Union had inter-
vened militarily in Egypt. Independence was sitting astride
Soviet sir routes to Egypt , and the Soviets had every reason
to expect that the Sixth Fleet would attempt to counter
Soviet military intervention. The Soviet Kynda, carrying
anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of about 250 nautical
lies, did not need to trail the carrier in order to target
it. Placing the Kynda group close to Independence sent a
clear warning that the Sixth Fleet would not be permitted to
537interfere in Soviet military operations.
Five Soviet ships—a Kashin, a Kotlin, an LST, and two
LSMs—were deployed off the coast of Egypt on October 24.
This force, and a group of combatants that joined it the
next day, probably had four missions: first, to support the
airlift to Egypt if the Soviets decided to intervene in
Egypt; second, to deter and defend against Israeli attacks
on Egyptian ports and airfields that would be used for the
Soviet airlift and sealift; third to evacuate remaining
Soviet noncombatant personnel if the Israelis continued
advancing into Egypt; and, fourth, to land embarked naval
the Soviet Moskva-class helicopter carriers remained in the
Black Sea during the crisis. See Weinland, p. 78; Watson,
pp.. 106, 111; Roberts, p. 195.
537Weinland, p. 83; Watson, p. 114; Roberts, p. 203;
Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking,** pp. 209-10; Miller,
"Storm-beaten Ships,** p. 24.
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infantry in Egypt in conjunction with th« landing of
airborne troops. The Soviet amphibious ships could carry a
maximum of about 1,800 troops, and probably carried much
less than that—a force inadequate to seriously threaten
Israel or effectively defend Egypt without the Soviet
538
airborne divisions that had been placed on alert. The
likely objective for Soviet naval infantry would have been
to prevent Israel from seizing Port Said—important for
logistical support of Soviet troops in Egypt.
When DEFCON 3 was set, the Sixth Fleet was allowed to
carry out the measures that Vice Admiral Murphy had been
requesting since early in the crisis to improve the fleet's
readiness for action. Kissinger makes it clear, however,
that Sixth Fleet movements were being used to send a
political signal to the Soviet Union, one the Soviets would
539detect long before they detected the U.S. alert. At 1:25
A.M. on October 25, the JCS ordered the Roosevelt carrier
group to proceed at best speed to the eastern Mediterranean
and ordered the Kennedy carrier group, still west of
538Weinland, pp. 84-85, 88; Quandt, p. 198; Roberts,
p. 204; Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After , pp. 109, 122-23;
Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking," p, 209; Glassman, pp.
162-63. Press reports, quoting U.S. officials, put the
number of Soviet naval infantry in the Mediterranean as high
as 6,000 troops.' See "Kissinger Says Action is Expression
of Policy," New York Times , October 26, 1973, p. 20. That
number is undoubtedly high: the Soviet amphibious ships in
the Mediterranean could not carry that many troops.




Gibraltar, to join Independence and Roosevelt in the eastern
Mediterranean at best speed. The three attack carriers were
concentrating astride Soviet sealanes and airlanes to Egypt,
in position to forcibly prevent the Soviet Union from
intervening militarily in the conflict. An hour later the
JCS suspended the heavy Navy support for the airlift to
Israel and allowed all but two of the escorts to return to
the Independence and Roosevelt groups. This left USS Harry
E. Yarnell (DLG 17) in the western Mediterranean and USS
Belknap (DLG 31) in the eastern Mediterranean as picket
ships for the airlift. At 3:00 P.M. on October 25, the JCS
ordered four U.S. Navy destroyers in the Baltic (previously
detached from the Kennedy group) to proceed to the
Mediterranean to reinforce the Sixth Fleet. Meanwhile, the
helicopter carrier Iwo Jima and its embarked Marines entered
the Mediterranean, for a total of over 5,000 Marines
assigned to the Sixth Fleet. The ships of the Sixth Fleet
were already operating at Condition III, a heightened
condition of readiness in which the ships were prepared to
immediately defend against enemy attacks (an internal Navy
540
readiness system separate from the DEFCON system)
.
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated in a news
conference on the day after the alert was declared that the
540Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973,** pp.
III-5, III-6; Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 443, 447; Miller, "Storm-
beaten Ships," pp. 23-24; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p.
589; Weinland, pp. 70-71, 74; Roberts, p. 204.

8X3
Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean had been a factor
in the U.S. decision to set DEFCON 3: "The Soviet buildup
of naval forces in the Mediterranean, associated with the
possibility of actions taking place than night have involved
U.S. naval forces, leads one to take precautionary steps
involved in putting all U.S. forces that could be involved
541in a higher state of readiness.** On October 25 three
Soviet combatants—a Sverdlov, a Mod-Kildin class destroyer
(armed with SS-N-2 anti-ship cruise missiles) , and a Kotlin-
class DDG
—
joined other Soviet ships trailing the
Independence group. Late on October 25 these three ships
and two other Kashin-class DOGs proceeded toward Egypt,
joining the five-ship amphibious group already there on
October 26. The Sverdlov and its two escorts soon departed,
and on October 27 intercepted the U.S. amphibious group
542
south of Crete. As additional Sixth Fleet task groups
rendezvoused in the operating area south of Crete over the
next few days, each U.S. task group was covered by a
separate group of Soviet surface combatants,' composed of
ships armed with anti-ship missiles escorted by additional
543
ships armed with AAW missiles.
541Schlesinger, "News Conference of October 26," p.
620.
542Weinland, p. 84; Roberts, p. 204; Rubinstein, p.
281.
543Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973,** p.
VI-8; Zumwalt, On Watch ; p. 447; Roberts, p. 206.
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The Soviet navy commenced intensive anti-carrier
exercises against the Independence group on October 26.
Soviet submarines armed with anti-ship cruise missiles
participated in the exercise, which continued through
544November 3. A Sverdlov-class cruiser and a Kashin-class
DDG began shadowing the Roosevelt group on October 26, and
soon joined the anti-carrier exercise. The Soviet anti-
carrier exercise was probably intended as a signal that the
Soviet navy was prepared to counter the Sixth Fleet in the
•astern Mediterranean. As Charles Petersen notes,
the Soviets routinely carry out anticarrier exercises
in full view of U.S. Navy observers—often using U.S.
carriers themselves as simulated targets. Through
this exercise activity, the Soviet Navy has made the
U.S. aware of some of the tactics its ACW [anti-
carrier warfare] forces might be expected to employ.
In effect, therefore, the Soviets have transmitted to
the U.S. an "action language" vocabulary that can be^c
«nd has been—employed for signaling during crises.
This is exactly what took place in the October 1973 crisis.
544Schlesinger, "News Conference of October 26," p.
621; Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 447; Weinland, p. 74; Roberts,
pp. 195, 204, 206. It is not clear how quickly the Navy
discerned that the Soviet anti-carrier activities were an
exercise rather than an actual attack. The navy could well
have had warning of the exercise from intelligence sources,
although there is no evidence of this. Since Sixth Fleet •
ships and planes were closely monitoring all the major
Soviet warships, final preparations for missile launch—such
as fire control radar lock-on and opening of missile tube
doors—or actual missile launches would have been detected
immediately. Lack of such indicators of an actual attack
may well have been the first, and only, evidence that the
Soviets were conducting an exercise.
545Charles C. Petersen, "Showing the Flag," in
Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval
Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 105.
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Stephen Roberts described the anti-carrier exercise as "the
most intense signal the Soviets had ever transmitted with
546
their naval forces in a crisis.** The signal was received
loud and clear by the Sixth Fleet.
The U.S. carriers, denied freedom to maneuver by White
House orders placing them in small, fixed operating areas,
547
were extremely vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive strike.
Soviet ships and submarines armed with anti-ship cruise
missiles were constantly within range of the U.S. carriers
548
while they were in the eastern Mediterranean. Vice
Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet, has described
the climate in the Mediterranean during the Soviet anti-
carrier exercise:
The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean
Fleet were, in effect, sitting in a pond in close
proximity and the stage for the hitherto unlikely **war
st sea** scenario was set. This situation prevailed
for several days. Both fleets were obviously in a
high readiness posture for whatever might come next,
although it appeared that neither fleet knew exactly
what to expect.
Admiral Zumwalt has described the period of the soviet anti-
carrier exercise in strong terms: "I doubt that major units
of the U.S. Navy were ever in a tenser situation since World
546Roberts, p. 210.
547
Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 436; Weinland, p. 74.
548Morin, letter to author, April 14, 1988; Dixon,
letter to author, April 18, 1988; Glassman, p. 162.
549Quoted in Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 447.
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War II ended than the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was
550for the week after the alert was declared. N This tense
situation lasted through October 30, well after the cease-
fire took hold and tensions in the Middle East had eased.
On October 27 a Sverdlov-class cruiser, Mod-Kildin
class destroyer (armed with SS-N-2 anti-ship cruise
missiles), and Kotlin-class DDG began trailing the U.S.
amphibious group. The three Soviet combatants represented a
formidable threat to the lightly armed U.S. amphibious
ships. As Soviet combatants rendezvoused with the U.S. task
groups, they joined the war at sea exercises that started on
October 26. A Soviet Kresta II-class ASW cruiser entered
the Mediterranean from the Atlantic on October 27—the only
Soviet surface combatant to do so during the crisis. This
Kresta II remained in the western Mediterranean, well clear
of the action to the east. Three Soviet combatants entered
the Mediterranean from the Black Sea on October 29: a Kynda-
class cruiser armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, a Kashin-
551
class DDG, and and a Kotlin-class DDG.
On October 30 the JCS authorized the three U.S. attack
carriers to move to the west and maneuver freely in order to
counter intense Soviet anti-carrier activities. As Robert




551'3XIbid; Roberts, pp. 195, 204, 206.
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and unintentional, but in the end not unwelcome—signal: the
552United States was relaxing. " The three carriers remained
southwest of Crete through November 13. The Soviet anti-
carrier group that had entered the Mediterranean on October
29 began trailing the Kennedy carrier group on October 31
and joined in the anti-carrier exercise. The Soviet navy
now had an anti-carrier group trailing each of the three
U.S. carrier task groups, and additional combatants trailing
the U.S. amphibious group. Also on October 31 two Nanuchka-
class corvettes armed with anti-ship cruise missiles and a
Skoryy-class destroyer entered the Mediterranean from the
553Black Sea. The Nanuchkas further increased the Soviet
squadron's anti-ship missile strength. As of October 31
there were 95 Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean,
including 40 surface combatants (five armed with anti-ship
cruise missiles), 23 submarines (about seven armed with anti-
ship cruise missiles), four AGIs, and 28 auxiliaries. The
40 Soviet surface combatants consisted of five cruisers,
fifteen destroyers, six frigates and corvettes, two guided
missile corvettes, eight amphibious ships, and four mine-
sweepers. The ships and submarines armed with anti-ship
cruise missiles could launch a total of 88 missiles in their
first salvo (up from about twenty on October 6 and forty on
5523 Mainland, p. 75.
553Zumwalt, On Watch
, p. 447; Weinland, pp. 71, 86;
Roberts, pp. 194, 206.
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October 24). The Sixth Fleet numbered about 60 ships,
including three attack carriers, two amphibious assault
554helicopter carriers, and nine attack submarines (SSNs)
.
U.S. and Soviet naval operations began to return to
normal upon completion of the Soviet war at sea exercise
against the Sixth Fleet. On November 3 Independence and her
escorts were ordered to Athens for a port visit and the
amphibious group was ordered to proceed to Souda Bay and
anchor. Also on November 3, Soviet surveillance of the
Sixth Fleet began to decline and Soviet combatants ceased
trailing Roosevelt and the U.S. amphibious groups. Over the
next few days Soviet combatants ceased trailing other U.S.
Navy units as they left the eastern Mediterranean. The
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron began reducing its strength to
peacetime levels on November 7 when three combatants entered
the Black Sea. The three U.S. carriers interrupted their
cycle of port visits and remained at sea November 9-14 while
Kissinger was in the Middle East conducting negotiations.
This was the final U.S. naval activity in the Mediterranean
related to the crisis. On November 18 the Sixth Fleet was
554Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973," pp.
III-6, 111-10, VI-8; "U.S. Carrier Force Is Sent Toward the
Indian Ocean," New York Times , October 30, 197 3, p. 1;
Zumwalt, On Watch
, p. 447; Weinland, pp. 77, 85; Watson, p.
Ill; Roberts, pp. 194, 206. The Soviet first salvo total of
88 anti-ship missiles included eight SS-N-14s carried by the
Kresta II-class cruiser, but since 1973 that missile has
been determined to be an ASW weapon. The actual Soviet
first salvo total was thus 80 anti-ship cruise missiles—
a
formidable threat to the Sixth Fleet.
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directed to stand down from alert and the Kennedy carrier
group, which was now a month overdue returning from
deployment, was ordered to proceed home to Norfolk. As of
November 19 the number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean
had declined from 95 to 70 and Soviet naval operations had
555
essentially returned to normal.
The U.S. and Soviet navies also increased their forces
in the Indian Ocean immediately after the crisis. During
the crisis, the U.S. Middle East Force consisted of a flag-
ship (a converted dock landing ship) and two destroyers.
The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron consisted of about twenty
ships, including a destroyer, a Foxtrot-class attack
submarine, two corvettes, two minesweepers, an LST, and
various auxiliaries. The CNO had recommended on October 25,
the day DEFCON 3 was set, that an attack carrier task group
be moved into the Indian Ocean from the Pacific. On October
29, as part of U.S. actions to increase its readiness for
military operations in the Middle East, the attack carrier
USS John Hancock (CVA 19), with five escorts and an oiler,
were ordered into the Indian Ocean. The carrier's destina-
tion was stated to be the Persian Gulf area and the deploy-
ment was originally described as a response to the Soviet
buildup in the Mediterranean (This was later retracted and
555Commander Sixth Fleet, "Command History 1973, H p.
VI-8; "Sixth Fleet's Alert Ends; Some Vessels Due Home," New
York Times , November 20, 1973, p. 4; Zumwalt, On Watch , pp.
447-48; Weinland, pp. 71, 85-86; Roberts, pp. 194, 206.
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the deployment described as a routine show-the-f lag
cruise). At the time, there was no unusual Soviet naval
activity in the Indian Ocean. On November 12 a Sverdlov-
class cruiser (the one commonly used as the Pacific Fleet
flagship) and a Kashin-class DOG transited the Straits of
Malacca, but remained in the eastern Indian Ocean rather
than joining Hancock in the Arabian Sea. U.S. and Soviet
naval activity in the Indian Ocean remained at unusually
high levels for several months, for reasons largely
556
unrelated to the situation in the Middle East.
In summary, both the United States and the Soviet
Union used their navies for political signaling in the 1973
Arab-Israeli War. Tactical-level interactions between U.S.
and Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean were intense
during the crisis: Soviet tattle tales and aircraft closely
monitored the Sixth Fleet, and U.S. ships and aircraft
closely monitored the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Soviet
ships and submarines armed with anti-ship cruise missiles
were constantly within range of U.S. the carriers while they
were in the eastern Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet took
556Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 446; "U.S. Carrier Force Is
Sent Toward the Indian Ocean," New York Times , October 30,
1973, p. 1; Roberts, p. 207. The increased U.S. presence in
the Indian Ocean was related to the Middle East crisis only
in the sense that the carrier task group was available in
the event that Arab nations attempted to close the sea lanes
out of the Persian Gulf by force. However, there apparently
was not much concern on the part of U.S. leaders that the
Arab nations would attempt to do this.
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actions to counter the threat from Soviet tat.tletal.es and
anti-carrier forces, seeking the ability to instantly
destroy all threatening Soviet units upon indication of a
Soviet attack. Tensions at sea were acute during the
October 26-31 period due to intense Soviet anti-carrier
exercises against the Sixth Fleet.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War marked several records and
new developments in Soviet naval operations. The Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron conducted operations on a much larger
scale than it had in the 1967 and 1970 Middle East crises,
and maintained those operations for a much longer period of
time, making it, in Bruce Watson's words, "the most
ambitious use of the Soviet Navy for political purposes up
557
to that time." Additionally, for the first time the
Soviet navy conducted crisis-related operations that did not
involve countering the U.S. Navy—such as the sealifts to
Syria and Egypt and defense of those sealifts—while at the
same time conducting significant operations directed against
the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron was
responsive to changes in Sixth Fleet operations, redeploying
ships as necessary to counter the U.S. fleet, and did not
558have to suspend its pro-Arab operations to do so. This
demonstrated a depth and flexibility that had not been seen
557Watson, p. 103. Also see Roberts, p. 210;
Rubinstein, p. 272.
558Weinland, p. 86; Roberts, p. 210.
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in previous crises. The implications of this are well
described by Bradford Dismukes:
On the basis of the information now available, it
appears that the Soviets were prepared to accept
significantly higher risks in this crisis than
before. They committed naval forces that, in the
situation, appeared to be quite formidable, and they
behaved at the peak of the crisis (with the threat to
intervene unilaterally on Egypt's behalf) as though
they considered the Sixth Fleet effectively
neutralized.
The Soviet Navy can thus be viewed as having become a full-
fledged superpower navy in 1973.
Several specific aspects of Soviet naval operations
were also noteworthy. First, the Soviet Navy conducted
extensive and sustained operations within a combat zone for
the first time. In previous crises, Soviet ships had
withdrawn from war zones, entering only as necessary to
monitor the fighting ashore and to keep tabs on the Sixth
Fleet. Second, it was the first time that the Soviet
Navy provided warships to protect a Soviet airlift and
sealift during a crisis. Third, it was the first time
that Soviet amphibious ships were deployed to the Mediter-
ranean in significant numbers in a crisis, and the first





562Ibid; Dismukes, p. 503.; Rubinstein, p. 272.
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fourth, it was the first time that the Soviets deployed
warships to counter the U.S. amphibious group as well as
U.S. carrier groups—a move that made it clear the Soviets
were countering the U.S. ability to intervene in the Middle
563Sast. All of these actions marked a new Soviet willing*
nest to fully exploit the capabilities of its navy in
support of crisis foreign policy objectives.
The October 1973 crisis was the first Soviet-American
confrontation in which the Soviet Navy posed a significant
immediate threat to the U.S. Navy. In the assessment of
Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet actions in the October War may
well have produced a situation in which the Soviets were
564tactically superior." This assessment was shared by
senior Navy officers. Early on October 25, Schlesinger and
Adairal Moorer briefed the Joint Chiefs on the events
leading up to the worldwide DEFCON 3 alert. According to
Admiral Zumwalt, Admiral Moorer had stated during the WSAG
seating that "we would lose our ass in the eastern Med
[Mediterranean] under these circumstances.** Admiral Zumwalt
told Schlesinger that the eastern Mediterranean was the
565
worst place for the U.S. Navy to fight the Soviets.
Ibid, p. 86; Roberts, p. 206.
564Dismukes, p. 502. Also see Aronson, p. 195; Dowty,
pp. 275-76; Harvey Sicherman, "The Yom Kippur War: End of
Illusion?,** Foreign Policy Papers , Vol. 1, No. 4 (Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1976), p. 53.
565Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 446.
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Admiral Moorer's opinion was not quite so negative looking
back on the crisis in retrospect: "Victory in the
Mediterranean encounter in 1973 would have depended on which
navy struck first and a variety of other factors. Victory
would have depended on the type of scenario which
occurred. " This still indicates, however, that the
Soviet Navy posed a severe threat to the Sixth Fleet. Bruce
Watson has summarized the impact of that threat:
Thus, for the first time in the post-World War II era,
the U.S. Navy had been effectively denied complete
control of the seas. Throughout the entire period
from 1957 through 1980, the Soviet Navy never posed a
greater threat against U.S. naval forces operating on
the high seas, nor was the [Soviet] navy's effect ever
more relevant in the U.S. -Soviet nonstrategic balance
of power. 567
The final noteworthy point about Soviet naval
operations in the October 1973 crisis is that the Soviets
did not deploy as many ships to the Mediterranean as they
could have sent. At the height of the Soviet buildup, only
20 of the 42 cruisers and destroyers in the Black Sea Fleet
bad been sent to the Mediterranean. Nor did the Soviets
deploy any of the modern ASW ships (Kara-class ASW cruisers
and Moskva-class ASW helicopter cruisers) that were
ego
available in the Black Sea Fleet. Several possible
reasons for this have been proposed by Western naval




Weinland, p. 78; Roberts, p. 195; Dismukes, p. 503.
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analysts. Stephen Roberts and Robert Weinland suggest that
the Soviets only deployed older, less capable, and therefore
569
more expendable ships to the Mediterranean. Bradford
Disnukes concludes, based on this pattern, that the Soviets
were maintaining "a strategic reserve to deal with
570
unforeseeable contingencies." Stephen Roberts, on the
other hand, contends that the Black Sea Fleet was
approaching the limits of its resources and that the Soviets
might have been forced to deploy ships from the Baltic or
Northern Fleets to further reinforce the Mediterranean
571Squadron.
All of these interpretations are probably reading too
much into the available information. The Soviets sent roost
of their ships armed with anti-ship missiles to the
Mediterranean (five of eight, including both Kynda-class
cruisers), probably because their primary concern was U.S.
intervention in the Middle East with carrier and amphibious
forces (that concern is evident in Soviet naval operations
during the crisis, described earlier). No modern ASW ships
were sent because the primary threat was U.S. surface ships,
not U.S. submarines. The Soviets appeared to send their
older ships to the Mediterranean simply because the ships
569






armed with anti-ship missiles had been built earlier than
the ASW ships (1959-1966 for the Kynda and Kresta I anti-
ship missile-armed cruisers, versus 1966-1976 for the Kresta
II and Kara ASW cruisers). Additionally, the Soviets sent
two relatively new Nanuchka-class corvettes armed with anti-
ship missiles to the Mediterranean. The Black Sea Fleet was
hardly at the limit of its resources with less than half of
its major surface combatants deployed (The number of
replenishment ships available to support the ships already
deployed was probably a greater constraint than the number
of combatants left to deploy) . On the other hand, the
Soviets probably did not keep 22 major surface combatants in
the Black Sea as a strategic reserve: they could easily be
bottled up if the U.S. closed the Turkish Straits. The
overall pattern of Soviet naval deployments in October 1973
was simple: they sent the ships they needed to counter U.S.
surface forces to the Mediterranean, and left those they did
not need in the Black Sea. The one possible implication of
this pattern is that the Soviets probably did not expect the
crisis to escalate to war with the United States. Had they
expected war, they probably would have surged every
available ship and submarine into the Mediterranean.
The final step in this review of U.S. naval operations
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is to examine the tactical-
level interactions that could have occurred with Soviet or




forces. The following interactions conceivably could have
occurred during the the crisis: collisions at sea between
U.S. and Soviet vessels, collisions between U.S. and Soviet
aircraft, U.S. ships or aircraft firing on Soviet or Arab
planes approaching the fleet in a potentially hostile
manner, U.S. ships or aircraft firing on Egyptian ships Or
submarines approaching the fleet in a potentially hostile
572Banner, Soviet naval vessels firing on U.S. planes
approaching them in a potentially hostile manner, Arab or
Israeli aircraft firing on U.S. planes carrying supplies to
Israel, U.S. fighters being flown to Israel, or U.S. planes
flying reconnaissance missions off their coasts. A remote
possibility was that Soviet Mig-25s in Egypt might try to
intercept U.S. SR-71 reconnaissance planes flying over the
Suez canal.
Despite the intense tactical-level interaction between
U.S. and Soviet Naval forces, there were no collisions at
sea or other dangerous incidents. Unlike 1967, there were
no instances of Soviet close quarters maneuvering to harass
the Sixth Fleet. Soviet Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance bombers
were active over the Mediterranean, but did not harass the
Sixth Fleet. There were minor incidents, such as training
572The Egyptian navy established a distant blockade of
Israel south and southwest of Crete with destroyers (beyond
the range of Israeli missile boats) and southeast of Crete




guns and missile launchers on U.S. ships, firing flares at
U.S. planes, and shining searchlights on U.S. ships at
night, all of which violate the Incidents at Sea Agree-
nent. Other than this, however, both sides complied with
the provisions of the Incidents at Sea Agreement: the U.S.
carrier groups used the maneuvering signals called for in
the Agreement and Soviet ships avoided interfering with the
573
U.S. formations. No Egyptian or Syrian vessels or
aircraft were encountered during the crisis because the
574
sixth Fleet was kept well clear of their coasts. On
October 25 two high speed surface contacts headed out into
the Mediterranean raised concern that they might be headed
573
Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988; J. P.
Moorer, letter to author, April 18, 1988; Morin, letter to
author, April 14, 1988; Dixon, letter to author, April 18,
1988; Glassman, p. 162; Roberts, p. 196. There was one
minor incident between U.S. and Soviet forces outside the
Mediterranean about the time war broke out in the Middle
Bast. While Kennedy was participating in a NATO exercise in
the Norwegian Sea, there was a minor mid-air collision
between a Soviet Tu-16 '•Badger'* reconnaissance bomber and a
U.S. F-4 Phantom jet fighter from Kennedy that had been sent
up to intercept and trail the Soviet plane. There was
"slight** damage to each, but both landed safely. J. P.
Moorer, letter to author, April 18, 1988. The Soviet Union
apparently did not file a diplomatic protest over the
incident, though it probably filed a complaint through
Incidents at Sea Agreement channels.
574Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988; Morin,
letter to author, April 14, 1988; Dixon, letter to author,
April 18, 1988. Weinland states that the Sixth Fleet "was
not challenged directly by any of the belligerents."
Weinland, p. 71. The fact that no Egyptian vessels were
encountered by the U.S. Navy during the crisis suggests that
the Egyptian destroyers were not aggressively enforcing the
blockade of Israel and may have spent considerable time in
Libyan or Algerian ports—far from danger.
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for the Independence carrier group, but the identity of the
contacts was established as Israeli well before there was
575
any need to take action against them. There were very
few accidents involving U.S. naval forces, and none serious
enough to impair Washington's ability to manage the crisis.
finding s,
This section will review the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to
answer the eight research questions. The first question is
to what degree were interactions between the forces of the
two sides at the scene of the crisis the result of actions
taken in accordance with mechanisms of delegated control,
rather than direct control by national leaders? The Nixon
Administration did not attempt to exercise direct control
over the operations of the Sixth Fleet other than its
movements in the Mediterranean. Sixth Fleet movements,
however, were closely controlled—much closer than in the
X967 Middle East War. Rather than giving the fleet
boundaries on where it was permitted to operate, as in 1967,
576Washington told the fleet exactly where to operate. On
the other hand, the President and Schlesinger did not
attempt to communicate directly with any level in the chain
575Roberts, p. 196.
576Zumwalt, interview by author, February 16, 1988;




of command below the JCS; orders to the Sixth Fleet were
passed via normal channels. Nor did they made an effort to
provide specialized guidance in mechanisms of delegated
control. As a result, the ships of the Sixth Fleet acted in
accordance with Navy standing orders in responding to Soviet
naval operations. The measures taken by the Sixth Fleet to
counter Soviet tattletales and anti-ship missile-armed ships
were standard Navy tactics that had been used in the past
(such as in the 1970 Jordanian crisis) . There was thus
significant delegation of authority to on-scene commanders
and the guidance contained in Navy standing orders and
standing rules of engagement played a crucial role in
determining the nature of the tactical-level interactions
that occurred.
The second question is were the forces of the two
sides at the scene of the crisis tightly coupled with each
other? Soviet tattletales and aircraft closely monitored
the Sixth Fleet, and U.S. ships and aircraft closely
monitored the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. The Soviets
quickly responded to changes in Sixth Fleet operations,
keeping every U.S. carrier in the eastern Mediterranean
targeted with anti-ship missiles. Similarly, the Sixth
Fleet quickly reacted to changes in Soviet naval operations,
keeping Soviet ships that were an immediate threat to the
carriers in the sights of U.S. ships or planes. Thus,
Soviet and American forces were tightly coupled during the
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crisis—much more tightly than they had been in any previous
Soviet-American crisis.
The third question is were the forces of the two sides
being used by their national leaders as a political
instrument in the crisis? It is clear that the United
577
States used the Sixth Fleet for political signaling.
Admiral Zumwalt observes that as part of their political-
military strategy, President Nixon and Kissinger "used the
578fleet for their 'shadow boxing' with the Soviet Union."
What Admiral Zumwalt viewed as "shadow boxing" was what
Kissinger viewed as subtle political signaling. Vice
Admiral Engen, a veteran of U.S. naval operations in both
the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars, felt that the Sixth
Fleet was used for political signalling more in 1973 than it
had been in 1967: "There seemed to be more 'State Depart-
ment' in this war and positioning of naval forces to convey
579
signals." That the Soviets received the signals being
sent with the Sixth Fleet is indicated by the note the
Soviets sent on October 12 protesting the movement of the
580U.S. fleet into the eastern Mediterranean.
577Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , pp. 475, 587-89;
Weinland, pp. 71-73, 75, 90; Safran p. 494.
578Zumwalt, interview by author, February 16, 1988.
579Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988.
580Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 475.
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The Soviet Union used its Mediterranean Squadron for
political signaling, and it is clear from Kissinger's com"
581
nents that U.S. leaders received the Soviet signals. The
Soviet naval actions that sent the strongest signals were
reinforcement of the Mediterranean Squadron, which almost
doubled in numbers of ships and quadrupled in firepower,
trailing of Sixth Fleet task groups, keeping the bulk of the
Squadron well clear of the fighting ashore, and conducting
an anti-carrier exercise from October 26 to November 3. As
will be discussed below, U.S. leaders also read political
signals into Soviet naval actions that may not have been
intended as signals—an example of inadvertent signaling.
The answers to these first three questions establish
that the conditions necessary for stratified interaction
existed in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The United States
relied on methods of delegated control, U.S. and Soviet
naval forces in the Mediterranean were tightly coupled, and
both sides used their forces as political instruments under
conditions of acute crisis. Significant and dangerous
interactions occurred at the tactical level that were not
directly controlled by American leaders. For example,
President Nixon had no direct control over Sixth Fleet
counter-targeting of Soviet ships carrying anti-ship cruise
581
Ibid, pp. 475, 509-10; Watson, p. 114; Roberts, pp
196, 203, 210; Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking, H pp.
202, 209-10; Weinland, p. 89.
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missiles, and was probably unaware that this activity had
inadvertently been set in motion by White House orders
making the fleet an easy target for the Soviet Navy.
The fourth question is did crisis interactions at the
tactical level become decoupled from the strategy being
pursued by national leaders? To establish that stratified
interactions became decoupled in the crisis requires two
findings: first, that one or more of the potential causes of
decoupling were present, and, second, that operational
decisions made by tactical-level decisionmakers differed
from those that political-level decisionmakers would have
made in order to coordinate the actions with their strategy
for managing the crisis. As for the first requirement, four
of the potential causes of decoupling were present in the
crisis: communications and information flow problems,
impairment of political-level decisionmaking, a fast-paced
tactical environment, and tactically inappropriate orders.
The U.S. communications system provided much faster
communications in 1973 than it had in 1967, but still did
not permit the President to exercise real-time direct
control over the Sixth Fleet. This did not cause problems
because the White House did not attempt to exercise such
close control. There were thus no serious communications
problems during the crisis.
Impairment of political-level decisionmaking was at
least a minor factor in the crisis. President Nixon was in
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the midst of the Watergate scandal and the resignation of
Vice President Spiro Agnew. Although President Nixon
reportedly made key decisions himself and was kept informed
of major developments in the crisis, he clearly did not
exercise close, detailed control over U.S. actions in the
582
crisis. The President's political travails appear not to
have had « direct impact on U.S. actions in the crisis, but
undoubtedly complicated top-level decisionmaking.
The tactical environment in the Mediterranean was very
fast-paced during the crisis. As has already been noted,
there was intense tactical-level interaction between the
U.S. and Soviet navies in the Mediterranean. The White
House was not directly controlling the actions of the Sixth
Fleet in that interaction, and available accounts of the
crisis suggest that Nixon and Kissinger were unaware that it
was occurring. Sixth Fleet efforts to counter the Soviet
anti-ship missile threat required frequent tactical
decisions as Soviet ships maneuvered to keep the U.S.
carriers targeted. This intense maneuvering for tactical
advantage was too fast-paced for the White House to be able
to effectively control it. If a Soviet vessel had fired a
missile at a U.S. carrier—accidently or deliberately—there
582Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 470; Quandt,
Decade of Decisions
, pp. 171, 183. In his memoirs, Nixon
intersperses descriptions of the Middle East crisis with
descriptions of the Watergate scandal, providing a good
illustration of the impact that the scandal had on his
attention. See Nixon, pp. 920-42.
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would have been no time for on-scene commanders to consult
with higher authority before taking action. The same situa-
tion could well have existed for the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron, which was constantly targeted at point blank range
by U.S. warships and attack aircraft.
Tactically inappropriate orders were a major factor in
the crisis and led to decoupling. To ensure that the Sixth
Fleet sent only the desired political signals, the White
House ordered the fleet to remain in small, fixed operating
areas. This made the U.S. fleet extremely vulnerable to a
Soviet preemptive strike. The on-scene commanders—acting
on their own initiative and well within their delegated
authority—sought to reduce their vulnerability by counter-
targeting the most threatening Soviet naval units. Tight
direct control of Sixth Fleet movements by the White House
thus generated tactically inappropriate orders.
The second requirement for establishing that
decoupling occurred is that the operational decisions made
by tactical-level decisionmakers differed from those that
political-level decisionmakers would have made in order to
coordinate those actions with their strategy for managing
the crisis. As was discussed earlier, the Sixth Fleet was
moved to south of Crete in order to demonstrate to the
Soviet Union that the United States was prepared for any
contingency, but had no aggressive intent and was not
preparing to take an active part in the conflict. Sixth
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Fleet movements on October 25 were intended to deter escala-
tion of the conflcit—specfically, Soviet intervention in
Egypt with airborne forces—but the fleet was restrained in
order to avoid signalling excessive hostility or an inten-
tion to intervene directly in the conflict. Given these
political signalling objectives, it is not clear that the
White House would have viewed Sixth Fleet preparations for
preemptive strikes against the Soviet navy
—
preparations the
Soviets were well aware of—as supporting the U.S. strategy
for managing the crisis or as sending the political signals
it wanted sent to the Soviet Union. Thus, there appear to
have been decoupled interactions in the crisis.
The fifth question is did national leaders and on-
scene commanders hold different perceptions of the
vulnerability of on-scene forces to preemption and the need
to strike first in the event of an armed clash? During the
first week of the crisis, U.S. Navy on-scene commanders were
relatively unconcerned about the Soviet naval threat because
the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron essentially continued
normal peacetime operations. Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander
of the Sixth Fleet, stated in a 1973 internal Navy report
that he "did not perceive SOVMEDFLT [Soviet Mediterranean
Fleet] a threat to successful completion of any of the
583perceived missions" during the October 6-13 period. From
583Quoted in Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 437.
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October 14 onward, however, the tactical situation changed
dramatically for the worse. U.S. Navy on-scene commanders
in the Mediterranean were highly concerned about the threat
of a Soviet preemptive attack due to the untenable tactical
position in which the Sixth Fleet had peen placed by White
House restrictions on the fleet's movements. When asked if
he had been put in a position that he considered
operationally undesirable or tactically vulnerable during
the crisis, Rear Admiral Dixon, Commanding Officer of the
Kennedy . replied yes, he had, because his carrier had been
placed in "a fixed position in close proximity to the
584Soviets." Soviet ships and submarines armed with anti-
ship missiles were constantly within range of the U.S.
585
carriers while they were in the eastern Mediterranean.
The threat of preemptive attack appeared to be particularly
acute during the October 26-30 period due to intense Soviet
anti-carrier exercises against the Sixth Fleet. Bruce
Watson had explained why a Soviet anti-carrier exercise
creates such grave concerns:
One of the most difficult situations for Sixth
Fleet forces to deal with is a Soviet anticarrier
warfare exercise. When a U.S. ship is used as the
simulated target, Soviet ships maneuver so
realistically that it is virtually impossible to
distinguish between exercise activity and a real
attack on a carrier. In these exercises, Soviet
584
Dixon, letter to author, April 18, 1988.
585Morin, letter to author, April 14, 1988; Dixon,
letter to author, April 18, 1988; Classman, p. 162.
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forces arc in position, and weapons are aimed at the
target. All that is needed to transform the exercise
into a shooting war is the order to fire. Just such
an exercise was begun on October 26.
The period of this Soviet exercise could well have been the
closest that the Soviet Union and the United States have
ever been to "hair trigger" readiness for war—at least at
the tactical level.
Not surprisingly, senior U.S. Navy officers appear to
have had a good grasp of the concerns felt by the on-scene
commanders in the Mediterranean. In a statement to the
press during the crisis, Admiral Bagley, CINCUSNAVEUR,
described how the Sixth Fleet was being targeted by the
587Soviet navy. Shlomo Aronson reports that senior naval
officers at the Pentagon were very worried about military
588
risks in the Mediterranean. Admiral Moorer expressed -
concern about the Soviet naval threat in the eastern
Mediterranean during the October 24-25 WSAG meeting, and
Admiral Zumwalt expressed similar concerns to
589Schlesinger. Thus, there does not appear to have been
stratified threat perceptions within the military chain of
command from the on-scene commander to the JCS Chairman.
586Watson, p. 115-16.
587Quoted in Glassman, p. 162.
588Aronson, p. 195. Also see Dowty, pp. 275-76;
Sicherman, p. 53.




Civilian officials appear to have held threat
perceptions much different from those held by U.S. Navy
officers. Kissinger, in particular, did not perceive a
threat from the Soviet Navy during the crisis. Kissinger's
cavalier description of Soviet-American naval interaction
during the crisis reveals his perception: "The two fleets,
signaling parallel intentions, later met off Crete and
590
started milling around there." The "milling around" that
Kissinger mentions was constant Soviet targeting of the U.S.
carriers with anti-ship missiles and simultaneous U.S.
counter-targeting of high-threat Soviet warships with ships
and armed aircraft—a much more dangerous situation than
that implied by Kissinger. Kissinger also was either
unaware of the Soviet anti-carrier exercise or did not
understand the threat it represented to the Sixth Fleet.
Kissinger states in his memoirs that after October 25, when
Soviet ships withdrew from the coast of Egypt, "No such
591threatening Soviet naval activity took place again." In
fact, the most threatening Soviet naval activity of the
crisis—the anti-carrier exercise—commenced the next day.
After the crisis Kissinger would directly confront
charges that the Soviet navy had been a serious threat to
the Sixth Fleet: "I have seen statements that in 1973, the





United States was affected in the conduct of the Kiddle East
crisis by its fear of the Soviet navy. This nay have been
true of our navy; it wasn't true of our government. ... We
all suffered from the illusion that our navy was far
superior to the Soviet navy, and we conducted ourselves
592
accordingly." Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zumwalt
certainly did not share this view, so the persons mentioned
by Kissinger probably included only himself, President
Nixon, and perhaps Schlesinger. The important point is that
this confirms a divergence of threat perceptions between
civilian and military officials: the Navy chain of command
from the JCS Chairman down to the carrier Commanding
Officers perceived a serious threat from Soviet anti-carrier
operations, while civilian officials did not perceive a
threat to the Sixth Fleet. Thus, stratified threat
perceptions did arise at the very top of the chain of
command, between civilian and military officials.
Part of the reason why civilian officials held much
different threat perceptions than those held by military
officials is that the Navy chain of command was not kept
informed of the political and diplomatic aspects of the
crisis. When asked if the JCS was kept informed of U.S.
objectives in the crisis and U.S. diplomatic efforts to
resolve the crisis, Admiral Zumwalt replied, "No. The JCS
592Quoted in Richard Valeriani, Travels With Henry
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), pp. 181-82.
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was only kept informed of those things on which Kissinger
wanted our support, or which he thought we would find out
593
anyway. H The Navy chain of command was also kept in the
dark. When asked if the chain of command was kept informed
of U.S. objectives in the crisis and U.S. diplomatic efforts
to resolve the crisis, Vice Admiral Engen, Deputy Commander
in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe, replied, "There never is
594
such information passed down the line." Admiral Zumwalt
confirms that Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth
Fleet, also was not briefed on the political logic behind
the tactically inappropriate orders being issued to his
fleet: "And, worst of all from my point of view, he was not
given the kind of explanation of these orders that a Vice
Admiral and Fleet Commander, who afterall is not a blabber-
595
mouth or a dummy, is entitled to." The on-scene comman-
der thus lacked important information on the political
context of the crisis, and had to interpret Soviet behavior
on the basis of the military and naval moves being made by
Soviet forces. It is not surprising, therefore, that Soviet
naval operations in the Mediterranean appeared much more
threatening to the Navy chain of command than they did to
Kissinger.
593Zumwalt, interview by author, February 16, 1988.
594
Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988.
595
Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 436.
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The only exception to this pattern was that Admiral
Moorer informed the unified and specified commander in
general terms of the purpose of the DEFCON 3 alert. In
addition to contacting them verbally, Admiral Moorer sent
then the following message at 3:37 A.M. on October 25:
1. Most recent communication with Soviets contains
request that US join them in more forceful enforcement
of Israel/Arab ceasefire by introduction of both
US/Soviet forces. Soviets further state intentions to
consider unilateral action if US declines.
2. Our reply not final at this point but, as you have
noted, US response includes signal of elevation in
force readiness, i.e., DEFCON Three world wide,
alerting of 82nd Airborne, more eastward movement of
carriers in Med [Mediterranean] , and redeployment of
SAC forces from Pacific.
3. I an in session with SECDEF and Chiefs and will
keep you advised.
This message and similar verbal communications were impor-
tant for ensuring that key military commanders understood
the purpose of the alert, which is described as a "signal"
to the Soviets.
That the chain of command was not kept informed of
political and diplomatic developments during the crisis was
not unique to this particular crisis, the same phenomenon
was observed in the 1958, 1962, and 1967 crises as well.
Commander Seventh Fleet was as much in the dark on U.S.
policy during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis as Commander
Sixth Fleet was in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Top-level
Joint Chiefs of Staff message, JCS 250737Z OCT 73,
October 25, 1973 (declassified 1984).
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civilian officials typically believe that political and
diplomatic matters must be kept closely held in order to
prevent premature disclosure of sensitive negotiations,
which could seriously disrupt efforts to resolve a crisis.
Although this is certainly a legitimate concern, it can
create problems in coordinating military operations with
political objectives if the military chain of command is
totally excluded from being kept informed on political
natters. Failure to provide the military chain of command
with sufficient information to be able to understand the
political context of a crisis is thus a major source of
stratified threat perceptions.
The security dilemma can be stratified in a crisis;
that is, decisionmakers at the political and tactical levels
of interaction can hold much different threat perceptions.
At the political level of interaction, neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union had an incentive to launch a
preemptive first strike against the other. Both sides
desired to prevent the crisis from escalating to war.
Military and naval moves, including the U.S. DEFCON 3 alert,
were taken primarily for political purposes, rather than to
achieve military advantages. At the tactical level of
interaction, however, U.S. and Soviet naval forces had
strong incentives to strike first and were actively
targeting each other. U.S. Navy on- scene commanders were
seriously concerned about the threat of a Soviet preemptive
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attack dua to Soviet anti-carrier operations. Soviet Navy on-
scana commanders roust have shared similar concerns due to
U.S. counter-targeting of their major combatants. The
security dilemma was thus stratified—mild at the political
level, but acute at the tactical level.
The sixth question is, when tactical-level interac-
tions become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation
dynamics from occurring at the tactical level and being
transmitted upward to the strategic and political levels of
interaction? Although there were intense tactical-level
interactions during the crisis, there were no cases of such
interactions generating an escalation sequence. The most
dangerous interactions occurred during the October 25-30
period, but did not escalate to violence. Although each
side was constantly targeting the other and both sides were
ready to instantly launch preemptive attacks, no weapons
were fired during the crisis.
Three factors appear to have inhibited escalation
during the crisis. First, neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union wanted to intervene militarily in the war if
they could possible avoid it, largely out of concern for an
armed clash with the other superpower. Therefore they both
acted cautiously with their military and naval forces,
avoiding situations that could inadvertently involve them in




The only exception to this pattern was the Soviet anti-
carrier exercise that commenced on October 26—an action
much different from Soviet behavior throughout the rest of
the crisis. If that exercise had commenced late on October
24 or early on October 25, at the peak of superpower
tensions, it might easily have been misperceived by 'the
United States as a further indication of imminent Soviet
military intervention in the Middle East. It would be
tempting to speculate that the Soviets deliberately waited
until after tensions had peaked in the Middle East before
starting the exercise, but the available evidence argues
against that interpretation. The timing of the exercise was
driven by U.S. naval moves: The Soviets started the
exercise in response to U.S. concentration of the Sixth
Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. The implication of this
is that the Soviet anti-carrier exercise could well have
started at any time in the crisis if the Sixth Fleet had
been concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore,
while the overall pattern of Soviet military and naval
behavior was one of restraint, the Soviets were willing to
engage in certain highly provocative activities.
The second factor inhibiting escalation was that the
United States and the Soviet Union communicated with each
other frequently during the crisis. This helped to prevent
the problem of ambiguous political signals, which can cause
intentions and objectives to be misperceived. Soviet
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warnings to the United States on October 24 that it was
prepared to intervene unilaterally in the Middle East if
Israel did not respect the U.N. ceesefire were particularly
important for avoiding a clash between the superpowers.
Although that warning prompted the most intense superpower
tensions of the crisis, including the U.S. worldwide DEFCON
3 alert, the situation probably would have been much worse
if the United States and the Soviet Union had not been in
direct communication at that point. The two superpowers
probably would have had great difficulty interpreting the
political significance of each other's military moves on
October 24 and 25 had they not been able to express their
interests and concerns to each other.
The third factor inhibiting escalation was caution and
prudence on the part of U.S. Navy commanders in the
Mediterranean. This was particularly important due to
Soviet targeting of the Sixth Fleet with anti-ship missile
platforms. On-scene commanders had to carefully balance the
need to maintain a tactically viable situation against the
danger of incidents with the Soviet Navy. This task was not
Bade easier by White House orders prohibiting the carriers
from maneuvering to evade Soviet targeting. Caution and
prudence were particularly important for the U.S. ships and
aircraft assigned to monitor high-threat Soviet ships and
destroy them if they attempted to launch anti-ship
missiles. When the Soviets commenced their anti-carrier
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exercise, U.S. ships and planes counter-targeting the
Soviets had to distinguish between preparations for simu-
lated and actual attacks—an exceedingly difficult task. A
single misjudgement could have produced a Soviet-American
sea battle in the Mediterranean. That no incidents occurred
is testimony to the caution and prudence shown by the on-
scene commanders.
The seventh question is did actions taken with mili-
tary forces send inadvertent signals to either adversaries
or friends, and did inadvertent military incidents occur
that affected efforts to manage the crisis? There were no
inadvertent military incidents serious enough to affect the
crisis, but there were instances of U.S. leaders misper-
ceiving the political signals being sent by Soviet naval
movements
.
In his memoirs, Kissinger makes this observation on
the naval situation in the Mediterranean as of October 6:
"Interestingly, Soviet naval units that had left Egyptian
ports on October 5 moved west . They, too, were demon-
strating noninvolvement while retaining the capacity for
597
rapid action. 1* There are two problems with this
assessment of Soviet naval moves. Pirst, Soviet naval
actions were more complex than Kissinger describes: not all
the Soviet ships that left Egypt went west, two went to
597Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , p. 475.
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Syria; several Soviet -ihips remained in Alexandria
throughout the war; and the Soviets were also moving AGIs
and minesweepers into the war zone. The actual pattern of
Soviet naval operations suggests a higher degree of Soviet
commitment to Syria and Egypt than Kissinger perceived.
Second, the Soviet ships that Kissinger describes as moving
west actually went to Soviet anchorages off Crete. The
practical reason for that was that Soviet replenishment and
supply ships were located at the anchorages. Additionally,
the Soviets were concentrating their major warships off
598Crete to counter the U.S. Sixth Pleet. * The Crete
anchorages occupy a strategic position in the eastern
Mediterranean, ideal for covering the Sixth Fleet when it
moves into the area. Thus, the actual signal being sent by
Soviet ships moving west was that of Soviet intent to
neutralize the Sixth Fleet.
Kissinger's assessment of Soviet-American naval
interaction during the crisis is also revealing: "The two
fleets, signaling parallel intentions, later met off Crete
599
and started milling around there." The two fleets
nesting off Crete was not a coincidence arising from
parallel political intentions; it was driven by strategic





moved into position to launch a preemptive strike against
the U.S. carriers if such became necessary. The Soviets
probably were not signaling intentions parallel to those of
the U.S. when they concentrated the Mediterranean Squadron
off Crete. Kissinger misperceived the intent of the Soviet
naval moves, giving them a political interpretation
reflecting his view at the start of the crisis that Soviet
intentions were benign. Interestingly, Kissinger's views of
Soviet intentions changed dramatically during the crisis as
the extent of Soviet support for Egypt and Syria became
clear. The key point is that naval movements are
inherently ambiguous and their intent easily misperceived.
Naval analysts and other observers have read political
signals into several other U.S. and Soviet naval actions
during the crisis. It is not clear, however, that any of
those alleged signals were intentional or that the other
side perceived the signals allegedly being sent. In every
case the naval actions can be accounted for by motives or
considerations other than political signalling, such as
logistic requirements or improving tactical readiness. This
further underscores the inherent ambiguity of naval move-
ments as political signals, and the tendency for naval
On how Kissinger's views evolved during the crisis,
see Ibid, pp. 469, 474-75, 497, 507-10, 518-19, 578-91.
601See Watson, p. 115; Weinland, pp. 73, 75; Roberts,
pp. 196, 210; Galia Golan, "Soviet Decisionmaking," p. 202.
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movements to be perceived as political signals even when
undertaken for non-political purposes.
The eighth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the crisis? Two of the three tensions arose during the
crisis. There was serious tension between political
considerations and the needs of diplomatic bargaining, on
the one hand, and military considerations and the needs of
military operations, on the other. The most serious tension
was between Washington's need to control Sixth Fleet move-
ments for political purposes and the on-scene commander's
need for freedom to maneuver the fleet in order to reduce
its vulnerability.
As was discussed earlier, the White House insisted on
restricting the movements of the Sixth Fleet lest the
fleet's movements send a misleading signal of U.S.
intentions to the Soviet Union. According to Vice Admiral
Engen, this was "A real sticking point. . . . Very
restrictive and destroyed flexibility of naval forces. This
602
was a big issue with COMSIXTHFLT—and properly so."
Admiral Zumwalt has described the tension that arose from
close White house control of Sixth Fleet movements:
Moreover, the orders were extraordinarily rigid. They
specified latitudes and longitudes and gave Dan [Vice
Admiral Murphy] little or no room for tactical
maneuvers aimed at making his missions easier to carry
602Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988
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out or his forces easier to protect or, optimally,
both. Several times during the next few days Dan
asked permission of the JCS ... to move these ships
or those toward the east in order to make his
surveillance of the battle scene more effective and
evacuation of Americans from the Middle East, if it
cane to that, more rapid. Each request was turned
down by Admiral Moorer, acting, he told me, on
instructions from the White House, which almost
certainly meant Henry Kissinger .603
To explain the nature of the Sixth Fleet's vulnerability
requires a brief review of modern naval warfare.
The Soviet tactic of keeping ships and submarines
armed with anti-ship cruise missiles within striking range
of the U.S. carriers created serious operational problems
for the Sixth Fleet. Modern anti-ship missiles,
particularly the very large missiles favored by the Soviet
navy, allow a single weapon to destroy or seriously damage a
ship. ' Tactically, all the missile needs to do is knock the
ship out of the battle—achieving what the Navy refers to a
a "mission kill." Captain Frank Andrews has described the
threat represented by anti-ship missiles: "A carrier battle
group is liable to serious wounds from preemptive missile
attack in forward waters . • • because modern technology
affords so much advantage to the side which strikes first
that the victim may be unable to defend himself . " Soviet
Navy doctrine places heavy emphasis on the first strike,
603Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 436.
604Captain Frank Andrews, "The Prevention of
Preemptive Attack," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 106
(May 1980) : 128.
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•king it a central objective of strategy as well as tac-
tics. Soviet naval writings emphasize the importance of
605
"the battle of the first salvo." The tactical doctrines
of the superpower navies interact, producing a war initia-
tion scenario described in the U.S. Navy as the "D-day
shootout." Anti-ship missiles can be difficult to defend
against, making destruction of the launch platform the most
effective defense against them. U.S. Navy tactical doctrine
for the defense of surface ship battle groups thus
emphasizes destruction of launch platforms before they can
607launch their missiles. Thus, the side that gets off the
first salvo in the D-day shootout is likely to accrue a
605Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G.
Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1974), pp. 131-132; Charles D. Petersen,
"About-Face in Soviet Tactics," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 109 (August 1983) : 57-63; Lieutenant Commander
Alan D. Zimm, "The First Salvo," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 111 (February 1985) : 55-60; T.A. Fitzgerald,
"Blitzkrieg at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112
(January 1986) : 33-38.
Admiral Harry D. Train, "Decision Making and
Managing Ambiguity in Politico-Military Crisis," in James G.
March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds
.
, Ambiguity and
Command; Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision
Making (Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986), p. 306.
ow See Kidd, "View From the Bridge," 18-29; Admiral
Stansfield Turner and Commander George Thibault, "Countering
the Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 103 (July 1977): 25-32; Lieutenant
Commander T. Wood Parker, "Thinking Offensively," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 107 (April 1981): 26-31; Captain
William J. Ruhe , "Antiship Missiles Launch New Tactics,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 108 (December 1982) : 60-65;
Andrews, "Prevention of Preemptive Attack," pp. 126-39;
Gregory, "Their Tattletales, " pp. 97-99.
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significant tactical advantage that could determine the
outcome of a war at sea.
Requiring that a task group operate at a fixed loca-
tion with little freedom to maneuver (known in the Navy as a
"ModLoc") increases its vulnerability to a Soviet preemptive
strike. Commander Frederick Glaeser has described the
problems that arise from this practice:
Although ModLocs are defended as visible proofs of
presence, they are in fact the first step in targeting
by an enemy. ... A force in ModLoc is trapped in a
set-piece battle in which an enemy with superior
numbers can organize an overwhelming coordinated
attack. In essence, we choose the place, and the
enemy selects the time, weather, and politically
opportune moment for his attack."
This is exactly the situation in which the White House
placed the Sixth Fleet. The fleet was not granted the
freedom to maneuver it needed in order to outrun slower
Soviet tattletales and to prevent the Soviets from keeping
609the carriers constantly targeted.
In a preemptive strike against the three U.S. carriers
on October 25, the Soviet Navy would have been able to
launch a first salvo of about thirteen anti-ship missiles
against each U.S. carrier—an extremely dangerous threat
that could be effectively countered only by destroying
608Commander Frederick J. Glaeser, "Guerrilla Warfare
at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 109 (August
1983): 42.
609Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988; Morin,
letter to author, April 14, 1988; Dixon, letter to author,
April 18, 1988; Glassman, p. 162.

854
Soviet launch platforms before they were able to fire their
weapons. Conversely, if the U.S. struck the first blow,
it would seriously degrade the ability of the Soviet Navy to
destroy the U.S. carriers. U.S. warships, their guns manned
and ready, and U.S. attack aircraft, armed with conventional
bombs and missiles, kept every Soviet ship that could
threaten the carriers constantly in their sights. Both
sides thus had strong incentives to strike first if they
believed that war was imminent. This was a tense and
dangerous situation that would have been at least partially
alleviated if the Sixth Fleet had been granted freedom to
aneuver at will. The intense tactical-level interactions
were not under the direct control of U.S. leaders, who
appear not to have understood the chain of events they had
set in motion (despite warnings from Admirals Moorer and
Zumwalt) . Thus, a restriction imposed on the fleet for
political purposes (avoiding misperceptions of U.S. inten-
tions) exacerbated the risks of a military confrontation and
the danger that a minor incident could touch off an armed
clash at sea between the superpowers.
There was also serious tension between the need for
top-level control of military operations in a crisis, and
the need for tactical flexibility and instantaneous
610On October 31, the height of the Soviet buildup in
the Mediterranean, the first salvo would have been about 26
missiles against each U.S. carrier.
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decisionmaking at the scene of the crisis. The tension over
level of control was worse than it had been in the 1958
Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, but not
as bad as it had been in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
President Nixon and Schlesinger respected the military chain
of command, using it to send orders to the Sixth Fleet
rather than attempting to communicate directly with the
fleet. Tensions arose primarily from the emphasis that
President Nixon and Kissinger placed on using the Sixth
fleet to send political signals, which required close White
House control over the fleet's movements. Vice Admiral
Murphy objected to this tight control because it placed the
fleet in a tactically untenable position, vulnerable to
Soviet preemption, but his requests for greater freedom to
612
maneuver the fleet were denied by the White House. Vice
Admiral Engen cited this as the most important lesson of the
crisis: "Give the on-scene commander authority [up] to
specified limits and leave him alone to position his forces
in the way that he feels is best. Don't try to do * squad
613
right or left* from Washington.** Although the Navy chain
of command was irritated by White House control of Sixth
Zumwalt, interview by author, February 16, 1988;
Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988.
612Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 436; Engen, letter to author,
April 25, 1988.
Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988.
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Fleet movements, there was no deep resentment against per-
ceived civilian interference as in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
There was moderate tension between performance of
crisis political missions and readiness to perform wartime
combat missions. Admiral Moorer states that there was no
concern that the Navy's response to the crisis would degrade
its ability to respond to threats elsewhere, and that war-
time considerations influenced the location of the Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean: "Our primary consideration was
the time required to get in strike position." This
suggests that positioning of the Sixth Fleet was influenced
by military considerations (the time it would take the fleet
to reach a launch point for air strikes against targets in
the Middle East and the Soviet Union) , as well as by the
political considerations described by Kissinger.
The commanding officers of the carriers Kennedy and
Roosevelt state that they did not experience a degradation
of their readiness to perform wartime missions during the
crisis. The increased readiness condition of the Sixth
Fleet resulted in improved logistic support for the ships in
the Mediterranean and the increased tempo of operations
actually improved readiness by providing more flight time
for pilots. On the other hand, because the fleet was on
614
T.H. Moorer, interview by author, February 9, 1988.
Morin, letter to author, April 14, 1988; Dixon,
letter to author, April 18, 1988
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standby for Middle East contingencies, routine exercises
intended to improve the combat proficiency of the fleet were
cancelled. This was a cause for concern on the part of Vice
616
Admiral Murphy and Vice Admiral Engen. But the greatest
concerns for U.S. wartime readiness arose from the transfer
of large quantities of U.S. military equipment and munitions
to Israel. This depleted U.S. war-reserve stocks and left
some operational units without sufficient equipment and
617
supplies to carry out wartime missions. Thus, although
Sixth Fleet operations in the crisis did not degrade the
fleet's readiness for wartime operations, U.S. resupply of
Israel degraded the overall combat readiness of U.S. forces.
In summary, the stratified interaction model
accurately describes Soviet-American interaction during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War. There was intense tactical-level
interaction between U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the
Mediterranean, and significant decoupling of tactical-level
interactions from political-level crisis management
efforts. The overall pattern was one of parallel stratified
interactions with frequent momentary decoupling. U.S. and
Soviet naval forces were very tightly coupled during the
crisis, but there were no serious incidents between them.
There were serious political-military tensions arising from
Engen, letter to author, April 25, 1988.
617
Zumwalt, On Watch , p. 441.
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close White House control over the location and movements of
the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented case studies of four crises
in which U.S. naval forces played a significant role: the
1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Bight research questions addressing the theory of stratified
Interaction and its corollaries were answered in each case
study. The the four case studies showed that the stratified
interaction uodel provides an accurate description of inter-
national interaction in crises. The next chapter will
examine four cases of peacetime attacks on U.S. Navy ships
in order to take a closer look at how the military chain of
command reacts to such incidents. Chapter IX will then use
the findings from all eight of the case studies in a struc-
tured, focused comparison in order to derive contingent
generalizations on crisis interaction and crisis stability.
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PEACETIME ATTACKS ON NAVY SHIPS
One of the most difficult missions assigned the Navy
is operations in the immediate vicinity of potentially
hostile forces during an international crisis or armed
conflict. The political importance and potential dangers of
such missions are generally recognized. Not as well
understood, however, is that routine naval missions viewed
as non-political or ordered for peacetime military objec-
tives rather than for political purposes almost always have
important political undertones and can generate significant
international political repercussions if an unanticipated
incident were to occur during the mission. For this reason
certain "non-political" missions, such as intelligence col-
lection or surveillance near a potentially hostile country
or the scene of fighting, need to be viewed as political in
nature even though not ordered for political purposes.
This chapter presents the third phase of the research
design, a structured focused comparison of four cases in
which a U.S. Navy ship was attacked during peacetime or




further develop and refine contingent generalizations on the
corollaries to the theory of stratified interaction. The
focus will be on how the military and naval chain of command
reacted to the attacks.
The incidents that will be examined are the August
1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the June 8, 1967 Israeli attack
on the intelligence collection ship USS Liberty (AGTR 5)
,
the January 22, 1968 North Korean seizure of the intelli-
gence collection ship USS Pueblo (AGER 2), and the May 10,
1987 Iraqi attack on the guided missile frigate USS Stark
(FFG 31) . Four of the eight questions asked in the previous
chapter will again be asked in these cases. The four
questions address decoupling of stratified interactions,
stratified escalation dynamics, misperceptions, and
political-military tensions.
The first question is did interactions at the tactical
and political levels become decoupled during or after the
attack on the Navy ship? The theory of stratified inter-
action states that under certain conditions crisis
interactions are stratified into three levels: political
(between national leaders) , strategic (between major
military commands) , and tactical (between on-scene forces)
.
The previous chapter showed that the conditions necessary
for stratified interactions are usually present in crises.
Decoupling of stratified interactions occurs to the extent
that operational decisions on the employment of military
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forces mad© at the strategic and tactical levels differ from
the decisions that political-level authorities would have
made to coordinate military actions with their political-
military objectives in the crisis. Decoupling simply means
that national leaders lose control over tactical-level
military interaction.
There are seven potential causes of decoupled inter-
actions: communications and information flow problems,
impairment of political-level decisionmaking, a fast-paced
tactical environment, ambiguous or ambivalent orders,
tactically inappropriate orders, inappropriate guidance in
mechanisms of indirect control, and deliberate unauthorized
actions by military commanders. To establish that tactical-
level interactions became decoupled requires two findings:
first, that at least one of the causes listed above was
present, and, second, that operational decisions made by
tactical-level commanders diverged from the political-
military objectives of political-level leaders.
The second question is, when stratified interactions
become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation dynamics
from occurring at the tactical level and being transmitted
upward to the strategic and political levels of interac-
tion? This question addresses the third corollary to the
theory of stratified interaction, that in a crisis escala-
tion dynamics can be stratified—arising at the tactical
level of interaction while national leaders are still
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attempting to resolve the crisis peacefully. The focus will
be on identifying escalation-inhibiting features and the
conditions that can cause the escalation-inhibiting factors
to break down.
The third question is did actions taken with naval
forces send inadvertent political signals to adversaries or
allies, and did inadvertent military incidents occur that
affected efforts to manage the crisis? This question
addresses two of the crisis management problems that can
arise when military forces are employed in a crisis:
oisperceptions and inadvertent military incidents.
The fourth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the response to the attack on a U.S. ship? Three tensions
between political and military considerations can arise in
crises: tension between political considerations and the
needs of diplomatic bargaining, on the one hand, and mili-
tary considerations and the needs of military operations, on
the other; tension between the need for direct top-level
control of military operations, and the need for tactical
flexibility and instantaneous decisionmaking at the scene of
the crisis; and tension between performance of crisis
missions and maintaining readiness to perform wartime
missions. All three tensions arise from the operational
requirements of crisis management, the essence of which is
placing political restrictions on military operations.
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The 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incident
USS Maddox , commissioned June 2, 1944, was 376 feet in
length, displaced about 3200 tons, and had a top speed of
around 31 knots. Armament consisted of three 5-inch/38
calibre twin mounts controlled by a MK 37 director, two 3-
inch/50 calibre twin mounts controlled by a MK 56 director,
two MK 32 ASW torpedo tube mounts, and two fixed Hedgehog
ASW launchers. The crew consisted of 11 officers and about
322 men, including a detachment of specialists manning an
electronic intelligence collection van mounted on deck.
Although an old ship, Maddox was a good choice for intelli-
gence collection duties off the coast of a potentially hos-
tile nation due to its weapons, speed and maneuverability.
The North Vietnamese-backed Viet Cong guerilla war
against the South Vietnamese Government and the Communist
insurgencies in Cambodia and Laos dominated the
international situation in Southeast Asia in August 1964.
The political and military situation in the Republic of
Vietnam (RVN) had been deteriorating for years due to
chronically unstable and ineffective governments. Seeking
to exploit the deterioration in the South, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in December 1963 ordered the Viet
Cong to take the offensive and in 1964 sharply increased the
infiltration of regular army troops into South Vietnam.
George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United
States in Vietnam
. Revised Edition (New York: Dell, 1969),
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The U.S. Government viewed the deteriorating situation
in South Vietnam Kith grave concern. The Cold War had not
yet been thawed by detente and the Communist insurgencies in
Indochina were viewed by the Johnson Administration as a
crucial battle in a global struggle between East and West.
Military and economic aid to South Vietnam increased
significantly during the first half of 1964 as the U.S.
2
sought to shore up the faltering Saigon regime.
A program of covert South Vietnamese military
operations against North Vietnam, known as Operation Plan
(OPLAN) 34A, was approved in January 1964 in an attempt to
coerce the North Vietnamese into halting support for the
insurgency in the South. As part of OPLAN 34A the U.S. Navy
provided South Vietnam with eight fast patrol boats (PTFs)
and other small craft, and trained their crews and naval
commandoes for raids on North Vietnam. The first successful
attacks were conducted in May 1964.
pp. 153-4; Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War; America's
Military Role in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1984), pp. 23, 37; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How
America Became Involved in Vietnam (Garden City, NY: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1987), pp. 207-11; Guenter Lewy, America in
Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 25-
31; Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking
Press, 1983), pp. 63-4.
2Anthony Austin, The President's War (New York:
Lippincott, 1972), pp. 35-6, 43-5, 227-33; Palmer, pp. 33-5;
Kahin, pp. 208-12; Karnow, pp. 323-6.
Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United
States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, Volume II: From
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The possibility of the U.S. striking directly at North
Vietnam had been raised as early as 1961, but it was not
until early 1964 that, retaliatory bombing of the North
received serious consideration. Contingency plans were
drawn up and target lists prepared by June 1964. The
desirability of a Congressional resolution authorizing the
President to take military action in Indochina was also
recognized and a proposed resolution was drafted in May
1964. Thus, by the summer of 1964 the United States had
completed military and political planning for some types of
4direct U.S. military action against North Vietnam.
In April 1962 the U.S. Navy had initiated a series of
patrols by destroyers in international waters off the coasts
of China, the Soviet Union and North Korea. Although the
primary mission of these patrols, code named "Desoto, H was
Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986)
, pp. 334-8; U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Gulf of
Tonkin, The 1964 Incidents , Hearings, 90th Congress, Second
Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1968), pp. 13-14, 20-21 (Cited hereafter as Tonkin Gulf
Hearings); Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971) , p. 113; Admiral Roy
L. Johnson, "Reminiscences of Admiral Roy L. Johnson, U.S.
Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral
History Program, April 1982), pp. 235-36. Also see John
Galloway, The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Rutherford, NJ:
Parleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970), pp. 37-42;
Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1969), p. 95; Karnow, pp. 364-7.
Johnson, Vantage Point , p. 119; Palmer, pp. 33-5;
Kahin, pp. 217-9; Lewy, pp. 21, 29-31; Karnow, pp. 344-5,
358-62; Austin, pp. 233-8.
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intelligence collection, establishing a U.S. naval presence
near the target countries and asserting freedom of the seas
in international waters off their coasts were recognized by
senior Navy officers and civilian officials as being
5political advantages of the patrols.
The first Desoto patrol off the coast of North Vietnam
was conducted in December 1962. DRV Navy vessels shadowed
subsequent patrols, but did not interfere with them. There
were no joint operations involving RVN OPLAN 34A forces and
U.S. Navy Desoto destroyers. Although the value of intel-
ligence collected by the Desoto patrols to the South
Vietnamese operations was recognized, coordination between
the two programs sought to prevent Desoto patrols from inter-
fering with OPLAN 34A missions. In 1964 minimum distances
of the Desoto patrols from North Vietnam were eight miles
from the mainland and four miles from islands, reflecting
the assumption that only a three mile territorial limit was
g
claimed by North Vietnam.
Maddox was assigned the July-August 1964 Desoto patrol
in the Tonkin Gulf. Special communications channels and
reporting procedures were in effect to link the ship to key
commands, and USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) was tasked to
5Admiral Johnson, "Reminiscences," p. 235; Eugene G.
Hindchy, Tonkin Gulf (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), pp.
54-70; Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. 393-4; Austin, pp. 240-1.
Tonkin Gulf Hearings, pp. 12, 25-27; Marolda and
Fitzgerald, pp. 394-405; Austin, 231-3; Galloway, p. 50.
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provide air cover. Maddox arrived off the coast of North
Vietnam the afternoon of July 31 and the next afternoon vas
operating in the vicinity of two islands attacked thirty-six
hours earlier by RVN Navy boats on an OPLAN 34A mission.
Early in the morning of August 2 DRV Navy headquarters
ordered preparations for battle that night. Maddox , warned
of the danger of attack, cleared the area by moving out into
the Gulf, but was ordered to resume the patrol and had done
so by 10:45 A.M. 7
At 3:00 P.M. on August 2 Maddox detected three DRV P-4
class torpedo (PT) boats on radar closing at high speed.
Maddox , which was about twenty-eight miles off the coast,
increased speed to twenty-five knots and set a course to the
south-east to move away from the coast. At 3:30 P.M. Maddox
set general quarters, reported the approaching contacts, and
requested air support. Four F-8 Crusaders and the destroyer
USS Turner Joy (DD 951) were immediately dispatched to
assist Maddox . The first shots of the engagement were fired
by Maddox , invoking the principle of anticipatory self-
defense against forces showing hostile intent. Maddox fired
an initial three shots at 4:05 P.M. as a warning and to get
the range to the PT boats, and opened fire on them three
7Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, "Reminiscences of Admiral
U.S. Grant Sharp, U.S. Navy (Retired), 1* Volume I (Annapolis,
MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program, March 1976),
PP. 214-17; Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. 405-14. Also see
Karnow, pp. 366-68; Windchy, pp. 113-30.
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minutes later at a range of 9,000 yards. The DRV PT boats
fired four torpedoes at Maddox, all of which missed. Maddox
fired 283 rounds from its 5-inch and 3-inch guns, scoring
hits on at least two of the boats and killing the commander
S
of one of them.
About twenty minutes after Maddox opened fire, the
torpedo boats broke off the attack. Maddox briefly
attempted to pursue but could not close the range. At 4:28
P.M. the F-8s from Ticonderoqa attacked the DRV boats,
scoring hits one one of them. Commander Seventh Fleet
ordered a halt to the action after the air attack. One DRV
torpedo boat was sunk, a second heavily damaged and the
third slightly damaged. Maddox was struck by one machine
gun bullet that caused minor damage and no casualties. One
9F-8 was struck by gunfire but landed safely in Danang.
The U.S. Government reaction to the incident was
restrained. Although intelligence assessments concluded
that the attack on Maddox reflected growing North Vietnamese
sensitivity to incursions and readiness to take aggressive
action when threatened, U.S. leaders concluded that the
attack may have been an unauthorized action by a local
commander. President Johnson told aides to play down the






pass a message to Premier Khrushchev expressing hope that
North Vietnam would not make further attacks on U.S. vessels
in international waters. A diplomatic protest was also
passed to North Vietnam warning that "grave consequences'*
would result from further attacks on U.S. forces. The
President ruled out reprisals against North Vietnam, but in
a public statement warned that U.S. Navy ships and aircraft
would "attack any force that attacks them."
The Navy chain of command in the Pacific—Commander
Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) , Commander in chief U.S.
Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) , and Commander in Chief Pacific
(CINCPAC)—regarded the North Vietnamese attack on Maddox as
a direct challenge to the United States, and believed that
the Desoto patrol should be resumed immediately. Vice
Admiral Roy L. Johnson, COMSEVENTHFLT, immediately ordered
Maddox to "Reverse course, get on station, and remain on
station." Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, CINCPAC, stated his view
at the time clearly in his oral history: "My chief reaction
was that we would, at the very least, continue the patrol.
The thing we couldn't do was pull the patrol out of the Gulf
and not go back in, because that would indicate to the
Communists that they had been able to back us down, and we
Johnson, Vantage Point , p. 113; Marolda and
Fitzgerald, pp. 419-22; Galloway, pp. 52-53; Goulden, pp.
134-37; Karnow, pp. 368-69; Austin, pp. 22-29.




couldn't have that happen." Admiral Thomas H. Moorer,
CINCPACFLT, provides insight on Admiral Sharp's view, noting
that there had been an earlier incident off the coast of the
Soviet Union: "Once, a destroyer off Petropavlovsk had run
when he was threatened. This infuriated Admiral Sharp. He
didn't want that to happen again." Admiral Sharp approved
a recommendation from Admiral Moorer to resume the patrol,
and an order was sent to COMSEVENTHFLT for Maddox to do so
—
14
an action that Vice Admiral Johnson had already taken.
President Johnson quickly ordered the Desoto patrol
resumed by Maddox and Turner Joy to show American
determination to exercise the right of freedom of the seas.
The manner in which the decision was made in Washington to
continue the patrol illustrates the mood among top civilian
officials at the time. According to Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr.,
the Navy duty officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency, a
Lieutenant Commander Winston Cornelius, was called upon to
brief JCS Chairman General Earle 6. Wheeler, Acting
Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, and President Johnson even before he was able to
notify the CNO's duty officer of the incident:
12Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," p. 218.
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, interview by author,
February 9, 1988.
14Admiral Johnson, "Reminiscences," p. 184; Admiral
Sharp, "Reminiscences," pp. 221-26. Also see Windchy, pp.
173-75; Goulden, p. 137.
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Before briefing Johnson, Cornelius, on his own
Initiative, prepared a message ordering the Maddox
back into the Gulf of Tonkin to reassert the doctrine
of freedom of the seas. When Johnson asked for his
recommendation, Cornelius showed him the message,
which Johnson immediately approved. After leaving the
White House, Cornelius finally was able to talk with
the Navy's duty captain, and informed him of the
president's decision. The message was sent to the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, who ordered
the Maddox , accompanied by the Turner Joy , to return
to the Gulf.
This fateful decision was thus made with little deliberation
and no input from the CNO. The President's action did not
raise any opposition because the Navy chain of command
agreed with the decision and had already ordered Maddox to
resume the patrol. The minimum distance from the North
Vietnamese mainland was increased to twelve miles and at
night the ships were to move out into the Gulf for safety.
The two destroyers were told that DRV forces should be
"treated as belligerents from first detection" and were
ordered to destroy any vessels that attacked them.
Maddox and Turner Joy resumed the Tonkin Gulf Desoto
patrol the morning of August 3. The night of August 3-4 the
RVN Navy conducted two OPLAN 34A missions, attacking DRV
shore defenses. Late in the afternoon of August 4, DRV Navy
headquarters ordered two Swatow-class sub chasers to prepare
15Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., "David Lamar McDonald," in
Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 347-48.
Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," pp. 221-26; Johnson,
Vantage Point , pp. 113-14; Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp.
419-22; Goulden, pp. 122-60; Windchy, pp. 178-210.
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for military operations that night, prompting the two
destroyers move out into the Gulf that evening. Maddox and
Turner Joy were over sixty miles from the coast of North
Vietnam that night when they gained high-speed radar
contacts at short range, locked on with fire control radars,
and opened fire. For the next four hours the two ships
engaged at least five possible contacts at close range while
evading several torpedoes detected on sonar. Numerous radar
and visual indications of hits on patrol boats were
reported. Sixteen U.S. Navy aircraft participated in the
engagement, attempting to locate and attack contacts
17
reported by the destroyers.
Doubts soon arose over what exactly happened in the
Tonkin Gulf the night of August 4. It had been a dark and
overcast night, with unusual radar propagation conditions
that easily could have generated numerous false contacts.
Only two pilots reported sighting possible contacts, and
their reports were uncertain. The two destroyers did not
hold the same contacts at the same time on radar and several
18
other inconsistencies in the engagement were also noted.
17Goulden, pp. 122-60; Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. 422-
36; Karnow, 369-70; Windchy, 178-210; Galloway pp. 53-66.
18Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences, " p. 229; James B.
Stockdale and Sybil Stockdale, In Love and War (New York:
Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 3-36. Also see Associated Press
dispatch, "Tonkin Gulf," January 24, 1967, reprinted in
Galloway, pp. 490-96; "The 'Phantom Battle' that Led to
War," U.S. News and World Report , July 23, 1984, pp. 56-67;
Windchy, p. 208; Galloway, pp. 57-63.
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At 1:27 A^M. , about an hour after the incident, the on-scene
commander, Captain John J. Herrick, sent a message stating
his uncertainty over exactly what had happened:
Review of action makes many reported contacts and
torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather
affects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have
accounted for many reports. No actual visual
sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation
before any further action taken.
About half an hour later Captain Herrick sent a second
message summarizing the immediately available evidence of an
attack t but warned that the "entire action leaves many
20doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning.** The
chain of command was thus warned of the ambiguous tactical
picture and that further investigation was warranted.
As soon as the incident was over, Admiral Sharp
recommended to JCS that "authority be granted for immediate
20punitive air strikes against North Vietnam." This was
ia
Commander Task Group 72.1 message, CTG 72.1 041727Z
AUG 64, August 4, 1964 (Tonkin Gulf Incident files.
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC). Reproduced or quoted in Tonkin Gulf Hearings, p. 54;
Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 440; Goulden, pp. 151-52;
Galloway, p. 62; Windchy, p. 210.
20Commander Task Group 72.1 message, CTG 72.1 041754Z
AUG 64, August 4, 1964 (Tonkin Gulf Incident files,
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC). Eased on my professional judgement (twelve years
experience in destroyers; a month at sea in Maddox in 1974,
and operational experience in the Tonkin Gulf), this is the
best assessment of the incident. There appear to have been
two North Vietnamese patrol boats in the vicinity of Maddox
*a<* Turner Joy at the start of the incident, but they did
not pursue the U.S. ships after they opened fire. For the
next four hours the two destroyers engaged false contacts.
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shortly after noon, Washington time. Although President
Johnson and his advisors were predisposed to retaliate, they
wisely insisted on confirmation that there had been a North
Vietnamese attack. Vice Admiral Blouin, then Director of
the Par East Region in the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA)
,
has described the pressure for confirmation:
[The] Big question was whether there had been an
attack. White House put tremendous pressure on Sec
Def, later on OASD/ISA (thus me) , on CNO, on CINCPAC.
Later, Adm Sharp met in Hawaii—communications were
difficult—with Adm Moorer, CINCPACFLT, trying to get
answers from Tonkin [Gulf] . President LBJ wanted a
decision so he could announce it on prime time TV
news. About 2315 all agreed there had been an
attack.
Admiral Sharp has described the White House pressure for
confirmation from his perspective as CINCPAC:
Well, I was on the phone both with General
Wheeler and with Secretary McNaroara. McNamara was
trying to confirm in his own mind that an attack
occurred. Of course, that's exactly what we were
trying to do also. My staff was working to try and
correlate all the reports that would come in and
CINCPACFLT staff was doing the same thing. Admiral
Moorer, CINCPACFLT, and I decided that there was
enough information available to indicate that an
attack had occurred. I told Secretary McNamara that,
but we also asked the Maddox to confirm absolutely
that the ships were attacked and told them to get word
to us as quickly as possible. We got a report from
21Sharp, "Reminiscences," p. 229. Also see Marolda
and Pitzgerald, p. 438.
vice Admiral Francis J. Blouin, letter to author,
February 29, 1988. Also see Tonkin Gulf Hearings, pp. 11,
58-59; Johnson, Vantage Point , pp. 114-15; Marolda and
Fitzgerald, pp. 436-44; Windchy, pp. 213-18; Galloway, pp.
63-65; Goulden, pp. 147-57.
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the ships which neither absolutely confirmed or denied
that they'd been under attack, but the weight of the
evidence still was that an attack had occurred, so I
told Mr. McNamara that. We also had some radio inter-
cept intelligence which tended to confirm the attack.
So we had various conversations back and forth with
Admiral Moorer and I in Honolulu and General Wheeler
in Washington, Secretary McNamara in Washington, and
finally we received an order to attack the next day,
attack North Vietnamese patrol craft bases. In the
meantime we were still receiving amplifying messages
from the Maddox, Turner Joy , and Captain Herrick.
Generally speaking, they seemed to still indicate that
the attack occurred. Turner Joy said that crew
members saw torpedoes and that a target burned when
hit, and her men saw black smoke. So while we were
getting the planes ready aboard the Ticonderoga and
the Constellation , we were still goinq back and forth
about the attack in the Tonkin Gulf.
Vice Admiral Johnson, COMSEVENTHFLT, also provides a vivid
description of the pressure to immediately confirm that
there had been a North Vietnamese attack, and, like Admiral
Sharp, suggests that the decision to retaliate was made
before the on-scene commanders had completed their
assessment of the incident:
Then began to arrive all this flood of inquiries from
Tom Moorer, Chick Clary [CINCPACFLT Chief of Staff],
Oley Sharp, and McNamara, "Confirm, confirm." You
have to validate the fact that you were actually under
attack because this is the thing that will decide
whether a retaliatory attack is ordered. So, of
course, I told Maddox, "You've got to report immediate-
ly what the hell happened." well, unfortunately, on
the Maddox they didn't have any automatic [encryption]
equipment, they had to do it hand-encrypted, and it
took hours and hours. . . .
And all the time the guys [CINCPACFLT and
CINCPAC] were driving me nuts. Every hour they were
calling, "What happened? What actually happened?" I
gave them what information I could. I said: "Now
that's all I have, and I can't tell you whether in my
23Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," pp. 229-30.

876
opinion an attack occurred tonight or not. All I can
tell you is that one did occur last night [sic] .
that's all I can tell you that's certain and as soon
as I get other information, I'll tell you."
Apparently Moorer and Sharp decided on their own
that there had been an attack and that's what they§told McNaraara, and that's when President Johnson
ordered the retaliatory attack.
The statements by Vice Admiral Blouin, Admiral Sharp, and
Vies Admiral Johnson reveal intense pressure from the
President and the Secretary of Defense for the Navy chain of
command to make an instant assessment as to whether or not
an attack had occurred. Furthermore, their comments suggest
that the decision to retaliate against North Vietnam was
based on a hurried and tentative evaluation of incomplete
and ambiguous information. Not even the on-scene commander
was certain what actually had happened, but tentative
indications that there may have been an attack were viewed
as sufficient cause for ordering retaliation.
As early as 3:10 P.M., Eastern Daylight Time—well
before the Navy chain of command had reached a firm con-
clusion about whether or not there had been an attack on the
destroyers—President Johnson gave McNamara tentative
authorization to conduct retaliatory air strikes against
North Vietnam. At 5:19 P.M., about five hours after the
incident ended. President Johnson approved plans for air
strikes against DRV naval vessels in or near five North
Vietnamese ports, and against a fuel depot ashore. At about
24Admiral Johnson, "Reminiscences," p. 239.
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6:00 P.M. the President gave final authorization for the air
strike based on Admiral Sharp's assessment that there had
been an attack, and at 6:07 P.M. McNamara issued the order
for the strikes. At 6:45 P.M. the President briefed
Congressional leaders on the incident and his intent to
25
retaliate. At 11:36 P.M. President Johnson announced on
television and radio that there had been an attack on U.S.
vessels and that "Air action is now in execution against
gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam
26
which have been used in these hostile operations." At the
time the President made this announcement, U.S. ships and
planes had been searching the Tonkin Gulf for debris from
the previous night's engagement for two hours without
finding anything (No physical evidence would ever be found)
.
The first wave of Navy planes attacked at 1:30 A.M.
(Washington time), nearly two hours after the President's
speech. They destroyed seven DRV vessels, heavily damaged
ten, and slightly damaged sixteen others—almost all of the
major vessels in the DRV Navy at the time. The fuel depot
was estimated to be 90 percent destroyed. Out of the sixty-
seven Navy aircraft that participated in the strikes, two
25Tonkin Gulf Hearings, pp. 58-59, 63; Johnson,
Vantage Point , pp. 114-15? Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp.
437-46; Goulden, pp. 147-57; Windchy, pp. 213-20.
26Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964 , Volume II (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government printing Office, 1965), p. 927.
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were lost and another two damaged. One pilot was killed and
another captured by the North Vietnamese. Maddox and Turner
Jo£ resumed the Desoto patrol off North Vietnam from August
27
5 to August 8, with no further incidents.
The most important U.S. response to the incident was
Congressional passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on
August 7. This resolution , based on the draft resolution
prepared in May, stated that the security of Southeast Asia
was a vital U.S. interest and authorized the President "to
take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression. The stage was thus set for the 1965
escalation of the U.S. role in the Vietnam War. North
Vietnam and the Viet Cong were not cowed by the U.S.
resolution or the retaliatory air strides and conducted
28further attacks on Americans in South Vietnam.
Two final points need to be made concerning the second
incident; involving Maddox and Turner Joy the night of
August 4. First, a decision by the President to delay the
decision on whether or not to retaliate against North
27Admiral Johnson, "Reminiscences, 1* pp. 239-40;
Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences, " pp. 229-32; Marolda and
Fitzgerald, pp. 444-49. Also see Galloway, pp. 67-70;
Goulden, pp. 147-57; Karnow, pp. 371-77; Kahin, pp. 224-5;
Austin, pp. 29-30, 38-48.
28Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. 451-52; Galloway, pp.
70-98; Palmer, pp. 35-36; Karnow, pp. 374-6; Austin, pp.
53-105; Lewy, pp. 33-36; Goulden, pp. 23-78.
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Vietnam while the Navy investigated incident probably would
not have resulted in a conclusion that there had not been an
attack and a decision that retaliation was not warranted.
Captain Alex A. Kerr, assigned by Vice Admiral Johnson to
Investigate the incident, concluded on August 6 that there
had indeed been a North Vietnamese attack on Maddox and
29Turner Joy . Bven if the President had delayed the
retaliation decision, this investigation probably would have
convinced him to proceed with air strikes against North
Vietnam.
The second point is that there was a similar incident
in the Tonkin Gulf a month after the August 4 incident. USS
Morton (DD 948) and USS Richard S. Edwards (DD 950)
commenced a Desoto patrol off the coast of North Vietnam on
September 13, 1964, remaining at least twenty miles from the
coast. At 7:29 P.M. on September 18 the two destroyers
detected two radar contacts closing them at high speed, set
general quarters, and requested air support. At 8:16 P.M.
they fired warning shots and at 8:22 P.M. opened fire on the
contacts. Over the next two hours the two destroyers
engaged at least four radar contacts, firing 299 shells
while they maneuvered to avoid torpedoes. The JCS decided
29Captain Alex A. Kerr, "The Reminiscences of Captain
Alex A. Kerr, U.S. Navy (Retired), H (Annapolis, MD: U.S.
Naval Institute, Oral History Program, 1984), pp. 459-60.




not to retaliate for this alleged attack due to lack of
intelligence confirmation of North Vietnamese involvement.
A Navy investigation later concluded that a North Vietnamese
patrol boat probably was in the vicinity of the ships at the
beginning of the incident, but there were no attacks on the
destroyers. The radar contacts they engaged and the tor-
pedoes they detected on sonar were evaluated as false.
The September 18 incident has two implications.
First, it suggests that essentially the same thing may have
happened in the August 4 incident—North Vietnamese patrol
craft were detected at the beginning of the incident, but
there were no attacks on the U.S. destroyers and the targets
they engaged were all false. Second, in contrast to the
August 4 incident, the chain of command reacted to the Sep-
tember 18 incident with restraint and skepticism. On August
4 the chain of command from the President to CINCPACFLT was
predisposed to believe that there had been a North
Vietnamese attack and paid little heed to the on-scene
commander's doubts. On September 18 the JCS initially
recommended retaliatory air strikes, but reversed itself due
to lack of evidence that there had been an attack on the
destroyers. The chain of command may well have learned a
lesson in dealing with ambiguous circumstances from the
August 4 incident, but there is no direct evidence of this.






This section will review the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incident
to answer the four research questions. The first question
is did interactions at the tactical and political levels
become decoupled during or after the attack on the U.S. Navy
ship? At least two of the potential causes of decoupled
interactions were present during the August 2 and 4
incidents: communications and information flow problems, and
a fast-paced tactical environment. Although the technical
capacity to do so may have existed, the Defense Department
and Navy communication systems were not configured to enable
Washington to speak directly to ships at sea in the Far East
(this would become a routine operational capability over the
next few years) . Officials in Washington spent hours
bombarding Navy commanders in the Pacific with demands for
more information on the second incident before they felt
they had sufficient information on which to base the
decision to retaliate. The President and the Secretary of
Defense were thus unable to control U.S. Navy operations in
the Tonkin Gulf while the incidents were in progress.
Although conditions for decoupling were present, the
operational decisions made by tactical-level commanders did
not diverge from the political-military objectives of
political-level leaders. Captain Herrick acted with caution
to avoid encounters with North Vietnamese forces while
conducting his surveillance mission, and Vice Admiral
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Johnson ordered the engagements on August 2 and 4 halted as
soon as it appeared the U.S. ships were out of danger.
Military commanders and political leaders were in agreement
that North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. ships warranted
retaliatory air strikes, and that the Desoto patrol should
be resumed after the incidents in order to assert freedom of
the seas. Interestingly, the on-scene commander, Captain
Herrick, had the greatest doubt that there had been a North
Vietnamese attack on August 4 and cautioned against a hasty
reaction. Thus, although national leaders temporarily lost
control over events in the Tonkin Gulf during the incidents,
this did not result in uncontrollable escalation of the
confrontations
.
The pattern in the two incidents is one of momentary
decoupling followed by immediate disengagement. On-scene
commanders, acting on their own authority under guidance
contained in the rules of engagement, used limited force in
response to apparent imminent attacks. They were not
required to request—and did not seek
—
permission from
higher authority to use force in self-defense. Once the
immediate threat had been countered and the destroyers were
out of danger, the on-scene commanders halted the engage-
ments—again on their own authority and without guidance
from higher in the chain of command.
The second question is, when stratified interactions
become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation dynamics
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from occurring at the tactical level and being transmitted
upward to the strategic and political levels of interaction?
Three escalation-inhibiting factors appear to have been
important in the Tonkin Gulf incidents. The first might be
called military prudence: on-scene commanders did not want
to fight under tactically unfavorable circumstances. A
•ingle torpedo could seriously damage or even sink a destroy-
er, multiple PT boats are a difficult threat for a single
destroyer to counter (as in the August 2 incident) , and
darkness makes countering PT boats even more difficult (as
in the August 4 incident) . Air support arrived after the PT
boats were driven off by Maddox in the first incident, and
was ineffective due to darkness and low cloud cover in the
second incident. It may well be the case that when U.S.
forces are the victim of an unanticipated attack, tactical
military considerations lead military commanders toward the
same general course of action that political considerations
lead national leaders toward. In the Tonkin Gulf incidents,
military considerations tended to make tactical-level
commanders more cautious than political-level leaders.
The second escalation-inhibiting factor was compliance
by on-scene commanders with the guidance contained in
mechanisms of indirect control. Under the peacetime rules
of engagement in effect in 1964, Maddox , Turner Joy , and the
aircraft supporting them were authorized to use force in
self-defense and in anticipatory self-defense when attack
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appeared to be imminent. Hot pursuit of the attacking force
in international waters was authorized and was used on
August 2 when Navy planes attacked the PT boats after they
had disengaged. On the other hand, retaliation against
targets in North Vietnam was not authorized unless
32
specifically approved by the President. These provisions
allowed force to be used without further permission from
higher authority, but also resulted in the engagements
halting quickly rather than escalating.
The third escalation-inhibiting factor was the empha-
sis that the President and Secretary of Defense McNamara
placed on confirming that there actually had been a North
Vietnamese attack the night of August 4. They did not
accept initial reports from the Tonkin Gulf at face value;
they insisted on knowing the basis for the conclusion that
there had been an attack on the destroyers. As former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Phil G.
Goulding points out, there is inherent skepticism toward
initial reports: HA cardinal rule in an establishment as
large as the Department of Defense is to assume that first
reports are always wrong , no matter what their security
33
classification, no matter to whom they are addressed."
32See Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. 422, 459.
Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny: Informing the
People on National Security (New York: Harper and Row,
1970) , p. 103.
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Double-checking the accuracy of initial reports is important
for avoiding unwarranted escalation of a confrontation
—
particularly when there may not have been a confrontation at
•ii. 34
The August 4 incident in the Tonkin Gulf suggests
three conditions that can cause the escalation-inhibiting
factors to break down. The first condition is long-terra
frustration and animosity toward the other side in a crisis
or incident. U.S. leaders had for years been growing
increasingly belligerent toward North Vietnam due to its
support for the Viet Cong, and had been preparing contin-
gency plans for direct military action against the North.
This created an atmosphere in which an apparent North
Vietnamese attack on U.S. forces would be likely to provoke
a strong U.S. response. The second condition is the
immediate prior occurrence of a confirmed provocation by the
other side, particularly when the U.S. response to the prior
incident was retrained and the other side was warned against
further incidents. The U.S. reacted with notable restraint
to the confirmed August 2 North Vietnamese attack on Maddox,
merely warning against further attacks. But the August 4
34Verifying the accuracy of initial reports can also
have negative consequences: tying up communications channels
with requests for further information and detailed descrip-
tions of past events, slowing the flow of current reports
and orders, and diverting the attention on military comman-
ders from the tactical situation to handling inquiries from




incident provoked U.S. retaliation against the North even
though the circumstances of the incident were not clear.
The third condition is for all levels in the military
chain of command, from the President to the on-scene
commander, to hold similar views toward the adversary and
toward the need for immediate retaliation. A strong unity
of views can suppress the skepticism that normally greets
ambiguous initial reports of a military incident, or lead to
hasty assessment of the incident in the rush to launch
retaliatory attacks. This appears to have occurred in the
U.S. decision to retaliate after the August 4 incident
—
McNamara sought confirmation that there had been an attack,
but the President decided to retaliate before a complete
assessment of the evidence had been made.
The third question is did actions taken with naval
forces send inadvertent political signals to adversaries or
allies, and did inadvertent military incidents occur that
affected efforts to manage the crisis? The U.S. responses
to the incidents did not send any serious inadvertent
political signals or result in any serious inadvertent
military incidents. However, the Desoto patrols apparently
were misperceived by North Vietnam. Some U.S. intelligence
analysts and military officers, including Captain Herrick,
suspected that the North Vietnamese misperceived the Desoto
patrol destroyers as participating in or directly supporting
OPLAN 34A attacks on North Vietnam. Although McNamara would
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later adamantly insist that there were no grounds for the
North Vietnamese to have confused the Desoto and OPLAN 34A
operations , such a misperception provides a plausible
explanation for the August 2 North Vietnamese attack on
Maddox . 35
The fourth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the U.S. response to the August 2 and 4 incidents? None of
the three tensions was serious because the U.S. responses
were limited and all levels of the chain of command held
generally similar views toward the need to retaliate. The
only aspect of the incidents that generated tension was the
demand for confirmation that there had been a North
Vietnamese attack in the second incident. McNamara's
efforts to confirm that there had been an attack somewhat
annoyed Admirals Sharp and Moorer, both of whom had
immediately recommended retaliation. Tension generated by
the demand for confirmation is an example of the tension
that can arise between political considerations and military
considerations: Confirmation was necessary so that retalia-
tion could be justified politically. But confirmation
required time to assess the evidence, which could delay the
retaliatory strikes—losing the advantage of surprise and
giving the adversary more time to ready his defenses.
35See Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. 420-22
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The 1967 Attack on the Liberty
OSS Liberty was launched in 1945, mothballed in 1958,
began extensive conversion for its new duties in 1963, and
recomraissioned in late 1964. Liberty 's mission was collec-
tion of electronic and communications intelligence, though
for important reasons the Navy cloaked this mission under
the cover of electromagnetic propagation research. The ship
was 455 feet in length and had a displacement of about
10,000 tons. At the time of the attack the crew consisted
of sixteen officers, 285 enlisted men, and three civilian
technicians. Armament was four . 50-ca liber machine guns
—
leaving the ship defenseless against any attack with weapons
heavier than small arms. Liberty 's maximum speed was
eighteen knots. Although a superb platform for peacetime
intelligence collection. Liberty was extremely vulnerable
when operating in close proximity to hostilities.
Liberty was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean as
Arab-Israeli tensions reached the crisis point in late
36May. The ship was to patrol just outside territorial
waters (twelve miles) off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula,
monitoring the progress of Israeli-Egyptian fighting as well
as conducting general surveillance of the region. Specific
forces were not designated to defend Liberty because the
See Chapter VII for a description of the background
to the 1967 war, U.S. policy during the crisis, and Sixth
Fleet operations during the crisis.
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U.S. was officially neutral in the conflict and the ship was
operating in international waters. Just before Liberty
commenced its patrol, at least five messages were sent
increasing the ship's standoff range from the coasts of the
belligerents—apparently in response to Arab claims that the
U.S. Navy was aiding Israel, and warnings from Egypt and
Israel that the seas off their coasts were war zones. Due
to misrouting of the messages to communications stations
that were not handling traffic to Liberty , the ship did not
37
receive these crucial messages. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie,
Deputy Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe in 1967,
has stated that "This whole prelude to the attack on Liberty
was the most appalling communications snafu [failure] that
38
the U.S. Navy ever had." Commander Sixth Fleet gained
operational control of Liberty shortly before the ship
commenced its mission, but did not have ships or aircraft
alerted to provide support for Liberty in the event of an
39
attack on the ship.
37James M. Ennes, Jr., Assault on the Liberty (New
York: Random House, 1979; Ivy Books Edition, 1987) , pp. 51-
4, 65; Goulding, pp. 130-2. On the communications problems,
see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed services, Review
of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase I ,
Hearings, 92nd Congress, First Session (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 6-17; "Order Didn't
Get to USS Liberty ," New York Times , June 9, 1967, p. 1;
Ennes, pp. 291-300.





Israeli aircraft spotted Liberty as soon as it arrived
in its patrol area the morning of 8 June, identified Liberty
as a U.S. Navy ship, and repeatedly flew by the ship
throughout the morning. At 2:00 P.M. two Israeli Mirage jet
fighters attacked Liberty with rockets and cannon fire,
followed by Mystere jet fighters attacking with rockets,
napalm, and cannon fire. At 2:35 P.M. three Israeli torpedo
boats attacked, launching at least five torpedoes, one of
which struck Liberty in its intelligence space. The Israeli
boats also raked the ship with machine guns, firing at
topside personnel and life rafts in the water before
breaking off the attack at 3:15 P.M. Liberty was severely
damaged, thirty-four men were killed and 171 were wounded.
As the torpedo boats retired, two Israeli assault
helicopters arrived, but did not attack (U.S. sources claim
they were carrying troops, Israeli sources claim they were
sent to assist and evacuate wounded) . An hour later the
torpedo boats returned to offer assistance, which was
refused by Liberty . The ship was able to clear the area
under its own power and rendezvoused with U.S. Navy ships
40the next day.
Bnnes, pp. 70-124; Goulding, pp. 93-113; "Israelis,
in Error, Attack U.S. Navy Ship," New York Times , June 9,
1967, p. 1; "U.S. Investigating Attack on Vessel," New York
Times , June 10, 1967, p. 15; Richard K. Smith, "The
Violation of the Liberty," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
104 (June 1978): 64-8. For the Israeli version of the
attack, see Israeli Defense Forces, "Preliminary Inquiry,"
Decision of Examining Judge Sgan Alux Y. Yerulshalmi,
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Liberty was in communication with the Sixth Fleet and
communications stations ashore via high frequency radio*
teletype and high frequency single sideband voice radio (the
CINCUSNAVEUR "High Frequency Command Net," commonly referred
to as "HICOM") . Except during periods when her radios were
out of commission due to Israeli attacks, Liberty was able
to report that she was under attack directly to the Sixth
Fleet's carriers. Liberty apparently was unable to communi-
cate with the Sixth Fleet during the first half hour of the
attack (2:00 P.M. to about 2:30 P.M.) due to power outages
and damage to radio antennas and transmitters. Ennes has
claimed that the Israelis jammed Liberty's radios, but this
cannot be substantiated and could well have been electro-
41agnatic interference rather than deliberate jamming.
VSS Saratoga (CVA 60) , steaming southwest of Crete,
first received a voice report from Liberty at about 2:30
P.M., stating "I am under attack. My posit [position] 31-
23N, 33-25E. I have been hit. Request immed [immediate]
Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67, July 21, 1967; Captain Yaakov
Nitzan, Israeli Navy, "Comment and Discussion," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 104 (November 1978) : 111-12; Hirsh
Goodman and Zeev Schiff, "The Attack on the Liberty," The
Atlantic Monthly . September 1984, pp. 78-84.
Ennes, pp. 89-92, 118-19. There were no reports
from Sixth Fleet units of communications jamming during the
attack on Liberty . What Liberty's radiomen detected was
probably Israeli electronic countermeasures (ECM) intended
to jam air search and fire control radars, which would have
been normal if the Israeli pilots thought they were
attacking an armed warship.
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assistance." Saratoga requested authentication of this
report (Prudent and required, but much to the annoyance of
Liberty ) , then relayed it to Commander Sixth Fleet
(COMSIXTHFLT) and Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces
Europe (CINCUSNAVBUR) . About five minutes later Saratoga
received and immediately relayed a second voice report from
Liberty , stating "Three unidentified gunboats approaching,
43
vessels now ..." Liberty did not finish the transmis-
sion, probably due to the Israeli attack. At about 2:43
P.M., in the midst of the Israeli torpedo boat attack,
Saratoga received and relayed a third voice report from
Liberty , stating "Under attack and hit badly." 44 At 2:53
P«M. Saratoga received and relayed a fourth voice report
from Liberty , stating "Hit by torpedo starboard side.
45Listing badly. Need assistance immediately." These are
42USS Saratoga (CVA 60) message, USS SARATOGA 081235Z
JUN 67, June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident file,
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC) • s»rwtoq» was relaying over radioteletype a report
received over HF/SSB voice radio. Saratoga probably pre-
ceded the radioteletype message with a voice radio report to
CTF 60 (the Carrier Strike Force commander) or COMSIXTHFLT.
43USS Saratoga message, USS SARATOGA 081237Z JUN 6'7,
June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident file, Opera-
tional Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC).
'
44USS Saratoga message, USS SARATOGA 081245Z JUN 67,
June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident file, Opera-
tional Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC)
.
45USS Saratoga message, USS SARATOGA 081254Z JUN 67,
June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident file, Opera-




the reports on which COMSIXTHFLT and the chain of command up
to the President based their initial decisions on how to
respond. An important point is that none of these reports
give the identity of the attackers. COMSIXTHFLT did not
know the identity of the attackers until after he had
ordered initial actions in support of Liberty .
Vice Admiral Martin, COMSIXTHFLT, acting on his own
authority, responded to Liberty's reports that she was under
attack by immediately ordering Saratoga and USS America (CVA
66) to launch aircraft to defend Liberty against further
attacks. This order apparently was first given over voice
radio at about 2:40 P.M., then followed with a message order
at 2:50 P.M.:
America launch four armed A-4's to proceed to 31-23N
33-25E to defend USS Liberty who is now under attack
by gunboats. Provide fighter cover and tankers.
Relieve on station. Saratoga launch four_armed A-l*s
ASAP [as soon as possible] same mission.
Commander Task Force 60 (CTF 60), the Carrier Strike Force,
Rear Admiral Wylie, letter to author, March 28,
1988. There was no question that Vice Admiral Martin had
authority to use force to defend Liberty . Admiral Horacio
Rivero, Vice Chief of Naval Operations in 1967, has stated,
ill reference to the Liberty incident, that "No commander
needs permission to defend himself, his forces, or other
U.S. forces under attack when he can assist. Any commander
who asks permission to do so, instead of acting first,
should be relieved. w Admiral Horacio Rivero, Jr., letter to
author, March 10, 1988.
47Commander Sixth Fleet message, COMSIXTHFLT 081250Z
JUN 67, June 8, 1967 (Declassified 1979. Liberty incident





later specified that America was to launch four armed F-4s
as fighter cover for the attack aircraft. Because the
carriers did not have pianos on alert to support Liber ty
,
the A-4s and A-ls had to be fueled and armed and their
pilots briefed, which would take about an hour. The
estimated launch times were 3:45 P.M. for America's A-4s and
4:00 P.M. for Saratoga's A-ls. The first planes were
estimated to arrive over Liberty at 5:15 P.M. Vice Admiral
Martin also ordered Task Force 60 to close Liberty's
position, and ordered the destroyers USS George F. Davis (DD
937) and USS Massey (DD 778) to rendezvous with Liberty at
48best speed. COMSIXTKFLT told Liberty over voice radio
48Commander Sixth Fleet message, COMSIXTHFLT 081320Z
JUN 67, June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident file,
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC). The planes launched at 3:45 P.M. and 4:00 P.M. were
the first launched specifically to defend Liberty . Ennes
claims that prior to this America launched nuclear-armed
alert aircraft to defend Liberty , but that they were
recalled when higher authorities learned of it. See Ennes,
pp. 89-90. This is undoubtedly false. America was
conducting routine flight operations for training at the
time Liberty was attacked, so the earlier launches described
by Ennes were probably training missions. It is likely,
however, that the carriers did launch their alert aircraft,
but not to defend Liberty . It would have been routine for
the carriers to have armed fighters on alert for air defense
in the event of a surprise air attack. Additionally, it
would have been routine in 1967 for the carriers to have
nuclear-armed strike aircraft on alert for general war
contingencies. Launching these alert fighters and strike
aircraft would have been a normal response to an attack on a
U.S. Navy ship: the fighters to defend the carriers (which
were far more valuable than Liberty ) and the strike aircraft
to circle in a safe holding area (ensuring availability for
wartime tasking). But none of these planes would have been
sent to defend Liberty .
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that help was on the way and sent Liberty a message stating
HYour flash traffic received. Sending aircraft to cover
you. Surface units on the way. Keep SITREPs [situation
49
reports] coming.**
The actions that Vice Admiral Martin did not take were
as important as those he did take. He did not order attacks
on Soviet forces in the Mediterranean or retaliation against
Egyptian forces or airfields. The actions he ordered were
strictly limited to the defense of Liberty . The rules of
engagement he issued (described below) were carefully
crafted to avoid further incidents. The restraint and
prudence shown by Vice Admiral Martin made a substantial
contribution to preventing the Liberty incident from
escalating to a superpower confrontation.
At 3:15 P.M. COMSIXTHFLT made an initial voice report
to CINCUSNAVEUR and Commander in Chief U.S. Forces Europe
(USCINCEUR) stating that Liberty was under attack and that
he was taking action to defend her. At 3:30 P.M.
COMSIXTHFLT sent a message situation report (SITREP)
describing in greater detail the actions he had ordered and
informing USCINCEUR that he had declared the forces
50
attacking Liberty hostile. This illustrates the exercise
Commander Sixth Fleet message, COMSIXTHFLT 081305Z
JUN 67 , June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident file.
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC); Ennes, pp. 89-90.
50COMSIXTHFLT 081320Z JUN 67.
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of delegated authority within the U.S. command system: the
on-scene commander initiates action, then immediately in-
forms his superiors of the actions he ordered. COMSIXTHFLT
informed USCINCEUR of his actions before the planes were
launched, allowing USCINCEUR to exercise control by negation
should it have been necessary. None of Vice Admiral
Martin* s orders were countermanded by higher authorities.
Vice Admiral martin used his authority to declare a
threatening force hostile in response to reports from
Liberty that she was under attack. After ordering aircraft
launched to defend Liberty , COMSIXTHFLT at 3:39 P.M. sent
the following rules of engagement to the carriers:
1. IAW [In accordance with) CINCUSNAVEUR INST
[Instruction] P03120.5B forces attacking Liberty are
declared hostile.
2. You are authorized to use force including
destruction as necessary to control the situation. Do
not use more force than required. Do not pursue any
unit toward land for reprisal purposes. Purpose of
counterattack is to protect Liberty only.
•
3. Brief all pilots [on the] contents [of] this msg
[message]
.
4. In addition brief pilots that Egyptian territorial
limit [is] only 12 miles and Liberty [is] right on
edge. Do not fly between Liberty and shoreline except
as required to carry out provisions [of] para
[paragraph] 2 above. Brief fighter cover that any
attacks on attack aircraft, Liberty, or they thera^-
selves is hostile act and para two above applies.
51Commander Sixth Fleet message, COMSIXTHFLT 081339Z
JUN 67, June 8, 1967 (Declassified 1979. Liberty incident




In a separate message COMSIXTHFLT emphasized "Ensure pilots
52do not repeat do not fly over land," Vice Admiral martin
thus took precautions to avoid incidents involving the
aircraft sent to defend Liberty .
Saratoga and America launched their attack aircraft
between 3:45 P.M. and 4:00 P.M. At 4:14 P.M. the U.S.
Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Tel Aviv sent a message to
COMSIXTHFLT and the chain of command reporting that Israel
had informed the U.S. Naval Attache of an accidental attack
on a U.S. ship off the Sinai. This was the first indication
received as to the identity of the attackers. Shortly
thereafter, at 4:22 P.M., Liberty reported that she had
identified the attackers as Israeli. In response to these
reports and a report from Liberty that the attacks had
ended, COMSIXTHFLT at abut 4:30 P.M. ordered the attack
aircraft recalled. COMSIXTHFLT reported to CINCUSNAVEUR and
USCINCBUR at 4:39 P.M. that he .had recalled the aircraft
53
sent to defend Liberty . Thus, by about 4:30 P.M. the
immediate crisis was over and there was little likelihood of
further armed clashes involving U.S. forces.
Guidance from Washington lagged far behind the pace of
•vents in the eastern Mediterranean. It was not until 4:16
52Commander Sixth Fleet message, COMSIXTHFLT 081336Z
JUM 67, June 8, 1967 (Unclassified. Liberty incident file,
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
DC)
53
Bnnes, pp. 89-92, 118-19; Goulding, pp. 97-98.
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P.M. that JCS sent a message authorizing use of force to
defend Liberty , and not until 4:46 P.M. that authorization
form the Secretary of Defense to use force was received and
passed on by USCINCEUR. Both of these messages apparently
were sent before Washington learned that Israel was respon-
sible for the attack. Neither of the messages had any
impact on actions taken by the Sixth Fleet. The JCS message
would have been received by Vice Admiral martin about the
sane time he received the DAO Tel Aviv message reporting
Israeli responsibility for the attack. Secretary of Defense
authorization to use force would have been received by Vice
Admiral martin about fifteen minutes after he ordered recall
54
of the planes sent to defend Liberty . At 5:29 P.M.,
almost an hour after Vice Admiral Martin had recalled his
planes, JCS sent a message rescinding authorization to use
55force to defend Liberty . Top-level civilian and military
officials in Washington thus had no direct role in
controlling tactical decisions in the Mediterranean after
Liberty was attacked. Vice Admiral Martin acted entirely on
his own authority, basing his decisions on CINCUSNAVEUR
standing peacetime rules of engagement.
54Under other tactical circumstances late arrival of
such messages could seriously complicate crisis management
efforts, prompting new fighting after initial disengagement
55Vice Admiral martin may have received verbal orders
to recall his planes before the JCS message rescinding
authorization to use force was sent, but the author could
find no evidence of this.
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COMSIXTHFLT directed the destroyers Davis and Massey
to continue at best speed to rendezvous with Liberty , and
provided then with air cover as they steamed eastward
through the night. Task Force 60 also steamed eastward to
rendezvous with Liberty , The destroyers rendezvoused with
Liberty early on June 9, and later that morning helicopters
56from America began evacuating Liberty's wounded.
In some respects tensions were greater in Washington
than in the Mediterranean during the attack on Liberty .
Secretary of Defense McNamara initially thought that Soviet
forces had attacked Liberty :
In the case of the Liberty in the Mediterranean in
June as an example, I thought the Liberty had been
attacked by Soviet forces. Thank goodness, our
carrier commanders did not launch immediately against
the Soviet forces who were operating in the
Mediterranean at the time. I then thought it had been
attacked by Egyptian forces. Who else could have done
it? Thank goodness, we did not launch against the
Egyptians.. We took time to find out it was the
Israelis.
In contrast to McNamara, the Navy chain of command was
confident that the Soviets had not conducted the attack on
Bnnes, pp. 141, 144*46; Goulding, pp. 97-98.
57
"Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara
Discuss Viet-Nam and Korea on 'Meet the Press'," Department
of State Bulletin 58 (February 26, 1968): 271. Also see
Goulding, p. 97? Authorization for Military Procurement,
Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1969, and Reserve
Strength , Hearings, 90th Congress, Second Session
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p.
47 (Cited hereafter as Authorization for Military Procure-
ment , 1969); Jonathan T. Howe, Multicrises: Sea Power and
Global Politics in the Missile Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1971) , p. 102.
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Liberty . COMSIXTHFLT and CTF 60 took no actions against
Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. Vice Admiral
Donald D. Engen, Commanding Officer of America in 1967,
states that the Sixth Fleet knew the Soviets could not have
conducted the attack because there were no Soviet aircraft
or naval vessels in the vicinity of Liberty . Rear Admiral
Wylie states that there was no concern at CINCUSNAVEUR that
the Soviets had conducted the attack, and Admiral Horacio
Rivero states that there was no concern on the CNO's staff
CO
that the Soviets had conducted the attack. It was thus
the more accurate picture that on-scene commanders had of
the local tactical situation and their compliance with
standing rules of engagement that prevented a clash with
Soviet or Egyptian forces. In retrospect, given McNamara's
inaccurate suspicions as to who had attacked Liberty , it is
perhaps fortunate that the Secretary of Defense was not able
to directly control Sixth Fleet actions during the incident.
Officials in Washington made an important contribution
to preventing the Liberty incident from escalating to a
superpower confrontation by notifying the Soviet Union of
the attack and the U.S. response to it. In his memoirs,
58Vice Admiral Donald D. Engen, letter to author,
March 21, 1988; Rear Admiral Wylie, letter to author, March
28, 1988; Admiral Rivero, letter to author, March 10, 1988.
Also see Howe, p. 103; Anthony R. Wells, MThe June 1967 Arab-
Israeli War," in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell,




President Johnson describes his use of the "hot line** to
inform the Soviets of the attack and that U.S. warplanes had
been sent to the scene:
There Has a possibility that the incident might lead
to even greater misfortune, and it was precisely to
avoid further confusion and tragedy that I sent a
message to Chairman Kosygin on the hot line. I told
him exactly what had happened and advised him that
carrier aircraft were on their way to the scene to
investigate. I wanted him to know, I said, that
investigation was the sole purpose of these flights,
and I hoped he would inform the proper parties.
Kosygin replied that our message had been received and
the information had been relayed immediately to the
Egyptians.
President Johnson somewhat distorted the mission of the
planes that had been sent to assist Liberty—they were fully
armed and had been ordered to defend her, rather than just
investigate. Portraying their mission as investigation was
probably intended to allay Soviet and Egyptian concerns.
The President's use of the hot line was important because
Sixth Pleet actions in support of Liberty—flying attack
planes and fighters into a war zone, close to Egyptian
territory—could have been misperceived as imminent U.S.
intervention in the war.
Israel officially claimed that it had "erroneously**
attacked Liberty believing that it was an Egyptian vessel,
and apologized for the attack. The U.S. Government did not
officially accept the Israeli explanation that the attack
59Johnson, Vantage Point
, p. 301. Also see Hugh




was a mistake, but, by accepting the Israeli apology and not
demanding a full accounting for the incident, tacitly
accepted the accident explanation. After an initial burst
of outrage, public opinion if the United States soon forgot
about the attack—reflecting U.S. Government handling of the
incident. In June 1968 Israel paid $3.3 million to the
families of those killed, in April 1969 paid $3.5 million to
the men wounded in the attack, and in December 1980 agreed
60to pay $6 million for damage to the ship.
Findings
This section will review the 1967 attack on the
Liberty to answer the four research questions. The first
question is did interactions at the tactical and political
levels become decoupled during or after the attack on the
U.S. Navy ship? At least two of the potential causes of
decoupled interactions were present during the incident:
communications and information flow problems, and a fast-
paced tactical environment. Although these factors
prevented political-level leaders from exercising direct
control over Sixth Fleet actions, decoupling did not occur.
The actions ordered by Vice Admiral Martin were restrained
and anticipated the desires of top-level officials in
Washington. COMSIXTHFLT carefully spelled out rules of
60Bnnes, pp. 154-58, 171-72, 184-91; Goulding pp. 123-
24, 134-35; Smith, pp. 69-70.
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engagement intended to avoid unnecessary incidents while
defending Liberty . Thus, although interactions were
stratified during the incident—evolving independently at
the political and tactical levels—they were not decoupled.
The pattern was one of parallel stratified interactions:
tactical-level military actions that support the crisis
management objectives of national leaders even though not
under the direct control of those leaders.
The second question is, when stratified interactions
become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation dynamics
from occurring at the tactical level and being transmitted
upward to the strategic and political levels of interac-
tion? Although tactical-level interaction did not become
decoupled in the Liberty incident, the case does shed light
on three escalation-inhibiting factors. First, by fully
complying with with the standing rules of engagement and
limiting his actions to those necessary to defend Liberty ,
the on-scene commander contributed to avoiding an
unnecessary clash with Soviet or Egyptian forces. Second,
use of the hot line apparently helped prevent the Soviets
and Egyptians from misperceiving the intent of actions taken
by the on-scene commander (or apparently would have, if the
planes had not been recalled before reaching Liberty ) .
Third, rapid Israeli notification of the United States that
it had inadvertently attacked a U.S. naval vessel cleared up
confusion in Washington and resulted in Sixth Fleet planes
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being recalled before they entered the war zone off the
coast of Sinai. The last two factors emphasize the
importance of communications among the parties to a crisis
for avoiding misperception and escalation.
The third question is did actions taken with naval
forces send inadvertent political signals to adversaries or
allies, and did inadvertent military incidents occur that
affected efforts to manage the crisis? Neither problem
arose during the Liberty incident. Vice Admiral Martin
carefully limited the Sixth Fleet response to the attack and
the President used the hot line to prevent misperceptions
from arising. The Israeli attack on Liberty was itself an
inadvertent military incident, momentarily complicating U.S.
crisis management efforts in the Middle East War, but no
further incidents occurred during the Sixth Fleet's response
to the attack.
The fourth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the response to the attack on Liberty? None of the three
tensions was serious during the Liberty incident. There w»s
little tension between political and military considerations
because the incident was over before significant diplomatic
activity—other than hot line messages—could begin. The
limitations that Vice Admiral Martin placed on his forces
supported U.S. political objectives in the crisis. There
was little tension between the need for top-level control
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and the need for tactical-level flexibility and initiative
because the incident evolved too rapidly for officials in
Washington to play a direct role in controlling events. JCS
and the Secretary of Defense could only reaffirm orders
already given by COMSIXTHFLT. There was no tension between
performance of crisis missions and maintaining readiness to
perform wartime missions because the Sixth Fleet response to
the attack was small-scale and of short duration.
The 1968 Seizure of the Pueblo
USS Pueblo was launched in 1944 as FP-344 , a light
cargo ship in service with the Army Transportation Corps,
and was mothballed in 1954. The ship was delivered to the
Navy in 1966, renamed Pueblo , underwent extensive conversion
for its new duties, and was commissioned on May 13, 1967.
Pueblo's primary mission, like that of Liberty , was collec-
tion of electronic and communications intelligence, although
it was designated an environmental research ship (AGER) with
the cover of conducting oceanographic and communications
research. The ship was 179 feet in length, had a displace-
ment' of 970 tons, and a top speed of thirteen knots. The
crew consisted of six officers, seventy-five enlisted men,
and two civilian oceanographers . Armament was two .50-
calibre machine guns—installed in the wake of the Liberty
incident—which had little value for self-defense. Pueblo
satisfied the requirement for an economical intelligence
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collection platform, but was extremely vulnerable— the worst
possible vessel to be operating near the coast of a country
possessed by a fanatical and violent hostility to the United
States.
In 1968 detente had not yet lessened Soviet-American
Cold War tensions, the United States was deeply involved in
the Vietnam War, and the protest movement against the war
was rapidly gaining momentum. The international setting on
the Korean Peninsula was dominated by North Korean hostility
to the governments of South Korea and the United States.
Although an uneasy truce had been in effect on the Peninsula
since the armistice of July 1953, numerous armed clashes had
occurred near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and in South
Korean waters due to North Korean efforts to infiltrate
agents into the South. The number of DMZ incidents had
increased sharply in 1967.
Political and military tensions had risen significant-
ly on the Korean Peninsula in the two weeks before Pueblo
arrived on station as the North Koreans renewed talk of
uniting the Peninsula militarily. North Korea also stepped
up its propaganda claims of South Korean and American
provocations against the North, and warned that military
action would be taken against incursions into its
territorial waters. On January 21, 1968, a team of 31 North
Korean troops infiltrated the DMZ to assassinate South
Korean President Park Chung Hee, but were stopped just short
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of the presidential residence in a bloody confrontation with
South Korean police and troops. This incident further
increased tensions on the Peninsula, bringing North and
South Korea to the brink of a military confrontation.
Pueblo's mission was authorized through normal
channels. On December 17, 1967, Commander U.S. Naval Forces
Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN) , Pueblo's operational commander,
submitted a mission proposal with a threat assessment that
the mission entailed "minimal risk." Commander Seventh
Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) , who commanded all U.S. Navy combat
forces in the Western Pacific, did not participate in
evaluating the mission proposal (but was informed of the
62
mission after it was approved) . COMNAVFORJAPAN submitted
the Pueblo mission proposal to Commander in Chief U.S.
Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) , whose staff reviewed and
endorsed the proposal and accompanying threat assessment.
CINCPACFLT forwarded the proposal to Commander in Chief
Pacific (CINCPAC) , whose staff also reviewed and endorsed
Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability (New
York: Cooward-McCann, 1970), pp. 27-33, 168-9; Lloyd M.
Bucher, Bucher: My Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Co., 1970), pp. 392-3; Edward R. Murphy, Jr., Second in
Command (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp.
117, 378; B.C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective,**
Asian Survey 9 (April 1969): 272-3.
62Admiral William F. Bringle, Commander Seventh Fleet
in 1968, letter to author, March 23, 1988; Vice Admiral Joe
P. Moorer, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations on the




it. CINCPAC then forwarded the proposal to the Joint
63Reconnaissance Center.
The Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) served JCS as
the central coordination center for peacetime reconnaissance
and surveillance missions. JRC passed the proposal to the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for a final evaluation of
the proposal and threat assessment. DIA concurred with the
assessment of minimal risk and returned the proposal to
JRC. JRC added Pueblo'
s
mission proposal to hundreds of
others in the "Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule, January
1968," which was reviewed by the military services, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) , National Security Agency (NSA)
,
and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research. After this review, which generated no objections
to the minimal risk assessment, the Monthly Reconnaissance
Schedule was submitted to the Joint Chiefs. On this
occasion the Operations Deputies, acting on behalf of the
Chiefs, actually approved the schedule. The Monthly
Reconnaissance Schedule was then submitted to Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, acting on behalf of
Secretary McNamara, and the Senior Interdepartmental Review
63Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," pp. 567-68; Admiral
John J. Hyland, Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet in
1968, letter to author, March 24, 1988; U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry Into the USS Pueblo and
EC-121 Plane Incidents , 91st Congress, First Session .
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp.




group, which handled routine intelligence matters and other
policy issues on behalf of the National Security Council,
for final approval. On December 29, 1967, Nitze approved
the Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule, including pueblo's
apparently routine mission.
The United States had previously conducted
surveillance off the coast of North Korea with specially-
equipped destroyers and the intelligence ship USS Banner
(AGER 1) , a vessel similar to Pueblo . Similar surveillance
missions conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union and
China were often subjected to harassment, but had never been
attacked. North Korea had not reacted to previous surveil-
lance missions and had a very small navy, so the danger to
Pueblo was assessed as minimal. United States military and
intelligence officials believed that North Korea would not .
attack a U.S. vessel in international waters. A mission off
the coast of North Korea was selected for Pueblo's first
operation because it appeared to be a relatively safe way to
train an inexperienced crew for more demanding and dangerous
missions off China and the Soviet Union. Admiral John J.
Hyland, then CINCPACFLT, has aptly described Pueblo's first
65
mission as a "shakedown" voyage.
Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1636-46; Authorization for Mili-
tary Procurement, 1969
. pp. 42-43; Armbrister, pp. 187-95.
65Admiral Hyland, letter to Author, March 24, 1988.
Also see Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1636-40; Armbrister, pp.





mission had been assessed as minimal
risk, COMNAVFORJAPAN did not request that COMSEVENTHFLT or
Commander Fifth Air Force designate specific naval or air
forces for quick-reaction support of Pueblo in the event of
an attack. Fifth Air Force had been alerted to provide
contingency support for Banner on some previous missions
(Seventh Fleet had not because almost all of its ships were
committed to the Vietnam War) . Additionally, there were no
contingency plans for support of Pueblo in an emergency.
On the morning of January 23, 1968, Pueblo was 15.5
miles from the nearest land, dead in the water off the North
Korean port of Wonsan. A North Korean SO-1 patrol craft
challenged Pueblo at about noon, demanding the ship's
see Vice Admiral John L. Chew, Commander U.S. Naval Forces
Japan (1964-1965) , "Reminiscences of Vice Admiral John L.
Chew, U.S. Navy (Retired)," (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval
Institute, Oral History Program, February 1979)
, pp. 381-85;
Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, Commander Service Force
Pacific ( Pueblo'
s
administrative commander) in 1968,
"Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, U.S. Navy
(Retired)," (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Oral
History Program, 1978), pp. 431-34.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, quoted in
Authorization for Military Procurement, 1969
, p . 53;
"Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Discuss
Viet-Nam and Korea on 'Meet the Press'," Department of State
Bulletin 58 (February 26, 1968): 271; Vice Admiral Kent L.
Lee, Commanding Officer of USS Enterprise (CVAN 65) in 1968,
interview by author, February 5, 198 8; Admiral Bringle.
letter to author, March 23, 1988; Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer,
letter to author, March 15, 1988; Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1621-
22. Also see Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, The Pueblo
Incident (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 27; Armbrister, pp.




identity and ordering it to "Heave to or I will fire. M The
patrol boat was soon joined by three P-4 torpedo boats and
pueblo was overflown by North Korean Mig jet fighters. One
of the torpedo boats had a boarding party at the ready.
Pueblo started heading for sea, but at 1:27 P.M. was fired
on by the SO-1 and the P-4's. Shortly thereafter Pueblo
halted. In response to a signal to "Follow me" from the
SO-1, Pueblo started into Wonsan harbor. After once
attempting to stop, which drew a barrage of fire that caused
the only death in the incident, Pueblo was ordered to halt
and at 2:32 P.M. was boarded and seized by the North
Koreans. At about 4:45 P.M. Pueblo entered Wonsan, and at
678:30 P.M. moored to a pier in the harbor.
Pueblo was in communications with the U.S. Naval
Communications Station at Kamiseya, Japan over high
frequency encrypted radioteletype at the time of the
attack. Voice communications normally were available
directly with Navy commanders (at sea and ashore) and radio
stations in Japan and Hawaii over the high frequency single
sideband command net ("HICOM"). At the time of the attack,
however, Pueblo was unable to use this circuit due to a
frequency shift that was in progress, degrading the net.
67Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1657-61; Authorization for
Military Procurement, 1969
, pp. 40-41; Admiral Sharp,
"Reminiscences," pp. 569-71; Bucher, pp. 167-212; Murphy,
pp. 120-52; Goulding, pp. 267-72. Also see Armbrister, pp.
32-60, 69-78; "North Korea Seizes Navy Ship," New York
Times , January 24, 1968, p. 1.
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Prior to being boarded, Pueblo transmitted two standard
operational reports by radioteletype to Kamiseya. These
operational reports, designated "OPREP-3" reports in the
joint operational reporting system, were both sent by Pueblo
in the M PINNACLE M category—reserved for emergencies and
other serious matters of "national level" interest. OPREP-3
PINNACLE reports were automatically sent to every level in a
unit's operational chain of command, including the National
Military Command Center, JCS, and the White House.
Additionally, Pueblo's radiomen sent informal real-time
status reports to Kamiseya over radioteletype until the ship
was boarded. Such informal messages were known as "operator
chatter" and had to be put into official messages by
Kamiseya before commands not listening to Pueblo directly
68
could receive them.
Pueblo sent its first OPREP-3 PINNACLE at 12:52 P.M.,
local time in the Sea of Japan (10:52 P.M. on December 22 in
Washington, D.C.). In this message Pueblo reported the
presence of the North Korean naval vessels and their order
to "Heave to or I will fire." The message was relayed by
Kamiseya and received by the COMNAVFORJAPAN duty officer
twenty-three minutes after it was sent. No action was taken
on this message by the COMNAVFORJAPAN staff because it
appeared to describe harassment much less severe than Banner




had experienced from the Soviets and Chinese on previous
missions. Because Pueblo had assigned this message a
relatively low transmission priority, it was placed in a
queue behind other messages of higher priority awaiting
69transmission to commands outside Japan.
Pueblo sent its second OPREP-3 PINNACLE at 1:18 P.M.,
local time in the Sea of Japan (11:18 P.M. on December 22 in
Washington, D.C.). In this message Pueblo reported that the
North Koreans had ordered the ship to follow them and were
preparing to board Pueblo . Kamiseya immediately relayed
this message to COMNAVFORJAPAN , where the duty officer
received it only four minutes after it was sent by Pueblo .
This was the message that served as a trigger—alerting the
chain of command that there was a genuine emergency in the
Sea of Japan. The COMNAVFORJAPAN staff began notifying
other commands of the emergency. At 1:45 P.M., twenty-seven
minutes after Pueblo sent the second OPREP-3 PINNACLE, Rear
Admiral Frank L. Johnson, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan,
was notified in Tokyo by telephone of the emergency. At
1:53 P.M., thirty-five minutes after Pueblo sent the second
OPREP-3 PINNACLE, the duty officer at Fifth Air Force











PINNACLE to Commander Fifth Air Force, which received it at
2:23 P.M., and to USS Enterprise (CVAN 65), which received
it at 2:38 P.M.—minutes after Pueblo was boarded by the
North Koreans. Additionally, COMNAVFORJAPAN sent several
"CRITIC" messages containing Pueblo's operator chatter
describing the North Korean attack. At the time, CRITIC was
the highest priority of message, reserved for strategic
warning and the alerting of National Command Authority of
71
attacks on U.S. forces. As this chronology shows, the
Navy communications system was able to maintain connectivity
between Pueblo and the radio station at Kamiseya, but
experienced serious delays in relaying time-critical
messages to the commanders that needed them.
Kamiseya took two actions with with Pueblo's second
OPREP-3 PINNACLE. First, Kamiseya immediately retransmitted
71Ibid. Vice Admiral Lee has stated that Enterprise ,
then in the East China Sea about 550 nautical miles from
Pueblo , monitored Pueblo's operator chatter directly. Vice
Admiral Lee, interview by author, February 5, 1988. This is
certainly plausible, and means that he would have received
Pueblo's reports of the attack real-time. Admiral Bringle,
then in the Tonkin Gulf on USS Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) , has
stated that his radiomen also monitored Pueblo's operator
-chatter, and that he ordered Enterprise into the Sea of
Japan in response to Pueblo's operator chatter. Admiral
Bringle, letter to author, March 24, 1988. This is less
plausible due to the distance. Admiral Bringle was probably
receiving COMNAVFORJAPAN ' s CRITIC messages relaying the
operator chatter. Admiral Sharp, who was visiting Admiral
Bringle on Kitty Hawk , has stated that shortly after 5:00
P.M. he and Admiral Bringle received the CRITIC messages




it to the commands that would normally receive an OPREP-3
PINNACLE: COMSEVENTHFLT, CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC, and the Nation-
al Military Command Center (NMCC, for JCS watch officers) .
For unexplained reasons this message was extremely slow in
reaching some of the commands, particularly CINCPACFLT and
CINCPAC. Second, about eighteen minutes after it was sent
by Pueblo , Karoiseya retransmitted the second OPREP-3
PINNACLE as a CRITIC message to DIA, NSA, JCS and other
commands. This CRITIC message was received by DIA and JCS
at 11:57 P.M. (one hour and thirty-nine minutes after Pueblo
sent it) . JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler was
notified of the message at 12:03 A.M., and Secretary of
Defense McNamara was notified about twenty minutes later.
the White House received the CRITIC at 11:43 P.M. (earlier
than JCS) , and Situation Room watch officers began notifying
National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow and other top
officials of the emergency. According to his memoirs, Presi-
72dent Johnson was notified of the emergency at 2:24 A.M.
Meanwhile, Pueblo had been boarded and seized by the North
Koreans at 11:35 P.M. (Washington time), and would enter
Wonsan at 2:45 A.M. the significance of this chronology is
that by the time top-level officials had been notified of
the emergency, it was too late to take action to prevent
seizure of the ship. If timely action was to be taken to





assist Pueblo , military commanders in the Far East would
have to order it on their own authority.
U.S. forces in the Far East did not respond to
Pueblo's calls for assistance in time to prevent the ship
from being captured by North Korea. The Fifth Air Force had
sevan F-4 fighter-bombers on alert in South Korea, but were
configured for nuclear weapons. Commander Fifth Air Force
directed that they be reconfigured for conventional weapons
to assist Pueblo , but that was a time-consuming process and
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles were the only conventional
ordnance immediately available (racks for conventional bombs
and rockets had to be flown in from Japan) . Commander Fifth
Air Force also ordered planes dispatched from Okinawa, where
there were eighteen fighter-bombers. Two F-105s, armed only
with 20 millimeter cannon to save time, were launched at
4:11 P.M., but could not reach Pueblo before dark because
they had to land and refuel in South Korea. There were
sixteen Air Force and eight Marine Corps attack planes at
U.S. bases in Japan—at most about one hour and twenty
minutes flight time from Wonsan—but for unknown reasons
73
none were launched. *
The attack carrier Enterprise , escorted by USS Truxton
{DLGN 35) , was steaming southwest in the East China Sea
73Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1622, 1668-73; Authorization for
Military Procurement, 1969 , p. 46; Armbrister, pp. 61-68,
210-41; "Tie-up of U.S. Jets Laid to Atom Role, H New York




about 550 nautical miles from Pueblo at tha time of the
attack. Enterprise carried a total of fifty-nine fighter
and attack aircraft (F-4B, A-4E, and A-6A) , thirty-five of
which were operational on January 23. Rear Admiral H.H.
Epes, Commander Task Group 77.5 (the Enterprise task group),
received Pueblo's first OPREP-3 PINNACLE at 2:30 P.M., and
received Pueblo's second OPREP-3 PINNACLE and the initial
74CRITIC messages eight minutes later. Rear Admiral Epes
decided not to take immediate action in support of Pueblo ,
citing five considerations: (a) he had not received any
requests to support Pueblo , (b) Pueblo apparently had
already been boarded and seized, (c) Pueblo would be in
North Korean territorial waters by the time his planes
arrived, (d) it would be dark by the time his planes
arrived, and (e) his planes would face alerted North Korean
air defenses, including surface-to-air missile batteries
75
around Wonsan and superior number of Mig fighters.
Enterprise probably would not have been able to launch
attack aircraft in time to prevent Pueblo from being seized.
Vice Admiral Lee has stated that "we could have had twenty
76planes* in the air in maybe an hour and a half." Starting
74Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988;
Vice Admiral Lee, interview by author, February 5, 1988;
Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1668-73; Armbrister, pp. 61-68, 210-41.
75Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1671-72; Armbrister, p. 219.




the clock at 2:40 P.M., which was about the time rear
Admiral Epes had sufficient information to understand the
seriousness of Pueblo'
s
situation, Enterprise could have had
planes in the air by about 4:10 P.M., and the planes could
have been over Pueblo at about 5:10 P.M. That is almost
three hours after Pueblo was boarded and twenty-five minutes
after it reached the mouth of Wonsan Harbor. This supports
Vice Admiral Lee's position that "We could have sent an air
strike, but it was too late by the time we received messages
telling us to respond." 77 If COMNAVFORJAPAN had requested
support from Enterprise as soon as Pueblo's first OPREP-3
PINNACLE was received at 1:21 P.M., Enterprise probably
would have been able to place attack aircraft over Pueblo
before the ship entered Wonsan.
At 3:06 P.M. Admiral Bringle ordered Enterprise and
Truxton to proceed to a position in the Sea of Japan off the
78
coast of South Korea at best speed. Re also directed,
however, that "No Task Group 77.5 ship or aircraft take any
79
overt action until further informed." Enterprise and
Truxton received and executed this message at 3:50 P.M.,
77Vice Admiral Lee, interview by author, February 5,
1988. Also see Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," p. 576.
78Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988;
Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, letter to author, March 15, 1988;
Admiral Sharp. "Reminiscences," pp. 571-72; Pueblo Inquiry ,
pp. 1669-72; Armbrister, pp. 219-29.
79Pueblo Inquiry , p. 1671. Also see Admiral Sharp,
"Reminiscences," p. 572; Armbrister, p. 229.
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shortly before Pueblo entered Wonsan. A U.S. navy destroyer
was also ordered to the scene, but could not arrive until
the next day, well after Pueblo was tied up in Wonsan.
Thus, no actions were taken that could have prevented the
80North Koreans from seizing the Pueblo .
There were three principle reasons for the lack of an
effective response by U.S. forces in the Far East: First,
there were no contingency plans to support Pueblo in the
•vent of an attack, and no air or naval forces were
designated to provide such support. Vice Admiral Lee had
described the limitations this creates:
The Navy has forces all over the world. There's
no way we can predict incidents in all the places we
operate. There's no way you can respond unless you
are prepared to. Unless you are on an alert basis, it
is difficult to respond quickly. This applies to
staffs, too: If --they are unprepared, they can't
respond quickly.
U.S. forces were unprepared to provide quick-reaction
support to Pueblo when she was attacked. Neither the Air
force nor the Navy had aircraft on alert to support Pueblo .
Aircraft that were not ready for a strike mission would have
required one to two hours for fueling and arming and pilot
briefings before they could even take off. The Navy did not
80Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988;
Vice Admiral Lee, interview by author, February 5, 1988;
Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1668-73; Armbrister, pp. 61-68, 210-41,
257-65; Goulding, pp. 269-90.




have any warships in the Sea of Japan covering the Pueblo
mission. The nearest U.S. warships would have required at
82least eighteen hours to reach Pueblo . According to
Admiral Hyland, then CINCPACFLT, "At the time of the
incident there wasn't anyone poised and ready to take action
of any kind against North Korea. ... It was all over
83before anyone except Pueblo herself could do anything."
The lack of contingency plans and alert forces thus severely
limited the military options available to U.S. commanders in
the Far East.
The second reason for the lack of an effective
response was that Air Force and navy commanders in the Far
Bast concluded that they would not be able to provide
adequate forces to support Pueblo prior to the ship entering
Wonsan Harbor, or prior to darkness, when providing air
ft A
support would be extremely difficult. According to JCS
Chairman General Wheeler:
82Admiral Hyland, letter to author, March 24, 1988;
Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988; Admiral
Sharp, "Reminiscences," pp. 573-74; Vice Admiral Lee,
interview by author, February 5, 1988; Vice Admiral J. P.
Moorer, letter to author, March 15, 1988; Pueblo Inquiry ,
pp. 1621-22, 1668-73. Also see Armbrister, pp. 61-68, 117-
22, 185-90, 199-204.
83Admiral Hyland, letter to author, March 24, 1988.
84Admiral Bringle, letter to author, march 23, 1988;
Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," pp. 573-74; Pueblo Inquiry ,
pp. 1668-73; Authorization for Military Procurement, 1969 ,
pp. 47-48, 52-53; Johnson, Vantage Point , pp. 534;
Armbrister, pp. 219-20, 230-31.
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factors considered by all levels in the chain of com-
mand when the incident occurred were capabilities of
• friendly and enemy forces, time of day, weather, and
probable hostile reaction. When these factors were
assessed against actual times of events associated
with the incident, time of receipt of the information
that the ship was under attack, and force response
time, it was apparent to all levels of command that
the Pueblo could not be retrieved by any action Bgior
to the time that the ship entered Wonsan Harbor.
Some observers, notably rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery and
the Special Subcommittee that investigated the incident for
the House Armed Services Committee, have argued that U.S.
commanders in the Far East were wrong in concluding that
they could not provide support to Pueblo in time to prevent
86her from being seized. The important point for this
study, however, is that U.S. commanders perceived—rightly
or wrongly—that they could not provide effective support to
Pueblo before the ship and crew were in North Korean hands.
The third factor that inhibited an immediate response
was the presence of large numbers of North Korean air force
Mig fighters and the close proximity of North Korean surface-
to-air missile sites around Wonsan. There is unanimous
agreement among military commanders that North Korea would
have had superior numbers of fighters in the air over
Pueblo : The ship had reported Migs overhead before being
captured, indicating that the North Korean air force had
been alerted to provide air cover. This did not preclude an
85Pueblo Inquiry , p. 1668.
86Gallery, pp. 51-56; Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1669-73.
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effort to drive off the attackers, but did mean that U.S.
attack aircraft would have to be provided with a strong
fighter escort if they were to be effective. It might also
have been necessary to strike North Korean surface-to-air
missile sites in order to protect the attack aircraft and
their fighter escort. Similarly, any Navy warships sent to
rescue Pueblo would have required substantial air cover.
U.S. military commanders thus believed that once Pueblo had
been seized, any response would have to be relatively large-
scale and include a strong fighter escort for the strike
force. Their judgement was that the North Koreans would not
be cowed by only a few attack aircraft, which would be
87
relatively easy to shoot down. The perception that a
large-scale response was called for further increased the
time required to mount a response, which in turn reinforced
the view that there was not sufficient time to respond
before Pueblo was tied up in Wonsan.
Rules of engagement and standing orders did not
inhibit U.S. commanders from providing support to Pueblo
prior to the ship entering Wonsan. Admiral Ryland,
CINCPACFLT, Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, COMSEVENTHFLT
Operations Officer, and Vice Admiral Lee, Commanding Officer
of Enterprise , have all stated that the rules of engagement
87Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988;
Vice Admiral Lee, interview by author, February 5, 1988;
Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," pp. 573-74; Pueblo Inquiry ,
p. 1668; Armbrister, pp. 219-20, 230-31.
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88permitted Navy units to use force to defend Pueblo.
Admiral Sharp, then CINCPAC, has confirmed this: "There was
a standing order in the Pacific Command, as there is every
place else in the Navy, that says that anyone in a position
to help a ship under attack is to do so without any further
orders." Admiral Bringle, then COMSEVENTHFLT, has
explained the autb rity of U.S. Navy commanders:
When an emergency arises which affects the safety of
personnel, ships or aircraft, either civilian or
military, Navy Commanders don't wait for specific
orders from higher authority to tell them to react.
They evaluate the situation quickly and react with the
forces which are available to assist, if at all
possible, .meanwhile keeping everyone involved fully
informed.
According to JCS Chairman General Wheeler, U.S. commanders
in the Far East had ample authority to assist Pueblo :
At the time of the attack by the North Korean naval
units, the United States had the historic right
—
codified internationally by Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter— to take any action in self-defense
proportionate to the attack and necessary to protect
the ship. Whatever military steps the United States
could have taken within these limits from the air or
on the sea to prevent the capture of the USS Pueblo
would have been fully justified. There were no rules
of engagement limiting going to the aid of Pueblo
during this time.
The statements by Admiral Bringle and General Wheeler are
88Admiral Hyland, letter to author, March 24, 1988;
Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, letter to author, March 15, 1988;
Vice Admiral Lee, interview by author, February 5, 1988.
89Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences," p. 576.
90Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988.
91Quoted in Pueblo Inquiry , p. 1668.
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fully consistent with the guidance contained in U.S.
standing peacetime rules of engagement since the early
921950s. Additionally, Secretary of Defense McNamara
testified in 1968 that Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan and
Commander Fifth Air Force had authority to take military
93
action without having to get permission from CINCPAC.
While Pueblo remained in international waters, U.S.
military commanders had broad authority to use force to
defend or recover the ship. In 1955 President Eisenhower
had approved a national Security Council staff proposal that
a distinction be drawn between self-defense (including hot
pursuit for self-defense) and reprisals. Military
commanders were authorized to use force in self-defense,
including hot pursuit into the airspace or territorial
waters of other nations under certain circumstances. But
only the President could order reprisals, generally
considered to be any retaliatory attacks against the
94territory of another country. Under this doctrine, U.S.
forces were authorized to use force to defend or gain
release of Pueblo so long as it did not entail attacks
against North Korean territory, which would have been
reprisals requiring Presidential approval.
92
.
See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion of U.S.
peacetime rules of engagement.




The peacetime rules of engagement in force in 1968
apparently did not permit hot pursuit into North Korean
territorial waters in order to defend or recover Pueblo,
Rear Admiral Epes stated that he could not take action in
North Korean territorial waters, and General John D. Ryan,
Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces, directed Commander
Fifth Air Force to keep his planes over international waters
95
while supporting Pueblo , " Vice Admiral Lee has stated that
under the rules of engagement "We could respond to defend a
96
Navy ship in international waters." Hot pursuit into
North Korean territorial waters thus does not appear to have
been authorized under the rules of engagement.
Once Pueblo entered Wonsan harbor, the rules of
engagement placed severe restrictions on the use of force by
U.S. military commanders. An effective rescue mission
probably could not have been carried out without suppressing
North Korean air and coastal defenses, and there would have
been a high risk of weapons directed against North Korean
naval vessels inadvertently impacting ashore. Admiral Sharp
has stated that an attack on Wonsan would have been "an act
97
of retaliation.** An attack on Wonsan Harbor thus fell in
the category of reprisals and required approval by the
95Armbrister, pp. 219-20.
96Vice Admiral Lee, interview by author, February 5,
1988.
97Admiral Sharp, "Reminiscences,** p. 573.
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President. According to Admiral Hyland, Admiral Br ingle,
and Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, Navy commanders had to get
authorization from higher authority before taking military
98
action against North Korea. The Navy report to the
Special Subcommittee that investigated the incident states
that "Combat action after Pueblo arrived in the harbor could
be viewed as retaliatory in nature, requiring approval of
99higher authority. H Evidently, this was precisely the view
held by Navy commanders in the Pacific.
General Wheeler testified that on the morning of
January 23, he received a "hold" order from "higher author-
ity," which could only be the Secretary of Defense and the
President. This order directed that U.S. forces were to
remain beyond eighty nautical miles from the coast of North
Korea when operating north of the Korean DMZ. General
Wheeler issued this order to CINCPAC by telephone at 10:25
A.M. Washington time (12:25 A.M. the next morning in the Sea
of Japan, four hours after Pueblo tied up in Wonsan) , and
reiterated the verbal order with a message that evening.
This was the first restraint placed on U.S. commanders in
the Par East by officials in Washington, and came well after
98Admiral Hyland, letter to author, March 24, 1988;
Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988; Vice
Admiral J. P. Moorer, letter to author, March 15, 1988.
99Pueblo Inquiry , p. 1672.
Pueblo Inquiry , p. 1668; Armbrister, p. 239;
Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1983.
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commanders in the Far East had decided against taking
immediate military action against North Korea.
After reviewing the orders that had been given on
January 23, 1968, the Special Subcommittee concluded that
U.S. military commanders in the Far East had authority to
take military action in support of Pueblo :
Since higher authority in Washington had appar-
ently not established a hold order on our forces until
0025 on the 24th of January, Korea time (10:25 Washing-
ton time on the 23rd) , our operational commanders were
apparently not precluded from exercising their own
judgement in respect to providing some assistance to
the Pueblo. Thus, it would appear that these opera-
tional commanders had both the authority and the
opportunity to act if they had been able to do so
immediately.
The two qualifications that must be placed in this assess-
ment are, first, that U.S. forces were not authorized to
engage North Korean forces inside North Korean territorial
waters, and, second, that military actions taken after
Pueblo was inside the North Korean port of Wonsan would have
constituted reprisals, thus requiring approval of the
President. These restrictions essentially halted U.S.
military action in support of Pueblo from 4:45 P.M. onward.
President Johnson and his advisors considered a wide
range of military options, but quickly decided that none of
them were feasible. COMSEVENTHFLT had a contingency plan
for retaliatory air strikes against North Korea (reportedly
code named "Fried Fish**), which was quickly updated for the
101Pueblo Inquiry , p. 1673.
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Pueblo emergency. The President elected not to carry out
retaliatory air strikes. Navy commanders in the Far East
also prepared a plan to send a destroyer into Wonsan and tow
Pueblo out (which would have entailed large-scale combat
operations to suppress North Korean defenses) , but this plan
102
was also disapproved by the President. Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations, states that the JCS
recommended strong action: "The JCS recommended that the
U.S. deliver an ultimatum to North Korea to return the ship,
and to mass B-52s for an attack. Our recommendation was
turned down. McNamara's excuse was 'We've already got one
war, we don't need two'." The President decided against
presenting an ultimatum to North Korea.
President Johnson's primary concern was for the safe
return of the crew, and he was also reluctant to become
involved in a second conflict while deeply engaged in
Vietnam. The President authorized two military actions:
deployment of some 350 Air Force tactical aircraft to South
Korea and a buildup of naval forces in the Sea of Japan.
?As a political gesture President Johnson ordered twenty-two
Air Force reserve squadrons and six Navy reserve squadrons
called up to active duty. All of these actions were
102Admiral Hyland, letter to author, March 24, 1988;
Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988; Vice
Admiral J. P. Moorer, letter to author, March 15, 1988.
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, interview by author,
February 9, 1988. Also see Johnson, Vantage Point , p. 535.
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essentially symbolic, as the President had already decided
that the United States would not take military action
104
against North Korea.
The U.S. naval buildup in the Sea of Japan lasted from
January 23 to March 22, 1968. At the height of the buildup,
the Navy had over eighteen warships in the Sea of Japan,
including three aircraft carriers, two cruisers, and four-
teen destroyers. This show of force had no apparent effect
on the North Koreans, who kept their air and naval forces
close to shore—well clear of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, reacted to the U.S. naval
presence with vitriolic anti-American propaganda and
harassment of the carrier task groups. Initially, five
Soviet ships, including three destroyers, an intelligence
collection ship (AGI) , and an naval research ship, trailed
the U.S. carriers. On February 4, Soviet Tu-16 Badger
bombers began intense surveillance of the U.S. carriers and
repeatedly buzzed them at low altitude. The Soviet Badgers,
some carrying clearly visible anti-ship cruise missiles.
104
"Admiral Hyland, letter to author, March 24, 1988;
Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, letter to author, March 15, 1988;
Johnson, Vantage Point
, pp. 535-36; Authorization for Mili-
tary Procurement, 1969 , p. 57; "North Korea Seizes Navy
Ship," New York Times , January 24, 1968, p. 1; "U.S. Calls
14,787 Air Reservists," New York Times , January 26, 1968, p.
1; "More U.S. Planes Go to Korea," New York Times , January
28, 1968, p. 1. Also see Armbrister, pp. 237-39, 258-67;
Abrara Shulsky, "Coercive Diplomacy," in Bradford Dismukes
and James McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 119-23.
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also conducted simulated strikes against the U.S. carriers.
This was the first instance of Soviet missile-armed aircraft
conducting simulated strikes against U.S. warships during a
period of international tension. On February 6 a Soviet
anti-carrier group, consisting of two Kynda-class cruisers,
(armed with SS-N-3 anti-ship cruise missiles) and four
destroyers, took station in the Sea of Japan just north of
the DMZ off the coast of North Korea—a clear signal that
the Soviet Union would oppose U.S. military action against
North Korea. On February 17 a Soviet destroyer and the
research ship harassed the U.S. formation by conducting
105dangerous maneuvers violating the rules of the road.
Soviet simulated anti-carrier strikes and harassment
significantly increased tensions in the Sea of Japan.
Interestingly, Soviet harassment of U.S. naval forces
in the Sea of Japan commenced after the United States began
discussion with North Korea in Panmunjon on Pueblo . This
pattern would be seen again during the 1973 Middle East War,
105Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, letter to author, March
15, 1988; "A Soviet Trawler Trails enterprise," New York
Times , January 26, 1968, p. 1; "Carrier Shifting from Korea
Post," New York Times , February 7, 1968, p. 1; Shulsky, pp.
121-23; Armbrister, pp. 258-67. Admiral Hyland and Admiral
Bringle state that there were no serious incidents between
U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the Sea of Japan during this
period. Admiral Hyland, letter to author, March 24, 1988;
Admiral Bringle, letter to author, March 23, 1988. However,
both COMSEVENTHFLT and CINCPACFLT were preoccupied with the
Vietnam War—the Tet offensive was in progress at the time
—
and probably did not pay close attention to operations in
the Sea of Japan.
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when Soviet naval units commenced intense anti-carrier
exercises against the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean after
the Israeli-Egyptian ceasefire finally took hold (See
Chapter VI for a further details) . In both cases this
pattern probably indicated a certain amount of caution by
the Soviet Union: avoiding naval actions that could involve
the Soviet Union in the conflicts, but, after tensions had
started to ease, taking symbolic actions for political
signaling purposes. It is not clear, however, exactly what
the Soviets were attempting to signal. The most likely
Soviet intentions in 1968 were to deter the United States
from taking military action against North Korea, to
neutralize U.S. coercive threats during the talks with North
Korea, and to demonstrate opposition to the U.S. naval
presence close to the Soviet Union in the Sea of Japan.
That in 1968 and 1973 the Soviets did not commence
simulated anti-carrier attacks until after tensions had
started to ease does not mean that such Soviet behavior is
not dangerous from a crisis management perspective.
Tensions at sea typically do not relax as quickly as they do
in the political arena because U.S. naval forces are usually
kept on station well after a crisis subsides, and because
there normally is a lag in informing U.S. naval commanders
of current political developments and future political
intentions {if they are told at all) . In 1968 and 1973 the
Soviets initiated simulated strikes against U.S. naval
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forces during the lag period before U.S. forces were
directed to stand down and their commanders informed that
military action was no longer contemplated. A tense and
dangerous situation can thus develop at sea even while U.S.
leaders perceive that the crisis has peaked and the danger
of an armed clash has eased.
Other than the symbolic military actions described
above, the United states limited its response to protests
and negotiations for the release of Pueblo'
s
crew. The crew
was imprisoned near Pyongyang, where for eleven months they
were exploited for anti-American propaganda and subjected to
torture and brutal treatment. On December 23, 1968 the
United States signed a confession that the Pueblo had in-
truded into North Korean waters—a confession it immediately
repudiated verbally—and the crew of the Pueblo was released
in Panmunjom. North Korea scored a propaganda victory over
the United States and kept the ship and that portion of its
classified equipment and publications that had not been
, 106destroyed.
Political and military tensions on the Korean
Peninsula remained acute throughout 1968 and into 1969.
There were dozens of North Korean provocations and
infiltration attempts along the DMZ, which resulted in seven
Ed Brandt, The Last Voyage of the Pueblo (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., 1969), pp. 227-33; Bucher, pp. 349-59;
Murphy, pp. 307-17; Armbrister, pp. 333-44.
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U.S. soldiers being killed. There were also numerous
North Korean provocations at sea. North Korea continued its
harassment of the South Korean fishing fleet, seizing at
least sixteen South Korean fishing boats in 1968. On June
22, 1968, North Korea claimed that it had sunk a U.S. spy
ship in the Yellow sea, but the vessel did not belong to the
United States and probably was a South Korean fishing
108boat. North Korea struck at the United States again on
April 14, 1969, shooting down an unarmed U.S. Navy EC-121
reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, ninety miles
109from the North Korean coast. North Korean seizure of the
Pueblo thus was not an isolated incident, but rather one of
scores of North Korean provocations and atrocities directed
against South Korea and the United States during the 1968-
1969 period.
10
"Korean Reds Kill 4 U.N. Soldiers,'* New York Times ,
•April 15, 1968, p. 1; "North Koreans Fire on American Unit,
Killing One Soldier," New York Times , April 22, 1968, p. 15;
"Two U.S. Soldiers Killed in North Korean Buffer Clashes,"
New York Times , July 23, 1968, p. 14; "G.I. Killed in Clash
with Korean Reds," New York Times , July 31, 1968, p. 3;
"Rising War Peril Is Seen in Korea," New York Times , August
16, 1968, p. 3; "2 U.S. Soldiers Die in Clash with North
Korean Intruders," New York Times , August 20, 1968, p. 13;
"C.I. Killed in Clash in Korea," New York Times , October 7,
1968, p. 4.
108
"Naval and Maritime Events, 1 July 1968-31 December
1969," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 96 (May 1970): 50,
52, 54; "North Korea Says It Sank 'Spy Ship'," New York
Times, June 23, 1968, p. 1.
109Pueblo Inquiry , pp. 1675-81; "23-Ship U.S. Fleet
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This taction will review the 1968 seizure of the
Pueblo to answer the four research questions. The first
question is did interactions at the tactical and political
levels become decoupled during or after the attack on
Pueblo ? One of the potential causes of decoupled interac-
tions was present and played an major role in how the
incident developed: communications and information flow
problems. Emergency messages from Pueblo required over an
hour to reach Washington and U.S. military commanders in the
Pacific. On the other hand, although U.S. military
commanders had authority to take military action in support
of Pueblo , they decided not to do so. President Johnson was
not confronted with having to halt combat operations or
approve them after the fact because none were initiated.
U.S. commanders in the Far East had already come to the same
conclusion that the President would reach: that there were
no effective military actions that could be taken to rescue
Pueblo without needlessly endangering the crew. Therefore,
although the President did not have direct control over the
initial response to the North Korean attack on Pueblo , U.S.
forces acted essentially as he would have wanted them to act
under the circumstances. This pattern is one of parallel
stratified interactions: tactical level interactions that
are not controlled by national leaders, but which support
the political objectives of those leaders.
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The second question is, when stratified interactions
become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation from
occurring at the tactical level and being transmitted upward
to the strategic and political level of interaction?
Although decoupling did not occur in the Pueblo incident,
two of the considerations that prevented decoupling can be
viewed as escalation-inhibiting factors: military prudence
and compliance with the guidance contained in mechanisms of
indirect control. U.S. military commanders were reluctant
to mount a response that would have been excessively
vulnerable to North Korean attacks. Loss of U.S. aircraft
sent to defend Pueblo almost certainly would have generated
escalatory pressures, so in this instance military prudence
led to tactical decisions that supported crisis management
objectives. U.S. military commanders complied with the
restrictions imposed on military operations by the standing
peacetime rules of engagement, barring their forces from
attacking North Korean forces inside North Korean
territorial waters and airspace, and not ordering actions
that would have constituted reprisals against North Korea.
The guidance contained in the peacetime rules of engagement
may or may not have been appropriate to the specific
circumstances, but U.S. military commanders were careful to
comply with that guidance.
The third question is did actions taken with naval
forces send inadvertent political signals to adversaries or
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allies, and did inadvertent military incidents occur that
affected efforts to manage the crisis? Neither problem
appears to have been arisen in the Pueblo incident, probably
due to the relatively passive U.S. response to the North
Korean provocation. North Korea succeeded in achieving a
fait accompli , effectively limiting U.S. options to settling
on North Korean terms, the passive U.S. response annoyed
the South Koreans, but this arose from correct perceptions
rather than from misperceptions. It apparently had little
impact on long-term U.S. relations with South Korea.
The fourth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the response to the North Korean seizure of Pueblo ? None of
the three tensions was serious during the incident. There
were essentially no tensions between political and military
considerations. All levels in the chain of command agreed
that effective military action could not be taken before
Pueblo entered Wonsan. There was disagreement between
military and civilian officials over whether or not
reprisals should be taken against North Korea, and over
whether or not if an effort should be made to recover the
ship by force. But these disagreements primarily revolved
around the military feasibility of the options proposed by
the military, rather than the political implications of the
options (The Johnson Administration perceived both




There was little tension between the need for direct
top-level control and the need for tactical-level flexi-
bility and initiative. U.S. military commanders in the Far
East had ample authority to take military action without
having to seek permission from higher authorities so long as
Pueblo remained in international waters. The "hold" order
issued to the military came well after commanders in the Far
East had decided against taking immediate military action,
and served only to avoid further incidents with North Korean
forces while Washington weighed reprisal options. If U.S.
commanders had ordered attacks on North Korean forces in
international waters to prevent Pueblo from being taken into
Wonsan, it is likely that the President would have supported
the action (As he supported Vice Admiral Martin's dispatch
of aircraft to defend Liberty in 1967)
.
There was some tension between performance of crisis
missions and readiness to perform wartime missions. The
limited time available for taking action meant that the
initial response to the North Korean attack on Pueblo had to
be made with U.S. forces in and around Japan and South
Korea. The aircraft closest to Pueblo—Air Force planes on
alert in South Korea—were configured for delivery of
nuclear weapons (a wartime mission) and could not be rapidly
reconfigured for conventional ordnance (for crisis
missions)
. Commander Fifth Air Force did not hesitate to
order these planes reconfigured for conventional ordnance.
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Maintaining readiness for wartime missions had greater
impact on the decision whether or not to retaliate against
North Korea. The heavy commitment of U.S. forces in Vietnam
limited the options available to U.S. military commanders
and made the President and Secretary of Defense reluctant to
take action against North Korea that could result in another
military conflict.
The 1987 Attack on the Stark
USS Stark was launched in 1980 and commissioned in
1982. The ship is 445 feet in length, displaces about 3,700
tons, and has a top speed of over twenty-nine knots. Anti-
aircraft armament consists of Standard SM-l(MR) 25-mile
range missiles fired from a MK 13 launcher, a 76 millimeter
MK 75 gun, and a 20 millimeter MK 16 close-in weapon system
(CZWS) for defense against anti-ship missiles. With these
weapons and the SPS-49 air search radar, naval tactical data
system (NTDS) , tactical data link, MK 92 fire control
system, SLQ-32 electronic warfare system, and chaff
launchers. Stark is well-armed for defense against air
threats—particularly anti-ship cruise missiles. The crew
consists of seventeen officers and 168 enlisted men. With
its modern systems for surveillance and self-defense. Stark
was a good choice for patrol duties in the Persian Gulf.
The Iran-Iraq War dominated the international
situation in the Persian Gulf in May 1987. The war erupted
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in September 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran, initially
penetrating deep into Iranian territory. Iran repelled the
Iraqi assault and the war stagnated along the Shatt al-Aiab
estuary. Iran and Iraq both frequently attacked oil
facilities— including oil platforms and shipping terminals
in the Persian Gulf—in an effort at crippling each other's
economies.
During the first three years of the war, Iraq
conducted sporadic attacks on shipping in the vicinity of
Iranian ports and oil terminals. In retaliation for Iraqi
attacks on oil facilities, Iran was stopping and boarding
tankers entering the Persian Gulf to verify that their
destination was not Iraq. The shipping war escalated in Kay
1984 with the first Iranian attacks on commercial shipping
in the Persian Gulf. Iraq also escalated its attacks on
shipping in 1984, conducting attacks more frequently and
covering more of the Persian Gulf. Iraqi attacks were
indiscriminate: Mirage fighters fired Exocet missiles at
whatever contacts they picked up on radar without attempting
to identify their nationality—hitting ships belonging to
Iraq* s allies on more than one occasion. Iran and Iraq
further intensified their anti-shipping campaigns in 1986,
conducting twice as many attacks as in 1985. Approximately
355 ships were attacked in the Persian Gulf from September
1980 to May 1987. In the nine months prior to the attack on
the Stark Iraq flew over 330 anti-shipping flights and fired
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90 French-made Exocet anti-ship missiles, hitting 40 ships
with them. 110
Soon after the Iran-Iraq War erupted in 1980 the
United States expressed concern for the security of shipping
in the Persian Gulf, particularly through the Strait of
Hormuz. Iran was viewed as the primary threat due to its
hostility to the U.S. and to Arab nations siding with Iraq.
U.S. Navy ships began escorting American-flag merchant ships
in the Persian Gulf after Iran began attacking shipping in
1984. In the spring of 1987 the United States, responding
to a request from Kuwait for assistance in countering an
Iranian campaign against Kuwaiti shipping, was making final
plans for reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti tankers.
Despite their escort duties, the ships of the U.S.
Navy's Middle East Force were primarily serving political
"As Tension Rises in the Gulf, Role for U.S.
Becomes Issue," New York Tiroes , May 23, 1984, p. 1? "Stark
Unaware It Was Target, Admiral Says," Los Angeles Times , May
20, 1987, p. 1; MU.S. Policy in Gulf Aimed at Halting Iran,
Official Says," Los Angeles Times , May 22, 1987, p. 1;
Ronald O'Rourke, "The Tanker War," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 114 (May 1988): 30-34.
"Escalating Iran-Iraq Fighting Prompts U.S. to
Study Its Available Options to Keep Strait of Hormuz Open,"
Wall Street Journal . September 24, 1980, p. 2; Warren
Christopher, "Conflict in Iraq and Iran," Current Policy No.
234, U.S. Department of State, October 7, 1980; "Weinberger
Pledges to Protect Gulf Shipping," Los Angeles Times , March
23, 1987, p. 1; "U.S. Tells Navy To Bolster Force At Persian
Gulf," New York Times , April 5, 1987, p. 1; Michael H.
Armacost, "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti
Reflagging," Current Policy No. 978, U.S. Department of




purposes in the Persian Gulf. Their presence was intended
to show the flag, demonstrating U.S. resolve to keep the sea
lanes open and deterring Iran from attacking American
•hipping. Special precautions were in effect to prevent
unwanted incidents. To avoid inadvertently shooting down
any of the many friendly aircraft over the Gulf, the rules
of engagement required Navy ships to radio warnings to
approaching planes and carefully assess their actions for
indications of hostile intent before firing. Prior to the
Stark incident, those procedures had appeared sufficient to
avert possible attacks on U.S. Navy ships while avoiding
112incidents with civilian aircraft.
U.S. Navy ships were warned that the primary danger to
them was inadvertent attacks, and were told that they were
to regard all Iranian and Iraqi aircraft as potentially
hostile. Stark had been briefed on the Persian Gulf rules
of engagement on February 28, 1987, just prior to joining
the Middle East Force. The report of the investigation into
112Rear Admiral Grant Sharp, "Formal Investigation
Into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the USS
Stark (FFG*31) on 17 May 1987, H letter serial no. 00/S-0487,
June 12, 1987 (Sanitized version released in 1988 by the
Department of the Navy)
, pp. 12-13 (Cited hereafter as
"Sharp Report); U.S. Congress, Rouse of Representatives, Com-
mittee on Armed Services, "Report on the Staff Investigation
into the Iraqi Attack on the USS Stark , " 14 June 1987, pp. 4-
6 (hereafter referred to as "Staff Investigation"). Also
see Michael Vlahos, "The Stark Report," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 114 (May 1988) : 65. For an example of how these
rules were used in the Gulf prior to the Stark incident, see
"U.S. Confirms Naval Incidents in Strait of Hormuz," New
York Times , February 29, 1984, p. A7.
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the Stark incident conducted by Rear Admiral Grant Sharp
states, referring to the February 28 briefing, "The ROE
[rules of engagement] briefer highlighted that the
probability of deliberate attack on U.S. warships was low,
but that indiscriminate attack in the Persian Gulf was a
significant danger.
"
According to the Sharp Report, the Stark tragedy was
not caused by ambiguous or overly restrictive rules of
engagement:
The Rules of Engagement that were in existence on 17
May 1987 were sufficient to enable Stark to properly
warn the Iraqi aircraft, in a timely manner, of the
presence of a U.S. warship; and, if the warning was
not heeded, the Rules of Engagement were sufficient to
enable Stark to defend herself against hostile intent
and imminent danger without absorbing the first
hit. 14
Stark was authorized to use force in anticipatory self-
defense against any aircraft that demonstrated hostile
intent by flying an apparent anti-ship attack profile and
failing to respond to radio warnings to remain clear.
Iraqi aircraft were routinely detected on anti-
shipping flights, but usually did not provoke a reaction by
U.S. Navy ships because the Iraqis were regarded as non-
hostile and their targets were inside the Iranian Exclusion
Zone—well away from U.S. Navy patrol areas. Occasionally,
however, Iraqi jets had to be warned away and at least one




close call had occurred when a U.S. Navy warship had been
close to the target of an Iraqi missile. Iraqi planes were
a danger because they made no effort to identify their
115
targets, firing blindly at radar contacts. Commander
Middle East Force had warned on May 14 and 16, 1987, that
Iraqi planes were conducting anti-shipping strikes in the
central Persian Gulf (the area in which Stark was
operating) , creating an increased danger of indiscriminate
attacks. Stark had received these messages and was thus
fully appraised of the threat.
On May 17, 1987, Stark was patrolling the central
Persian Gulf about eighty-five miles northeast of Bahrain,
twelve miles outside the Iranian Exclusion Zone. Shortly
after 8:00 P.M. Stark was informed that a U.S. Air Force
AWACS radar plane had detected an Iraqi aircraft two hundred
miles from the ship heading southeast along the coast of
Saudi Arabia. Stark picked up the plane on air search radar
when it was seventy miles away and detected the Mirage's
radar in the search mode. At 9:08 P.M., when the Iraqi
plane was thirteen miles away. Stark broadcast a warning
identifying itself as a U.S. warship and requesting the
115**
"2nd U.S. Warship Warned Off Iraqi Jets," Los
Angeles Times . 21 May 1987, p. 14; "Staff Investigation,"
pp. 4-5. The near miss occurred in 1986 when an Iraqi
missile struck a ship about six miles from the destroyer USS
John Hancock
. See "1985 Iraqi Attack on U.S. Ship Cited,"
New York Times . May 24, 1987, p. 13.
Sharp Report, pp. 7-8.
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plane's intentions. At 9:07 P.M. the Mirage launched an
Exocet missile from a range of about twenty-two miles. A
minute later the plane launched a second Exocet missile at a
range of about fifteen miles. Stark was sending a second
warning to the Iraqi plane when the second missile was
launched. Stark's electronic warfare system detected the
homing radars on the Exocet missiles, but they were misiden-
tified as the Mirage's radar in a fire control mode. Stark
did not detect the missiles on radar. The Tactical Action
Officer (TAO) ordered initial defensive actions after the
missiles were launched, but the response was too late to be
effective. First detection of the missiles was a sighting
by a lookout, who did not recognize them as missiles and
117
sound a warning until seconds before they struck.
At 9:09 P.M. the first missile impacted the port side
of Stark , but failed to explode. About twenty seconds later
the second missile struck the ship near where the first had
struck, exploding just inside the ship. The blast tore a
large hole in the port side and unexpended fuel from the
missiles started an intense fire that required nearly a day
to extinguish. Thirty-seven men died and several were
118
wounded in the attack.
117Sharp Report, pp. 1-3, 8-14; "Staff Investigation,"
pp. 7-18; Vlahos, pp. 64-65.
118 Sharp Report, pp. 14-15; "Staff Investigation," pp.
18-20; Vlahos, pp. 64-65.
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Two Saudi F-15 fighters had scrambled as the Iraqi jet
flew down their coast, but their ground controllers refused
to let them pursue the Mirage after the attack. No U.S.
•hips or aircraft attempted to engage the Iraqi plane before
the attack and none were able to engage it after the
attack. Stark was towed into Bahrain harbor for temporary
repairs by a U.S. Navy tender before beginning the long
119
voyage back to the United States.
The United States delivered a formal diplomatic
protest to Iraq and demanded a full explanation for the
attack. Reagan Administration spokesmen described the
incident as an accident, a case of mistaken identity. The
U.S. also stated that it expected an apology and compensa-
tion for the men who died and the damage to the ship. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff revised the rules of engagement for
Middle East Force ships, requiring radio warnings and defen-
sive measures be taken at longer ranges, and emphasizing
that all aircraft approaching U.S. Navy ships must be
120treated as potentially hostile.
119
"Staff Investigation, 1* pp. 20-22; "Saudis Balked at
Intercepting Iraqi Attacker," New York Times , May 21, 1987,
p. Al.
120Sharp Report, p. 7; "Staff Investigation," p. 6:
"Iraqi Missile Hits U.S. Navy Frigate in Persian Gulf," New
York Times . May 18, 1987, p. Al; "Iraqi Missile Hits U.S.
Warship; 30 Missing, 3 Dead," Los Angeles Times , May 18,
1987, p. 1; "Missile Toll on Frigate is 28," New York Times ,
May 19, 1987, p. Al; "Ship Deaths at 28; Iraq, Iran Warned,"
Los Angeles Times , May 19, 1987, p. 1.
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Iraq formally accepted responsibility for the attack,
expressing "profound regret" and calling it an "uninten-
tional incident," and presented a compensation proposal to
the United States. Iraqi spokesmen stated that the pilot
believed he was attacking an Iranian ship and had not heard
the warnings broadcast by Stark . Iraq also claimed Stark
had been ten miles inside the Iranian Exclusion Zone, a
charge the U.S. refuted. Iraq and the U.S. later reached an
agreement on measures to prevent inadvertent attacks on U.S.
Navy ships, but incidents continued to occur in which U.S.
ships had to warn off Iraqi aircraft. In some cases Iraqi
planes veered away only seconds before they would have been
shot down. Iraqi pilots did not cease their indiscriminate
attacks on whatever ships they happened to detect on radar
121in the Persian Gulf.
Findings
This section will review the 1987 attack on Stark to
answer the four research questions. The first question is
did interactions at the tactical and political levels become
decoupled during or after the attack on Stark ? There was no
decoupling in the Stark incident. The attack lasted only a
121Sharp Report, p. 16; "Staff Investigation," pp. 8-
9; "Missile Toll on Frigate is 28," New York Times , May 19,
1987 , p. Al; "Ship Deaths at 28; Iran, Iraq Warned," Los
Angeles Times , May 19, 1987, p. 1; "U.S. and Iraq Act to




few minutes and was over before any other units could employ
their weapons in support of Stark . The identity of the
attacking aircraft was known well before the attack, and
military commanders at the scene quickly concluded that the
attack had been inadvertent. No effort was made to shoot
down the Iraqi plane because no U.S. forces were in a
position to do so. The only sense in which actions at the
tactical level failed to support national policy was that
Stark failed to take defensive actions authorized under the
rules of engagement.
The second question is, when stratified interactions
become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation from
occurring at the tactical level and being transmitted upward
to the strategic and political levels of interaction? The
Stark incident illustrates an escalation-inhibiting factor:
accurate intelligence on friendly and potentially hostile
forces. Because the attacking aircraft was known to have
been Iraqi, there was no question that Iran might have been
responsible for the attack on Stark . Without such
intelligence, U.S. commanders in the Persian Gulf probably
would have suspected that Iran had conducted the attack.
Circumstantial evidence pointing to Iranian complicity and
lack of an Iraqi admission of responsibility could well have
led to the President ordering retaliatory attacks on Iranian
forces or bases. This situation is analogous to that
described in the Liberty incident, when accurate information
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on Soviet forces in the Mediterranean prevented U.S.
military commanders from suspecting that the Soviets had
attacked Liberty .
It appears that inadvertent escalation would be more
likely when intelligence is incomplete and ambiguous,
supporting worst-case assessments of the nature and
implications of an attack on U.S. forces. For example, on-
scene commanders could conclude that full-scale attacks on
U.S. forces at the scene of the crisis will soon follow,
placing a premium on preempting the expected enemy attack.
Under certain circumstances on-scene commanders might have
authority to preempt without having to seek permission from
higher authority.
The third question is did actions taken with naval
forces send inadvertent political signals to adversaries or
allies, and did inadvertent military incidents occur that
affected crisis management efforts? Neither of these
problems arose after the attack on Stark , but the attack
itself was an inadvertent military incident. The attack on
Stark illustrates the danger of inadvertent military
incidents when U.S. naval forces are operating in close
proximity to hostilities.
The fourth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the response to the attack on Stark ? None of the three
tensions was present because the incident was brief and the
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attack was known to have been inadvertent. U.S. Navy ships
in the Persian Gulf had ample authority under the rules of
engagement to use force in self-defense or anticipatory self-
defense. Nevertheless, Navy commanders in the Persian Gulf
had been placed in a complex and dangerous tactical environ-
ment. There was great risk of U.S. ships being attacked
Inadvertently or deliberately, and equally great risk of
political embarrassment to the United States if civilian of
friendly military aircraft were shot down. Rules of engage-
ment cannot eliminate the dangers and risks inherent in such
an environment, they can, at best, reduce the likelihood of




Comparing the circumstances in which the four inci-
dents occurred and the possible motives of the attackers
will shed further light on the nature of peacetimes attacks
on U.S. Navy ships.
Circumstances of Peacetime Attacks
There are important similarities in the international
circumstances of the attacks. In all four cases some form
of conflict, tensions, or rivalry among the major powers
structured the environment and affected American interests
sufficiently to compel limited U.S. involvement. In three
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of the cases (Tonkin Gulf, Liberty , and Pueblo ) Soviet-
American cold war rivalry was a source of tension, and in
one case ( Stark ) Soviet-American competition for influence
in the Middle East was a major U.S. concern.
In all four cases some form of armed conflict was in
progress. In three cases (Tonkin Gulf, Liberty , and Stark )
a local armed conflict was being fought at the time of the
incident. In the Pueblo case an intense ideological and
political rivalry, held in check only by an uneasy military
armistice, had recently escalated to a high level of
tension—accompanied by a series of military clashes and a
significant rise in casualties. In all of the cases U.S.
Navy ships were sent on missions either in the midst of
fighting ( Stark ) , near the scene of fighting (Tonkin Gulf
and ( Liberty ) , or near the scene of severe tensions
( Pueblo ) . Despite the danger inherent in such situations,
U.S. leaders felt that the threat to the ships was not
excessive because the U.S. was not a belligerent and was
officially neutral in the conflict ( Liberty and Stark )
,
because the ship would be operating in international waters
and the belligerents would respect international law (all
four cases), or because belligerents hostile to the U.S. had
political-military incentives to avoid incidents with the
United States (Tonkin Gulf and Pueblo ) . As the case studies
show, such factors are not always effective in preventing
peacetime attacks on Navy ships.
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The U.S. role in the conflicts varied considerably,
but there are strong similarities among the cases. The
United States was officially neutral in the conflict in two
of the cases ( Liberty and Stark ) , but in each case the U.S.
Government and the American public were either sympathetic
to one side (Israel in the Liberty case) or hostile to one
side (Iran in the Stark case) . In the other two cases
(Tonkin Gulf and Pueblo ) the U.S. was firmly committed to
one side in the conflict, but at the time of the incidents
the U.S. was not taking direct military action against the
countries it opposed (North Vietnam and North Korea) . The
situation was politically and militarily complex in all four
cases—the United States had interests compelling it to
become involved in the conflicts, but other interests and
political constraints restrained the U.S. from direct
military intervention. Thus, naval forces were employed to
pursue limited political-military objectives.
The missions being conducted by the U.S. Navy ships
also varied considerably. In three of the cases the ships
were on an intelligence collection mission (Tonkin Gulf,
Liberty , and Pueblo ) , and in the remaining case ( Stark ) the
ship was on a surveillance mission. In two of the cases
(Liberty and Pueblo ) the missions had no important political
objectives and were ordered for military purposes. In the
other two cases (Tonkin Gulf and Stark ) the missions had the
political purposes of establishing a visible U.S. presence
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in an area of tensions, asserting freedom of the seas in
international waters, and demonstrating U.S. resolve to
protect its interests in the conflicts.
The political implications of the naval missions in
the four cases also varied. Two of the missions ( Liberty
and Pueblo ) were viewed as nominally non-political, but in
fact had significant latent or inadvertent political
impact. If one accepts the theory (assessed below) that the
Israeli attack on Liberty was deliberate, then it is
possible that the unannounced presence of Liberty off the
Sinai sent an inadvertent signal of retrenchment to Israel
—
symbolizing opposition to unrestrained Israeli offensives
against neighboring Arab countries, particularly new
offensive action against Syria. However, there is no
evidence to support this. Pueblo appears to have sent an
inadvertent signal of hostility to North Korea, symbolizing
support for South Korean offensive action against the
North. Liberty and Pueblo also had the deterrent effect
associated with overt surveillance missions: denying
adversaries—and allies, in the case of Israel—the options
of surprise attack, fait accompli , or a contrived pretext
for an attack.
Two of the missions had definite political purposes in
addition to important military functions. In the Tonkin
Gulf Incident, Maddox and Turner Joy had the political pur-




opposing North Vietnamese support for the guerrilla war in
the South. Stark had the political purposes of demonstrat-
ing U.S. support for the Persian Gulf states opposed to Iran
(deterring attacks on them) , and supporting the principle of
freedom of navigation in the international waters of the
Persian Gulf. These two cases clearly show the political-
military nature of military actions taken during crises.
Motives for the Attacks
The motives of the perpetrators of the attacks in most
cases cannot be ascertained with certainty, but sufficient
evidence is available to postulate reasonably plausible
motives. Two of the attacks (Tonkin Gulf and Pueblo ) were
motivated by self-defense, defense of territorial waters, or
retaliation for hostile acts believed to have involved the
ship that was attacked. However, in neither case had the
ship committed the hostile acts of which it was accused.
The other two attacks ( Liberty and Stark ) were portrayed as
accidents that resulted from mistaken identity. Although
allegations have been made to the contrary, none of these
four cases can be conclusively established as having been
deliberate unprovoked aggression against a warship known by
the attacker to belong to the United States and to be on
routine operations in international waters.
Two of the incidents (Tonkin Gulf and Pueblo ) occurred
under circumstances in which the perpetrator plausibly could
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have perceived a military threat from the U.S. ship, and
therefore have been motivated by self-defense, defense of
territorial waters, or retaliation for hostile acts believed
to have involved the ship. North Vietnam apparently per-
ceived Maddox as having participated in or supported South
Vietnamese raids that had taken place nearby immediately
before the destroyer arrived. The first attack on Maddox
was probably retaliation for those raids, intended to demon-
strate a capability to defend against them and to coerce the
122
U.S. and South Vietnam into ceasing the raids. The
attack would also have secondary political propaganda value,
by showing defiance of American strength and portraying the
U.S. as a "paper tiger" ineffective against North Vietnam.
Opinions vary widely as to North Korean motives for
seizing Pueblo . President Johnson, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, and Secretary of State Rusk believed that North
Korea sought to divert U.S. and South Korean forces from
123Vietnam on the eve of the Tet offensive. This
explanation lacks plausibility: military coordination
122Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. 420-5; Lewy, pp. 32,
36; Karnow, pp. 366, 370; Kahin, pp. 220-5; Kahin and Lewis,
pp. 156-7; Austin, pp. 201-8, 263, 334; Goulden, pp. 92-6,
79-81; Windchy, pp. 147-8, 153-4.
123Johnson, Vantage Point
, p. 535; Authorization for
Military Procurement, 1969 , p. 65; "Secretary Rusk and
Secretary of Defense McNamara Discuss Viet-Nam and Korea on
'Meet the Press'," Department of State Bulletin 58 (February
26, 1968): 262. Also see Howard H. Lentner, "The Pueblo




between North Vietnam and North Korea probably was not close
enough to permit such coordination, and North Korea had no
way of knowing that Pueblo would be off Wonsan just prior to
the Tet offensive. Press reports, quoting Pentagon
officials, speculated that North Korea seized the ship for
intelligence purposes (perhaps on behalf of the Soviets) , to
124
capture Pueblo's sensitive electronic equipment. This
also lacks plausibility: Since it was Pueblo's first mis-
sion, North Korea probably had no way of knowing that Pueblo
would be a lucrative target. James Cable has offered two
alternative interpretations of the North Korean seizure of
Pueblo ; first, that it was an impulsive, reckless act, per-
haps initiated by a relatively junior commander, or, second,
that the act was premeditated, intended to halt the surveil-
lance mission and to deter the United States from conducting
125
such missions in the future. Either of these interpreta-
tions is plausible than the previous explanations, but there
is little evidence to support either view.
The political situation on the Korean Peninsula in
early 1968 and the pattern of North Korean hostility toward
the United States suggest that Pueblo's mission probably was
perceived by the North Koreans. Pueblo , on a routine
124
"Intelligence Data Called a Goal of Ship Seizure,'
New York Times . January 26, 1968, p. 7.
125James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979 , Second
Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 52-53.
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Intelligence mission in international waters, arrived off
Wonsan in the midst of acute tensions on the Korean
Peninsula. North Korea had been pursuing an aggressive
campaign of provocations against the South, raising tensions
nearly to the crisis level, and had been warning South Korea
and the United States against violating North Korean
territorial waters. The North Koreans were spoiling for a
fight and were particularly sensitive about the presence of
U.S. aircraft and vessels off its coast. North Korea may
have misperceived Pueblo to be an immediate threat to North
Korean territory or territorial waters (perhaps landing
South Korean saboteurs or agents in retaliation for North
Korean attacks on the South) , or as a deliberate political
provocation in response to the North Korean propaganda
campaign. If North Korea indeed held such perception, then
countering the perceived threat and deterring future such
threats would have been the principle motives for seizing
126 *Pueblo . An attack on a U.S. naval vessel would also have
secondary political propaganda value: showing defiance of
American strength and portraying the U.S. as a "paper tiger
ineffective against North Korea. Thus, although attacking
and seizing a U.S. vessel off the coast of North Korea was
premeditated, Pueblo was a target of opportunity rather than
having been predesignated for seizure.
126Armbrister, pp. 27-8, 187-95; Bucher, pp. 392-3;
Goulding, pp. 295, 300; Koh, pp. 264-80.
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Two of the incidents ( Liberty and Stark ) were por-
trayed as accidents, with the nations responsible for the
attacks giving the official explanation that the attacks
were the result of mistaken identity. Israel claimed
Liberty was mistaken for the Egyptian transport El Quisir ,
and Iraq claimed Stark was mistaken for a civilian tanker
headed for an Iranian port. The U.S. Government officially
accepted the claims that the attacks were accidents, though
it denied that there were grounds for mistaken identity to
have occurred in any of the attacks.
The danger of U.S. ships accidently being caught in
the fighting was recognized in the Liberty and Stark cases,
as evidenced by the precautions that were taken. In the
Liberty case the threat of indiscriminate attacks
—
deliberate attacks launched without efforts to identify the
target—appears to have been seriously underestimated, with
the result that Liberty was inadequately protected against
such a threat. In the Stark case the rules of engagement
authorized measures to defend against indiscriminate attacks
and Middle East Force ships had been warned of the danger of
indiscriminate attacks. However, the daily contact that
Middle East Force ships had with Iraqi planes apparently
tended to make at least some of them complacent about the
threat of being attacked by the Iraqis. Thus, the threat of
indiscriminate attacks must be regarded as everpresent when
U.S. ships must operate in the vicinity of hostilities.
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Ironically, in both the Liberty and Stark cases the
attacks were carried out by the side that the U.S. favored:
Liberty by Israel and Stark by Iraq. This underscores the
danger of accidental or indiscriminate attacks in peacetime,
and warns against assuming that friendly nations can be
relied upon to avoid U.S. ships or tacitly provide them a
shield. These incidents also warn against reliance on the
imaginary lines prominently displayed on charts—the limits
of territorial waters, exclusion zones, or war zones—as
providing protection against attacks. Precise navigation is
a luxury often foregone, either deliberately or inadver-
tently, in the heat of battle.
Questions were raised in the aftermath of the attacks
on Liberty and Stark about whether they were, in fact,
accidental. The Liberty incident is by far the most
controversial of the two. Former Liberty officer James M.
Ennes claims Israel attacked Liberty to prevent it from
monitoring Israeli preparations to attack the Golan Heights,
a move the Israelis knew the United States opposed and would
127try to block. From a purely military perspective the
attack was a rational action, but the political rationale
for a deliberate attack is weak. Israel has on several
occasions shown a willingness to proceed as it sees fit
127Ennes, pp. 172-4, 187-8, 191-2, 254-63. Also see
Goulding, pp. 123-4, 136-7; Smith, p. 64; and Anthony
Pearson, Conspiracy of Silence (London: Quartet Books,
1978), pp. 105, 116-118, 163.
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regardless of U.S. pressure to the contrary. Why in this
one instance it was necessary to attack a U.S. ship rather
128
to just ignore U.S. pressure is not clear. The political
illogic of a deliberate attack is compounded by the fact
that the United States had begun a policy shift toward align-
ment with Israel, which would improve Israel's strategic
position.
There is insufficient evidence to resolve the contro-
versy over the Liberty incident. The Israelis insist to
this day that the attack was an accident, and have given an
129
elaborate scenario explaining how it occurred. One need
not believe this scenario to accept that the attack was
indiscriminate: the forces sent out to find an Egyptian ship
128Certain Israeli leaders, particularly Moshe Dayan
(Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1956 war and Defense
Minister in the 1967 war) , may have had an attitude of
"never again" toward giving in to U.S. pressure for them to
abandon their military objectives or conquered territory
after their experience in the 1956 war with Egypt. In 1956,
photographs taken by U-2 reconnaissance planes had alerted
President Eisenhower to British, French, and Israeli
military and naval moves, enabling him to exert strong
pressure on the three nations to abandon their plan to seize
the Suez Canal early in the operation. Liberty could have
been viewed by the Israelis as giving President Johnson the
same advantage in 1967. On the role of U-2s in 1956, see
Donald Neff , Warriors at Suez (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1981), pp. 333, 353; and Michael R. Breschloss, Mayday:
Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper
and Row, 1986), pp. 136-139. In an interview with the
author, Arthur C. Lundahl, Director of the CIA's National
Photographic Intelligence Center in 1956, confirmed that
U-2s had monitored the crisis.




attacked the first vessel they found without attempting to
identify it. The arguments given by Israel to support
their claim of mistaken identity (Claims that Liberty was
not flying a U.S. flag, did not have U.S. hull markings, and
was moving at over thirty knots) can be dismissed as an ef-
fort to cover a poor showing by the Israeli Defense Forces.
The Stark incident appears to be a clear-cut case of
indiscriminate attack, but allegations have been made that
it too was deliberate. Former U.S. Air Force Middle East
analyst Joseph Churba claims that Iraq deliberately attacked
the ship to provoke increased U.S. involvement in the
Persian Gulf. Of the charges raised in the three inci-
dents, this one is least plausible and least supported by
evidence. Iraq made no attempt to make the attack appear to
have been the work of Iran: the Mirage flew a flight path
In an incident strikingly similar to the Liberty
incident, the Israeli Air Force on November 2, 1956 attacked
the British frigate HMS Crane off of Sharm el Sheikh. At
the time Israel and Britain were allies. in the Suez Crisis,
and Crane was on patrol as part of their campaign against
Egypt. During the 1973 Yora Kippur War, Israeli Navy missile
boats accidently struck Greek, Japanese, and Soviet merchant
ships with Gabriel anti-ship missiles while attempting to
attack Syrian naval vessels. See Dupuy, pp. 210-211, 559.
Thus, the Israelis launched indiscriminate attacks in the
1956, 1967, and 1973 wars, apparently due to permissive
rules of engagement and lax identification requirements. In
the 1956 and 1967 wars, the Israeli Air Force appeared to be
poorly trained and organized for war at sea, particularly in
the areas of ship recognition training for pilots and
intelligence support for maritime operations.
131 " Stark was attacked by two Iraqi jets, not one,
experts say," San Diego Union , August 2, 1987, p. A14.
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to intercept Iranian shipping in the central Persian Gulf,
but released its missiles about thirty miles early. Iraqi
leaders would have had to have been extremely ill-informed
of U.S. domestic political opinion, which was sceptical of
the Navy role in the Gulf to begin with, in order to think
that such an attack—easily identified as Iraqi—would have
provoked a greater role in the Gulf. If anything, the
attack influenced the U.S. decision to delay the start of
convoying of Kuwaiti tankers.
There are two sets of motives for the Liberty and
Stark incidents: first, the motives for the attacks if they
were accidents, and, second, the motives for the attacks if
they were deliberate. The first set of motives, those for
the attacks the perpetrators claimed they had thought they
were launching, are all routine wartime reasons for
attacking ships. If the Israeli attack had been on an
Egyptian ship, rather than on Liberty , its purpose would
have been military: countering a threat to army operations
ashore. If the Iraqi attack had been on an an Iranian
tanker, rather than on Stark , its purpose would have been
political-economic: interrupting Iranian tanker shipping as
part of a campaign of economic coercion. As these two
incidents show, indiscriminate attacks are motivated by
common wartime political-military objectives.
The interesting question is why were the attacks
launched indiscriminately, rather than after positive
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identification of the target? The primary reason why
indiscriminate attacks would be preferred is military:
avoiding the risks inherent in making positive identifica-
tion of a target before attacking. This appears to have
been the motive for indiscriminate attacks in the Liberty
and Stark incidents—neither Israel nor Iraq were motivated
to identify their targets before striking. Indiscriminate
attacks could also be preferred for political reasons:
intimidation or coercion of the enemy and his supporters, or
retaliation for unrestrained attacks made by the enemy.
Given delegation of decisionmaking authority, these motives
nay come into play at low levels in the chain of command
even when national policy is one of restraint and caution.
Indiscriminate attacks are most likely when armed forces
equipped with powerful modern weapons have only rudimentary
tactical training, as in the case of Iraq, but can also
occur when well-trained forces have permissive rules of
engagement that emphasize military expediency, as in the
case of Israel.
The second set of motives for the two attacks are
those that would have prompted deliberate attacks on ships
known to have been U.S. Navy. The attack on the Stark would
have had a political motives: provoking the U.S. into
greater military intervention against Iran in the Persian
Gulf. The attack on the Liberty primarily would have had a
military motive
—
preventing surveillance of Israeli military
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activities—but could also have had the political motive of
warning the United States not to restrain Israel from
achieving its territorial objectives. Similar motives could
well prompt deliberate attacks on U.S. naval vessels in
future crises.
A wide range of military and political motives for at-
tacking ships in wartime could create tactical circumstances
in which U.S. Navy ships are indiscriminately or accidently
attacked. Indiscriminate attacks are the greatest danger.
Belligerents in a local conflict could also have motives for
deliberately attacking U.S. ships near the scene of
fighting. The fact that the U.S. Government has readily
accepted the accident explanation in the past makes it more
likely that deliberate attacks under the guise of accidents
could occur in the future.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the third phase of the research
design, a structured focused comparison of four cases in
which U.S. Navy ships were attacked during peacetime or
crisis operations. The focus will be on how the military
and naval chain of command reacted to the attacks. The
incidents that were examined were the August 1964 Tonkin
Gulf Incidents, the June 8, 1967 Israeli attack on the
intelligence collection ship USS Liberty (AGTR 5) , the
January 22, 1968 North Korean seizure of the intelligence
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collection ship USS Pueblo (AGER 2), and the May 10, 1987
Iraqi attack on the guided missile frigate USS Stark (FFG
31). Four research questions, addressing the decoupling of
stratified interactions, stratified escalation dynamics,
nisperceptions, and political-military tensions, were asked
in each of the cases.
This completes the third and final phase of the
research design. The next chapter integrates the findings
from all three phases of the research design and from them





FINDINGS AND CONTINGENT GENERALIZATIONS
To provide diagnostic power of the kind needed by
policymakers, an explanatory theory must be capable of pro-
viding explanations that discriminate among causal patterns.
That is, it must be capable of offering differentiated
explanations for a variety of crisis management and crisis
stability problems. A differentiated explanatory theory is
constructed by formulating contingent generalizations
—
regularities that occur only under certain specific condi-
tions. The objective of this study has been to identify
different causal patterns associated with variation in
crisis military interaction. For this purpose an analytic-
inductive procedure was used to analyze four historical
cases of crisis naval operations and four cases of peacetime
attacks on U.S. Navy ships. This yielded a typology of
crisis management and crisis stability problems, each linked
with a somewhat different causal pattern.
To develop the contingent generalizations, eight ques-
tions addressing specific aspects of the theory were applied
to historical cases through the method of structured focused




studies of crisis naval operations: the 1958 Taiwan Straits
Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Middle East
War, and the 1973 Middle East War. Four of the eight
questions—those addressing decoupling of interactions,
stratified escalation dynamics, misperceptions, and
political-military tensions—were also addressed in four
case studies of peacetime attacks on U.S. Navy ships: the
1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967 Israeli attack on the
USS Liberty , the 1968 North Korean seizure of the USS
Pueblo , and the 1987 Iraqi attack on the USS Stark .
The purposes of this chapter are to summarize the
findings of the eight case studies and to derive from them
contingent generalizations on crisis military interactions
and crisis stability. The first section will present the
findings on the theory of stratified interaction, including
the corollary of decoupled interactions. The second section
will present the findings on crisis stability, including the
crisis security dilemma, escalation dynamics, and mispercep-
tion. The third section will present the findings on the
three political-military tensions and their impact on crisis
management. The final section will present the contingent
generalizations on crisis military interaction.
Stratified Interaction
The first three questions addressed the conditions
necessary for stratified interaction to occur: delegated
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control, tight coupling, and acute crisis. These questions
were examined in the four case studies of crisis naval
operations.
peleqated Control
The first question is to what degree were interactions
between the forces of the two sides at the scene of the
crisis the result of actions taken in accordance with
mechanisms of indirect control, rather than direct control
by national leaders? Mechanisms of indirect control, rather
than direct control by national leaders, played the major
role in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis, but decisionmaking
authority was delegated selectively. The Eisenhower
Administration was concerned about the danger of events
getting out of control in the Taiwan Straits. To control
the risk of escalation, the President retained total control
of nuclear weapons and delegated authority to retaliate with
conventional weapons against mainland targets only under
circumstances in which the Joint Chiefs did not have time to
consult with the him prior to taking action.
Beyond this, however, United States communications
capabilities in 1958 forced employment of delegated methods
of control and heavy reliance on mechanisms of indirect con-
trol. U.S. Navy commanders in the Pacific had significant
authority to conduct operations as they saw fit—within the
policy limits set by the President and the JCS—and
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exercised that authority to its limits. The only detailed
instructions provided by the JCS concerned rules of engage-
ment and the limit on how close ships could approach Quemoy
and the mainland. Throughout the crisis Washington was ill-
informed of the status of operations currently in progress,
which precluded American leaders from exercising close
control over the operations. The overall picture that
•merges is of the Eisenhower Administration exploiting the
flexibility of the U.S. command system for crisis management
purposes
.
In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy
Administration was clearly concerned about the danger of an
incident with Soviet ships or submarines. The President and
McNamara exercised a greater degree of control over U.S.
Navy operations than had ever been attempted in the past.
However, they primarily controlled naval operations through
mechanisms of indirect control, particularly mission orders
and rules of engagement, rather than through direct
control. The President and McNamara retained authority
certain crucial decisions, particularly retaliation against
Cuban air defenses and the boarding of ships. Other than
this, however, they exercised control by negation, rather
than positive control, over Navy operations they felt were
particularly sensitive. Less sensitive operations were not
closely controlled, with methods of delegated control being
used. Presidential orders were passed via the chain of
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command and neither the President nor McNamara ever gave
orders directly to ships at sea.
In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, The Johnson Administra-
tion did not attempt to exercise direct control over the
operations of the Sixth Fleet other than its movements in
the Mediterranean. Nor did the President or McNamara make
an effort to provide specialized guidance in mechanisms of
indirect control, other than limitations on how close the
fleet and its aircraft could approach the coasts of the
belligerents. When the USS America experienced severe
Soviet harassment on June 8 the on-scene commanders were
guided by standing Navy policies for handling such
situations, rather than by special instructions from the
White House. There was thus significant delegation of
authority to on-scene commanders and the guidance contained
in Navy standing orders and standing rules of engagement
played a crucial role in determining the nature of the
tactical-level interactions that occurred.
In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Nixon Administration
did not attempt to exercise direct control over the
operations of the Sixth Fleet other than its movements in
the Mediterranean. Sixth Fleet movements, however, were
closely controlled—much closer than in the 1967 Middle East
War. Rather th^n giving the fleet boundaries on where it
was permitted to operate, as in 1967, Washington told the
fleet exactly where to operate. On the other hand, the
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President and Schlesinger did not attempt to communicate
directly with any level in the chain of command below the
JCS; orders to the Sixth Fleet were passed via normal
channels. Nor did they made an effort to provide
specialized guidance in mechanisms of delegated control. As
a result* the ships of the Sixth Fleet acted in accordance
with Navy standing orders in responding to Soviet naval
operations. There was thus significant delegation of
authority to on-scene commanders and the guidance contained
in Navy standing orders and standing rules of engagement
played a crucial role in determining the nature of the
tactical-level interactions that occurred.
In summary, the pattern observed in the four case
studies of U.S. naval operations in crises was one of direct
control being exercised selectively and to a limited
degree. Heavy reliance was placed on mechanisms of indirect
control in all four cases, although the guidance contained
in those mechanisms was not always revised to reflect the
specific circumstances of the crisis at hand. Tactical-
level military interactions rarely were under the direct
control of political-level leaders.
»
Tight Coupling
The second question is were the forces of the two
sides at the scene of the crisis tightly coupled with each
other? The forces of the two sides at the scene of the
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crisis wars tightly coupled with each other in the 1958
Taiwan Straits crisis, but their interactions were
restrained by U.S. and Chinese efforts to avoid military
clashes. Both sides appeared to have good intelligence
concerning the other side's forces and operations. The
pattern of Communist Chinese shelling suggested that they
had good intelligence on the convoys and Chinese protests of
alleged U.S. violations of their airspace and territorial
waters suggest that they were able to keep close tabs on
U.S. navy operations in the Straits. U.S. on-scene
commanders had similarly good information on Communist
military activities. The Taiwan Patrol Force maintained
intensive patrol and surveillance of the mainland coast.
However, detection of actions by the other side did not
automatically generate tactical reactions. The United
States and Communist China both took steps to prevent
clashes between their forces and those measures largely
prevented interactions from occurring. Thus, although the
Intelligence requirement for tight coupling of the two
sides' forces was met, tactical interactions tended to be
dampened by measures taken to avoid clashes.
In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the forces of the
two sides at the scene of the crisis were tightly coupled
with each other, but not as tight as might be expected given
the seriousness of the crisis. The tightest coupling was
between U.S. Navy ASW forces and Soviet submarines, followed
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closely by coupling between the Quarantine force and Soviet
merchant ships. In both cases, however, Khrushchev's
decision not to challenge the quarantine dampened the
interactions between the two sides. The Soviet submarines
were not attempting to force their way through U.S. naval
forces to get to Cuba, they were attempting to return home
unmolested. The only Soviet ships that approached the
quarantine line were those that the U.S. would have no
reason to take into custody. Interactions between U.S. and
Cuban forces were also dampened by the efforts that leaders
on both sides made to avoid provocations. In this regard
the Cuban Missile Crisis was similar to the 1958 Taiwan
Strait Crisis: although significant U.S. forces were
operating in close proximity to the adversary's forces,
tactical-level interactions were dampened by the caution and
restraint shown by both sides.
Soviet and American naval forces in the Mediterranean
were tightly coupled during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Soviet tattletales closely monitored the Sixth Fleet, U.S.
aircraft closely monitored the Soviet Mediterranean Squad-
ron, and U.S. ships and planes searched for and trailed
Soviet submarines. Each side reacted to actions taken by
the other side.
Soviet tattletales and aircraft closely monitored the
Sixth Fleet, and U.S. ships and aircraft closely monitored
the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron during the 1973
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Arab-Israeli War. The Soviets quickly responded to changes
in Sixth Fleet operations, keeping every U.S. carrier in the
•astern Mediterranean targeted with anti-ship missiles.
Similarly, the Sixth Fleet quickly reacted to changes in
Soviet naval operations, keeping Soviet ships that were an
immediate threat to the carriers in the sights of U.S. ships
or planes. Thus, Soviet and American forces were tightly
coupled during the crisis—much more tightly than they had
been in any previous Soviet-American crisis.
In summary, naval forces at the scene of the crisis
were tightly coupled in all four of the crisis naval
operations case studies. However, the tightness of coupling
between the forces of the two sides can vary significantly
from crisis to crisis and over time within a particular
crisis. Tactical-level military commanders have independent
access to intelligence and surveillance information on
adversary forces, and thus are not dependent on political-
level decisionmakers for information on the adversary. As
would be expected under conditions of tight coupling, naval
forces tend to react quickly to changes in the other side's
operations, seeking to maintain or improve their tactical
position in the event of hostilities. However, this tight
action-reaction linkage can be dampened by measures intended
to avoid incidents between the two side's forces, such as
geographic separation and a deliberately low tempo of




Political Use of Force
The third question is were the forces of the two sides
being used by their national leaders to convey political
signals in support of crisis bargaining? Both Communist
China and the United States used their military forces for
political purposes in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis.
Communist China was conducting a limited probe of an
ambiguous American commitment to the offshore islands, and
exerting carefully controlled pressure on the Nationalists
and the United States. The United States responded by
accepting a test of capabilities under the ground rules
established by the Chinese Communists, backed by a massive
concentration of naval and air power in the Straits to
convey a strong deterrent threat. Faced with a choice
between escalating the confrontation or accepting an
unfavorable outcome, the Chinese backed down and salvaged as
much as they could politically.
In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the forces of the
two sides were used by their national leaders as a political
instrument. President Kennedy clearly was using the U.S.
armed forces to convey political signals to Khrushchev
during the crisis. The President and McNamara actively
sought out ways to reinforce the signals being sent to the
Soviets, such as by modifying Navy ASW procedures to support
the political objectives of the quarantine. Khrushchev, on
the other hand, may have used military forces for political
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signalling/ but did not do so as clearly as President
Kennedy. Khrushchev was probably avoiding signals of
hostile intent by not placing Soviet forces at full alert,
recalling freighters carrying arms, and recalling the three
submarines in the Atlantic. However, there is insufficient
evidence to establish this conclusively. Shooting down an
American U-2 over Cuba on October 27 certainly sent the
wrong signal to the United States, but this action may not
have been authorized in the Kremlin. Cuba placed its armed
forces on alert, but avoided provocatory actions during the
crisis. This was probably intended to avoid giving the
United States a pretext for invading the island. Thus, all
three of the participants in the crisis used their military
forces for political signalling.
The United States and the Soviet Union used their
naval forces for political signalling in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War. The Johnson Administration used the Sixth
Fleet to signal the U.S. intention not to intervene in the
crisis, but also used the fleet to warn the Soviets against
direct military intervention in the conflict. The Soviet
Union also conveyed political signals by rapidly building up
its Mediterranean Squadron, shadowing the Sixth Fleet, and
keeping the bulk of the squadron well clear of the fighting
and the Sixth Fleet. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was the
first crisis in which both superpowers actively used their
navies for political signalling.
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Both the United States and the Soviet Union used their
naval forces as a political instrument during the 1973 Arab'
Israeli War. It is clear that the United States used the
Sixth Fleet for political signaling. That the Soviets
received the signals being sent with the Sixth Fleet is
indicated by the note the Soviets sent on October 12, 1973,
protesting the movement of the U.S. fleet into the eastern
Mediterranean. The Soviet Union used its Mediterranean
Squadron for political signaling, and it is clear that U.S.
leaders received the Soviet signals. The Soviet naval
actions that sent the strongest signals were reinforcement
of the Mediterranean Squadron, which almost doubled in
numbers of ships and quadrupled in firepower, trailing of
Sixth Fleet task groups, keeping the bulk of the Squadron
well clear of the fighting ashore, and conducting an anti-
carrier exercise from October 26 to November 3.
In summary, naval forces were used by both sides for
political signalling or related political functions in all
four of the case studies on crisis naval operations. Use of
naval forces for political purposes can bring naval units of
the two sides in a crisis into close proximity, creating a
danger of military incidents.
Stratified Interaction
The answers to these first three questions suggest




in all four of the crises. In the 1958 Taiwan Straits
Crisis, the United States relied on methods of delegated
control, U.S. and Chinese Communist military forces were
tightly coupled, and both sides used their forces as a
political instrument under conditions of acute crisis.
Interactions occurred at the tactical level that were not
directly controlled by American leaders. The findings of
this case suggest, however, that stratification is not an
absolute concept—there can be degrees of stratification.
Measures taken by both sides to prevent confrontations
between their forces can greatly reduce opportunities for
tactical-level interaction to occur.
Although the President sought to maintain close
control of military operations 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, he
relied heavily on methods of delegated control and
communications problems constrained his ability to
effectively exercise direct control. In certain operations
there was tight coupling between the forces of the two
sides. Both sides used their forces as a political
instrument under conditions of acute crisis. Interactions
occurred at the tactical level that were not directly
controlled by American leaders. The President did not
directly control any of the anti-submarine warfare
operations or the boarding of the Marucla (other than to
order it to occur) . Navy forces encountered Cuban air and
naval forces on several occasions without the President or
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McNamara controlling the interactions. The President's
attention was focused on a very small portion of the overall
operations that were in progress. The stratified inter*
action model offers a good description of Soviet-American
interactions in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the United States relied
on methods of delegated control, U.S. and Soviet naval
forces in the Mediterranean were tightly coupled, and both
•ides used their forces as a political instrument under
conditions of conditions of acute crisis. Interactions
occurred at the tactical level that were not directly
controlled by American leaders. For example, President
Johnson had no control over whether or not the Soviet
harassment of America on June 8 would produce a clash
between the U.S. and Soviet navies. The stratified
interaction model of international crises, in which
interactions evolve in separate, semi-independent sequences
at the political, strategic, and tactical levels, offers a
good description of Soviet-American interactions in the 1967
Arab-Israeli War.
In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States relied
on methods of delegated control, U.S. and Soviet naval
forces in the Mediterranean were tightly coupled, and both
sides used their forces as political instruments under
conditions of acute crisis. Significant and dangerous
interactions occurred at the tactical level that were not
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directly controlled by American leaders. For example,
President Nixon had no direct control over Sixth Fleet
counter-targeting of Soviet ships carrying anti-ship cruise
missiles, and was probably unaware that this activity had
inadvertently been set in motion by White House orders
making the fleet an easy target for the Soviet Navy.
Decoupled Interactions
The fourth question is did crisis interactions at the
tactical level become decoupled from the strategy being
pursued by national leaders? There are seven potential
causes of decoupling: communications and information flow
problems, impairment of political-level decisionmaking, a
fast-paced tactical environment, ambiguous or ambivalent
orders, tactically inappropriate orders, inappropriate
guidance in mechanisms of indirect control, and deliberate
unauthorized actions by military commanders. To establish
that stratified interactions became decoupled in a crisis
requires two findings: first, that one of the seven condi-
tions just mentioned was present, creating conditions for
decoupling, and, second, that operational decisions made by
tactical-level decisionmakers differed from the decisions
that political-level decisionmakers would have made in order
to coordinated those actions with their political-diplomatic
strategy for resolving the crisis. Decoupled interactions
were examined in all eight case studies.

980
There were instances of tactical-level interactions
becoming decoupled from the crisis management strategy being
pursued by U.S. leaders in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis.
Three of the potential causes of decoupling arose on the
American side in the crisis: communications problems, a
fast-paced tactical environment, and ambiguous orders.
Communications between Washington and the Far East were slow
and cumbersome. When the President suspended convoy escort
operations on October 6 in response to the Communist
unilateral ceasefire announcement, the order was not
received by Commander Taiwan Patrol Force until after two
more Nationalist convoys had been escorted on October 7. As
it turned out, the extra day of escort operations did not
adversely affect U.S. efforts to resolve the crisis, but it
could have had a much more serious impact—the Chinese
Communists had made the ceasefire contingent on the U.S. not
escorting Nationalist convoys. This was the most serious
instance of decoupling in the crisis.
The impact of a fast-paced tactical environment and
ambiguous orders were most apparent on August 24, the first
full day of the crisis. It would be August 26 before the on-
scene commanders received the first JCS directive on the
crisis, but they had to respond immediately to a Communist
Chinese threat of unknown proportions. In the early hours
of the crisis it was not clear whether the Communists
intended to attack Taiwan, invade Quemoy or neighboring
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islands, or just harass the offshore islands with artillery
fire. The Nationalists were appealing for assistance to
repel an invasion of one of the islands. Compounding the
control problems created by this rapidly evolving situation
was the ambiguous Eisenhower Administration policy toward
defense of the offshore islands. U.S. military commanders
in the Pacific had sought clarification on the offshore
islands earlier in August as tensions rose in the Straits,
but the President was unwilling to state a definitive policy
until September 6. On-scene commanders had ample authority
to take military action under the terms of the defense
treaty with the Nationalists and the Formosa Resolution if
Taiwan were threatened, but initially had no specific
guidance on the offshore islands. Left to their own
devices, the on-scene commanders took actions on August 24
and 25—sending U.S. destroyers to the assistance of
Nationalist forces defending the offshore islands—that the
President may not have authorized had he been able to make
the decisions himself. This is another potential example of
decoupling during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis.
Despite the vast scale of operations that were
conducted and the intensity of the interactions that took
place during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, decoupling was
relatively rare. There were no serious instances of
decoupling involving naval forces. The potential cause of
decoupling that was most prominent in the crisis was
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communications problems. Despite the advances that had been
made in communications technology, the effort to exercise
close control over large-scale operations seriously
overloaded and degraded U.S. communications systems. These
communications problems did not cause serious decoupling
because only a very small portion of U.S. forces were in
contact with adversary forces and because attention had been
paid to the guidance contained mechanisms of indirect
control, so that U.S. forces would act as the President
desired when he could not control their actions.
The second potential cause of decoupling, a fast-paced
tactical environment, was not a major problem during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. There were no fast-paced engage-
ments. Anti-submarine warfare operations—the most
dangerous Soviet-American tactical interactions during the
crisis—were particularly slow and tedious, providing ample
opportunity for disengagement. Similarly, the intercept and
boarding of merchant ships takes place at a leisurely pace
and is relatively easy to control. Fast-paced engagements,
such as air combat and sea battles fought with tactical
aircraft and cruise missiles, never arose. This appears to
have been a key factor in the success of the President's
crisis management efforts—opening with operations that were
Inherently slow-paced. The President probably knew
intuitively that this was an advantage of a blockade, but it
was not an explicit consideration in the decision.
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In the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy and
Secretary of Defense HcNamara also sought to avoid three of
the other potential causes' of decoupling: ambiguous or
ambivalent orders, tactically inappropriate orders, and
inappropriate guidance in mechanisms of indirect control.
This is a striking contrast with the 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis, when the Navy did not have clear guidance on whether
or not it could defend the off-shore islands when the crisis
erupted. By tailoring certain key guidance contained in
mission orders and rules of engagement to support the
President's political objectives, the President and McNamara
avoided the problem of inappropriate guidance in mechanisms
of indirect control. McNamara did not attempt to rewrite
Navy tactical doctrine, but did impose certain requirements
and limitations on the Navy. The most important innovation,
the special submarine surfacing signals, were devised in
conjunction with the Navy. By not attempting to exercise
positive direct control of operations while they were in
progress, the President and McNamara largely avoided the
problem of tactically inappropriate orders. The method of
control they used—control by negation—only required that
orders be given if a Navy commander embarked on a course of
action that they opposed.
The final potential cause of decoupling—unauthorized
actions by military commanders—did not occur during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy was aware, at least
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in general terms, of Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
operations. He had been briefed on and approved quarantine
plans that directed the Navy to surface and identify Soviet
submarines, and authorized use of force, if necessary, to
prevent Soviet submarines from reaching Cuba without being
inspected for offensive weapons. McNamara received detailed
briefings on Navy operations, including ASW operations, at
least once daily in Flag Plot and received frequent situa-
tion reports in between briefings. McNamara* s knowledge of
Navy ASW procedures was detailed enough to know that the
Navy would need to develop special procedures for signalling
submarines to surface for identification. Navy ASW forces
strictly complied with the special submarine and surfacing
procedures. No Soviet submarines were depth charged. No
unauthorized actions occurred despite the resentment many
senior Navy officers felt against the close attention that
the President and McNamara paid to naval operations.
Two of the potential causes of decoupling—communica-
tions problems and a fast-paced tactical environment—were
present in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, but there were no
serious instances of decoupling. The U.S. communications
system did not permit the President to exercise real-time
direct control over the Sixth Fleet. Due to geographic
distance, President Johnson's ability to communicate
directly with the Sixth Fleet in 1967 was less than
President Kennedy's ability to communicate directly with the
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Second Fleet in 1962. A second potential cause of
decoupling—a fast-paced tactical environment—was also
present during some periods of the crisis. In spite of
these factors, divergence of tactical-level military opera-
tions from political-level objectives was not a serious
problem during the crisis. Although on-scene commanders
often made operational decisions on their own authority,
their decisions generally supported the President's
political objectives. The response of Navy on-scene
commanders to Soviet harassment on June 8 may have been an
instance of tactical-level military operations diverging
from political-level objectives, but there is no evidence
that the President disapproved of how they handled the
situation. The overall pattern, therefore, was one of
parallel stratified interactions: interactions the President
did not control, but which supported his political
objectives.
Four of the potential causes of decoupling were
present in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War: communications and
information flow problems, impairment of political-level
decisionmaking, a fast-paced tactical environment, and
tactically inappropriate orders. The U.S. communications
system provided much faster and more reliable communications
in 1973 than it had in 1967, but still did not permit the
President to exercise real-time direct control over the
Sixth Fleet. Impairment of political-level decisionmaking
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was at least a minor factor in the crisis. President Nixon
was in the midst of the Watergate scandal and the resigna-
tion of Vice President Spiro Agnew. Although President
Nixon reportedly made key decisions himself and was kept
informed of major developments in the crisis, he clearly did
not exercise close, detailed control over U.S. actions in
the crisis.
The tactical environment in the Mediterranean was fast-
paced during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The White House did
not directly control the actions of the Sixth Fleet and
available accounts suggest that Nixon and Kissinger were
unaware of the intensity of the naval interactions that were
occurring. Sixth Fleet efforts to counter the Soviet anti-
ship missile threat required frequent tactical decisions as
Soviet ships maneuvered to keep the U.S. carriers targeted.
This intense maneuvering for tactical advantage was too fast-
paced for the White House to be able to effectively control
it. The same situation could well have existed for the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, which was constantly targeted
at point blank range by U.S. warships and attack aircraft.
Tactically inappropriate orders were a major factor in
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and may have led to decoupling.
To ensure that the Sixth Fleet sent only the desired
political signals, the White House ordered the fleet to
remain in small, fixed operating areas. This made the U.S.
fleet extremely vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive strike.
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The on-scene commanders—acting on their own initiative and
well within their delegated authority—sought to reduce
their vulnerability by counter-targeting the most
threatening Soviet naval units. Tight direct control of
Sixth Fleet movements by the White House thus generated
tactically inappropriate orders.
The factors listed above may have led to decoupling of
tactical-level interactions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War. The Sixth Fleet was moved to south of Crete in order
to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the United States
was prepared for any contingency, but had no aggressive
intent and was not preparing to take an active part in the
conflict. Sixth Fleet movements of October 25 were intended
to deter escalation of the conflict—specifically, Soviet
intervention in Egypt with airborne forces—but the fleet
was restrained in order to avoid signalling excessive
hostility or an intention to intervene directly in the
conflict. Given these political signalling objectives, it
is not clear that the White House would have viewed Sixth
Fleet preparations for preemptive strikes against the Soviet
navy
—
preparations the Soviets were well aware of—as
supporting the U.S. strategy for managing the crisis or as
sending the political signals it wanted sent to the Soviet
Union. There may well have been tactical-level interactions
between U.S. and Soviet naval forces that complicated
management of the crisis.
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At least two of the potential causes of decoupled
interactions were present during the August 2 and 4, 1364,
Tonkin Gulf Incidents: communications and information flow
problems, and a fast-paced tactical environment. Although
the technical capacity to do so may have existed, the
Defense Department and Navy communication systems were not
configured to enable Washington to speak directly to ships
at sea in the Far East. Officials in Washington spent hours
bombarding Navy commanders in the Pacific with demands for
more information on the second incident before they felt
they had sufficient information on which to base the
decision to retaliate. The President and the Secretary of
Defense were thus unable to control U.S. Navy operations in
the Tonkin Gulf while the incidents were in progress.
Although conditions for decoupling were present in the
1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the operational decisions made
by tactical-level commanders did not diverge from the
political-military objectives of political-level leaders.
The on-scene commander acted with caution to avoid encoun-
ters with North Vietnamese forces while conducting the
surveillance mission, and Commander Seventh Fleet ordered
the engagements on August 2 and 4 halted as soon as the U.S.
ships were out of danger. Military commanders and political
leaders were in agreement that North Vietnamese attacks on
U.S. ships warranted retaliatory air strikes, and that the
Desoto patrol should be resumed after the incidents in order
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to assert freedom of the seas. Interestingly, the on-scene
commander had the greatest doubt that there had been a North
Vietnamese attack on August 4 and cautioned against a hasty
reaction. The pattern in the two incidents was one of
momentary decoupling followed by tactical-level escalation
and disengagement. On-scene commanders, acting on their own
authority under guidance contained in the rules of engage-
ment, used limited force in response to apparent imminent
attacks. They were not required to request—and did not
seek
—
permission from higher authority to use force in self-
defense. Once the immediate threat had been countered and
the destroyers were out of danger, the on-scene commanders
halted the engagements—again on their own authority and
without guidance from higher in the chain of command.
At least two of the potential causes of decoupled
interactions were present during the Liberty incident:
communications and information flow problems, and a fast-
paced tactical environment. Although these factors
prevented political-level leaders from exercising direct
control over Sixth Fleet actions, decoupling did not occur.
The actions ordered by Commander Sixth Fleet were restrained
and anticipated the desires of top-level officials in
Washington. Commander Sixth Fleet carefully spelled out
rules of engagement intended to avoid unnecessary incidents
while defending Liberty . Thus, although interactions were
stratified during the incident—evolving independently at
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the political and tactical levels—they were not decoupled.
The pattern was one of parallel stratified interactions:
tactical-level military actions that support the crisis
management objectives of national leaders even though not
under the direct control of those leaders.
One of the potential causes of decoupled interactions
was present in the Pueblo incident and played an major role
in how the incident developed: communications and informa-
tion flow problems. Emergency messages from Pueblo required
over an hour to reach Washington and U.S. military comman-
ders in the Pacific. On the other hand, although U.S.
military commanders had authority to take military action in
support of Pueblo , they decided not to do so. President
Johnson was not confronted with having to halt combat
operations or approve them after the fact because none were
initiated. U.S. commanders in the Far East had already come
to the conclusion that there were no effective military
actions that could be taken to rescue Pueblo without
needlessly endangering the crew. Therefore, although the
President did not have direct control over the initial
response to the North Korean attack on Pueblo , U.S. foroes
acted essentially as he would have wanted them to act under
the circumstances. This pattern is one of parallel
stratified interactions: tactical level interactions that
are not controlled by national leaders, but which support




There was no decoupling of tactical-level interactions
in the Stark incident. The attack lasted only a few minutes
and was over before any other units could employ their
weapons in support of Stark , The identity of the attacking
aircraft was known well before the attack, and military
commanders at the scene quickly concluded that the attack
had been inadvertent. No U.S. forces were in a position to
shoot down the Iraqi plane. The only sense in which actions
at the tactical level failed to support national policy was
that Stark failed to take defensive actions authorized under
the rules of engagement.
In summary, various potential causes of decoupling
were present in all eight of the cases examined in this
study. The most common cause of decoupling was communica-
tions problems or properly functioning communications that
are simply too slow to permit direct control of military
operations. This was a factor in all eight of the cases.
The second most common cause of decoupling was a fast-paced
tactical environment. This was a factor in the 1958 Taiwan
Straits Crisis, the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Liberty incident, and the 1973
Arab-Israeli War. Ambiguous orders were a factor in the
1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis and tactically inappropriate or-
ders were a factor in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Impairment




Three patterns of tactical-level interactions were
seen in the eight cases. The most common pattern was
parallel stratified interactions: tactical-level interac-
tions that were not directly controlled by political-level
leaders, but which generally supported their political objec-
tives and crisis management strategy. Parallel stratified
interactions were seen in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the
1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Liberty incident, the 1968
Pueblo incident, and the 1987 Stark incident.
The second pattern was momentary decoupling: tactical-
level interaction that was not controlled by political-level
leaders and did not support their political and crisis
management objectives, followed by immediate disengagement
(that is, without tactical-level escalation and often
without shots being fired) . The pattern between instances
of momentary decoupling is parallel stratified interac-
tions. Momentary decoupling was seen in the 1958 Taiwan
Straits Crisis, and possibly in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
The third pattern was decoupling followed by disengage-
ment* In this pattern, a tactical-level incident occurs
that is not directly controlled by political-level leaders
and does not support their political objectives. The
incident leads to an armed clash, but then halts at the
initiative of on-scene commanders without intervention by
political-level authorities. Decoupling followed by




Crisis stability exists to the extent that neither
side has an incentive to strike the first military blow.
The crisis security dilemma is that, in a crisis, many of
the actions a state takes to increase its security and
improve its bargaining position decrease the security of the
adversary. The stratified crisis security dilemma is that,
in a crisis, the security dilemma is stratified, arising
from the interaction processes occurring separately at each
of the three levels, and affecting the likelihood of war
separately at each level. This in turn leads to the concept
of stratified escalation dynamics: in a crisis in which
interaction between the two sides has become stratified and
decoupled, the security dilemma, operating separately at
each level of interaction, can trigger an escalatory spiral
at the tactical level, which under certain circumstances can
cause the crisis to escalate uncontrollably to war.
Stratified Crisis Stability .
The fifth question is did national leaders and on-
scene commanders hold different perceptions of the vulner-
ability of on-scene forces to preemption and the need to
strike first in the event of an armed clash? This question
addresses the second corollary to the theory of stratified
interaction, that the security dilemma can become stratified
in crises. The implication of this is that decision-makers
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at the political and tactical levels can hold different
perceptions of the offense-defense balance, vulnerability to
preemption, and the need to strike first.
National leaders and on-scene commanders holding dif-
ferent threat perceptions appears not to have been a serious
problem in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. The entire chain
of command, from the President down to commanding officers
at sea in the Straits, appear to have been aware of the
danger of incidents with Communist Chinese forces. The
emphasis in JCS operational directives was on avoiding
clashes with the Communists, and on-scene commanders took
similar measures on their own initiative. These actions
largely prevented U.S. forces from operating in the sights
of Communist guns, thus reducing their vulnerability to
preemption by the Communists. Although some U.S. commanders
in the Far East wanted to take more vigorous action against
Communist China, they did not perceive a significantly
greater threat to U.S. forces than did officials in
Washington. Thus, the security dilemma was not stratified.
There were instances in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
of national leaders and on-scene commanders holding
different threat perceptions, but this did not create
aerious crisis management problems. Although the JCS
remained committed to the air strike option as its preferred
course of action until Khrushchev agreed on October 28 to
remove Soviet offensive missiles from Cuba, this does not
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reflect differences in threat perceptions. Rather, it
reflects differences of opinion over whether or not the
quarantine would be sufficient to compel Khrushchev to
remove the missiles that were already in Cuba. Even
President Kennedy was skeptical that it would work, but
decided to give it a try before resorting to force. The
primary area in which there appear to have been stratified
threat perceptions, that is, on-scene commanders at the
tactical level holding threat perceptions different from
those held by decisionmakers at the political level, was in
the area of ASW. Navy commanders at sea were more concerned
about the Soviet submarine threat than were senior military
and civilian leaders in Washington. However, the
differences were not extreme and the President and McNamara
were also concerned about the Soviet submarine threat.
There was recognition at all levels that for several
reasons, including that fact that submarines were to be
stopped and boarded under the quarantine, the Navy would
have to conduct intense ASW operations.
The one other area in which threat perceptions were
stratified was the Cuban air and naval threat to U.S. Navy
ships. Navy commanders were particularly concerned about
the threat from Cuban Komar missile boats. There is little
mention of this threat in available EXCOMM records.
Perceptions of the threat from Cuban aircraft were mixed,
not following any pattern, and were not stratified.
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Zn the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, threat perceptions were
not acute at any level of the chain of command and officials
in Washington appear to have been more concerned about the
Soviet naval threat to the Sixth Fleet than were the on-
scene commanders. Threat perceptions and the security
dilemma thus were not stratified during the crisis.
During the first week of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,
U.S. Navy on-scene commanders were relatively unconcerned
about the Soviet naval threat because the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron essentially continued normal
peacetime operations. From October 14 onward, however, the
tactical situation changed dramatically for the worse. U.S.
Navy on-scene commanders in the Mediterranean were highly
concerned about the threat of a Soviet preemptive attack due
to the untenable tactical position in which the Sixth Fleet
had peen placed by White House restrictions on the fleet's
movements. Soviet ships and submarines armed with anti-ship
missiles were constantly within range of the U.S. carriers
while they were in the eastern Mediterranean. On-scene
commanders perceived the threat of preemptive attack to be
particularly acute during the October 26-30 period due to
intense Soviet anti-carrier exercises directed against the
Sixth Fleet. The period of this Soviet exercise could well
have been the closest that the Soviet Union and the United
States have ever been to "hair trigger" readiness for war
—
at least at the tactical level.
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Civilian officials appear to have held threat percep-
tions much different from those held by U.S. Navy officers
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Henry Kissinger, in
particular, did not perceive a threat from the Soviet Navy
during the crisis , and was either unaware of the Soviet anti-
carrier exercise or did not understand the threat it
represented to the Sixth Fleet. This suggests a divergence
of threat perceptions between civilian and military
officials: The Navy chain of command from the JCS Chairman
down to the carrier Commanding Officers perceived a serious .
threat from Soviet anti-carrier operations, while civilian
officials did not perceive a threat to the Sixth Fleet.
Thus, stratified threat perceptions did arise between
civilian and military officials at the top of the chain of
command
.
Part of the reason why civilian officials held much
different threat perceptions than those held by military
officials in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was that the Navy
chain of command was not kept informed of the political and
diplomatic aspects of the crisis. The on-scene commander
lacked important information on the political context of the
crisis and had to interpret Soviet behavior on the basis of
the military and naval moves being made by Soviet forces.
It is not surprising, there-fore, that Soviet naval opera-
tions in the Mediterranean appeared much more threatening to
the Navy chain of command than they did to Kissinger.
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The security dilemma appears to have been stratified
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. At the political level of
interaction, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
had an incentive to launch a preemptive first strike against
the other. Both sides desired to prevent the crisis from
escalating to war. Military and naval moves, including the
U.S. DEFCON 3 alert, were taken primarily for political pur-
poses. At the tactical level of interaction, however, U.S.
and Soviet naval forces had strong incentives to strike
first and were actively targeting each other. U.S. Navy on-
scene commanders were seriously concerned about the threat
of a Soviet preemptive attack due to Soviet anti-carrier
operations. Soviet Navy commanders must have shared similar
concerns due to U.S. counter-targeting of their major
combatants. The security dilemma was thus stratified—mild
at the political level, but acute at the tactical level.
In summary, threat perceptions were stratified in the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Stratified threat perceptions did not cause crisis
management problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but did
cause problems in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The crisis
security dilemma was stratified in the in the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War: at the political level of interaction there
was little incentive for either side to launch a preemptive
first strike, but at the tactical level naval forces had
strong incentives to strike first and were actively
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targeting each other. A number of incidents could have
triggered an inadvertent naval battle in the Mediterranean
that U.S. and Soviet leaders might not have been able to
control until the initial engagements were over.
Escalation Dynamics
The sixth question is, when tactical-level interac-
tions become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation
dynamics from occurring at the tactical level and being
transmitted upward to the strategic and political levels of
interaction? This question addresses the third corollary to
the theory of stratified interaction, that escalation
dynamics can be stratified in a crisis. Although escalation
dynamics cannot be addressed directly—none of the cases
escalated to war—research was done to identify escalation-
inhibiting factors and conditions that can cause those
factors to break down.
When decoupling occurred in the 1958 Taiwan Straits
Crisis, it did not produce tactical-level escalation.
Instead, interactions remained at a relatively low intensity
and when U.S. and Communist forces did come in contact, they
quickly disengaged. There appear to have been two reasons
for this. First, U.S. on-scene commanders exercised caution
in the absence of guidance from higher authority. For
example. Commander Taiwan Defense Command and Commander
Taiwan Patrol Force initially ordered ships to remain twelve
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miles from the mainland and aircraft to remain twenty miles
from the mainland—a policy more restrictive than that
approved by the President later. This tactical-level
prudence compensated for lack of operational guidance when
decoupling occurred, preventing escalation even when actions
took place that the President had not ordered.
The second factor inhibiting escalation in the 1958
Taiwan straits Crisis was that both sides took steps to
avoid military clashes and adhered to tacit ground rules for
a test of capabilities between their forces. Those ground
rules included no Communist attacks on U.S. forces, no U.S.
attacks on Chinese forces except in self-defense (and
defense of Nationalist forces in international airspace or
waters), and no U.S. attacks on the Chinese mainland. By
1958 the United States and Communist China had evolved tacit
rules of crisis behavior, and those rules contributed to
preventing escalation.
Three escalation-inhibiting factors were present in
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The first was caution and
prudence on the part of U.S., Soviet, and Cuban leaders
during the crisis. President Kennedy's decision to open
with relatively slow-paced naval operations, Khrushchev's
early decision not to challenge the quarantine, and Castro's
decision not to provoke the United States were the factors
that determined the nature of the tactical-level interac-
tions. Escalation was avoided by the tactical environment
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having been structured in such a manner as to prevent
clashes from occurring. Although this was what President
Kennedy had in mind when he selected the quarantine over
other military options, the outcome was due to decisions
made in Moscow and Havana as well as in Washington.
The second escalation-inhibiting factor in the Cuban
Missile Crisis was compliance by on-scene military
commanders with the guidance contained in mechanisms of
indirect control. There was immediate disengagement in the
one instance that weapons were fired at a U.S. Navy unit:
When Cuban anti-aircraft guns fired at Navy reconnaissance
jets on October 27 , the unarmed Navy planes simply left the
area. The fact that no effort was made by on-scene comman-
ders to strike at Cuban air defenses marks compliance with
the requirement that the President approve retaliatory
attacks. Navy ASW forces trailed Soviet sub-marines for
days without escalation by either side. The special ASW
procedures specified by McNamara were used as he had in-
tended. There were no instances of naval forces conducting
unauthorized operations or using weapons in violation of the
rules of engagement.
The third escalation-inhibiting factor in the Cuban
Missile Crisis was communication between Soviet and American
leaders. The need for communication between the two sides
is well established in the crisis management literature.
Formal and informal messages were used to clarify
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intentions, express concern over incidents, and defuse
situations that might otherwise have generated even greater
tensions between the two sides. Military moves were not the
only means of signalling intentions available to President
Kennedy, he had several other channels for delivering formal
and informal messages to Khrushchev. Because Kennedy and
Khrushchev were exchanging communications frequently during
the crisis, they could wait, send a protest, and assess the
implications of an isolated incident, rather than immediate-
ly reacting to it. These communications were not perfect,
but the availability of formal and informal communications
channels between the two superpowers appears to have
moderated the use of military forces for political signaling
by allowing diplomatic rather than military responses to
military incidents.
Although there were intense tactical-level interac-
tions between U.S. and Soviet naval forces during the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, there were no cases of those interactions
generating an escalation sequence that the President could
not control. Four escalation-inhibiting factors appear to
account for this. The first factor was caution on the part
of U.S. leaders in the restrictions they placed on Sixth
Fleet movements and caution on the part of U.S. naval comman-
ders in the Mediterranean when potentially serious incidents
did occur. The most dangerous interactions took place on




escorts. This interaction sequence did escalate, in the
sense that a second Soviet ship joined the harassment on the
second day, but did not escalate to violence. There were no
collisions and no shots were fired. Although naval comman-
ders on both sides were determined not to be intimidated,
they were cautious to avoid collisions.
The second factor inhibiting escalation in the 1967
Arab-Israeli War was that the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
generally behaved in a cautious and circumspect manner.
Soviet caution was an important factor in the lack of
escalation during particularly intense interactions at sea.
U.S. Navy commanders could tolerate a certain amount of
indiscretion by individual Soviet ships because it clearly
was not part of a pattern of harassment and did not appear
to presage a Soviet preemptive attack. Thus, while Soviet
efforts to show caution around the Sixth Fleet were not
entirely successful in preventing tensions from arising,
they did help to prevent serious incidents from occurring.
The third factor inhibiting escalation in the 1967
Arab-Israeli War was the tight coupling between U.S. and
Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. Overall, this was
beneficial for crisis management because the signal the
United States and Soviet Union were sending with their
fleets was one of non-involvement in the hostilities. Thus,
although tight coupling is generally perceived as increasing
the danger of escalation in crises, it can also reduce the
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likelihood of escalation when both sides are attempting to
avoid involvement in a local conflict.
The fourth factor inhibiting escalation in the 1967
Arab-Israeli War was use of the Soviet-American hot line.
Both sides used the hot line to express concerns, give
warnings , and avoid misperceptions. The hot line wa3 thus
used to dampen the potential negative effects of tight
coupling between U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the
Mediterranean. Ironically, while tight coupling of the
naval forces in the Mediterranean increased the need for the
hot line, it also increased the effectiveness of the hot
line as a means for conveying political messages. Soviet
and American leaders could verify the veracity of statements
Bade by the other side by comparing them with reports on the
other side's naval operations. The essential requirement
for this synergistic relationship to exist was careful
coordination of naval operations with political objectives
and diplomatic initiatives. The United States and the
Soviet Union were largely successful in achieving such
coordination.
There were intense tactical-level interactions during
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, but no instances of the inter-
actions generating an escalation sequence. The most
dangerous inter-actions occurred during the Soviet anti-
carrier exercise (October 25-30) , but they did not escalate
to violence. Although each side was constantly targeting
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the other and both sides were ready to instantly launch
preemptive attacks, no weapons were fired during the
crisis. Three factors appear to have inhibited escalation
during the crisis. First, neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union wanted to intervene militarily in the war if
they could possible avoid it, largely out of concern for an
armed clash with the other superpower. Therefore they both
acted cautiously with their military and naval forces,
avoiding situations that could inadvertently involve them in
the fighting and, with one exception, avoiding actions that
were unnecessarily provocative. The only exception to this
pattern was the Soviet anti-carrier exercise that commenced
on October 26—an action much different from Soviet behavior
throughout the rest of the crisis. Thus, while the overall
pattern of Soviet military behavior was one of restraint,
the Soviets were willing to engage in certain highly
provocative activities.
The second factor inhibiting escalation in the 1973
Arab-Israeli War was that the United States and the Soviet
Union communicated with each other frequently during the
crisis. This helped to prevent the problem of ambiguous
political signals, which can cause intentions and objectives
to be misperceived. Soviet warnings to the United States on
October 24 that it was prepared to intervene unilaterally in
the Middle East if Israel did not respect the U.N. ceasefire
were particularly important for avoiding a clash between the
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superpowers. Although that warning prompted the most
intense superpower tensions of the crisis, including the
U.S, worldwide DEFCON 3 alert, the situation could well have
been much worse if the United States and the Soviet Union
had not been in direct communication. The superpowers
probably would have had great difficulty interpreting the
political significance of each other's military moves on
October 24 and 25 had they not been able to express their
interests and concerns to each other.
The third factor inhibiting escalation in the 1973
Arab-Israeli War was caution and restraint on the part of
U.S. Navy commanders in the Mediterranean. This was
particularly important due to Soviet targeting of the Sixth
Fleet with anti-ship missile platforms. On-scene commanders
had to carefully balance the need to maintain a tactically
viable situation against the danger of incidents with the
Soviet Navy. This was particularly important for U.S. ships
and aircraft assigned to monitor high-threat Soviet ships
and destroy them if they attempted to launch anti-ship
missiles. When the Soviets commenced their anti-carrier
exercise, U.S. ships and planes counter-targeting the
Soviets had to distinguish between preparations for
simulated and actual attacks—an exceedingly difficult
task. A single misjudgement could have produced a Soviet-
American sea battle in the Mediterranean, which could well
have escalated to general war.
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Three escalation-inhibiting factors appear to have
been important in the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents. The first
was military prudence: on-scene commanders did not want to
fight under tactically unfavorable circumstances. It may
well be the case that when U.S. forces are the victim of an
unanticipated attack, tactical military considerations lead
military commanders toward the same general course of action
that political considerations lead national leaders toward.
In the Tonkin Gulf Incidents, military considerations tended
to make tactical-level commanders more cautious than
political-level leaders.
The second escalation-inhibiting factor in the Tonkin
Gulf Incidents was compliance by on-scene commanders with
the guidance contained in mechanisms of indirect control.
Under the peacetime rules of engagement in effect in 1964,
.
U.S. forces were authorized to use force in self-defense and
in anticipatory self-defense when attack appeared to be
imminent. Hot pursuit of the attacking force was authorized
in international waters and was used on August 2 when Navy
planes attacked the PT boats after they had disengaged. On
the other hand, retaliation against targets in North Vietnam
was not authorized unless specifically approved by the Presi-
dent. On the one hand, these provisions allowed force to be
used without further permission from higher authority, but
on the other hand, they resulted in the engagements halting
quickly rather than escalating.
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The third escalation-inhibiting factor in the Tonkin
Gulf Incidents was the emphasis that the President and
Secretary of Defense McNaroara placed on confirming that
there actually had been a North Vietnamese attack the night
of August 4. They did not accept initial reports from the
Tonkin Gulf at face value; they insisted on knowing the
basis for the conclusion that there had been an attack on
the destroyers. Double-checking the accuracy of initial
reports is important for avoiding unwarranted escalation of
a confrontation—particularly when there may not have been a
confrontation at all.
The August 4 incident in the Tonkin Gulf suggests
three conditions that can cause the escalation-inhibiting
factors to break down. The first condition is long-term
frustration and animosity toward the other side in a crisis
or incident. U.S. leaders had for years been growing
increasingly belligerent toward North Vietnam due to its
support for the Viet Cong, and had been preparing contin-
gency plans for direct military action against the North.
This created an atmosphere in which an apparent North
Vietnamese attack on U.S. forces would be likely to provoke
a strong U.S. response. The second condition is the
immediate prior occurrence of a confirmed provocation by the
other side, particularly when the U.S. response to the prior
incident was retrained and the other side was warned against
further incidents. The U.S. reacted with notable restraint
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to the confirmed August 2 North Vietnamese attack on Maddox ,
merely warning against further attacks. But the August 4
incident provoked U.S. retaliation against the North even
though the circumstances of the incident were not clear.
The third condition that can degrade the escalation-
inhibiting factors is for all levels in the military chain
of command, from the President to the on-scene commander, to
hold similar views toward the adversary and toward the need
for immediate retaliation. A strong unity of views can
suppress the skepticism that normally greets ambiguous
initial reports of a military incident, or lead to hasty
assessment of the incident in the rush to launch retaliatory
attacks. This appears to have occurred in the U.S. decision
to retaliate after the August 4 incident—McNamara sought
confirmation that there had been an attack, but the
President decided to retaliate before a complete assessment
of the evidence had been made.
Tn® Liberty incident sheds light on three escalation-
inhibiting factors. First, by fully complying with with the
standing rules of engagement and limiting his actions to
those necessary to defend Liberty , the on-scene commander
contributed to avoiding an unnecessary clash with Soviet or
Egyptian forces. Second, use of the hot line apparently
helped prevent the Soviets and Egyptians from misperceiving
the intent of actions taken by the on-scene commander.
Third, rapid Israeli notification of the United States that
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it had inadvertently attacked a U.S. naval vessel cleared up
confusion in Washington and resulted in Sixth Fleet planes
being recalled before they entered the war zone off the
coast of Sinai. The last two factors emphasize the impor-
tance of communications among the parties to a crisis for
avoiding misperception and escalation.
Although decoupling did not occur in the Pueblo
incident, two of the considerations that prevented
decoupling can be viewed as escalation-inhibiting factors:
military prudence and compliance with the guidance contained
in mechanisms of indirect control. U.S. military commanders
were reluctant to mount a response that would have been
excessively vulnerable to North Korean attacks. Loss of
U.S. aircraft sent to defend Pueblo almost certainly would
have generated escalatory pressures, so in this instance
military prudence led to tactical decisions that supported
crisis management objectives. U.S. military commanders
complied with the restrictions imposed on military
operations by the standing peacetime rules of engagement,
barring their forces from attacking North Korean forces
inside North Korean territorial waters and airspace, and not
ordering actions that would have constituted reprisals
against North Korea. The guidance contained in the
peacetime rules of engagement may or may not have been
appropriate to the specific circumstances, but U.S. military
commanders were careful to comply with that guidance.
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The Stark incident suggests an escalation-inhibiting
factor: accurate intelligence on friendly and potentially
hostile forces. Because the attacking aircraft was known to
have been Iraqi, there was no question that Iran might have
been responsible for the attack on Stark . Without such
intelligence, U.S. commanders in the Persian Gulf probably
would have suspected that Iran had conducted the attack.
Circumstantial evidence pointing to Iranian complicity and
lack of an Iraqi admission of responsibility could well have
led to the President authorizing retaliatory attacks on
Iranian forces or bases. This situation is analogous to
that described in the Liberty incident, when accurate
information on Soviet forces in the Mediterranean prevented
U.S. military commanders from suspecting that the Soviets
had attacked Liberty .
It appears that inadvertent escalation is more likely
when intelligence is incomplete and ambiguous, supporting
worst-case assessments of the nature and implications of an
attack on U.S. forces. For example, on-scene commanders
could conclude that full-scale attacks on U.S. forces at the
scene of the crisis will soon follow, placing a premium on
preempting the expected enemy attack. Under certain circum-
stances on-scene commanders might have authority to preempt
without having to seek permission from higher authority.
In summary, six internal and two external escalation-
inhibiting factors were identified in the case studies. The
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internal factors function within the government and military
chain of command of one nation. The internal factors are
military prudence (avoiding threat of surprise attack and
combat under unfavorable circumstances) , caution and
restraint on the part of on-scene commanders, compliance by
on-scene commanders with the guidance contained in mechan-
isms of indirect control, national leaders structuring the
tactical environment to dampen military interactions,
accurate and timely tactical intelligence on friendly and
potentially hostile forces, and national leaders and the
military chain of command double-checking the accuracy of
initial reports of military incidents. These factors tend
moderate the intensity of tactical-level interactions, pre-
vent armed clashes from occurring, and produce disengagement
rather than escalation when clashed do occur.
External escalation-inhibiting factors function
between the two sides in a crisis. There are two external
factors: tacit rules of crisis behavior observed by the two
sides and communications between the two sides in the
crisis. Tacit rules of crisis behavior are best developed
between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also
contributed to avoiding escalation in the 1958 Taiwan
Straits Crisis. The Soviet-American tacit rules are not
without flaws. Soviet naval forces have engaged in
exceedingly dangerous behavior—dangerous maneuvering at




during international crises. The 1972 Soviet-American
Incidents at Sea Agreement has only been partially
successful in moderating such Soviet behavior. The most
dangerous situation arises in confrontations with nations
that the United States does not share tacit rules of crisis
behavior, like Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
The findings of the eight case studies indicate that,
contrary to what the escalation dynamics theory predicts,
there is a tendency for naval tactical-level interaction to
lose momentum and for the forces involved to disengage after
an initial incident or armed clash. Pauses tend to occur
naturally in naval operations due to the need to regroup and
prepare for further action. Due to the risk of defeat in
battle, naval commanders are reluctant to initiate or
sustain combat operations under circumstances they cannot
predict or control. Naval commanders quickly reach the
limits of their authority and need permission from higher
authority to initiate further combat operations. If do not
have such permission, or anticipate that they will not be
able get it, naval commanders normally will try to break off
combat ac-tion as soon as it is safe to do so—rather than
risk being left in an untenable tactical position. The
operational requirements of crisis management, if being
followed, tend to accentuate the tendency toward
disengagement by denying on-scene commanders tactical
options (such as surprise attack and concentration of
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superior force) that can be crucial for successful combat
operations.
The case studies identified three conditions that can
cause the escalation-inhibiting factors to break down,
allowing a crisis to escalate uncontrollably to war. The
first condition is for national leaders and military
commanders to be predisposed to take action against the
adversary due to a long-term failures of diplomacy to
resolve tensions, military and diplomatic frustration with
the adversary. Sustained hostility, harassment, or a
history of aggression by the adversary can generate a
perception that the adversary's leaders are unreasonable,
irresponsible, or uninterested in serious negotiations,
reducing the incentive to pursue diplomatic initiatives
toward the adversary. These expectations could be entirely
correct, but could also result from insufficient or
ambiguous intelligence on the adversary's objectives and
intentions.
The second condition that can erode the escalation-
inhibiting factors is the immediate prior occurrence of one
or more hostile acts against United States forces, citizens,*
or vital interests. Prior attacks can create an expectation
that further attacks will occur or that the adversary is
likely to escalate the level of violence. As with long-term
frustrations, short-term expectations of further violence




insufficient or ambiguous intelligence on the adversary's
objectives and intentions. The short-term effects of
immediate prior hostile acts can reinforce the effects of
long-term frustration with the adversary, appearing to
confirm negative assessments of his intentions. Expectation
of further attacks tends to predispose national leaders and
military commanders toward broader military options toward
the adversary.
The third condition that can erode the escalation-
inhibiting factors is for all levels in the chain of
command, from the President to the on-scene commander, to
hold similar views toward the adversary and the need for
immediate retaliation for provocations. A strong unity of
views can suppress the skepticism that normally greets
ambiguous initial reports on a military incident, or lead to
hasty assessment of the incident in the rush to launch
retaliatory attacks.
-
Misperceptions and Inadvertent Military Incidents
The seventh question is did actions taken with mili-
ary fdrces send inadvertent signals to either adversaries or
friends, and did inadvertent military incidents occur that
affected efforts to manage the crisis? This question
addresses crisis management problems that arise when
military forces are employed in crises: the misperception
dilemma and inadvertent military incidents.
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Inadvertent political signals and inadvertent military
incidents were not a serious problem in the 1958 Taiwan
Straits Crisis. The military moves taken by each side were
carefully designed to signal their intentions. The
principle problem that the United States experienced arose
from the ambiguity of the Eisenhower Administration's
commitment to the defense of the offshore islands. U.S.
leaders were caught between deterring an adversary and
restraining an ally: too strong a commitment miaht encourage
the Nationalists to be overly aggressive , while too weak a
commitment might encourage the Communists to be overly
aggressive. The Eisenhower Administration attempted to
resolve this dilemma with a calculated policy of ambiguity,
which only prompted the Communist probe of the American
commitment and subsequent efforts by the Nationalists to use
the crisis as grounds for striking back at the mainland.
The problem was not that the Communists and Nationalists
misperceived U.S. intentions, but rather that they correctly
perceived the ambivalence in U.S. policy.
There were two instances of U.S. naval forces sending
inadvertent signals of hostility during the Cuban Missile
Crisis: the first was when a Soviet merchant ship captain
mistook a Navy patrol plane's high-powered search light
(flashed for photographs) for an attack on his ship, and the
second was a Soviet merchant ship captain's complaint that
he had been threatened by a Navy destroyer inspecting MRBMs
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on his deck. Although the Soviet Government filed protests
over these incidents, it did not interpret them as deliber-
ate indications of hostile intentions on the part of the
United States.
There was only one inadvertent military incident
during the Cuban Missile Crisis serious enough to have
affected the President's efforts to manage the crisis: the
Air Force U-2 that strayed over the Soviet Union on October
27. This apparently annoyed Khrushchev, who complained
about the incident to President Kennedy, but otherwise did
not have a major impact on the crisis. There were no
serious inadvertent military incidents involving naval
forces. The lack of incidents is somewhat surprising, given
the tremendous scope of United States military operations
during the crisis, and may not be a reliable indicator of
what to expect in future crises.
There do not appear to have been any instances of the
Soviets seriously misperceiving the intent of Sixth Fleet
operations during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, largely due to
close Soviet monitoring of the fleet and United States use
of the hot line. Sixth Fleet and Middle East Force move-
ments in May, intended to support the President's efforts to
pressure Nasser into reopening the Strait of Tiran, may have
sent an inadvertent signal of hostility to the Arab
nations. The inadvertent hostile signal would lead Arab
leaders to assume U.S. hostility after war broke out. It
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thus complicated U.S. efforts to manage the crisis by
lending credibility to Arab claims of American complicity in
the Israeli attacks—claims that contributed to serious
deterioration in U.S. relations with the Arab nations.
There were no inadvertent military incidents that
seriously affected United States crisis management efforts
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The most serious incident of
the crisis was the attack on the Liberty , but Israel quickly
notified the United States that it had conducted the attack,
thus defusing tensions over the incident. The second most
serious incident of the crisis was the harassment of USS
America by Soviet ships on June 7 and 8. But there were no
collisions and no shots were fired. The absence of serious
inadvertent incidents was largely due to the cautious manner
in which the two superpowers conducted naval operations in
the Mediterranean. The most important factor in avoiding
incidents that could complicate crisis management was the
decisions made by national leaders on the two sides that
structured the tactical environment in such a manner as to
moderate the tensions that would arise from tactical-level
interactions.
There were no inadvertent military incidents serious
•nough to affect U.S. crisis management efforts during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War, but there aopear to have been
instances of U.S. leaders misperceiving the political
signals being sent by Soviet naval movements. Kissinger
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interpreted Soviet naval moves at the start of the war as
demonstrating non-involvement in the conflict, but the
actual pattern of Soviet naval operations suggests a higher
degree of Soviet commitment to Syria and Egypt than
Kissinger perceived. Kissinger also missed the point that
Soviet naval movements demonstrated an intent to neutralize
the Sixth Pleet if it were positioned to intervene.
Naval analysts and other observers have read political
signals into several other U.S. and Soviet naval actions
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It is not clear, however,
that any of those alleged signals were intentional or that
the other side perceived the signals allegedly being sent.
In every case the naval actions can be accounted for by
motives or considerations other than political signalling,
such as logistic requirements or improving tactical
readiness. This further underscores the inherent ambiguity
of naval movements as political signals, and the tendency
for naval movements to be perceived as political signals
even when undertaken for non-political purposes.
The U.S. response to the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents
did not send any serious inadvertent political signals or
result in any serious inadvertent military incidents.
However, the Desoto patrols apparently were misperceived by
North Vietnam. Some U.S. intelligence analysts and military
officers suspected that the North Vietnamese misperceived
the Desoto patrol destroyers as participating in or directly
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supporting OPLAN 34A attacks on North Vietnam. Although
McNamara would later insist that there were no grounds for
the North Vietnamese to have confused the Desoto and OPLAN
34A operations, such a misperception provides a plausible
explanation for the August 2 attack on Maddox .
The U.S. response to the attack on the Liberty did not
send any serious inadvertent political signals or result in
•ny serious inadvertent military incidents. Commander Sixth
Fleet carefully limited the fleet's response to the attack
and the President used the hot line to prevent mispercep-
tions from arising. The Israeli attack on Liberty was
itself an inadvertent military incident, momentarily
complicating U.S. crisis management efforts in the Middle
East War, but no further incidents occurred during the Sixth
Fleet's- response to the attack.
The U.S. response to the North Korean seizure of the
Pueblo did not send serious inadvertent political signals or
result in serious inadvertent military incidents, probably
due to the relatively passive U.S. response to the North
Korean provocation. North Korea achieved a fait accompli ,
effectively limiting U.S. options to settling on North
Korean terms. The passive U.S. response annoyed the South
Koreans, but this arose from correct perceptions rather than
from misperceptions.
The U.S. response to the attack on Stark did not send
serious inadvertent political signals or result in serious
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inadvertent military incidents, but the attack itself was an
inadvertent military incident. The attack on Stark
illustrates the danger of inadvertent military incidents
vhen U.S. naval forces are operating in close proximity to
hostilities.
In summary, inadvertent political signals may have
been a factor in some of the crises, but inadvertent
military incidents were not serious problems in the eight
cases examined in this study. Misperceptions of U.S.
intentions or the purposes of U.S. naval operations may have
been a factor in the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, and the 1968 Pueblo incident. U.S. naval
operations in response to the four peacetime attacks on U.S.
Navy ships appear not to have generated misperceptions.
There appear to be three reasons for the lack of
inadvertent military incidents in crises. First, the
military chain of command normally cancels most military
exercises affecting forces committed to or on standby for
the crisis, greatly reducing the possibility of interna-
tional incidents arising from exercise-related accidents.
The primary reason why exercises are cancelled is that the
forces are needed for crisis operations, but exercises have
also been cancelled to avoid potential political complica-
tions. The second reason is that the military chain of
command usually advises on-scene commanders to act with
caution and to avoid provocative actions. The third reason
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for the lack of incidents in crises is best described as
military prudence: on-scene commanders, motivated by self-
preservation, generally avoid deliberately placing their
forces in situations where they are extremely vulnerable to
deliberate or inadvertent attacks. Military prudence is
occasionally violated by top-level political officials
ordering naval forces into dangerous waters, but on other
occasions U.S. leaders have been careful to keep U.S. forces
well clear of fighting in a local conflict. These three fac-
tors counteract other factors—increased tempo of operations
and adversary forces in close proximity—that contribute to
the occurrence of inadvertent military incidents.
Political-Military Tensions
The eighth question is did any of the three tensions
between political and military considerations arise during
the crisis? There are three tensions between political and
military considerations that can arise when military forces
are used as a political instrument in crises: tension
between political considerations and the needs of diplomatic
bargaining, on the one hand, and military considerations and
the needs of military operations, on the other; tension
between the need for top-level control of military options
in a crisis, and the need for tactical flexibility and
instantaneous decision-making at the scene of the crisis;
and tension between performance of crisis political missions
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and readiness to perform wartime combat missions. All three
tensions arise from the requirements of crisis management,
the essence of which is placing political constraints on
military operations. Tensions between political and mili-
tary considerations were examined in all eight case studies.
Political vs Military Considerations
In the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, tension between
political considerations and military considerations arose
in the restrictions placed on the support that could be
provided for the Quemoy resupply effort. The most efficient
way of resupplying the Nationalist garrison would have been
to carry their supplies in U.S. amphibious ships escorted
right up to the beach by U.S. warships. However, this would
have been a serious provocation to the Communists, who might
not have refrained from shelling the American vessels. That
probably would have led to U.S. naval bombardment and air
strikes against Communist shore batteries, air fields, and
naval bases. The political restrictions on the resupply
operation were thus prudent from a crisis management
perspective, even if they required the U.S. and Nationalist
navies to improvise ways to get supplies ashore under fire.
In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, tensions between
political considerations and military considerations
primarily arose from the fundamental decision to impose a
quarantine on offensive arms rather than immediately launch
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an air strike against the Soviet missiles sites or invade
Cuba. The JCS never wavered from its advocacy of the air
strike option. There was also concern that the President's
strategy of applying military force in graduated increments
would increase the difficulty of carrying out the air strike
or invasion options by alerting the Cubans—losing the
tactical and strategic advantage of surprise. Further,
tensions arose between the military consideration of
protecting U.S. forces against a sudden attack by Cuban or
Soviet forces, and the political consideration of avoiding
military moves that appeared to threaten an immediate effort
to achieve a military solution to the crisis. However,
civilian leaders accommodated military commanders to a much
greater degree than past accounts have acknowledged. Presi-
dent Kennedy and Secretary McNamara were sympathetic to the
military's concern with protecting its men. The rules of
engagement issued for the quarantine were not significantly
different from normal peacetime rules and did not infringe
upon a commander's right of self-defense. The only opera-
tional area in which the President deliberately denied the
military any authority to take action in self-defense was in
the case of Cuban air defenses firing on U.S. reconnaissance
aircraft, but this was based on the well-established
distinction between self-defense and retaliation.
There was moderate tension between political and
military considerations during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
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This arose primarily from the restrictions placed on move-
ments of the Sixth Fleet carriers for purposes of political
signalling. The carrier force commanders objected to
restrictions on their mobility, which denied them one of the
greatest advantages of carrier air power, and the publicity
surrounding their movements, which they believed made it
easier for the Soviets to target the carriers. On the other
hand, the restrictions on the carriers did not impose
unreasonable limitations on their ability to carry out their
immediate mission. The restrictions were disregarded by the
on-scene commander when it was necessary to respond to the
attack on the Liberty . The President later authorized the
actions that Commander Sixth Fleet had already initiated,
which indicates that tensions between political and military
considerations were not serious.
There was tension between political and military
considerations during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The most
serious tension was between Washington's need to control
Sixth Fleet movements for political purposes and the on-
scene commander's need for freedom to maneuver the fleet in
order to reduce its vulnerability to Soviet preemptive
attack. The White House restricted the movements of the
Sixth Fleet lest the fleet's movements send a misleading
signal of U.S. intentions to the Soviet Union. The Soviet
tactic of keeping ships and submarines armed with anti-ship
cruise missiles within striking range of the U.S. carriers
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created serious operational problems for the Sixth Fleet.
Soviet Navy doctrine placed heavy emphasis on the first
strike, making it a central objective of strategy as well as
tactics. U.S. Navy tactical doctrine for the defense of
surface ship battle groups emphasized destruction of launch
platforms before they can launch their missiles. The
tactical doctrines of the superpower navies interacted,
producing a war initiation scenario described in the U.S.
Navy as the HD-day shootout." The side that gets off the
first salvo in the D-day shootout is likely to accrue a
significant tactical advantage that could determine the
outcome of a war at sea. A restriction imposed on the fleet
for political purposes (avoiding misperceptions of U.S.
intentions) exacerbated the risks of a military confron-
tation and the danger that a minor incident could touch off
an armed clash at sea between the superpowers.
None of the three political-military tensions was
serious in the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents because the U.S.
responses were limited and all levels of the chain of
command held generally similar views toward the need to
retaliate. The only tension was that generated by the White
House demand for confirmation that there had been a North
Vietnamese attack in the second incident. This is an
example of the tension that can arise between political
considerations and military considerations: Confirmation
was necessary so that retaliation could be justified
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politically. But confirmation required time to assess the
evidence, which could delay the retaliatory strikes--
alerting the adversary and losing the advantage of surprise.
There was little tension between political and
military considerations in the Liberty incident because the
incident was over before significant diplomatic activity
—
other than hot line messages—could begin. The limitations
that Commander Sixth Fleet placed on his forces supported
U.S. political objectives in the crisis.
There were essentially no tensions between political
and military considerations in the Pueblo incident. All
levels in the chain of command agreed that effective
military action could not be taken before Pueblo entered
Wonsan. There was disagreement between military and
civilian officials over whether or not reprisals should be
taken against North Korea, and over whether or not if an
•ffort should be made to recover the ship by force. But
these disagreements primarily revolved around the military
feasibility of the options proposed by the military, rather
than the political implications of the options.
lit summary, tension between political and military
considerations were serious in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War; moderate in the 1958 Taiwan
Straits Crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; and minor in
the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967 Liberty incident,




Tension arose between the need for top-level control
and the need for on-scene flexibility and initiative in the
1958 Taiwan Straits crisis , but overall a workable balance
appears to have been struck. The Chief of Naval Operations
insisted on frequent and detailed reports from Navy
commanders in the far East, but methods of delegated control
were used and officials in Washington relied heavily on
mechanisms of indirect control. This muted tension over
centralization of control.
Tension arose during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
between the need for top-level control of military
operations and the need for on-scene flexibility and
initiative. This was the most severe political-military
tension during the crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis marked
a turning point in American civil-military relations and in
the evolution of U.S. command and control doctrine. The
origin of the tension was a sudden attempt to impose radical-
ly new methods of direct control on a command system set up
for delegated methods of control without prior planning,
consideration of the implications, or even consultation with
the military.
The Navy, with its tradition of granting autonomy to
commanders at sea, reacted strongly to the Kennedy
Administration's efforts at Closely controlling military
operations. Admiral Anderson, at the interface between
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between civilian authorities and the Navy chain of command
•s Chief of Naval Operations and the JCS Executive Agent for
Cuban operations, took the lead in preventing what he
perceived to be unreasonable civilian interference in naval
operations. Most senior Navy Officers deeply resented the
new civilian attention to the details of naval operations,
which they viewed as "micromanagement." There was a
widespread attitude that McNamara was incompetent at
controlling military operations. McNamara, the admirals
felt, was trying to run naval operations the way he would
manage a Ford assembly line, but without the experience
necessary to do so and with no respect for those who did
have the requisite experience. If McNamara was resented,
his civilian aides were despised. Navy admirals commonly
referred to them as NJunior Field Marshals" and a variety of
less polite expressions. There was .thus serious tension
between the President's desire to maintain control over
•vents and the Navy's desire to operate on the basis of its
traditional philosophy of command, in which commanders at
sea are delegated substantial authority.
Although there was widespread resentment toward
McNamara, the admirals who ran the quarantine at sea did not
feel unreasonably burdened by civilian authorities and
understood the need for close control. The fact that Navy
commanders who did not have to work directly with McNamara
felt less resentment and better understood the President's
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political objectives strongly suggests that much of the
friction and anger visible in Washington was generated by
the McNamara's personality, management style, and personal
attitudes, rather than by the underlying policy conflicts.
Because of the emphasis on direct civilian control of
military operations, civilian authorities did not keep
military leaders adequately informed of the overall U.S.
political-diplomatic strategy for resolving the crisis. By
not informing the JCS of political-diplomatic efforts at
resolving the crisis, the President risked defeating his
efforts to ensure that military operations supported his
political objectives. The Chiefs did not need to know the
details of sensitive communications with the Soviets to
understand the President's diplomatic objectives. Such an
understanding might have helped them to anticipate
operational problems that could have interfered with the
President's crisis management strategy.
There was only moderate level of control tension in
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Orders to the Sixth Fleet were
passed via the chain of command and only the general
location and movements of the fleet in the Mediterranean
were closely controlled. On-scene commanders disliked this
control of their operations, but it did not seriously
interfere with their ability to carry out their mission.
Level of control tensions arose during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War. The tension over level of control was worse
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than in the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and tha 1967 Arab-
Israeli War, but not as bad as in the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis. President Nixon and Schlesinger respected the mili-
tary chain of command, using it to send orders to the Sixth
Fleet rather than attempting to communicate directly with
the fleet. Tensions arose primarily from the emphasis that
President Nixon and Kissinger placed on using the Sixth
fleet for political signalling, which required close White
House control of the fleet's movements. Although some Navy
commanders were irritated by White House control of Sixth
Fleet movements, there was no deep resentment against per-
ceived civilian interference as in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
There was little level of control tension in the
Liberty incident because the incident evolved too rapidly
for officials in Washington to play a direct role in
controlling events. JCS and the Secretary of Defense could
only reaffirm orders already given by Commander Sixth Fleet.
There was little level of control tension in the
Pueblo incident. U.S. military commanders in the Far East
had ample authority to take military action without having
to seek permission from higher authorities so long as Pueblo
remained in international waters. The "hold" order issued
to the military came well after commanders in the Far East
had decided against taking immediate military action, and
served only to avoid further incidents with North Korean
forces while Washington weighed reprisal options. If U.S.
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commanders had ordered attacks on North Korean forces in
international waters to prevent Pueblo from being taken into
Wonsan, it is likely that the President would have supported
the action (As he supported Vice Admiral Martin's dispatch
of aircraft to defend Liberty in 1967).
In summary, level of control tensions were serious in
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,
moderate in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and minor in the 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis, and the four cases of peacetime
attacks on Navy ships. Level of control tensions appear to
be directly proportional to the scale and duration of the
crisis military operations being conducted, and more intense
when national leaders perceive a danger of the crisis
escalating to war (which prompts them to exercise close
control over military operations)
.
Crisis vs Wartime Missions
Tensions arose between performance of crisis missions
and readiness to perform wartime missions in the 1958 Taiwan
Straits crisis. The CNO's staff was concerned that pro-
longed operations would erode U.S. capabilities for military
operations in other parts of the world or for general war.
CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke felt that U.S. naval forces were
overextended during the crisis and would have been hard
pressed to respond to an outbreak of fighting elsewhere
while committed in the Taiwan Straits. Of the three types

1033
of political-military tensions, tension between performance
of crisis missions and readiness to perform wartime missions
was the most serious in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis.
Tensions arose in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
between performance of crisis missions and readiness to
perform wartime missions. Preparations for invasion of Cuba
degraded the ability of the United States to respond to
Soviet moves in Europe, particularly against Berlin. The
only reason that this did not generate severe tensions was
that the political-military situation in other theaters,
including Europe was relatively quiet. Military men were
not overly concerned about the negative consequences of the
preparations for invasion of Cuba because there was no
immediate need for the forces elsewhere. This situation
would have changed drastically if the Soviets had moved
against Berlin or Turkey in response to a U.S. move against
Cuba, which justifies the President's concern for such a
Soviet move.
There was very little tension between performance of
crisis political missions and readiness to perform wartime
combat missions during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Sixth
Fleet operations during the crisis did not seriously detract
from the fleet's readiness for wartime contingencies. The
only feature of the crisis operations that the on-scene
commanders did not like, even though they understood its
purpose and importance, was the publicizing of the fleet's
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movements. This is a crucial consideration in wartime
operations, but one that directly conflicts with political
crisis management considerations. Other than this, there
was little tension between performance of crisis missions
and readiness for wartime contingencies.
There was moderate tension between performance of
crisis political missions and readiness to perform wartime
combat missions in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. There
apparently was little concern that the Navy's response to
the crisis would degrade its ability to respond to threats
elsewhere. Wartime considerations as well as political
considerations influenced the location of the Sixth Fleet in
the Mediterranean, and the fleet's carriers did not
experience a serious degradation of their readiness to
perform wartime missions during the crisis. The greatest
concern for U.S. wartime readiness arose from the transfer
of large quantities of U.S. military equipment and munitions
to Israel, which depleted U.S. war-reserve stocks and left
some operational units without sufficient equipment and
supplies to carry out wartime missions.
There was no tension between performance of crisis mis-
sions and maintaining readiness to perform wartime missions
in the Liberty incident because the Sixth Fleet response to
the attack was small-scale and of short duration.
There was some tension between performance of crisis
missions and readiness to perform wartime missions in the
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Pueblo incident. The limited time available for taking
action meant that the initial response to the North Korean
attack on Pueblo had to be made with U.S. forces in and
around Japan and South Korea. The aircraft closest to
Pueblo—Air Force planes on alert in South Korea—were
configured for delivery of nuclear weapons (a wartime
mission) and could not be rapidly reconfigured for
conventional ordnance (for crisis missions) . Commander
Fifth Air Force did not hesitate to order these planes
reconfigured for conventional ordnance. Maintaining
readiness for wartime missions had greater impact on the
decision whether or not to retaliate against North Korea.
The heavy commitment of U.S. forces in Vietnam limited the
options available to U.S. military commanders and made the
President and Secretary of Defense reluctant to take action
against North Korea that could result in another military
conflict.
None of the three political-military tensions was
present in the Stark incident because the incident was brief
and the attack was known to have been inadvertent. U.S.
Navy ships in the Persian Gulf had ample authority under the
rules of engagement to use force in self-defense or
anticipatory self-defense. Nevertheless , Navy commanders in
the Persian Gulf had been placed in a complex and dangerous
tactical environment. There was great risk of U.S. ships




great risk of political embarrassment to the United States
if civilian of friendly military aircraft were shot down.
In summary, tensions between performance of crisis
missions and readiness to perform wartime missions were
serious in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis and the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis; moderate in the 1968 Pueblo incident and the
1973 Arab-Israeli War; and minor in the 1964 Tonkin gulf
Incidents, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Liberty incident,
and the 1987 Stark incident. Tensions between performance
of crisis missions and readiness to perform wartime missions
are directly proportional to the scale and duration of the
crisis operations being conducted, and can be exacerbated by
the geographic location of the crisis (a crisis located far




The dependent variable is the outcome of crisis
interactions; specifically, whether or not tactical-level
military interactions cause escalation of a crisis. The
dependent Variable is not dichotomous (either escalation or
no escalation) , a range of outcomes can occur (as will be
described below) . Inadvertent escalation originally was
defined as any increase in the level or scope of violence in
• crisis that was not directly ordered by national leaders
or anticipated by them as being the likely result of their
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orders. This definition encompasses what will be called
inadvertent controlled escalation: a military move ordered
by national leaders (and executed as they desired) provokes
unanticipated escalation by the adversary, which in turn pro-
vokes a deliberate escalatory response by the first side.
Escalation of the crisis arises from deliberate decisions
made by national leaders, rather than from uncontrolled
tactical-level or strategic-level interactions. The
escalation is inadvertent because national leaders did not
intend to escalate the crisis and did not anticipate that
their moves would provoke escalation by the adversary.
Variance in the dependent variable will be described
in terms of six patterns of crisis military interactions:
unified interaction, parallel stratified interaction, momen-
tary decoupling of interactions, decoupled interactions
followed by disengagement, inadvertent tactical-level escala-
tion, and inadvertent strategic-level escalation. The first
two patterns—unified interaction and parallel stratified
interaction—can have three escalation outcomes: no escala-
tion, inadvertent controlled escalation, or deliberate
escalation. Inadvertent controlled escalation and deliber-
ate escalation can halt short of war or continue on to war.
In the third and fourth patterns—momentary decoupling of
interactions and decoupled interactions followed by
disengagement—tactical-level interaction halts without
significant escalation. The fifth pattern—inadvertent
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tactical level escalation—can have three outcomes:
disengagement short of war, inadvertent strategic-level
escalation, or deliberate escalation to war. The sixth
pattern— inadvertent strategic-level escalation—can have
three outcomes: disengagement short of war, inadvertent
















































escalation to war, or deliberate escalation to war. The six
patterns of crisis military interaction and their various
outcomes are illustrated in Figure 2.
These six patterns constitute a typology of crisis
military interaction and appear to cover the full range of
interactions that could occur in a crisis. However, because
they were identified through an analytical-inductive
process, rather than deductively, no claim is made that the
six patterns constitute the universe of possible crisis
military interactions. Additional patterns could be
identified through further empirical research.
More than one of the patterns of crisis military
interaction can occur in a crisis. The first four patterns
—
unified interaction, parallel stratified interaction,
momentary decoupling of interaction, decoupled interactions
followed by disengagement, and inadvertent tactical-level
escalation—can occur in various sequences in a crisis.
Changes in the seven independent variables affecting mili-
tary interactions determine which pattern occurs. The
causal patterns associated with each pattern of military
interaction are not mutually exclusive: At any given moment
in a crisis, some of the independent variables could have
values allowing more than one of the five patterns to
occur. Events that are inherently unpredictable, such as
communications failures or military accidents, can determine
which pattern arises. Assessments of the likelihood of
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inadvertent escalation must therefore be made in probabilis-
tic terms--that is, in terms of which patterns are more or
less likely to occur.
Contingent generalizations will be formulated for the
aix patterns of crisis military interaction, offering a
distinct causal pattern for each type of interaction. Each
of the causal patterns is produced by specific variations in
seven independent variables. These seven independent
variables were identified in the case studies as significant
in determining the outcome of crisis military interaction.
The first step in formulating the contingent generalizations
will be to define the seven independent variables and
describe the range of variation of each variable. The six
types of crisis military interaction and their causal
patterns will then be described.
Independent Variables
There are seven independent variables that determine
the nature of crisis ailitary interaction and its effect on
crisis stability: the degree of political-level control of
tactical-level military interaction/ the scale of military
operations, the intensity of tactical-level military interac-
tions, the perceived threat of attack at the tactical level,
the relationship between political-level and tactical-level
threat perceptions, the strength of escalation-inhibiting
factors, and the impact of inadvertent military incidents.
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These seven independent variables determine the degree to
which crisis interactions to become stratified, whether or
not stratified interactions become decoupled, and whether or
not decoupled interactions result in an uncontrollable
escalation sequence. The seven independent variables and
terms that will be used to describe the range of variation


































The first independent variable is political-level
control over tactical-level military operations: the ability
of national leaders to ensure, by whatever control methods
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or mechanisms are used, that crisis military operations
support their overall strategy for resolving the crisis.
Political-level control of tactical-level military
operations will be described as direct, indirect, or loss of
control. Direct control means that national leaders can
direct changes in military operations as necessary to
support their strategy for managing a crisis. National
leaders do not have to make every operational decision
themselves in order to effectively exercise direct control,
but they must have the capability to intervene in the
conduct of military operations on a real-time basis when
necessary for crisis management.
Indirect control means that national leaders are
relying primarily on mechanisms of indirect control to
coordinate the actions of military forces. Under indirect
control, national leaders normally have some capability to
direct changes in military operations in order to ensure
that those operations support their crisis strategy.
Communications or other constraints preclude constant, real-
time, direct control of tactical-level military operations,
forcing delegation of control and reliance on mechanisms of
indirect control.
Loss of control means that national leaders are not
able to direct changes in military operations in order to
support their crisis strategy. Loss of control is caused by
the sources of decoupling: communications and information
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flow problems, impairment of political-level decisionmaking,
• fast-paced tactical environment, ambiguous or ambivalent
orders, tactically inappropriate orders, inappropriate
guidance in mechanisms of indirect control, and deliberate
unauthorized actions by military commanders. National
leaders can experience loss of control even while in direct
communication with the on-scene commander.
The second independent variable is the scale of crisis
military operations being conducted by United States armed
forces. The scale of military operations partially
determines three other factors. First, it affects the
ability of political-level officials to control tactical-
level military operations. Generally, the larger the scale
of operations the more difficult it is for national leaders
to maintain direct control over all the operations being
conducted and the more likely it is that decoupling will
occur. Second, it affects the opportunity for military
interactions with the other side's forces. Generally, the
larger the scale of operations, the greater the number of
tactical interactions between the forces of the two sides.
Third, it affects the opportunity for inadvertent military
incidents to occur. Generally, the larger the scale of
operations, the greater the likelihood of inadvertent
military incidents.
The scale of military operations will be described as
local, theater, or global. Local operations cover a
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relatively small, well-defined geographic area, and involve
relatively small forces— a single navy task force, army
division, a single air force air task force, or joint task
force of roughly equivalent size. The joint task force that
invaded Grenada in 1983 represents the approximate maximum
size of local-scale operations. Forces larger than this
generally require theater-level control in order to
coordinate operations. Theater operations involve a
substantial portion of the conventional forces in a
particular theater. The operations may not cover the entire
theater, but require theater—level coordination. The
forces that participated in operations against Cuba during
the Missile Crisis (including preparations for air strike
and invasion contingencies) represent the approximate
maximum size of theater-scale operations. Global operations
involve operations in two or more theaters. For example,
placing United States forces at Defense Condition of
Readiness (DEFCON) three, as was done during the Cuban
Missile Crisis and the 1973 Middle East War, initiates
global-scale operations.
The third independent variable is the intensity of
tactical-level interactions between the military forces of
the two sides in a crisis. This independent variable is
separate from scale of operations because large scale
operations do not necessarily result in intense inter-
actions. The adversary may choose not to initiate
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operations on a similar scale, or may take precautions to
reduce contact with the other side's forces. The 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis is an example of this. Although the
United States Navy conducted extensive operations off the
coast of the mainland, providing ample opportunities for
interaction with Communist Chinese forces, the Communist
Chinese did not exploit those opportunities and were careful
to avoid incidents with us forces.
The intensity of tactical-level military interactions
is also affected by geography, the operations being con-
ducted, and the political signals being sent. Geography
includes such factors as the presence of national boundaries
to separate ground forces and the amount of sea room
available for naval forces to maneuver. The nature of the
operations being conducted can affect how close the forces
are in proximity to each other and the threat they appear to
present toward each other. For example, U.S. destroyers
escorting convoys in the Persian Gulf are brought into more
frequent contact Iranian forces than is a carrier battle
group maintaining a presence in the Gulf of Oman. The
nature of the political signals being sent with military
forces also affects the frequency of contacts and apparent
level of threat. Forces used to send a coercive threat for
deterrence or compellence generally operate closer to the
scene of a crisis, in greater strength, and can conduct more
threatening operations (such as when a show of force is
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conducted) . On the other hand, forces used to signal
reassurance and an intent not to resort to force tend to be
moved away from the scene of the crisis and tend to conduct
less threatening operations.
The intensity of interactions will be described as
routine, heightened, or intense. Routine intensity of
interaction is the level normally experienced in peacetime.
It includes normal peacetime surveillance activities and,
for naval forces, the normal level of peacetime contact
among vessels at sea. Heightened intensity of interaction
includes increased surveillance activity, closer proximity
of forces, and tactical positioning of some forces for the
possibility of combat. An example would be Soviet anti-
carrier forces moving to within missile range of U.S.
carrier battle groups. Severe intensity of interaction
includes deliberate harassment, constant surveillance and
targeting activities, and frequent maneuvering by both sides
to maintain and improve their tactical positions.
The fourth independent variable is the perceived
threat of attack held by tactical-level military comman-
ders. Tactical-level commanders (also referred to as on-
scene commanders) are those directly commanding forces at
the scene of a crisis. For naval forces, tactical-level
commanders include commanding officers of ships and
commanders of task groups and task forces. Certain fleet
commanders can also be tactical-level commanders if directly
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controlling operations at the scene of a crisis (such as
Commander Seventh Fleet during the 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis, Commander Second Fleet during the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis, and Commander Sixth Fleet during the 1967 and 1973
Arab-Israeli Wars)
.
Tactical-level commanders are constantly assessing the
threat to their forces on the basis of their tactical
situation relative to the adversary's forces. Because the
on-scene commander must at all times be prepared for a
sudden outbreak of fighting—either on orders from his
superiors or instigated by the adversary—his assessment of
the adversary's intentions is heavily influenced by the
actions the adversary's forces are taking. This is a
particular form of the military practice of assessing
intentions on the basis of capabilities. On-scene
commanders do not, of course, base their assessment of the
adversary's intentions only on the basis of what adversary
forces are capable of doing, but this factor plays a much
larger role at the tactical level of interaction than it
does at the political level of interaction.
The threat perceptions held by tactical-level military
commanders can range from being entirely accurate to being
acute misperceptions. The on-scene commander could
accurately perceive that the adversary's forces are unlikely
to attack, or that they are making final preparations for an




might also misperceive military actions taken by the
adversary to send political signals or improve defensive
capabilities as indicating an intent to attack. This is the
crisis security dilemma in action at the tactical level.
Many of the actions a state takes in a crisis in order to
increase its security and improve its bargaining position
decrease the security of its adversary. This dilemma is
particularly acute in naval warfare, where the fragility of
platforms relative to the destructiveness of weapons
dictates tactical emphasis on shooting first. Many of the
actions taken with naval forces in crises to increase a
nation's security and improve its bargaining position
inherently increase the vulnerability of the adversary's
naval forces to a first strike.
Quite apart from the crisis security dilemma, another
possibility is that the on-scene commander could be deceived
into thinking that an attack is unlikely by adversary
efforts to cover an imminent surprise attack with secrecy
and deception. In this situation the on-scene commander
misperceives the threat of attack as being unlikely, when in
fact an attack is imminent. An on-scene commander also
Blight not have sufficient information on the level of
hostility being shown by the adversary outside the immediate
vicinity, producing a misperception that the threat of
attack is less than it actually is. Thus, the threat
perceptions held by tactical-level military commanders can
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range from highly accurate to acute misperceptions , and
misperceptions can be of a threat that is either greater or
leaser than the actual threat.
The perceived threat of attack held by tactical-level
military commanders will be described as unlikely, possible,
or imminent. These are terms commonly used by military
forces to designate threat warning levels. The perception
that threat of attack is unlikely means that the adversary
is not expected to launch an attack, or does not have the
capability to launch an attack, within a certain time frame
(generally one or two days) . The perception that threat of
attack is possible means that the adversary has the
capability to launch an attack in the near future, but there
is not sufficient information to determine that it is in
fact his intention to attack. The perception that threat of
attack is imminent means that the adversary has the
capability to launch an attack, and the apparent intention
of launching an attack, in the immediate future.
The fifth independent variable is the relationship
between political-level and tactical-level threat
perceptions. Political-level authorities can hold threat
perceptions much different from those held by tactical-level
military commanders. The two groups of decisionmakers are
making their assessments in much different environments and
often on the basis of different information. National
leaders focus primarily on the overall political and
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strategic picture, including communications with the
adversary. To national leaders the tactical situation at
the scene of the crisis is but one element in constructing
the overall picture. On-scene commanders, on the other
hand, focus on their immediate tactical situation,
particularly the behavior of the adversary's forces in the
vicinity. On-scene commanders normally have only limited
information on the overall political-military situation
—
primarily intelligence reports on adversary military moves
—
and use that information to assess the local picture. A
military move that is only a political signal to the
national leaders can be seen as a seriously threatening
change in the tactical situation by the on-scene commander.
Such differences in perceptions are what is meant by
stratification of threat perceptions.
Such differences in political-level and tactical-level
threat perceptions are important because they create the
stratified crisis security dilemma. The stratified crisis
security dilemma is that the security dilemma can arise
independently at different levels of interaction, affecting
the the likelihood of war separately at each level. For
example, tactical level military commanders can perceive a
severe threat of imminent attack while political level
authorities perceive little likelihood of attack. Further,
decisionmakers at one level may not be aware that
decisionmakers at the other level hold much different threat
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perceptions. Thus, the likelihood of serious fighting
erupting and escalation occurring can be different at the
different levels of crisis interaction.
The relationship between political-level and tactical-
level threat perceptions will be described as convergent,
similar, or divergent. Convergent threat perceptions occur
when decisionmakers at the political and tactical levels of
interaction hold essentially the same threat perceptions,
even though their focus may be different. For example,
threat perceptions would be convergent when national leaders
perceive that the adversary has decided to resort to war and
that war cannot be averted by further diplomatic efforts,
while on-scene commanders perceive that attack by the
adversary's forces at the scene of the crisis is imminent.
Similar threat perceptions are not exactly the same, thus
allowing for some differences, but are not extremely
different. Divergent threat perceptions are significantly
different at the political and tactical levels of
interaction. Historically, the tendency is for tactical-
level decisionmakers to perceive a greater threat of attack
than do political-level decisionmakers.
The sixth independent variable is the strength of the
factors inhibiting escalation. As was discussed earlier in
this chapter, there are six internal and two external
escalation-inhibiting factors. The internal factors are
military prudence, caution and restraint on the part of
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on-scene commanders, compliance by on-scene commanders with
mechanisms of indirect control, national leaders structuring
the tactical environment to dampen military interactions,
accurate and timely tactical intelligence on friendly and
potentially hostile forces, and national leaders and the
chain of command double-checking the accuracy of initial
reports of military incidents. The external factors are
tacit rules of crisis behavior observed by the two sides and
communications between the two sides in a crisis.
The strength of the factors inhibiting escalation will
be described as strong, weak, or lacking. Strong inhibiting
factors prevent escalation from occurring other than as the
result of a deliberate decision by national leaders. Weak
inhibiting factors allow escalation to occur when an
engagement first breaks out, but prevent the military action
from gaining sustained momentum. Lack of the inhibiting
factors can allow escalation to arise from an inadvertent
military incident and gain momentum, exceeding the ability
of national leaders to control it.
The seventh independent variable is the impact of
inadvertent military incidents on stratified interactions.
Inadvertent military incidents include unanticipated
authorized actions, military accidents, and unauthorized
actions. Inadvertent military incidents can trigger
decoupling of tactical-level military interactions from
political-level crisis management objectives, and the start
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of an escalation sequence at the tactical level of inter-
action. Decoupling and escalation are not inevitable
consequences of inadvertent military incidents. Whether or
not decoupling and escalation occur is a function of the
ability of national leaders to exercise direct control over
tactical-level military operations, the threat perceptions
held by tactical-level military commanders, and the strength
of the factors inhibiting escalation. Thus, the signifi-
cance of inadvertent military incidents can vary widely, and
they generally are not particularly dangerous.
The impact of inadvertent military incidents will be
described as minor, moderate, or significant. Minor means
that inadvertent military incidents have little effect on
stratified interaction—they do not occur often, are not
likely to cause decoupling when they do occur, and do not
impede the re-establishment of control when decoupling does
occur. Moderate means that the impact of inadvertent inci-
dents can vary widely, depending on the circumstances in
which they occur. The impact can range from momentary
decoupling to an uncontrollable escalation sequence. Signi-
ficant means that inadvertent military incidents tend to
have a major impact on stratified interaction. Significant
incidents tend to cause decoupling of tactical-level
military interactions from political-level objectives, to
prevent rapid re-establishment of political-level control,




The first pattern of crisis military interaction is
unified interaction. In this pattern, political-level
leaders exercise direct control over tactical-level military
operations. Unified interaction is the optimum pattern of
crisis military interaction for crisis management: the
pattern achieved when national leaders succeed in meeting
the crisis management requirement that they maintain close
control over military operations. There were no examples of
this pattern of crisis military interaction in the case
studies. The fact that the pattern was not actually
observed suggests that its occurrence is improbable,
particularly in a military establishment as large and
complex as that of the United States.
Unified interactions can have three escalation out-
comes: no escalation, inadvertent controlled escalation, or
deliberate escalation. If the crisis escalates to war, it
is through deliberate decisions by national leaders. This
does not mean that national leaders preferred war to
diplomatic efforts from the beginning of the crisis. They
may
—
particularly in the age of nuclear weapons—opt for war
with great reluctance and apprehension, out of desperation
rather than hope for decisive gains. Escalatory pressures
are primarily top-down rather than bottom-up. That is, the
level of violence at the tactical level reflects the
strategy being pursued at the political level.
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The causal pattern for unified interaction is sum-
marized in Table 6. Political-level control of tactical
level military operations is the most significant indepen-
dent variable determining whether this pattern occurs.
Unified interaction occurs when political national leaders
Table 6
Unified Interaction




Scale of military operations
Intensity of tactical-level
military interactions















are exercising direct control of military operations, and
have the capability to ensure that tactical-level inter-
actions support their strategy for managing the crisis.
Small-scale local military operations favor occurrence of
the pattern because national leaders tend to shift from
direct to indirect control as the scale of military
operations increases. Declaring a worldwide alert (DEFCON 3
or higher) puts great pressure on direct control by setting
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in motion a large range of military operations that can
generate military interactions with the other side's forces.
Routine to heightened intensity, of tactical-level
interactions between the two sides eases the difficulty of
exercising direct control over military operations. As the
intensity of interactions increases, national leaders are
increasing left out of the tactical picture. On-scene
commanders must increasingly make their own decisions to
keep pace with rapidly-changing tactical circumstances.
Any level of tactical-level threat perceptions,
whether unlikely, possible, or imminent, can cause unified
interactions. The relationship between political-level and
tactical-level threat perceptions is the more important
independent variable: the threat perceptions held by
political-level leaders and tactical-level military
commanders are convergent. An example of convergent threat
perceptions would be for national leaders to perceive that
the adversary intends to resort to war while on-scene
commanders perceive that an attack by the other side is
imminent. This type of convergence would tend to generate
escalatory pressures. Convergent threat perceptions would
also occur when national leaders perceive that the adversary
intends to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis and on-
scene commanders perceive that an attack is unlikely.
Convergent threat perceptions tend to prevent tactical-level
interactions from becoming decoupled from political-level
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control. Unified interaction do not exclude the possibility
of war resulting from misperception. When misperceptions
occur, they are convergent—national leaders incorrectly
perceive that the adversary intends to resort to war while
on-scene commanders incorrectly perceive that attack is
imminent.
If the factors inhibiting escalation are strong, they
contribute to the occurrence of unified interactions; but
such factors do not have a major causal role because the
independent variables already mentioned tend to prevent
escalation pressures from occurring. That is, tactical-
level military commanders tend not to feel greater pressure
to escalate than do political-level leaders. Internal
factors are more important than external factors. The
internal factors inhibiting escalation tend to prevent
tactical-level interactions from generating bottom-up
escalatory pressures. The external factors inhibiting
escalation become important only when national leaders begin
contemplating escalatory military options.
The impact of inadvertent incidents must be minor for
the unified interaction pattern to occur. Inadvertent
incidents do not trigger decoupling of tactical-level inter-
actions; national leaders retain direct control. The most
important independent variables causing unified interactions
are thus direct political-level control of tactical-level




The second pattern of crisis military interaction is
parallel stratified interaction. In this pattern national
leaders retain control over the escalation and de-escalation
of conflict. The separate interaction sequences at the
political and tactical levels evolve in parallel, in the
sense of reflecting the same overall strategy toward the
adversary. National leaders do not control every operation-
al decision made at the tactical level, but the decisions
made by on-soene commanders support the crisis management
strategy of national leaders. Parallel stratified interac-
tion is the second best pattern of military interaction from
a crisis management perspective (second only to unified
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Intensity of tactical-level
military interactions
















stratified interactions can have three escalation outcomes:
no escalation, inadvertent controlled escalation, or
deliberate escalation.
The causal pattern for parallel stratified interaction
is summarized in Table 7. Political-level control of
tactical-level military interaction is the most important
independent variable in this pattern. Political-level
control is indirect, rather than direct, as in the unified
interaction pattern. National leaders rely primarily on
mechanisms of indirect control for ensuring that tactical-
level interactions support their strategy for managing the
crisis. For this reason crisis interactions are stratified,
rather than unified.
Local to theater scale of operations favor occurrence
of the pattern because national leaders tend to have greater
difficulty controlling tactical-level military operations as
their scale increases. The likelihood of tactical-level
interactions becoming decoupled from political-level objec-
tives tends to increase as the scope of military operations
increases. Smaller-scale operations thus contribute to
stratified interactions being parallel.
Routine to heightened intensity of tactical-level
interactions between the two sides makes the task of con-
trolling tactical-level military operations feasible. As
the intensity of interactions increases, national leaders




on-scene commanders must make their own decisions to keep
pace with rapidly-changing tactical circumstances. Intense
tactical-level interactions tend to increase the likelihood
of decoupling and inadvertent military incidents, causing
one of other patterns of crisis military interaction.
Any level of tactical-level threat perceptions,
whether unlikely, possible or imminent, can cause parallel
stratified interactions. As in the unified interaction
pattern, the more important independent variable causing the
parallel stratified interaction pattern is that the threat
perceptions held by political-level leaders and tactical-
level military commanders are convergent. Convergent threat
perceptions tend to keep tactical-level interactions
parallel with political-level interactions when national
leaders are not exercising direct control of military
operations. When misperceptions occur, however, they are
convergent—national leaders incorrectly perceive that the
adversary intends to resort to war while on-scene commanders
incorrectly perceive that attack is imminent.
If the factors inhibiting escalation are strong, they
contribute to 'the occurrence of parallel stratified inter-
actions; but such factors do not have a major causal role
because the independent variables already mentioned tend to
prevent stratified escalation pressures from occurring.
Tactical-level commanders tend not to feel greater pressure
to escalate than do political-level leaders.
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Strong internal factors inhibiting escalation do not
mean that parallel stratified interactions inevitably end in
successful crisis resolution short of war. The internal
factors serve only to prevent escalation of tactical-level
interactions, they do not prevent escalatory pressures from
arising separately at the political level of interaction.
The most dangerous situation under conditions of parallel
stratified interactions is for escalatory pressures to arise
simultaneously at all three levels in the chain of command
—
political, strategic, and tactical. This is a convergence
of perceptions at the three levels that escalation of the
conflict is the only course of action that can forestall
unacceptable damage to vital national interests. This type
of convergence is essentially what occurred in the 1964
Tonkin Gulf Incident, in which all levels in the chain of
command perceived the North Vietnamese attacks as deliberate
provocations warranting strong retaliation. Doubts about
the circumstances of the attacks and whether retaliation was
appropriate were not thoroughly explored due to a broad
consensus supporting an escalatory response.
The impact of inadvertent military incidents must be
minor for the parallel stratified interaction pattern to
occur. The essential requirement is that if inadvertent
incidents occur, they do not trigger decoupling (which
causes other patterns of crisis military interaction to
arise). That is, the responses made by on-scene commanders
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to inadvertent incidents support the crisis management
strategy being pursued by national leaders— the essence of
parallel interactions. The most important independent
variables in the parallel stratified interaction pattern are
thus indirect political-level control of tactical-level
military operations and convergent threat perceptions.
Momentary Decoupling
The third pattern of crisis military interaction is
momentary decoupling of interaction. In this pattern
national leaders temporarily lose control of military
interactions, but are able to quickly re-establish control.
However, there is a brief period in which national leaders
are not controlling tactical-level military interactions.
During that period, the actions taken by the on-scene
commander do not support the crisis management efforts being
pursued by national leaders. Those actions could well be
authorized under guidance contained in the mechanisms of
indirect control, but nevertheless complicate political and
diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. This does not
mean that the on-scene commander was "wrong" to take the
actions. For example, he may have been compelled to use
force in self-defense as authorized in his rules of
engagement. The use of force could well have been necessary
to avert an attack, appropriate to the tactical
circumstances, and fully justified under international law,
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but still have interfered with crisis management efforts.
The key point is that tactical-level interactions not
controlled by national leaders occur, and that those actions
complicate or interfere with political-level crisis
management efforts. Instances of momentary decoupling were
observed in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War.
The causal pattern for momentary decoupling of
interactions is summarized in Table 8. Momentary loss of
political-level control of tactical military operations is
the key independent variable causing the pattern: National
leaders lose effective direct or indirect control over
military operations. This can result from several factors,
Table 8
Momentary Decoupling
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Intensity of tactical-level
military interactions

















including communications and information flow problems,
impairment of political-level decisionmaking, a fast-paced
tactical environment, ambiguous or ambivalent orders,
tactically inappropriate orders, inappropriate guidance in
mechanisms of indirect control, and deliberate unauthorized
actions by military commanders. The important feature is
that whatever causes decoupling is not permanent; it does
not prevent national leaders from quickly re-establishing
control.
Local to theater scale of military operations favor
the occurrence of momentary decoupling by increasing the
likelihood that national leaders will be able to to re-
establish control over tactical-level military interaction.
Global-scale operations make it more difficult for national
leaders to re-establish control over tactical-level military
interaction after decoupling occurs. When national leaders
are managing global operations they have difficulty focusing
their attention of an individual engagement, leading to one
of the patterns in which decoupled interactions evolve on
their own (toward escalation or disengagement)
.
The same is true of the intensity of tactical-level
military interaction: routine to heightened interaction
favors the occurrence of momentary decoupling. At the lower
intensities, decoupled tactical-level interactions are less
likely to gain a momentum of their own and national leaders
have less difficulty keeping abreast of the tactical
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•ituation—both of which facilitate the re-establishment of
control over tactical-level military operations. Intense
tactical-level interactions favor the occurrence of patterns
that are not controlled by political-level authorities (the
last three patterns of crisis military interaction, which
are discussed below)
.
The tactical-level threat perception that favors the
occurrence of momentary decoupling is that attack is
unlikely or possible. Momentary decoupling can result from
technical problems with communications systems even when the
on-scene commander views an attack as unlikely. But
momentary decoupling can also result from actions taken in
response to a perception that attack is possible. The
perception that attack is imminent tends not to be
associated with momentary decoupling because it prompts more
intense tactical interactions, which prevent national
leaders from immediately re-establishing control.
A relationship between political-level and tactical-
level threat perceptions that is convergent or similar
favors the occurrence of momentary decoupling. Convergent
or similar threat perceptions facilitate the ability of
national leaders to re-establish control over tactical-level
military operations. Divergent threat perceptions, on the
other hand, tend to cause tactical-level interactions to





Strong escalation-inhibiting factors cause decoupling
to be momentary rather than leading to escalation sequences
beyond the control of national leaders. Strong internal
factors inhibiting escalation facilitate the ability of
national leaders to re-establish control over tactical-level
military operations. For example, on-scene commanders
normally reach the limits of their authority under the
mechanisms of indirect control early in an engagement, and
turn to the chain of command for further guidance. This
creates an opportunity for control to be re-established if
communications channels are open and top-level officials
have a grasp of the tactical situation. The external
factors inhibiting escalation also facilitate re-
establishment of control by slowing the pace of action and
preventing tactical-level interaction from gaining momentum
during the period in which control is lost.
When inadvertent military incidents have a significant
impact on crisis military interactions, they tend to cause
the initial decoupling of tactical-level military inter-
actions from political-level objectives. The most common
type of incident is for an unanticipated authorized action
by an on-scene commander to produce an engagement with the
other side. An example would be use of force in self-
defense under the rules of engagement. The use of force is
both necessary and authorized, but had not been directly
ordered by national leaders and results in an engagement
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over which they have no control. This situation has arisen
several times in the Persian Gulf when Iranian forces
threatened U.S. Navy ships or aircraft. In every incident
the on-scene commanders halted the engagement when the
immediate needs of self-defense were met and sought guidance
from higher authority concerning retaliatory attacks. In
some instances the President was able to issue order on
retaliatory attacks within minutes of an engagement, a clear
example of direct control being re-established after
decoupling. Although accidents and unauthorized actions can
also trigger momentary decoupling, there were no instances
of this occurring in any of the case studies.
In summary, two of the independent variables cause de-
coupling to occur, while the other five cause the decoupling
to be momentary. The independent variables that cause
decoupling to occur are loss of political-level control over
tactical-level military operations and inadvertent incidents
with a significant impact on crisis military interaction.
The independent variables that cause the decoupling to be
momentary are local to theater scale of military operations,
routine to heightened intensity of tactical-level military
operations, unlikely to possible tactical-level threat
perceptions, a convergent to similar relationship between
political-level and tactical-level threat perceptions, and
strong escalation-inhibiting factors. Momentary decoupling
is the most c&m&ob of the four crisis military interaction
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patterns that are marked by decoupling of tactical-level
military interaction from political-level objectives.
Decoupled Interactions Followed by Disengagement
The fourth pattern of crisis military interaction is
decoupled interactions followed by disengagement. This pat-
tern begins with decoupling of tactical-level interaction
from political-level control. National leaders are not able
to immediately re-establish control due to communications
problems, decisionmaking overload, or a fast-paced tactical
environment. But the initial tactical-level engagement
between the two sides does not gain momentum and escalate,
it loses momentum and the forces disengage. By the time
national leaders re-establish control, the shooting has
stopped. Tactical-level disengagement can be a requirement
for political-level control to be re-established,
particularly in a fast-paced tactical environment.
The Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 2 and 4, 1964 are
examples of decoupling followed by disengagement. President
Johnson and his advisors had not been paying close attention
to the USS Maddox prior to the first North Vietnamese
attack, and were not able to control the engagement once it
started. Although the White House was paying much closer
attention to events in the Tonkin Gulf at the time of the
second incident, U.S. communications capabilities still did
not permit top-level officials to control the engagement.
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In both incidents, U.S. Navy commanders in the Tonkin Gulf
acted on the authority delegated to them in mechanisms of
indirect control. Neither of the incidents escalated after
the initial engagements: U.S. naval forces disengaged as
soon as the immediate threat of attack by North Vietnamese
appeared to have been countered, rather than being ordered
to disengage by national leaders. On-scene commanders
consulted with higher authority on retaliation and President
Johnson made the decision on further military operations
against North Vietnam. Thus, although escalation occurred
after the second Tonkin Gulf incident, it was was deliberate
(as opposed to inadvertent) escalation.
The causal pattern for decoupled interactions followed
by direngagement is summarized in Table 9. The most
Table 9
Decoupled Interactions Followed by Disengagement
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portant independent variables causing this pattern of
isis military interaction to occur are loss of political-
/el control over tactical-level military interactions and
rong escalation-inhibiting factors.
Loss of political-level control over tactical-level
litary interactions is most likely to arise from a fast-
ced tactical environment, rather than communications or
cisionmaking problems. National leaders tend to lose
ntrol because they are remote from the scene of action and
e on-scene commander does not have time to consult with
gher authority. Improved communications have not
gnificantly alleviated this limitation over the period
vered in this study (1958-1987): A fast paced-tactical
vironment precluded direct White House control over the
gagements between U.S. Navy and Iranian forces in the
rsian Gulf in 1987. On the other hand, improved
immunications contributed to the President being able to
ke speedy decisions on retaliation against Iranian forces,
lowing retaliatory attacks to commence soon after Iranian
©vocations. The primary effect of improved communications
ius has been to make it easier to re-establish control
ter an engagement begins, making the momentary decoupling
ittern more likely than the decoupling followed by
sengagement pattern.
The scale of military operations tends not to be a
.gnificant independent variable causing the decoupling
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followed by disengagement pattern because loss of control is
primarily caused by the nature of the local tactical
environment. The pattern can occur during military
operations of any scale when the local tactical environment
is the cause of decoupling. Although no examples were found
in the case studies, it is possible that this pattern of
crisis military interaction could also be caused by
communications or decisionmaking problems. Such problems
are more likely to arise as the scale of operations
increases to theater and global.
The intensity of tactical-level military interactions
is a significant independent variable causing the decoupling
followed by disengagement pattern. Intense tactical-level
interactions are more prone to cause loss of control and an
initial engagement than are routine intensity of interac-
tions, and make it more difficult for national leaders to to
re-establish control before the forces disengage.
Tactical-level threat perceptions that attack is
imminent tend to cause decoupling and the initial engage-
ment. A perception that attack is imminent can prompt the
on-scene commander to use force without consulting with
higher authority or without waiting for a top-level decision
after reporting his intentions. The tactical-level percep-
tion of threat can range from being completely accurate, as
in the first Tonkin Gulf Incident, to being an acute misper-
ception of the adversary's intentions.
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The relationship between political-level and tactical-
level threat perceptions tends not to be a significant
independent variable causing the decoupling followed by
disengagement pattern, and therefore can range from conver-
gent to divergent. Regardless of the threat perceptions
they may hold, national leaders are not able to re-establish
control over tactical-level interaction until the forces
disengage.
Strong escalation-inhibiting factors favor occurrence
of the decoupling followed by disengagement pattern, rather
than the two patterns involving escalation. The internal
factors are more important than the external factors.
Internal factors prevent the tactical-level engagement from
spreading upward, becoming a larger battle involving
additional forces. The on-scene commander breaks off the
engagement once the immediate threat to his forces is
countered. The chain of command reacts with caution rather
than over-reacting. External factors can also contribute to
the forces of the two sides disengaging rather than
escalating after the initial engagement. The most important
external factor is adherence to tacit rules of crisis
behavior. Even when the adversary instigates an incident
with a deliberate provocation, he could well decide that
escalation of the resulting engagement would not serve his
interests. The adversary's leaders could also be decoupled




adversary's on-scene commander. In either case, observance
of tacit rules of crisis behavior by the adversary con-
tributes to disengagement rather than escalation being the
result of an incident.
The occurrence of inadvertent military incidents with
a significant impact on crisis military interaction favors
occurrence of the decoupling followed by disengagement
pattern. Inadvertent military incidents can trigger the
decoupling of tactical-level inter-actions and the initial
engagement between the forces of the two sides. The most
common pattern is for an unanticipated authorized action by
an on-scene commander to produce an engagement with the
other side, as in use of force in self-defense under the
rules of engagement. Military accidents or unauthorized
actions could also trigger this pattern of decoupling, but
no examples were found in the case studies.
In summary, four of the independent variables cause
decoupling and the initial engagement to occur, one of the
independent variables causes disengagement to occur without
tactical-level escalation, and two of the independent
variables are no't significant causes of the pattern. The
independent variables that cause decoupling and the initial
engagement to occur are loss of political-level control over
tactical-level military operations, intense tactical-level
military operations, tactical-level threat perceptions that
attack is imminent, and inadvertent incidents with a
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significant impact on crisis military interaction. The
independent variable that causes decoupled tactical-level
interactions to disengage rather than escalate is strong
escalation-inhibiting factors. The independent variables
that have no significant role in causing the pattern to
occur are the scale of military operations and the relation-
ship between political-level and tactical-level threat
perceptions. The decoupling followed by disengagement
pattern occurs less often than the momentary decoupling
pattern, but more often than the two decoupling patterns
involving escalation.
Inadvertent Tactical-Level Escalation
The fifth pattern of crisis military interaction is
inadvertent tactical-level escalation. This pattern begins
with decoupling of tactical-level interaction from political-
level crisis management objectives. National leaders are
not able to immediately re-establish control due to communi-
cations problems, decisionmaking overload, or a fast-paced
tactical environment. The initial tactical-level engagement
gains momentum and escalates, increasing in violence and
involving an increasing amount of each side's forces.
The inadvertent tactical-level escalation pattern can
have three outcomes: disengagement short of war, inadvertent
strategic-level escalation, or deliberate escalation by
national leaders. The escalation sequence stops under one
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of three circumstances: one side disengages after suffering
catastrophic losses, both sides disengage from an incon-
clusive engagement due to exhaustion of ordnance and
attrition of forces, or national leaders re-establish
control and order disengagement. The third scenario
—
national leaders halting tactical-level escalation after
losing control— is unlikely due to the extreme difficulty of
maintaining direct control of forces once they are engaged
in battle.
There were no examples of this crisis military inter-
action pattern in the case studies. The possibility of
decoupled interactions being followed by tactical level
escalation can be inferred from observed variation in the
independent variables affecting military interaction.
Table 10
Inadvertent Tactical-Level Escalation
Independent Variable Value or Range
Political-level control of . Loss of control
tactical-level military
operations
Scale of military operations Theater to global
Intensity of tactical-level Intense
military interactions
Perceived threat of attack at Imminent
the tactical level
Relationship between political- Divergent
level and tactical-level
threat perceptions
Factors inhibiting escalation Weak




However, the fact that the pattern was not actually observed
suggests that its occurrence is improbable.
The causal pattern for decoupled interactions followed
by tactical level escalation is summarized in Table 10. The
most significant independent variables in the inadvertent
tactical-level escalation pattern are loss of political-
level control of tactical-level military interaction,
divergent threat perceptions, and weak factors inhibiting
escalation.
Loss of political-level control of tactical-level
military interaction causes decoupling to occur and allows
tactical-level escalation that is not controlled by national
leaders to occur. Such loss of control can be caused by
communications and information flow problems, impairment of
political-level decisionmaking, a fast-paced tactical
environment, ambiguous or ambivalent orders, tactically
inappropriate orders, inappropriate guidance in mechanisms
of indirect control, or unauthorized actions by military
commanders. Inadvertent tactical-level escalation could
even occur while national leaders are in direct communica-
tion with the on-scene commander if they are incapable of
staying abreast of a rapidly changing tactical environment.
Theater to global scale of military operations are
normally significant in causing the inadvertent tactical-
level escalation pattern. Larger-scale operations can cause
loss of control arising from communications and information

1077
flow problems or impairment of political-level decision-
making. Inadvertent tactical-level escalation can also
occur during smaller-scale military operations when the
cause of decoupling is a fast-paced tactical environment,
ambiguous or ambivalent orders, tactically inappropriate
orders, inappropriate guidance in mechanisms of indirect
control, or unauthorized actions by military commanders.
Intense tactical-level military interaction contri-
butes to causing the inadvertent tactical-level escalation
pattern by causing loss of political-level control of
tactical-level military interaction and making it more
difficult for national leaders to re-establish control
before significant tactical-level escalation occurs.
Tactical-level threat perceptions that attack is
imminent tend to cause decoupling, the initial engagement,
and the tactical-level escalation. A perception that attack
is imminent can prompt the on-scene commander to use force
without consulting with higher authority or without waiting
for a top-level decision after reporting his intentions.
The tactical-level perception of threat can range from being
completely accurate to being an acute misperception of the
adversary's intentions.
A divergent relationship between political-level and
tactical-level threat perceptions is an important indepen-
dent variable in the inadvertent tactical-level escalation
pattern. Divergent threat perceptions inhibit the
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re-establishment of political-level control over tactical-
level interaction, but also help prevent tactical-level
escalation from causing inadvertent strategic-level or
deliberate political-level escalation. A divergent
relationship between political-level and tactical-level
threat perceptions thus contributes to escalation remaining
limited to the tactical level of interaction.
Weak escalation-inhibiting factors favor occurrence of
the inadvertent tactical-level escalation pattern. Neither
internal nor external escalation-inhibiting factors are suf-
ficient to prevent tactical-level escalation from occurring.
On the other hand, the internal and external escalation-
inhibiting factors prevent escalation from spreading upward
to the strategic and political levels. Internally,
strategic-level military commanders and political-level
leaders react with caution to the tactical-level engage-
ment. Externally, both sides adhere to tacit rules of
crisis behavior that inhibit escalation, and communications
between the two sides may be used to avoid escalation and
hasten tactical disengagement. The escalation-inhibiting
factors are thus too weak to prevent tactical-level
escalation, but are strong enough to prevent inadvertent
strategic-level escalation or deliberate political-level
escalation.
The occurrence of inadvertent military incidents with
a significant impact on crisis military interaction favors
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the occurrence of the inadvertent tactical-level interaction
pattern. Inadvertent military incidents can trigger the
decoupling of tactical-level interactions and the initial
engagement between the forces of the two sides. The most
common pattern is for an unanticipated authorized action by
an on-scene commander to produce an engagement with the
other side, as in use of force in self-defense under the
rules of engagement. Military accidents or unauthorized
actions could also trigger this pattern of decoupling.
In summary, four of the independent variables cause
decoupling and the initial engagement to occur, two of the
independent variables cause tactical-level escalation to
occur, and two of the independent variables allow tactical-
level escalation to occur but prevent it from causing
inadvertent strategic-level escalation or deliberate
political-level escalation. The independent variables that
cause decoupling and the initial engagement to occur are
loss of political-level control over tactical-level military
operations, intense tactical-level military operations,
tactical-level threat perceptions that attack is imminent,
and inadvertent incidents with a significant impact on
crisis military interaction. The independent variables that
cause decoupled tactical-level interactions to escalate are
intense tactical-level military interaction, and a tactical-
level threat perception that attack is imminent. The
independent variables that allow tactical-level escalation
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but prevent inadvertent strategic-level escalation or
deliberate political-level escalation are a divergent
relationship between political-level and tactical-level
threat perceptions and weak escalation-inhibiting factors.
Inadvertent Strategic-Level Escalation
The sixth pattern of crisis military interaction is
inadvertent strategic-level escalation. This pattern can
arise via either of two paths: escalation at the strategic
level arising from tactical-level escalation, or initiation
of escalation at the strategic level without prior tactical-
level escalation. Inadvertent strategic-level escalation
arising from tactical-level escalation was the path examined
in this study, which focused on tactical-level military
interaction. Inadvertent strategic-level escalation without
prior tactical-level escalation could arise from inadvertent
military incidents (unanticipated authorized actions,
military accidents, and unauthorized deliberate actions)
involving strategic-level forces. Many of the factors
affecting tactical-level interaction probably also affect
strategic-level interaction, but such strategic level
factors were not addressed in this study. The remainder of
this discussion will address only inadvertent strategic-
level escalation, arising from tactical-level escalation.
Inadvertent strategic-level escalation arising from
tactical-level escalation begins with tactical-level
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interactions decoupling from political-level control.
National leaders are unable to immediately re-establish con-
trol over tactical-level interaction due to communications
problems, decisionmaking overload, or a fast-paced tactical
environment. The initial tactical-level engagement gains
momentum and escalates, increasing in violence and involving
an increasing amount of each side's forces. The tactical-
level escalation spiral generates escalatory pressures at
the strategic level, reinforcing perceptions that the
adversary is preparing for war and is not interested in a
diplomatic solution to the crisis. The scope of fighting
rapidly grows to the theater level and spreads to other
theaters, possibly becoming global in scope. The spread of
the escalatory spiral to the strategic level of interaction
is through deliberate decisions made by strategic-level
military commanders, but is considered to be inadvertent
because it was not directly ordered by national leaders and
did not support their efforts to manage the crisis.
The inadvertent strategic-level escalation pattern of
crisis military interaction can have three outcomes:
inadvertent escalation to war, deliberate escalation to war,
or disengagement short of war. Inadvertent escalation to
war occurs if strategic-level military commanders, acting on
their own authority, order initiation of wartime military
operations (that is, to execute contingency war plans)
.
This could occur under three circumstances: First,
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inadvertent escalation to war could occur when tactical-
level and initial strategic-level escalation is misperceived
as initiation of war by the adversary. Strategic-level
military commanders then order wartime operations under the
authority delegated to them to act in such situations. This
would appear to be the most likely circumstances for
inadvertent escalation to war. Second, inadvertent
escalation to war could arise from strategic-level military
commanders misperceiving that national leaders desire that
wartime operations be initiated, but are for some reason
(such as communications failure) incapable of issuing the
order. Third, inadvertent escalation to war could arise
from an unauthorized deliberate decision by a strategic
level military commander to initiate wartime operations
(that is, ordering such operations knowing that national
leaders would oppose the decision) . Based on the findings
of this study, this would be the least likely path for
inadvertent escalation to war.
Deliberate escalation to war occurs when inadvertent
strategic-level escalation prompts national leaders to make
a deliberate decision to initiate wartime operations. The
final decision for war is a deliberate one made by national
leaders. The decision for war could be based on an accurate
assessment to that the adversary intends to initiate wartime
military operations, or has already done so, but could also
be based on a misperception of the adversary's intentions
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and the causes of the tactical-level and strategic-level
escalation being experienced in the crisis.
Disengagement short of war can occur under either of
two circumstances: First, when national leaders are able to
re-establish control over strategic-level military
interaction and halt escalation of the conflict, or, second,
when strategic-level military commanders halt escalation of
military operations on their own authority (perhaps
realizing that their original decision to commence strategic-
level military operations was unwarranted)
.
There were no examples of the inadvertent strategic-
level escalation pattern of crisis military interaction in
the case studies. The possibility of decoupled interactions
being followed by escalation spreading to the strategic
level can be inferred from observed variation in the
independent variables affecting military interaction.
However, the fact that the pattern was not actually observed
suggests that its occurrence is improbable.
The causal pattern for inadvertent strategic-level
escalation is summarized in Table 11. The most important
independent variables causing this pattern are loss of
political-level control of tactical-level military
interaction, convergent threat perceptions, and lack of
escalation-inhibiting factors.
Loss of political-level control of tactical-level









Scale of military operations
Intensity of tactical-level
military interactions















tactical-level escalation that is not controlled by national
leaders to occur. Such loss of control can be caused by
communications and information flow problems, impairment of
political-level decisionmaking, a fast-paced tactical
environment, ambiguous or ambivalent orders, tactically
inappropriate orders, inappropriate guidance in mechanisms
of indirect control, or unauthorized actions by military
commanders. Decoupling could occur while national leaders
are in direct communication with the on-scene commander if
they cannot stay abreast of a rapidly changing tactical
environment.
Global-scale Military operations tend to favor the
occurrence of the inadvertent strategic-level escalation
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pattern* Larger-scale operations make loss of political-
level control over tactical-level and strategic-level
interactions more likely, and provide an opportunity for a
tactical engagement to rapidly spread to theater and strate-
gic forces. The most acute danger is when the military
forces of both sides are at a high level of alert, maintain-
ing readiness to commence combat operations on short notice.
Tactical-level threat perceptions that attack is
imminent tend to cause decoupling, the initial tactical-
level engagement, and tactical-level escalation. A
perception that attack is imminent can prompt the on-scene
commander to use force without consulting with higher
authority or without waiting for a top-level decision after
reporting his intentions. The tactical-level perception of
threat can range from being completely accurate to being an
acute misperception of the adversary's intentions.
A convergent relationship between strategic-level and
tactical-level threat perceptions is an important indepen-
dent variable in the inadvertent strategic-level escalation
pattern. The spread of escalation to the strategic level
results from strategic-level military commanders perceiving
that war with the adversary is imminent and unavoidable.
Further, a convergent relationship between political -level
and strategic-level threat perceptions is important in
causing deliberate escalation to war to result from inadver-
tent strategic-level escalation. National leaders make a
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deliberate decision to initiate wartime military operations,
rather than to halt strategic-level escalation, because
previous tactical-level and strategic-level escalation
appears to confirm their suspicions that the adversary is
not interested in a diplomatic solution to the crisis.
Convergence of threat perceptions is thus a significant
independent variable in the inadvertent strategic-level
escalation pattern of crisis military interaction.
A lack of escalation-inhibiting factors is also a
significant independent variable in the inadvertent
strategic-level escalation pattern. The internal factors
that would ordinarily prevent escalatory pressures from
spreading upward are nullified by convergent threat
perceptions. On-scene commanders and the chain of command
have little incentive to react with military and political
caution because national lealers share their worst-case
perceptions of h=: adversary's intentions. The external
factors inhibiting escalation are also lacking. A lack of,
or erosion of, tacit rules of crisis behavior cause the two
sides to react to tactical-level escalation with strategic-
level escalation, rather than restraint, and communications
between the two sides are not used or not effective in
preventing misperceptions of intentions and arresting the
escalation spiral.
The occurrence of inadvertent military incidents with
a significant impact on crisis military interaction favors
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the occurrence of the inadvertent strategic-level interac-
tion pattern. Inadvertent military incidents can trigger
the decoupling of tactical-level interactions and the
initial engagement between the forces of the two sides; and
can also contribute to the spread of tactical-level escala-
tion to the strategic level. For example, accidental launch
of a strategic nuclear weapon in the midst of tactical-level
escalation could well trigger strategic-level escalation by
appearing to be preemption by the other side.
In summary, five of the independent variables cause
decoupling and the initial engagement to occur, while five
of the independent variables cause tactical-level escalation
to result in inadvertent strategic-level escalation. The
independent variables that cause decoupling and the initial
engagement to occur are loss of political-level control over
tactical-level military operations, global-scale military
operations, intense tactical-level military interaction,
tactical-level threat perceptions that attack is imminent,
and inadvertent incidents with a significant impact on
tactical-level military interaction. The independent
variables that cause tactical-level escalation result in
inadvertent strategic-level escalation are loss of political-
level control over strategic-level military operations,
global-scale military operations, a convergent relationship
between strategic-level and tactical-level threat percep-
tions (and, in the case of deliberate escalation to war.
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convergent political-level and strategic-level threat
perceptions), a lack of escalation-inhibiting factors, and
inadvertent incidents with a significant impact on strategic-
level military interaction. The inadvertent strategic-level
escalation pattern appears to be the crisis interaction
pattern least likely to occur.
Conclusion
The dependent variable in the theory of stratified
interaction is the outcome of crisis military interaction;
specifically, the degree to which and the manner in which
tactical-level military interactions cause escalation of a
crisis. Variance in the dependent variable is described in
terms of six patterns of crisis military interaction:
unified interaction, parallel stratified interaction,
momentary decoupling, decoupled interactions followed by
disengagement, inadvertent tactical-level escalation, and
inadvertent strategic-level escalation. The first two
patterns—unified interaction and parallel stratified
interaction—can have three escalation outcomes: no escala-
tion, inadvertent controlled escalation, or deliberate
escalation. Inadvertent controlled escalation and deliber-
ate escalation can halt short of war or continue on to war.
In the third and fourth patterns—momentary decoupling of
interactions and decoupled interactions followed by
disengagement—tactical-level interaction halts without
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significant escalation. The fifth pattern--inadvertent
tactical level escalation—can have three outcomes:
disengagement short of war, inadvertent strategic-level
escalation, or deliberate escalation to war. The sixth
pattern—inadvertent strategic-level escalation—can have
three outcomes: disengagement short of war, inadvertent
escalation to war, or deliberate escalation to war.
These six patterns constitute a typology of crisis
military interaction and appear to cover the full range of
interactions that could occur in a crisis. However, because
they were identified through an analytical-inductive
process, rather than deductively, additional patterns could
be identified through further empirical research.
More than one of the patterns of crisis military
interaction can occur in a crisis. The first four patterns
—
unified interaction, parallel stratified interaction,
momentary decoupling of interaction, decoupled interactions
followed by disengagement, and inadvertent tactical-level
escalation—can occur in various sequences in a crisis.
Contingent generalizations were formulated for the six
patterns of crisis military interaction, offering a distinct
causal pattern for each type of interaction. Each of the
causal patterns is produced by specific variations in seven
independent variables that were identified in the case
studies as significant in determining the outcome of crisis
military interaction. The seven independent variables that
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determine the nature of crisis military interaction and the
likelihood of escalation are (a) the degree of political-
level control over tactical-level military interaction, (b)
the scale of military operations, (c) the intensity of
tactical-level military interactions, (d) the perceived
threat of attack at the tactical level, (e) the relationship
between political-level and tactical-level threat percep-
tions, (f) the strength of escalation-inhibiting factors,
and (g) the impact of inadvertent military incidents. The
seven independent variables determine the degree to which
crisis interactions to become stratified, whether or not
Table 12
Comparison of Crisis Interaction Patterns
Ind Unified Parallel Stratified Momentary
Var Interaction Interaction Decoupling
(a) direct indirect loss
(b) local local- local-
theater theater
(c) routine- routine- routine-
heightened heightened heightened
(d) any* any* unlikely-
possible
(•) convergent convergent convergent-
• similar
(f) strong strong strong
(g) minor minor significant
Independent variable not significant in the pattern.
Note: Independent variables (Ind Var) are lettered in the






























If) strong weak lacking
<*) significant significant significant
Independent variable not significant in the pattern.
Note: Independent variables (Ind Var) are lettered in the
sequence given at the top of page 1090.
stratified interactions become decoupled, and the degree to
which decoupled interactions result in escalation of a
crisis. The values of the seven independent variables that
cause or tend to favor each of the patterns of crisis
military interaction are summarized in Table 12.
On the basis of the eight historical cases examined in
this study, a ranking of the six patterns of crisis interac-
tion—from most to least likely to occur when U.S. naval
forces are employed in a crisis—would be as follows:
parallel stratified interaction, momentary decoupling,
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dtcoupled interactions followed by disengagement, inadver-
tent tactical-level interaction, inadvertent strategic-level
interaction, and unified interaction. The independent
variables that most affect this ranking are political-level
control of tactical-level interaction and the strength of
the escalation-inhibiting factors. Direct political-level
control of tactical-level military operations is difficult
for U.S. leaders due to the size and complexity of the U.S.
armed forces, making the unified interaction pattern rare
and providing ample opportunities for stratified crisis
interactions to become decoupled. The escalation-inhibiting
factors are generally quite strong, preventing escalation
even when decoupling occurs—making momentary decoupling and
decoupling followed by disengagement much more common than
inadvertent tactical-level escalation or inadvertent
strategic-level escalation.
Three issues remain to be addressed. First, what do
these findings imply for the analytical value of the theory
of stratified interaction. Second, what are the implica-
tions of these findings for the practice of crisis
management. Third, to what degree can these findings be
generalized to crises involving forces other than naval
forces. These issues will be addressed in the next chapter,
which will offer overall conclusions on the theory of
stratified interaction, the implications of these findings




The theory of stratified interaction and the
contingent generalizations derived from it provide a policy-
relevant explanatory theory of crisis military interaction.
The theory provides differentiated explanations for a
variety of crisis military interactions, thus allowing
policymakers to diagnose specific situations in which crisis
management and crisis stability problems can arise.
Studies of international crises have repeatedly
concluded that the success of crisis management is
critically dependent upon top-level political authorities
maintaining close control of the actions of their military
forces. This essential requirement for crisis management
has also been identified as a potentially serious problem
area. But the existing literature on crises and crisis
management by and large has not progressed beyond
identifying general requirements for crisis management.
Policymakers need an enhanced ability to diagnose specific
situations in which particular crisis management and crisis
stability problems can arise. Policymakers cannot operate




crisis management. Rather, they need the ability to judge
how the general requirements of crisis management apply in
the particular crises they face.
Contemporary crisis management theory has poor
diagnostic power when applied to a particular crisis
situation. Scholars engaged in formulating crisis
management theories generally have not attempt to develop a
differentiated typology of situations in which crisis
management and crisis stability problems can arise. Most
scholars engaged in formulating crisis management theory
have been insufficiently concerned with explanatory, as
opposed to prescriptive, theory. What is needed is an
explanatory theory that is policy-relevant without being
prescriptive. Earlier studies have not succeeded in
identifying theoretically relevant variation in crisis
military interaction. Crisis management and crisis
stability problems can arise in different ways, causing
crisis management to fail for different reasons.
To acquire diagnostic power of the kind needed by
policymakers, an explanatory theory must be capable of
providing explanations that discriminate among causal
This discussion draws heavily from Alexander L.
George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign
Policy; Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1974), pp. 509-515; Alexander L. George, "Case
Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured,
Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon, ed., Diplomacy: New
Approaches in History, Theory, and Poliry (New York: The
Free Press, 1979), pp. 59-60.
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patterns. That is, it must be capable of offering differen-
tiated explanations for a variety of patterns of crisis
military interaction. A differentiated explanatory theory
is possible by formulating contingent generalizations, which
identify regularities that occur only under certain specific
conditions. The objective of this study was to identify
different causal patterns associated with variation in
crisis military interaction. For this purpose an analytical-
inductive procedure was used to analyze four historical
cases of crisis naval operations and four cases of peacetime
attacks on U.S. Navy ships. This inductive procedure
yielded a typology of crisis military interactions, each
linked with a somewhat different causal pattern.
The dependent variable was whether on not inadvertent
escalation occurs in an international crisis. For the pur-
poses of this study, inadvertent escalation was defined as
any increase in the level or scope of violence in a crisis
that was not directly ordered by national leaders or antici-
pated by them as being the likely result of their orders.
The specific phenomena explained in the study were the
interaction of military forces in crises and the impact of
such interactions on crisis stability. Empirical research
on the use of United States naval forces in crises was used
to develop a set of contingent generalizations explaining
three aspects of the theory: (a) the conditions under which
crisis interactions become stratified and decoupled, (b) the
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conditions that prevent stratified escalation dynamics from
occurring, and (c) the conditions under which tensions
between political and diplomatic objectives arise and affect
crisis decision-making in particular ways. The analysis
defined discrete p<*Lterns of tactical-level crisis interac-
tion, each associated with a particular causal pattern.
Because the patterns of tactical-level interaction were
arrived at empirically, the patterns identified in this
study probably do not cover the universe of interaction
patterns—additional patterns could well be identified
through further empirical research.
The scope of the study was limited to international
crises in which two fundamental conditions were present:
The first was that both sides in a crisis sought to protect
or advance vital national interests, or at least had vital
interests at stake that they were unwilling to sacrifice for
the purpose of avoiding war. Both sides thus took military
actions intended to support crisis bargaining and to counter
military moves by the other side. The second condition was
that neither side desired war as the outcome of the crisis.
National leaders on each side limited their objectives and
restrained their military moves to avoid provoking a war.
Both sides thus sought to avoid inadvertent escalation of
the crisis while deterring escalation by the other side.
When both of these conditions are met, the primary danger is
of war arising from inadvertent escalation.
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The nature of the phenomena being addressed dictated a
focus on decisionmaking and the details of how crisis mili-
tary operations are controlled. That, in turn, required a
research design in which a small number of cases were
examined using the method of structured focused comparison,
rather than a research design using a large number of cases
and statistical methods to identify significant causal
variables explaining variance in outcomes.
Empirical data for the study came from two sets of
case studies. The first set consisted of four cases in
which United States naval forces were employed in crises:
the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis, the 1967 Middle East War, and the 1973 Middle East
War. The second set of case studies consisted of four cases
in which U.S. Navy ships were attacked in peacetime: the
1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967 Israeli attack on the
USS Liberty , the 1968 North Korean seizure of the USS
Pueblo , and the 1987 Iraqi attack on the USS Stark .
The Theory of Stratified Interaction
Previous studies of international crises implicitly
viewed the various political and military interactions that
occur between the two sides as a single interaction
sequence. The flow of events in a crisis is viewed as a
single sequence of actions and reactions. A consequence of
this perspective is the implicit assumption that all the
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actions taken by a nation during a crisis either are ordered
by national leaders in pursuit of their policy objectives,
or should not have occurred and therefore represent a loss
of control over events. The single interaction sequence
model does not accurately describe international crises.
What actually occurs is multiple interaction sequences that
only partially influence each other. Multiple interaction
sequences, evolving simultaneously but semi-independently,
arise when national leaders do not make all operational
decisions themselves, but must delegate significant decision-
making authority to subordinates.
Stratified Interaction
The theory of stratified interaction states that,
given conditions of delegated control, tight horizontal
coupling between the military forces of the two sides, and
acute crisis, interactions between the two sides will be
stratified in three levels: political, strategic and
tactical. The first corollary to the theory is that
tactical-level interactions can become decoupled from the
political-military objectives of national leaders. The term
decoupled is used to mean that vertical command and control
links to operational military forces at the scene of a
crisis are severed or otherwise fail to ensure that tactical-
level decisionmaking supports the crisis management strategy
of national leaders. Decoupling occurs to the extent that
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operational decisions on the employment of military forces
made at the strategic and tactical levels differ from the
operational decisions political level decisionmakers would
have made to coordinate those military actions with their
political-diplomatic strategy for resolving the crisis.
This is an inductive theory arrived at through empirical
historical research into crisis interactions.
Crisis Stability
Crisis stability exists to the extent that neither
side has an incentive to strike the first military blow.
The crisis security dilemma is that, in a crisis, many of
the actions a state takes to increase its security and
improve its bargaining position decrease the security of the
adversary. The stratified crisis security dilemma is that,
in a crisis, the security dilemma is stratified, arising
from the interaction processes occurring separately at each
of the three levels, and affecting the likelihood of war
separately at each level. This in turn leads to the concept
of stratified escalation dynamics: in a crisis in which
interaction between the two sides has become stratified and
decoupled, the security dilemma, operating separately at
each level of interaction, can trigger an escalatory spiral
at the strategic or tactical levels, which under certain




Among the various ways in which wars can arise, pre-
emption and inadvertent escalation are particularly relevant
to the study of how war can arise from a crisis. Preemption
is motivated by perceptions and fears that the other side is
about to strike first. An important implication of the
stratified crisis security dilemma is that tactical-level
military commanders can perceive incentives to preempt while
political-level leaders do not. Tactical-level commanders
can be delegated the authority to order certain types of
preemption under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.
Such tactical-level preemption could well set in motion an
escalation sequence that is at least temporarily beyond the
control of national leaders.
War can also arise inadvertently through an escalation
process in which the two sides take increasingly threatening
military and diplomatic moves in an effort at gaining
leverage in crisis bargaining and improving their military
positions. Accidents and other inadvertent military actions
contribute to the escalation process. The escalation
dynamic is driven by rising stakes in the outcome of a
conflict, which increase the motivation of national leaders
to prevail, and by an action-reaction process, in which an
escalatory action by one side provokes an escalatory reac-
tion by the other side in recurring cycles. This escalation
dynamic increases tensions and hardens resolve until it
results in a deliberate or preemptive decision for war.
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Another aspect of crisis stability is the danger of
misperception under conditions of stratified interaction.
The concept of the misperception dilemma describes the
inadvertent results that can occur when military forces are
used for signalling in a crisis. When signalling
adversaries, the dilemma is between inadvertent signals of
hostility and inadvertent signals of acquiescence. When
signalling an ally or friend, the misperception dilemma is
between inadvertent signals of encouragement and inadvertent
signals of retrenchment. Given stratified interactions,
then perceptions of the adversary can also be stratified,
with different perceptions being held at different levels of
interaction. Misperceptions can arise at one level without
other levels necessarily being aware of them, providing a
mechanism by which stratified interactions can become
decoupled.
Political-Military Tensions
The crisis management literature is based on an
erroneous view of the manner in which military forces are
controlled in crises. This apparently resulted from the
frequently observed phenomenon of United States leaders
exercising close control over military operations in crises,
combined with a lack of familiarity with military command
and control procedures. The crisis management literature
typically describes the control of crisis military
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operations as being highly centralized, with top-level
civilian authorities exercising direct control— in contrast
to routine peacetime operations, which are described as
highly decentralized and having little involvement of
civilian political authorities. Although this description
is essentially correct, it fails to grasp the complexity of
military command and control, and leads to inaccurate
assessments of the crisis management problems arising from
the employment of military forces in crises.
Even in crises, military commanders are delegated
significant authority to make operational decisions on the
employment of their forces—including decisions on the use
of force. Under certain circumstances military commanders
can use conventional weapons without seeking permission from
higher authorities. The scope of their authority is spelled
out in a variety of documents, which collectively will be
referred to as mechanisms of indirect control. There are
even provisions for commanders to act contrary to their
written instructions when circumstances dictate. Although
some scholars have recognized that these features exist in
the United States military command and control system, the
actual complexity of that system has not been reflected in
the literature on crisis management.
The interaction of political and military considera-
tions when military force is employed as a political
instrument in crises generate tensions—actual and potential
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conflicts between political and military considerations
which force decision-makers, either knowingly or tacitly, to
make trade-offs among individually important but mutually
incompatible considerations. These political-military
tensions, which can give rise to difficult policy dilemmas
in a crisis, are inherent in the use of force as a political
instrument under conditions of stratified interaction.
There are three political-military tensions. The
first is tension between political considerations and the
needs of diplomatic bargaining, on the one hand, and
military considerations and the needs of military
operations, on the other. The second is tension between the
need for top-level control of military options in a crisis,
and the need for tactical flexibility and instantaneous
decision-making at the scene of the crisis. The third is
tension between performance of peacetime political missions
and readiness to perform wartime combat missions. These
three tensions between political and military considerations
affect the degree to which stratified interactions become
decoupled in a crisis, thus having a significant impact on
crisis decision-making and crisis stability.
Mechanisms of Indirect Control
Organization and management studies show that
significant delegation of decisionmaking authority is common
in large organizations. Delegation of decisionmaking is
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driven by the limits on decisionmaking, which cause decision-
making by top-level officials to deteriorate as the size and
complexity of the organization increase. These observations
apply particularly well to the military chain of command,
which is founded on the principle of delegating control
while retaining command. As organization theory predicts,
delegation of control in the military command system is
primarily due to constraints on the ability of top-level
authorities to effectively control tactical operations.
Organization and management studies show that tension
between autonomy and control is always present in public and
business organizations, particularly those consisting of
numerous independent operating units. As before, these
findings apply particularly well to the U.S. military.
Tension between delegation and control is always present in
the military chain of command. Pressures toward centralized
control are driven by the complexity of modern warfare, fear
of nuclear war, and efforts to exploit the force multiplier
effect. Pressures toward decentralized control are driven
by severe constraints on the ability of top-level
authorities to effectively control tactical operations, and
by the advantages gained by granting the on-scene commander
flexibility to exercise initiative.
Organization and management studies show that delega-
tion of decisionmaking can range from being highly rule-
governed, for standard, repetitive situations, to highly
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discretionary, for situations that cannot be anticipated.
This also applies to military command and control. The
methods of exercising control cover a "tightness of control"
spectrum ranging from very tight to very loose control.
Toward the tight end of the spectrum are positive direct
control, and direct control by negation. Toward the loose
end of the spectrum are monitored delegated control and
autonomous delegated control. The guidance contained in
mechanisms of indirect control can also range from being
detailed and specific (tight indirect control) to general
and flexible (loose indirect control) . In military command
and control, as in public administration and business manage-
ment, tighter forms of control are more appropriate for
standard situations that are easily anticipated, while
looser forms of control are more appropriate for an environ-
ment marked by uncertainty and ambiguity, in which specific
decisionmaking situations are difficult to anticipate.
Organization and management studies show that three
types of control mechanisms are used in various combina-
tions: hierarchical (rules and procedures) , collegial
(professionalism) , and nonhierarchical (organizational and
societal norms and culture) . All three methods are used in
the military organizations. The mechanisms of indirect
control—the alert system, standing orders, mission orders,
contingency plans, and rules of engagement—are all
hierarchical controls. They relieve higher authorities of
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the burden of having to closely monitor the details of
military operations— a burden that can quickly exceed their
information processing and decisionmaking capabilities when
large-scale operations are being conducted in a fast-paced
political-military environment. Relieved of this burden,
top-level authorities are better able to concentrate on
monitoring the overall political-strategic situation,
formulating and revising their strategy for dealing with the
confrontation, and coordinating the overall execution of
military operations so that they support that strategy,
Hierarchical controls serve similar functions in public and
business organizations.
Collegial and nonhierarchical controls are relied upon
heavily in military organizations. Collegial control is
provided by the professionalism of the officer corps, which
is highly developed and stressed in the training of
officers. Non-hierarchical controls—organizational norms
and values—are also widely used in the military. They are
most visible in elite military units, such as Army Special
Forces and the Marine Corps. Members of these units are
indoctrinated that their elite status requires that they
meet superior standards of performance— typically
discipline, endurance, aggressiveness, and fighting skill
—
unique to their organizations. Similar nonhierarchical
controls are used throughout the armed forces to complement
and reinforce military professionalism.
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Collegial and nonhierarchical controls have a major
impact on the effectiveness of delegated control and the
mechanisms of indirect control. On the one hand, controls
such as discipline, loyalty, and respect for the chain of
command are essential for delegated control and mechanisms
of indirect control to function at all. Similarly,
professional experience and judgement can be crucial for
correctly interpreting ambiguous orders and carrying out
general guidance under rapidly changing circumstances. The
ultimate test of professional experience and judgement is
knowing when to disregard inappropriate orders in order to
take action that better supports the national interest. On
the other hand, collegial and nonhierarchical controls can
generate commitment to particular operational doctrines or
procedures, and resistance to operations custom-designed for
crisis management purposes.
Studies of public administration and business manage-
ment repeatedly show that in large organizations comprised
of numerous independent operating units, optimum performance
is achieved with decentralized decisionmaking combined with
appropriate—primarily collegial and nonhierarchical
—
controls. The issue as to what degree of centralization or
decentralization is optimum for military operations was not
directly addressed in this review of the military command
system. The strength and weaknesses of the methods of con-
trol and mechanisms of indirect control, and the arguments
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for and against centralization of decision-making authority,
were discussed, but the focus was on how military command
and control function in principle. Many things can go wrong
in the stress and confusion of crisis military operations,
and there are inherent limits on the ability of any methods
or mechanisms of control to ensure that decisions made at
one level are those that are most appropriate for the situa-
tion at another level. The optimum degree of centralization
or decentralization can vary widely depending on the nature
of the military operation being conducted and the political-
military context of the operation.
The United States armed forces rely on a flexible
combination of direct and indirect control. The methods of
control range from positive direct control and direct
control by negation at the tight end of the "tightness of
control" spectrum, to monitored delegated control and
autonomous delegated control at the loose end. Certain of
the methods of control can be used in conjunction, and
forces can be rapidly shifted from one method to another as
the situation warrants.
When a military commander delegates control of opera-
tional forces, he does not relinquish all control of those
forces to his subordinate. In most cases, he retains a
certain amount of direct control, which can vary widely in
tightness. Additionally, the commander has at his disposal
various mechanisms of indirect control. Mechanisms of
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indirect control are order:*, instructions, or detailed
guidance issued to a commander prior to the start of a
mission in order to ensure that the operational decisions he
makes support the objectives and intentions of his
superiors. Such instructions can range from being very
detailed and specific to very general in nature. As the
method of control being used moves across the "tightness of
control** spectrum from tight to loose—that is, as the
subordinate is granted increasing freedom from direct
control—the importance of the mechanisms of indirect
control increases. When a subordinate is operating under
autonomous delegated control, with no direct communications
links at all, the mechanisms of indirect control are the
only means of control available. There are five mechanisms
of indirect control: the alert system, standing orders,
mission orders, contingency plans, and rules of engagement.
The U.S. alert system, which is based on five levels
of Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) , defines the overall
framework for controlling the readiness of U.S. forces,
providing a uniform system for all operational commands.
Within this framework,, following guidance from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , individual commands formulate alert
procedures and readiness postures applicable to their
forces. The system is highly flexible, allowing different
major commands to be placed at different DEFCON levels as
the world situation warrants. Much of the detailed guidance

1110
for operational forces is included in standing orders and
contingency plans activated as higher levels of DEFCON are
declared. Certain military commanders are delegated
authority to increase the readiness of their forces
independent of the DEFCON set by the JCS. They must
maintain the minimum readiness level set by JCS, but can
place their forces at a higher condition of readiness if
warranted by the particular threat facing their commands.
They can also select from among various readiness postures
—
tailored for different types of threats—within a given
DEFCON level. Lower level commanders (who do not have
authority to order changes in DEFCON) can also increase the
readiness of their forces independent of the worldwide or
theater DEFCON level.
Standing orders are detailed guidance on operational
procedures prepared on a routine basis during peacetime.
Although they are revised periodically, the intent is that
they provide stable guidance, thereby minimizing uncertainty
over operational procedures and facilitating the exercise of
delegated control. Standing orders fall into four general
categories: doctrinal publications, operations orders,
operations plans, and long-range schedules.
Mission orders include letters of intent (LOIs)
,
operations plans or operations orders issued for a specific
short-term operation, and various other types of orders used
to initiate routine and non-routine operations. Mission
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orders can range from being very detailed and specific to
being very brief and general. At a minimum, a mission order
includes the objective of the operation, the forces assigned
to it, the identity of the commander, and the time frame for
the operation. Mission orders serve as a mechanism of
indirect control by relieving a commander of having to
exercise direct control over the details of an operation's
execution. An important function of mission orders is to
define the scope of decisionmaking authority delegated to
subordinate commanders. A mission order can specify which
decisions must be referred to higher authority and which
decisions the subordinate commander is authorized make
himself.
Contingency plans are those operations plans (OPLANs)
prepared in advance for execution in the circumstances
specified in the plans. Contingency plans are commonly
prepared for crisis and peacetime emergency scenarios,
various limited war scenarios, and general war scenarios
(the last two types are often collectively referred to as
"war plans'*) . Contingency plans serve as a mechanism of
indirect control by allowing a commander to rapidly issue a
single order to execute an operation that he and his staff
have had time to prepare in detail ahead of time. Contin-
gency plans are distributed in advance, eliminating the
burden of having to issue a large volume of orders when a
decision in made to carry out the operation. The only
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direct orders that are needed are last-minute revisions to
the contingency plan and the mission order directing that it
be executed as modified.
Rules of engagement are orders issued to define the
circumstances in which the U.S. armed forces are authorized
to use their weapons for defense against hostile forces in
peacetime, and to specify the scope and level of violence of
combat operations in wartime. Rules of engagement serve as
a mechanism of indirect control by allowing top-level
authorities to specify policies on the use of force prior to
situations in which direct control of the decision to use
force is not possible. The purpose of rules of engagement
is to provide guidance to operating forces from National
Command Authorities, via the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
operational chain of command, on how to respond to threat of
attack in peacetime, and on limitations on fighting in
wartime.
Wartime rules of engagement place limits on military
action when U.S. forces are engaged in an armed conflict.
Certain military options may be deemed undesirable in war-
time due to escalation control, diplomatic, and humanitarian
considerations. For example, an important escalation con-
trol function of wartime rules of engagement is to prevent
incidents with the military forces of non-belligerents.
Wartime rules of engagement can also be used to prevent
geographic expansion of a conflict when it is politically
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and diplomatically desirable to confine the fighting to a
limited area. Wartime rules of engagement allow military
action under such circumstances only for self-defense— the
adversary is forced to make the decision to escalate or
expand the conflict.
Peacetime rules of engagement are founded on the right
of self-defense as defined under international law and in
U.S. Department of Defense directives. The peacetime rules
prohibit U.S. military commanders from using force in peace-
time unless absolutely necessary for self-defense. The
principle of anticipatory self-defense allows commanders to
shoot first upon clear demonstration of hostile intent
(i.e., when threatened with imminent attack). There are two
categories of peacetime rules of engagement: standing and
special. Standing rules of engagement are written for
routine peacetime operations. They are in effect at all
times for the forces they cover. Special rules of engage-
ment are issued to cover particularly sensitive situations,
such as operations near a country openly hostile to the U.S.
and operations during an international crisis.
The operational requirement of crisis management that
national leaders maintain close control over military opera-
tions can be exercised in a variety of ways. One approach
is to shift from methods at the loose end of the tightness
of control spectrum—autonomous delegated control monitored
delegated control—to methods at the tight end of the
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spectrum—direct control by negation and positive direct
control. This is the approach commonly referred to in the
crisis management literature. This type of direct control
has its costs, and can even hinder effective crisis manage-
ment. Unless the scope of military operations is very small
and simple, direct control can quickly overload information
processing and decisionmaking. National leaders typically
focus on selected aspects of the operations, which may not
be the most important or dangerous evolutions taking place.
The need for close control thus needs be weighed against the
constraints on the ability of national leaders to exercise
effective direct control of military operations.
A second approach to maintaining close control of
crisis military operations is through the mechanisms of
indirect control. This entails shifting the guidance
contained in mechanisms of indirect control from being
general and flexible (loose indirect control) , to being
detailed and specific (tight indirect control) . Close
attention to the rules of engagement is particularly
important in this regard. As was also true with methods of
control, excessive tightness in the mechanisms of indirect
control can be counterproductive—denying the ori-scene
commander the flexibility he needs to adapt to rapidly
changing circumstances. The optimum tightness of control
lies somewhere between absolute control and absolute
autonomy. Establishing precisely where the optimum balance
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between control and delegation lies is one of the inherent
tensions in crisis management.
U.S. military command and control procedures allow
ample opportunity for stratified interaction to occur in
crises. The U.S. armed forces rely on a flexible combina-
tion of direct and delegated control that emphasizes
delegation of authority and providing on-scene commanders
with freedom of action. Monitored delegated control is the
method of control preferred by military commanders, and when
direct control is necessary, control by negation is
preferred over positive control. Primary emphasis is placed
on use of mechanisms of indirect control rather than on the
exercise of direct control. These preferences are strongest
in the Navy, which has a long tradition of operational
autonomy and which accords substantial authority to command-
ing officers. Even in crises, when there is a tendency for
high-level military commanders as well civilian authorities
to centralize control over operations, on-scene commanders
are delegated substantial decisionmaking authority.
Tactical-Level Military Interaction
Tactical-level interactions are divided, based on the
perspective of political-level decisionmakers, into two
major categories: deliberate military actions and inadver-
tent military incidents. Deliberate military actions are
ordered by political-level decisionmakers. They can occur
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under delegated as well as direct control, and can be
ordered in mechanisms of indirect control as well as
directly over real-time communications links. Inadvertent
military incidents are military actions that may affect the
development of a crisis, but which are not specifically
ordered or anticipated by national leaders. There are three
categories of inadvertent military incidents: unanticipated
authorized actions, military accidents, and unauthorized
deliberate actions. Inadvertent military incidents are
troublesome because decisionmakers may fail to realize they
are unauthorized and perceive them as a deliberate provoca-
tion, signal of hostile intent, or escalation of a crisis.
Unanticipated authorized actions are military actions
taken by military commanders in compliance with guidance
contained in mechanisms of indirect control, but not
directly ordered or specifically approved by national
leaders. Such actions are taken by on-scene commanders in
response to events or tactical conditions that national
leaders did not anticipate, are not aware of, or do not
understand. Such actions are authorized, in that they are
taken in compliance with guidance contained in one of the
echanisms of indirect control—the alert system, standing
orders, mission orders, contingency plans, or rules of
engagement. But they are unanticipated, in the sense that
national leaders did not directly order the specific action
or anticipate that the specific action would result from
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guidance contained in mechanisms of delegated control.
National leaders can only react to unanticipated authorized
actions and try to manage their impact on the crisis.
The most common phenomenon appears to be that national
leaders order a military operation without understanding the
full range of specific military actions that military
commanders have authority to take in order to carry out that
operation. Ambiguous orders, operations initiated without
specific military objectives to guide decisionmaking by on-
scene commanders, and open-ended military operations (those
that drag on without a definitive conclusion) are particu-
larly prone to cause unanticipated authorized actions.
Reliance on methods or delegated command and mechanisms of
indirect control is the most important condition giving rise
to the possibility of unanticipated authorized actions, but
such actions can also occur when tighter methods of control
are being exercised. National leaders exercising control by
negation could tacitly approve a military action (by not
vetoing it) without understanding what the action entails.
This could also occur when positive direct control is being
exercised, though in this case it is more accurate to
describe the consequences of the action, rather than the
action itself, as being unanticipated.
Misperceptions on the part of on-scene military comman-
ders are another possible cause of unanticipated authorized
actions. This could occur when a military commander
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misperceives the political-military context of the local
tactical situation. For example, he might misperceive
aggressive enemy military moves as indicating that friendly
forces are in imminent danger of attack, or even that war
had started, and order military actions that would have been
authorized in these situations. The possibility of such
misperceptions underscores the danger inherent in simulating
attacks on an adversary's forces during a crisis—such as
the Soviet Navy conducted against the U.S. Sixth Fleet while
U.S. forces were at DEFCON 3 in the 1973 Middle East War.
In this instance U.S. Navy commanders in the Mediterranean
either knew or presumed that the Soviets were only
conducting an exercise and did not attack any Soviet ships.
Under other circumstances, however, such forbearance could
be much more difficult for on-scene commanders.
Contingency plans can be a source of unanticipated
authorized actions if national leaders do not fully under-
stand the operational implications of the plans or do not
have the time or inclination to carefully review the content
of a plan before ordering it executed. Although United
States military contingency plans contain a broad range of
options for the employment of military forces, civilian
policy-makers tend to view most predefined military options
«s inappropriate because the options were designed for a
crisis scenario different than the one at hand, or were
defined to meet purely military objectives rather than the
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requirements for employment of military forces in a crisis.
In practice, top-level military and civilian officials
jointly review and revise contingency plans to meet the
needs of the specific crisis at hand prior to executing
them* However, the possibility of a contingency plan
setting in motion military operations that top-level
political leaders had not anticipated cannot be excluded
entirely.
The alert system can also be a source of unanticipated
authorized actions. The President and his advisors—even
the Secretary of Defense—may not be aware of the full range
of actions that can result from setting a higher level of
Defense Condition of Readiness (DEFCON) . Further, they may
not be informed that a particular action has been initiated
until it is too late to halt it or until it has already had
an unanticipated effect on the crisis.
The most important potential source of unanticipated
authorized actions is operational decisions made by tactical
level military commanders on the basis of guidance contained
in standing orders, mission orders, or the rules of engage-
ment. Even when under direct control by top-level political
authorities, operational commanders usually have sufficient
authority to take actions that could significantly affect
the development of a crisis. Ambiguous or ambivalent orders
greatly increase the likelihood of unanticipated authorized
actions by leaving the on-scene commander uncertain as to
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the objectives of his mission, the intentions of national
leaders, and the actions he is authorized to take. Movement
of forces outside the scene of a crisis into battle posi-
tions, employment of weapons in self-defense in accordance
with the rules of engagement, and stepped up surveillance of
sensitive targets are all actions the President might not
anticipate as resulting from his decisions, but which could
raise tensions in a crisis.
Military accidents are actions not ordered or deliber-
ately initiated at any level in the chain of command.
Military accidents are troublesome because decisionmakers
may fail to realize they are unauthorized and perceive them
as a deliberate provocation, signal of hostile intent, or
escalation. This problem is compounded by modern communica-
tions systems, which in theory give national leaders in many
countries the capability for detailed control of military
operations and the ordering specific tactical actions.
Since almost any military action could conceivably be the
result of orders from national leaders, an adversary may
assume that those leaders ordered an action, that was, in
fact, an accident. Thus, virtually any military action can
assume strategic importance if believed to have been
conceived and personally supervised by national leaders.
In practice, national leaders and even military
commanders attempt to distinguish accidents from deliberate




considered when evaluating whether a particular incident was
a provocation or an accident are (a) the international
political climate (Did the adversary have political and
military motives to make a deliberate provocation or
attack?) , (b) the overall pattern of military operations at
the time of the incident (Was the incident isolated or one
of several attacks?) , and (c) whether the circumstances of
of the incident indicate that it was a deliberate action
(Were appropriate combat tactics used?). However, when
assessment of a military accident must be made in the fog of
a crisis, with possibly incomplete and erroneous information
coining in from the scene and decision makers attempting to
sort out adversary intentions under great stress, the possi-
bility of an accident being misperceived as a deliberate
provocation or attack is heightened.
U.S. and Soviet leaders have used communications with
each other to clarify whether incidents were accidents or
provocations. One tactic is to assume (at least for diplo-
matic purposes) that an isolated incident was an accident,
but warn that further such incidents would be viewed as
deliberate provocations or attacks. Both of the superpowers
have used the "hot line** to prevent incidents from becoming
confrontations. Communications between the United States
and the Soviet Union, particularly over the hot line, have
thus proven valuable for sorting out accidents from
provocations (and for preventing provocations from recurring
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by warning against similar "accidents" in the future)
.
Situations could arise, however, in which national leaders
or on-scene military commanders on the side that was the
victim of a military accident perceive that they do not have
time for communications with the other side before taking a
military response to an apparent deliberate attack.
Military accidents occur infrequently in international
crises. There are three reasons for this. First, the
military chain of command normally cancels most military
exercises affecting forces committed to or on standby for
the crisis, greatly reducing the possibility of interna-
tional incidents arising from exercise-related accidents.
The primary reason why exercises are cancelled is that the
forces are needed for crisis operations, but exercises have-
also been cancelled to avoid potential political complica-
tions. The second reason for the rarity of accidents in
crisis is that the military chain of command usually advises
on-scene commanders to act with caution and to avoid
provocative actions. The third reason for the lack of
incidents in crises is military prudence: on-scene
commanders, motivated by self-preservation, generally avoid
deliberately placing their forces in situations where they
are extremely vulnerable to deliberate or inadvertent
attacks- Military prudence is occasionally violated by top-
level political officials ordering naval forces into
dangerous waters, but on other occasions U.S. leaders have
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boen careful to keep U.S. forces well clear of fighting in a
local conflict. These three factors counters :c other
factors—increased tempo of operations and adversary forces
in close proximity— that might otherwise contribute to the
occurrence of inadvertent military incidents.
Unauthorized deliberate actions are ordered or exe-
cuted by tactical-level military commanders in violation of
orders issued directly by national leaders, or in violation
of operational guidance contained in mechanisms of indirect
control. One way in which an unauthorized deliberate action
can occur is for a military commander to stretch the limits
on the actions he is authorized to take—complying with a
broad interpretation of the letter of his orders rather than
with what he knows to be the spirit of those orders. This
type of unauthorized action is especially likely when the
orders given to military forces are vague or ambiguous,
leaving ample room for an on-scene commander to rationalize
his actions. Unauthorized deliberate actions incidents are
exceedingly rare.
Not all unauthorized deliberate actions are harmful to
crisis management efforts. An on-scene military commander
with an appreciation of the political objectives being pur-
sued by national leaders could well decide to ignore orders
that are inappropriate for the local situation and pursue a
course of action that better supports crisis management
efforts. Two types of unauthorized deliberate actions can
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e distinguished on the basis of the military commander's
ntentions: constructive and malicious.
A constructive unauthorized action is taken in the
elief that actions called for in existing orders are inap-
ropriate under the circumstances, and that the unauthorized
ction would better support the national objectives in the
risis. Whether or not the outcome is constructive is a dif-
erent matter, and a well-intentioned action could seriously
omplicate crisis management efforts. The mark of a con-
structive unauthorized action is an effort to inform the
hain of command as soon as possible of the action taken and
he reasons for taking it.
A malicious unauthorized deliberate action is taken
>ut of opposition to the objectives underlying specific
>rders, disrespect for the chain of command or the method of
rontrol being used, or frustration with particular orders
!elt to be unnecessarily endangering the men performing the
lission. The mark of a malicious unauthorized action is an
sffort to conceal the action from higher authority.
Incidents at sea can be either deliberate or inadver-
tent. Incidents at sea include various forms of harassment
ind other dangerous interactions between Soviet and American
aaval forces. They may be initiated deliberately on direct
sr standing orders from national leaders (for military
reasons or as a political signal) , or may occur inadver-
tently—that is, without having been ordered by national
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?aders. Inadvertent incidents at sea can fall into any of
-it three categories of inadvertent military incidents:
lanticipated authorized actions, military accidents, and
^authorized deliberate actions.
Findings of the Case Studies
Eight questions addressing specific aspects of the
tieory of stratified interaction were addressed in the case
tudies. The first three questions address the conditions
ecessary for stratified interaction to occur: delegated
ontrol, tight coupling between the forces of the two sides,
nd conditions of acute crisis. The first question is to
hat degree were interactions between the forces of the two
ides at the scene of the crisis the result of actions taken
n accordance with mechanisms of indirect control, rather
han direct control by national leaders? The pattern
bserved in the four case studies of U.S. naval operations
n crises was one of direct control being exercised
selectively and to a limited degree. Heavy reliance was
•laced on mechanisms of indirect control in all four cases,
tlthough the guidance contained in those mechanisms was not
ilways revised to reflect the specific circumstances of the
Tisis at hand. Tactical-level military interactions rarely
'ere under the direct control of political-level leaders.
The second question is were the forces of the two
sides at the scene of the crisis tightly coupled with each
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her? Naval forces at the scene of the crisis were tightly
upled in all four of the crisis naval operations case
udies. However, the tightness of coupling between the
rces of the two sides can vary significantly from crisis
crisis and over time within a particular crisis,
ictical-level military commanders have independent access
> intelligence and surveillance information on adversary
>rces, and thus are not dependent on political-level
•disionmakers for information on the adversary. As would
i expected under conditions of tight coupling, naval forces
»nd to react quickly to changes in the other side's
aerations, seeking to maintain or improve their tactical
asition in the event of hostilities. However, this tight
stion-reaction linkage can be dampened by measures intended
d avoid incidents between the two side's forces, such as
eographic separation and a deliberately low tempo of
perations or pauses (periods of inaction)
.
The third question is were the forces of the two sides
eing used by their national leaders to convey political
ignals in support of crisis bargaining? Naval forces were
sed by both sides for political signalling or related
olitical functions in all four of the case studies on
risis naval operations. Use of naval forces for political
urposes can bring naval units of the two sides in a crisis




The answers to these first three questions suggest
at conditions necessary for stratified interaction existed
all four of the crises. In the 1958 Taiwan Straits
isis, the United States relied on methods of delegated
ntrol, U.S. and Chinese Communist military forces were
ghtly coupled, and both sides used their forces as a
litical instrument under conditions of acute crisis,
teractions occurred at the tactical level that were not
rectly controlled by American leaders. The findings of'
is case suggest, however, that stratification is not an
solute concept— there can be degrees of stratification,
asures taken by both sides to prevent confrontations
(tween their forces can greatly reduce opportunities for
ictical-level interaction to occur.
Although the President sought to maintain close con-
rol of military operations in the 1962 Cuban Missile
'isis, he relied heavily on methods of delegated control
id communications problems constrained his ability to
Ifectively exercise direct control. In certain operations
lere was tight coupling between the forces of the two
ides. Both sides used their forces as a political
istrument under conditions of acute crisis. Interactions
rcurred at the tactical level that were not directly
>ntrolled by American leaders. The President did not
Lrectly control any of the ASW operations or the boarding
t the Marucla (other than to order it to occur) . Navy
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>rces encountered Cuban air and naval forces on several
;casions without the President or McNamara controlling the
iteractions. The President's attention was focused on a
&ry small portion of the overall operations that were in
rogress. The stratified interaction model of international
rises, in which interactions evolve in semi-independent
squences at the political, strategic and tactical levels,
Cfers a good description of Soviet-American interactions in
tie Cuban Missile Crisis.
In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the United States relied
a methods of delegated control, U.S. and Soviet naval
orces in the Mediterranean were tightly coupled, and both
ides used their forces as a political instrument under
onditions of conditions of acute crisis. Interactions
ccurred at the tactical level that were not directly
ontrolled by American leaders. For example, President
ohnson had no control over whether or not the Soviet
arassraent of America on June 8 would produce a clash
etween the U.S. and Soviet navies. The stratified inter-
ction model of international crises, in which interactions
volve in separate, semi-independent sequences at the
olitical, strategic, and tactical levels, offers a good
escription of Soviet-American interactions in the 1967 Arab-
sraeli War.
In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States relied
n methods of delegated control, U.S. and Soviet naval
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reel in the Mediterranean were tightly coupled, and both
des used their forces as political instruments under
mditions of acute crisis. Significant and dangerous
attractions occurred at the tactical level that were not
.rectly controlled by American leaders. For example,
resident Nixon had no direct control over Sixth Fleet
junter-targeting of Soviet ships carrying anti-ship cruise
Lssiles, and was probably unaware that this activity had
ladvertently been set in motion by White House orders
aking the fleet an easy target for the Soviet Navy.
The fourth question is did crisis interactions at the
actical level become decoupled from the strategy being
irsued by national leaders? There are seven potential
auses of decoupling: communications and information flow
roblems, impairment of political-level decisionmaking, a
ast-paced tactical environment, ambiguous or ambivalent
rders, tactically inappropriate orders, inappropriate
uidance in mechanisms of indirect control, and deliberate
nauthorized actions by military commanders. To establish
hat stratified interactions became decoupled in a crisis
equires two findings: first, that one of the seven factors
ust mentioned was present, and, second, that operational
ecisions made by tactical-level decisionmakers differed
rom the decisions that political-level decisionmakers would
ave made in order to coordinate these actions with their
olitical-diplomatic strategy for resolving the crisis.
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Various potential causes of decoupling were present in
1 eight of the cases examined in this study. The most
mmon cause of decoupling was communications problems or
operly functioning communications that are simply too slow
permit direct control of military operations. This was a
ctor in all eight of the cases. The second most common
use of decoupling was a fast-paced tactical environment.
is was a factor in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the
64 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the
67 Liberty incident, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
ibiguous orders were a factor in the 1958 Taiwan Straits
isis and tactically inappropriate orders were a factor in
e 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Impairment of political-level
tcisionmaking was a factor in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Three patterns of tactical-level interactions were
ten in the eight cases. The most common pattern was
irallel stratified interactions: tactical-level interac-
.ons that were not directly controlled by political-level
;aders, but which generally supported their political objec-
ives and crisis management strategy. Parallel stratified
Jteractions were seen in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the
?67 Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Liberty incident, the 1968
jeblo incident, and the 1987 Stark incident.
The second pattern was momentary decoupling: tactical-
evel interaction that was not controlled by political-level
eaders and did not support their political and crisis
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nagement objectives, followed by immediate disengagement
hat is, without tactical-level escalation and often
thout shots being fired) . The pattern between instances
momentary decoupling is parallel stratified interac-
ons. Momentary decoupling was seen in the 1958 Taiwan
raits Crisis, and possibly in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
The third pattern was decoupling followed by disengage-
>nt. In this pattern, a tactical-level incident occurs
lat is not directly controlled by political-level leaders
id does not support their objectives for the operation in
ogress. The incident leads to an armed clash, but then is
ilted by the on-scene commanders without intervention by
>litical-level authorities. Decoupling followed by
Isengagement occurred in the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents.
The fifth question is did national leaders and on-
:ene commanders hold different perceptions of the
ilnerability of on-scene forces to preemption and the need
3 strike first in the event of an armed clash? This
lestion addresses the second corollary to the theory of
tratified interaction, that the security dilemma can become
tratified in crises. The implication of this is that
ecision-makers at the political and tactical levels can
old different perceptions of the offense-defense balance,
ulnerability to preemption, and the need to strike first.
Threat perceptions were stratified in the 1962 Cuban
issile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Stratified
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hreat perceptions did not cause crisis management problems
n the Cuban Missile Crisis, but did cause problems in the
973 Arab-Israeli War. The crisis security dilemma was
tratified in the in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War: at the
olitical level of interaction there was little incentive
or either side to launch a preemptive first strike, but at
he tactical level naval forces had strong incentives to
trike first and were actively targeting each other. A
umber of incidents could have triggered an inadvertent
aval battle in the Mediterranean that U.S. and Soviet
eaders might not have been able to control until the
nitial engagements were over.
The sixth question is, when tactical-level interac-
ions become decoupled, what factors inhibit escalation
ynamics from occurring at the tactical level and being
ransmitted upward to the strategic and political levels of
nteraction? This question addresses the third corollary to
he theory of stratified interaction, that escalation
ynamics can be stratified in a crisis. Although escalation
ynamics cannot be addressed directly—none of the cases
scalated to war—research was done to identify esoalation-
nhibiting factors and the conditions that can cause those
actors to break down.
Six internal and two external escalation-inhibiting
actors were identified in the case studies. The internal
actors function within the government and military chain of
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mmand of one nation. The internal factors are military
udtnce (avoiding threat of surprise attack and combat
der unfavorable circumstances) , caution and restraint on
a part of on-scene commanders, compliance by on-scene
mmanders with the guidance contained in mechanisms of
idirect control, national leaders structuring the tactical
vironment to dampen military interactions, accurate and
mely tactical intelligence on friendly and potentially
stile forces, and national leaders and the military chain
command double-checking the accuracy of initial reports
military incidents. These factors tend to moderate the
ttensity of tactical-level interactions, prevent armed
ashes from occurring, and produce disengagement rather
ian escalation when clashed do occur.
External escalation-inhibiting factors function
ttween the two sides in a crisis. There are two external
ictors: tacit rules of crisis behavior observed by the two
,des and communications between the two sides in the
risis. Tacit rules of crisis behavior are best developed
stween the United States and the Soviet Union, but also
mtributed to avoiding escalation in the 1958 Taiwan
:raits Crisis. The Soviet-American tacit rules are not
Lthout flaws. Soviet naval forces have engaged in
<ceedingly dangerous behavior—dangerous maneuvering at
lose quarters and simulated attacks on U.S. naval forces—
iring international crises. The 1972 Soviet-American
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tcidents at Sea Agreement has only been partially
t
tccessful in moderating such Soviet behavior. The most
mgerous situation arises in confrontations with nations
»at the United States does not share tacit rules of crisis
»havior, like Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
The findings of the eight case studies indicate that,
>ntrary to what the escalation dynamics theory predicts,
lere is a tendency for naval tactical-level interaction to
)se momentum and for the forces involved to disengage after
i initial incident or armed clash. Pauses tend to occur
iturally in naval operations due to the need to regroup and
repare for further action. Naval commanders are reluctant
5 initiate or sustain combat operations under circumstances
aey cannot predict or control due to the risk of defeat in
ittle. Naval commanders quickly reach the limits of their
uthority and need permission from higher authority to
aitiate further combat operations. If they do not have
ach permission, or anticipate that they will not be able
»t it, naval commanders normally will try to break off
ombat action as soon as it is safe to do so—rather than
isk being left in an untenable tactical position. The
perational requirements of crisis management, if being
allowed, tend to accentuate the tendency toward disengage-
ent by denying on-scene commanders tactical options (such
s surprise attack and concentration of superior force) that
an be crucial for successful combat operations.
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The case studies identified three conditions that can
use the escalation-inhibiting factors to break down,
lowing a crisis to escalate uncontrollably to war. The
rst condition is for national leaders and military comman-
ra to be predisposed to take action against the adversary
«
e to a long-term failures of diplomacy to resolve
nsions, military and diplomatic frustration with the
versary. Sustained hostility, harassment, or a history of
gression by the adversary can generate a perception that
e adversary's leaders are unreasonable, irresponsible, or
interested in serious negotiations, reducing the incentive
i pursue diplomatic initiatives toward the adversary.
lese expectations could be entirely correct, but could also
ssult from insufficient or ambiguous intelligence on the
Iversary's objectives and intentions.
The second condition is the immediate prior occurrence
! one or more hostile acts against United States forces,
tizens, or vital interests. Prior attacks can create an
;pectation that further attacks will occur or that the
tversary is likely to escalate the level of violence. As
th long-term frustrations, short-term expectations of
trther violence could be entirely correct, but could also
'suit from insufficient or ambiguous intelligence on the
Iversary's objectives and intentions. The short-term
ifects of immediate prior hostile acts can reinforce the
ffects of long-term frustration with the adversary,
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pearing to confirm negative assessments of his
tentions. Expectation of further attacks tends to
•dispose national leaders and military commanders toward
oader military options toward the adversary.
The third condition that can erode the escalation-
ihibiting factors is for all levels in the chain of
>mmand, from the President to the on-scene commander, to
>ld similar views toward the adversary and the need for
nmediate retaliation for provocations. A strong unity of
Lews can suppress the skepticism that normally greets
nbiguous initial reports on a military incident, or lead to
isty assessment of the incident in the rush to launch
staliatory attacks.
The seventh question is did actions taken with
ilitary forces send inadvertent signals to either
dversaries or friends, and did inadvertent military
incidents occur that affected efforts to manage the crisis?
his question addresses crisis management problems that
rig? yh*>n military forces are employed in crises: the
isperception dilemma and inadvertent military incidents.
Inadvertent political signals may have been a factor
n some of the crises, but inadvertent military incidents
ere not serious problems in the eight cases examined in
his study. Misperceptions of U.S. intentions or the
urposes of U.S. naval operations may have been a factor in
he 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
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d the 1968 Pueblo incident. U.S. naval operations in
iponae to the four peacetime attacks on U.S. Navy ships
pear not to have generated misperceptions
.
The eighth question is did any of the three tensions
tween political and military considerations arise during
e crisis? There are three tensions between political and
litary considerations that can arise when military forces
e used as a political instrument in crises: tension
itween political considerations and the needs of diplomatic
trgaining, on the one hand, and military considerations and
le needs of military operations, on the other; tension
jtween the need for top-level control of military options
1 a crisis, and the need for tactical flexibility and
istantaneous decision-making at the scene of the crisis;
id tension between performance of crisis political missions
id readiness to perform wartime combat missions.
Tension between political and military considerations
sre serious in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973
rab-Israeli War; moderate in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis
ad the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; and minor in the 1964 Tonkin
Jlf Incidents, the 1967 Liberty incident, and the 1968
neblo incident, and the 1987 Stark incident.
Level of control tensions were serious in the 1962
nban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, moderate
ft the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and minor in the 1958 Taiwan
traits Crisis, and the four cases of peacetime attacks on
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Navy ships. Level of control tensions appear to be directly
proportional to the scale and duration of the crisis
military operations being conducted, and more intense when
national leaders perceive a danger of the crisis escalating
to war (which prompts them to exercise close control over
military operations)
.
Tensions between performance of crisis missions and
readiness to perform wartime missions were serious in the
1*958 Taiwan Straits Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis; moderate in the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1973
Arab-Israeli War; and minor in the 1964 Tonkin gulf
Incidents, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Liberty incident,
and the 1987 Stark incident. Tensions between performance
of crisis missions and readiness to perform wartime missions
are directly proportional to the scale and duration of the
crisis operations being conducted, and can be exacerbated by
the geographic location of the crisis (a crisis located far
from expected wartime battlegrounds generates more serious
tension) .
Contingent Generalizations
The dependent variable in the theory of stratified
interaction is the outcome of crisis military interaction;
specifically, the degree to which and the manner in which
tactical-level military interactions cause escalation of a
crisis. Variance in the dependent variable is described in
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terms of six patterns of crisis military interaction:
unified interaction, parallel stratified interaction,
Romentary decoupling, decoupled interactions followed by
disengagement, inadvertent tactical-level escalation, and
inadvertent strategic-level escalation. The first two
patterns'—unified interaction and parallel stratified
interaction—can have three escalation outcomes: no escala-
tion, inadvertent controlled escalation, or deliberate
tscalation. Inadvertent controlled escalation and deliber-
ate escalation can halt short of war or continue on to war.
In the third and fourth patterns—momentary decoupling of
interactions and decoupled interactions followed by
disengageiuent--tactical-level interaction halts without
significant escalation. The fifth pattern—inadvertent
tactical level escalation—can have three outcomes:
disengagement short of war, inadvertent strategic-level
escalation, or deliberate escalation to war. The sixth
pattern—inadvertent strategic-level escalation—can have
three outcomes: disengagement short of war, inadvertent
escalation to war, or deliberate escalation to war.
These six patterns constitute a typology of crisis
ailitary interaction and appear to cover the full range of
interactions that could occur in a crisis. However, because
they were identified through an analytical-inductive
process, rather than deductively, additional patterns could
be identified through further empirical research.

1140
More than one of the patterns of crisis military
interaction can occur in a crisis. The first four patterns
—
unified interaction, parallel stratified interaction,
momentary decoupling of interaction, decoupled interactions
followed by disengagement, and inadvertent tactical-level
escalation—can occur in various sequences in a crisis.
Contingent generalizations were formulated for the six
patterns of crisis military interaction, offering a distinct
causal pattern for each type of interaction. Each of the
causal patterns is produced by specific variations in seven
independent variables that were identified in the case
studies as significant in determining the outcome of crisis
military interaction. The seven independent variables that
determine the nature of crisis military interaction and the
likelihood of escalation are the degree of political-level
control over tactical-level military interaction, the scale
of military operations, the intensity of tactical-level
military interactions, the perceived threat of attack at the
tactical level, the relationship between political-level and
tactical-level threat perceptions, the strength of
escalation-inhibiting factors, and the impact of inadvertent
military incidents. The seven independent variables
determine the degree to which crisis interactions to become
stratified, whether or not stratified interactions become
decoupled, and the degree to which decoupled interactions
result in escalation of a crisis.
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The first pattern of crisis military interaction is
unified interaction. In this pattern, political-level
leaders exercise direct control over tactical-level military
operations. Unified interaction is the optimum pattern of
crisis military interaction for crisis management: the
pattern achieved when national leaders succeed in meeting
the crisis management requirement that they maintain close
control over military operations. Unified interactions can
have three escalation out-comes: no escalation, inadvertent
controlled escalation, or deliberate escalation.
The causal pattern for unified interaction is direct
political-level control of tactical-level military
interaction, local scale of military operations, routine to
heightened intensity of tactical-level military interaction,
any tactical-level threat perceptions (not a significant
variable in this pattern) , a convergent relationship between
political-level and tactical-level threat perceptions,
strong factors inhibiting escalation, and inadvertent
military incidents that have minor impact on crisis military
interaction. There were no examples of the unified interac-
tion pattern in the case studies. The fact that the pattern
was not actually observed suggests that its occurrence is
improbable, particularly in a military establishment as
large and complex as that of the United States.
The second pattern of crisis military interaction is
parallel stratified interaction. In this pattern national
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leaders retain control over the escalation and de-escalation
of conflict. The separate interaction sequences at the
political and tactical levels evolve in parallel, in the
ftnse of reflecting the same overall strategy toward the
•dversary. National leaders do not control every operation-
al decision made at the tactical level, but the decisions
made by on-scene commanders support the crisis management
strategy of national leaders. Parallel stratified interac-
tion is the second best pattern of military interaction from
a crisis management perspective (second only to unified
interaction) . Parallel stratified interactions can have
three escalation outcomes: no escalation, inadvertent
controlled escalation, or deliberate escalation.
The causal pattern for parallel stratified interaction
is indirect political-level control of tactical-level
military interaction, local to theater scale of military
operations, routine to heightened intensity of tactical-
level military interaction, any tactical-level threat
perceptions (not a significant variable in this pattern) , a
convergent relationship between political-level and tactical-
level threat perceptions, strong factors inhibiting escala-
tion, and inadvertent military incidents that have minor
impact on crisis military interaction. The most important
independent variables in the parallel stratified interaction
pattern are indirect political-level control of tactical-
level military operations and convergent threat perceptions.
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The third pattern of crisis military interaction is
omentary decoupling of interaction. In this pattern
ational leaders temporarily lose control of military
interactions, but are able to quickly re-establish control,
owever, there is a brief period in which national leaders
re not controlling tactical-level military interactions.
Hiring that period, the actions taken by the on-scene
:ommander do not support the crisis management efforts being
mrsued by national leaders. Those actions could well be
tuthorized under guidance contained in the mechanisms of
indirect control, but nevertheless complicate political and
iiplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. This does not
nean that the on-scene commander was "wrong** to take the
ictions. For example, he may have been compelled to use
force in self-defense as authorized in his rules of
engagement. The use of force could well hsvc been necessary
to avert an attack, appropriate to the tactical
circumstances, and fully justified under international law,
but still have interfered with crisis management efforts.
Hie key point is that tactical-level interactions not
controlled by national leaders occur, and that those actions
complicate or interfere with political-level crisis
nanagement efforts. Instances of momentary decoupling were
observed in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962 Cuban




In the causal pattern for momentary decoupling, two of
:he independent variables cause decoupling to occur, while
;he other five cause the decoupling to be momentary. The
Independent variables that cause decoupling to occur are
Loss of political-level control over tactical-level military
operations and inadvertent incidents with a significant im-
pact on crisis military interaction. The important feature
Is that whatever causes decoupling is not permanent; it does
lot prevent national leaders from quickly re-establishing
:ontrol. The independent variables that cause the
decoupling to be momentary are local to theater scale of
military operations, routine to heightened intensity of
tactical-level military operations, unlikely to possible
tactical-level threat perceptions, a convergent to similar
relationship between political-level and tactical-level
threat perceptions, and strong escalation-inhibiting
factors. Momentary decoupling is the most common of the
four crisis military interaction patterns that are marked by
decoupling of tactical-level military interaction from
political-level objectives.
The fourth pattern of crisis military interaction is
decoupled interactions followed by disengagement. This pat-
tern begins with decoupling of tactical-level interaction
from political-level control. National leaders are not able
to immediately re-establish control due to communications
problems, decisionmaking overload, or a fast-paced tactical
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nvironment. But the initial tactical-level engagement
etween the two sides does not gain momentum and escalate,
t loses momentum and the forces disengage. By the time
ational leaders re-establish control, the shooting has
topped. Tactical-level disengagement can be a requirement
or political-level control to be re-established,
articularly in a fast-paced tactical environment.
In the causal pattern for decoupling followed by
isengagement, four of the independent variables cause
ecoupling and the initial engagement to occur, one of the
ndependent variables causes disengagement to occur without
;actical-level escalation, and two of the independent
'ariables are not significant causes of the pattern. The
.ndependent variables that cause decoupling and the initial
mgageraent to occur are loss of political-level control over
:actical-level military operations, intense tactical-level
ailitary operations, tactical-level threat perceptions that
ittack is imminent, and inadvertent incidents with a
lignificant impact on crisis military interaction. The
Independent variable that causes decoupled tactical-level
Interactions to disengage rather than escalate is strong
escalation-inhibiting factors. The independent variables
that have no significant role in causing the pattern to
t>ccur are the scale of military operations and the relation-
ship between political-level and tactical-level threat
perceptions. The decoupling followed by disengagement
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attern occurs less often than the momentary decoupling
attern, but more often than the two decoupling patterns
nvolving escalation.
The fifth pattern of crisis military interaction is
nadvertent tactical-level escalation. This pattern begins
ith decoupling of tactical-level interaction from political-
evel crisis management objectives. National leaders are
ot able to immediately re-establish control due to communi-
:ations problems, decisionmaking overload, or a fast-paced
;actical environment. The initial tactical-level engagement
jains momentum and escalates, increasing in violence and
.nvolving an increasing amount of each side's forces. There
rere no examples of this crisis military interaction pattern
in the case studies.
The inadvertent tactical-level escalation pattern can
lave three outcomes: disengagement short of war, inadvertent
itrategic-level escalation, or deliberate escalation by
national leaders. The escalation sequence stops under one
3f three circumstances: one side disengages after suffering
:atastrophic losses, both sides disengage from an incon-
clusive engagement due to exhaustion of ordnance and attri-
tion of forces, or national leaders re-establish control and
order disengagement. The third scenario—national leaders
halting tactical-level escalation after losing control—is
unlikely due to the difficulty of maintaining direct control
of forces once they are engaged in battle.
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In the causal pattern for inadvertent tactical-level
fcalation, four of the independent variables cause
•coupling and the initial engagement to occur, two of the
ndependent variables cause tactical-level escalation to
ccur, and two of the independent variables allow tactical-
evel escalation to occur but prevent it from causing
nadvertent strategic-level escalation or deliberate
olitical-level escalation. The independent variables that
ause decoupling and the initial engagement to occur are
oss of political-level control over tactical-level military
perations, intense tactical-level military operations,
actical-level threat perceptions that attack is imminent,
nd inadvertent incidents with a significant impact on
xisis military interaction. The independent variables that
:ause decoupled tactical-level interactions to escalate are
.ntense tactical-level military interaction, and a tactical-
.evel threat perception that attack is imminent. The
.ndependent variables that allow tactical-level escalation
>ut prevent inadvertent strategic-level escalation or
ieliberate political-level escalation are a divergent
relationship between political-level and tactical-level
threat perceptions and weak escalation-inhibiting factors.
The sixth pattern of crisis military interaction is
inadvertent strategic-level escalation. This pattern can
arise via either of two paths: escalation at the strategic
level arising from tactical-level escalation, or initiation
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[ escalation at the strategic level without prior tactical-
evel escalation. Inadvertent strategic-level escalation
rising from tactical-level escalation was the path examined
i this study, which focused on tactical-level military
nteraction. Inadvertent strategic-level escalation without
rior tactical-level escalation could arise from inadvertent
ilitary incidents (unanticipated authorized actions,
ilitary accidents, and unauthorized deliberate actions)
evolving strategic-level forces. Many of the factors
ffecting tactical-level interaction probably also affect
trategic-level interaction, but such strategic level
actors were not addressed in this study. There were no
xamples of this crisis military inter-action pattern in the
ase studies.
Inadvertent strategic-level escalation arising from
actical-level escalation begins with tactical-level
nteractions decoupling from political-level control,
ational leaders are unable to immediately re-establish con-
rol over tactical-level interaction due to communications
roblems, decisionmaking overload, or a fast-paced tactical
nvironment. The initial tactical-level engagement gains
omentum and escalates, increasing in violence and involving
n increasing amount of each side's forces. The tactical-
evel escalation spiral generates escalatory pressures at
•he strategic level, reinforcing perceptions that the
'dversary is preparing for war and is not interested in a
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liplomatic solution to the crisis. The scope of fighting
rapidly grows to the theater level and spreads to other
.heaters, possibly becoming global in scope. The spread of
the escalatory spiral to the strategic level of interaction
Lb through deliberate decisions made by strategic-level
nilitary commanders, but is considered to be inadvertent
Decause it was not directly ordered by national leaders and
Jid not support their efforts to manage the crisis. The
inadvertent strategic-level escalation pattern of crisis
military interaction can have three outcomes: inadvertent
escalation to war, deliberate escalation to war, or
disengagement short of war.
In the causal pattern for inadvertent strategic-level
escalation, five of the independent variables cause
decoupling and the initial engagement to occur, while five
of the independent variables cause tactical-level escalation
to result in inadvertent strategic-level escalation. The
independent variables that cause decoupling and the initial
engagement are loss of political-level control over tactical-
level military operations, global-scale military operations,
intense tactical-level military interaction, tactical-level
threat perceptions that attack is imminent, and inadvertent
incidents with a significant impact on tactical-level
military interaction. The independent variables that cause
tactical-level escalation to result in inadvertent strategic-
level escalation are loss of political-level control over
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trategic-level military operations, global-scale military
perations, a convergent relationship between strategic-
evel and tactical-level threat perceptions (and, in the
ase of deliberate escalation to war, convergent political-
evel and strategic-level threat perceptions) , a lack of
scalation-inhibiting factors, and inadvertent incidents
ith a significant impact on strategic-level military
nteraction. The inadvertent strategic-level escalation
attern appears to be the crisis interaction pattern least
ikely to occur.
On the basis of the eight historical cases examined in
his study, a ranking of the six patterns of crisis interac-
ion—from most to least likely to occur when U.S. naval
orces are employed in a crisis—would be as follows:
>arallel stratified interaction, momentary decoupling,
lecoupled interactions followed by disengagement, inadver-
;ent tactical-level interaction, inadvertent strategic-level
.nteraction, and unified interaction. The independent
variables that most affect this ranking are political-level
:ontrol of tactical-level interaction and the strength of
:he escalation-inhibiting factors. Direct political-level
:ontrol of tactical-level military operations is difficult
for U.S. leaders due to the size and complexity of the U.S.
irmed forces, making the unified interaction pattern rare
ind providing ample opportunities for stratified crisis
'.nteractions to become decoupled. The escalation-inhibiting
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actors are generally quite strong, preventing escalation
van when decoupling occurs—making momentary decoupling and
ecoupling followed by disengagement much more common than
nadvertent tactical-level escalation or inadvertent
trategic-level escalation.
Generality of Findings
The generality of this study— that is, the applicabil-
.ty of the theory and findings to international crises other
han cases that were studied—-must be addressed because the
ases studies all concerned crisis naval operations and
>eacetime attacks on Navy ships. As was explained in the
introduction, there were four reasons for this focus,
first, the Navy is the branch of the U.S. armed forces
railed upon most often to respond to crises. Second,
American leaders and many analysts perceive naval forces as
having important advantages over other types of forces for
crisis response. Third, in spite of the frequency of use
and perceived advantages of naval forces, the role of naval
forces as a political instrument is not well understood.
Fourth, in some respects naval forces have a greater
ftscalatory potential than do other types of military force,
rhese reasons for focusing on naval forces provide a
starting point for assessing the generality of the findings.
The theory and contingent generalizations are
applicable to a broad range of crisis naval operations. The
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ises that were studied ranged from large-scale (the 1962
iban Missile Crisis and the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis) , to
jderate in scale (the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars) , to
ilatively small in scale (the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incidents,
)68 Pueblo Incident, and 1987 Stark Incident). Because
ival forces are the type of force most commonly used by the
lited States in crises, the theory is thus directly
pplicable to most of the crises in which the United States
is been involved over the pa3t forty years.
The theory and contingent generalizations are also
pplicable to most other U.S. crisis operations with conven-
ional forces, including amphibious operations, ground force
perations, shore-based air operations, and operations with
combination of forces. The theory is applicable to other
.S. forces because central features of the U.S. command and
ontrol system—such as delegation of control and the
echanisms of indirect control (described in Chapter IV)
—
ffect tactical-level interaction involving all types of
.S. forces. Additionally, the escalation-inhibiting fac-
ors and the conditions that can erode those factors are not
nique to naval forces—they would affect the likelihood of
scalation regardless of the type of force being employed in
crisis. All forms of tactical-level military interaction
an thus be accommodated by the theory.
The key to applying the theory to military inter-
ctions other than those involving naval forces is to take
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nto account the specific command and control procedures
ted by other U.S. forces, and the differing warfare
nvironments of other types of forces. For example, the
ikelihood of inadvertent incidents or initiation of
ncontrollable tactical level escalation would appear to be
ess with ground forces than with naval forces: national
oundaries normally separate the ground forces of the two
ides, but on the high seas opposing naval forces are free
o intermingle at close quarters. The technology of naval
arfare has long placed a premium on striking first in
attle (particularly in the age of anti-ship cruise
issiles) , but the offensive has enjoyed—or has been
erceived as enjoying—a similar advantage in land warfare
t various times. Naval battles tend to be intense but
rief—ordnance is rapidly exhausted and losses of ships and
lanes mount quickly, forcing disengagement. On the other
tand, once fighting among ground forces has started, it can
»e more difficult for national leaders to control and less
ikely to die out without escalation after the initial
engagement. In short, relative to naval forces, ground
orces are less likely to become engaged in fighting, but
ire more difficult to disengage after fighting starts.
?hese differences are readily accommodated in the theory,
rhich explicitly recognizes that they exist.
One area to which this study cannot be applied is the
employment of strategic nuclear forces as a political
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.natrument in crises. Strategic nuclear forces are under
:ommand and control procedures significantly more central-
ized than those of general purpose forces. While there is,
>f necessity, significant delegation of authority concerning
:he details of strategic force operations, decisionmaking
luthority for employment of nuclear weapons is highly
:entralized—resting with National Command Authorities. The
:oncepts that were developed in this study could be used to
issess strategic level interaction in crises—interaction
that can become a significant factor when forces are alerted
In order to send political signals—but the contingent
generalizations must be modified to account for the unique
features of strategic nuclear command and control.
The theory can be applied to crises involving coun-
tries other than the United States, but again care must be
taken to account for the different command and control
methods and procedures used by other countries, the dif-
fering strategic environments they face, and the differing
warfare environments their forces face. The forces of some
countries, such as the Israeli and West German armies,
emphasize freedom of action for and initiative on the part
of lower-level commanders. In other countries, notably the
Soviet Union, the emphasis is on centralized control of
military operations. Differences in command and control
philosophies, operational styles, and professional tradi-
tions can produce significant differences in the crisis
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anagement and crisis stability problems facing different
•tions.
Implications for Crisis Management
The theory of stratified interaction and the findings
f this study have several implications for crisis manage-
ent. The most important is that effectively exercising
lose control of all crisis military operations can be
xceeding difficult in practice. This is an inherent
roblem that improved communication technology has affected
nly marginally. Several variables affect the ability of
op-level political authorities to exercise direct, real-
ism control of military operations, including the scale of
he operations, the nature of the missions, the intensity of
nteraction with the other side's forces, the pace at which
he tactical situation evolves, and the speed and relia-
ility of communications links.
As the scale of military operations and the intensity
f interactions with the other side increase, there is a
endency for top-level officials to become overloaded and
ocus their attention on selected, narrow aspects of crisis
perations. But tactical-level-military interactions are
ften too fast-paced for top-level officials to exercise
iirect control over even small-scale local operations,
lational leaders therefore generally delegate significant
discretionary decisionmaking authority to military
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mmanders and rely heavily on mechanisms of indirect con-
ol to guide tactical-level decisionmaking. Significant
liance is placed on rules of engagement and the distinc-
on between use of force in self-defense (which on-scene
mmanders can order) and retaliation (which only the
esident can order) . The crisis management requirement
sat top-level political authorities maintain close control
! the details of military operations thus can be difficult
> meet in practice, and attempts to exercise such control
in in fact be counterproductive--impeding effective crisis
tnagement.
Not only can national leaders be overly optimistic
aout their ability to closely control crisis military
perations, they can also be overly optimistic about their
bility to use military force—or the threat of military
orce—as a precision instrument for political signaling,
a some circumstances, particularly when the scope and inten-
ity of military operations are relatively small, national
eaders can be highly discriminating in the manipulation of
orces for signaling. But as the scope and intensity of
perations increase, military forces become an increasingly
nwieldy political instrument. In addition to the control
roblems mentioned above, this is caused by the scale, speed
nd complexity of modern combat.
If military operations are to be conducted effec-
ively, whether their purpose is to send a political signal
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r to achieve a military objective, they must be conducted
a accordance with the operational principles on which their
ffectiveness depends. Those principles often have a great
eal of flexibility, but attempting to bend them excessively
n a effort at sophisticated political signaling can create
erious problems for tactical-level military commanders—an
xample of the tension between political and military
onsiderations. Such problems arose during the 1967 Arab-
sraeli War, when the Sixth Fleet placed in a situation of
rave vulnerability to preemption by Soviet naval forces in
he Mediterranean— a situation created by White House
fforts to use the fleet for political signalling. Efforts
y U.S. on-scene commanders to cope with their vulnerability
reated a situation in which the naval forces of the two
ides were constantly targeting each other at point blank
ange, and were at hair-trigger readiness to launch
reemptive strikes against each other.
National leaders must expect that some things will go
rong when they employ military forces in crises. Inadver-
ant military incidents of various types occur in virtually
11 crisis military operations. The friction Clausewitz
bserved in war begins as soon as military forces are set in
totion, and long before the first shot is fired. Although
nadvertent military incidents are unavoidable, they
'enerally are not particularly dangerous. The tendency is
or inadvertent incidents to provoke highly cautious
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actions on the part of on-scene commanders. At least in
ival operations, when engagements occur, they tend to end
lickly rather than escalate. In fact, because on-scene
>mmanders are almost always better informed on the local
ictical situation, they are less likely to overreact or
ike worse case assumptions than are top-level authorities.
lere is normally a requirement that on-scene commanders
insult with higher authority after taking initial defensive
:tion, and a tendency for them to do so even when it is not
equired. The military chain of command tends to double-
neck the accuracy initial reports before ordering further
ilitary operations. Thus, the most important action that
ational leaders can take when an inadvertent military
ncident occurs is not to seize direct control of tactical
ecisions, but rather to focus on communicating with the
ther side in order to avoid misperceptions of the incident.
A further implication of the findings of this study
or crisis management, one certainly not anticipated when
he study was launched, is that the greatest danger of a
risis escalating to war may well arise from decisionmaking
t the political level of interaction, rather than from
ecisionmaking at the tactical level of interaction,
arallel stratified interaction—tactical-level interaction
hat generally supports political objectives even though not
irectly controlled by national leaders-^-was found to be the
ost common pattern of crisis military interaction. When
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ctical-level interactions become decoupled from political-
vel objectives, the most common patterns are momentary
coupling and decoupling followed by disengagement, rather
an escalation. Tactical-level military engagements tend
lose momentum as on-scene commanders reach the limit of
leir authority and seek guidance from higher authority.
:e implication of these findings is that tactical-level
.litary interaction normally will not escalate to war with-
it a deliberate decision by national leaders to initiate
irtime operations. The deliberate decision could well be
ised on misperceptions of the adversary's intentions
—
Lsperceptions that may have been heavily influenced by
ladvertent tactical-level escalation (the inadvertent con-
rolled escalation path to war)—but the decision for war is
till a deliberate decision made by national leaders. The
trategic, political, psychological, and cognitive factors
lat can cause national leaders to abandon diplomatic
Cforts and resort to war—whether reluctantly or eagerly
—
lus are probably the most important variables in crisis and
icalation theory.
Further Research
The previous discussion of the generality of the
leory of stratified interaction suggested that additional
^search would allow refinement of the theory to apply to a
roader range of crisis military interactions. Additional
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ease studies of United States crisis naval operations would
be useful for refining the theory in a broader range of
crisis situations. Particularly valuable would be case
studies on United States naval operations in the 1954 Quemoy-
Matsu Crisis, 1956 Suez Crisis, 1970 Jordanian Crisis, 1971
Indo-Pakistani War, 1981 and 1986 Gulf of Sidra operations,
and 1984-1988 Persian Gulf operations. These cases cover a
broader range of crisis naval operations, including
operations in a prolonged crisis (1984-1988 Persian Gulf
operations) , evacuation of civilians and allied forces (1954
Quemoy-Matsu Crisis and 1956 Suez Crisis) , and incidents in
which the United States was exercising the initiative,
rather than reacting to events (1981 and 1986 Gulf of Sidra
operations) .
The theory would also benefit from, and provide useful
analytical tools for, case studies of U.S. amphibious opera-
tions, such as the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, 1965 intervention in
the Dominican Republic, and 1983 invasion of Grenada.
Amphibious operations entail particularly complex command
and control procedures, and involve a wide range of forces.
Thus, there is potential for a much wider range of inter-
action with the forces of the other side. Case studies of
amphibious operations allow the command procedures and
warfare environments of diverse forces to be contrasted in
the context of a single intervention. Additionally, case
studies of these three operations would address the
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particular problems of limiting and controlling the use of
force by ground forces.
Additional areas for further research can also be
identified. The command and control procedures and crisis
sperations of the other United States armed forces need to
investigated in the manner that the United States Navy was
investigated in this study. There are differences among the
services in the details of their command philosophies and
the operational environments they face in crises. Certain
types of military operations, such as covert missions by
special forces, can raise particularly difficult command and
control problems.
Strategic level interaction needs to be examined in
the same manner that tactical level interaction was examined
in this study. Particularly important would be case studies
(and perhaps sophisticated simulations) of the interaction
between United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces
when either or both sides begin using them to send political
signals in crises. Although strategic nuclear command and
control is highly centralized, there could he opportunities
for decoupling and escalatory sequences to occur.
Crisis military interaction involving the forces of
other countries needs to be examined in the same manner that
interactions involving United States forces were examined in
this study. Different countries can have different command
and control philosophies, and face different strategic and
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tactical environments in crises. Additional research in
these areas would broaden the applicability of the theory of
stratified interaction.
Closing Remarks
In summary, the theory of stratified interaction
provides a policy-relevant explanatory theory of crisis
military interaction. The contingent generalizations
derived from the theory provide differentiated explanations
for a variety of crisis military interactions, thus allowing
policymakers to diagnose specific situations in which crisis
management and crisis stability problems can arise. The
theory thus advances the study of crisis management beyond
identification of crisis management requirements to identify
the manner in which those requirements apply in specific
crisis situations. The method of structured focused
comparison, which provides an inductive approach to theory
formulation based on historical case studies, is a valuable
methodology. It is particularly appropriate for the
formulation of a differentiated theory cast in the form of
contingent generalizations. Further studies using this
method to examine crisis military operations would broaden
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